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ABSTRACT 
In 2003, ASEAN issued the Bali Concord II. In this declaration, ASEAN set the goal of 
creating the people-oriented ASEAN Community (AC) by 2015. The ASEAN Political-
Security Community (APSC) is a pillar of the AC. The APSC’s blueprint addressed several 
security issues that are central to ASEAN’s own objectives, which are prominent in the 
ASEAN Charter and which play no less an important role in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural 
Community (ASCC). However, although ASEAN has pledged to address these security issues, 
many Southeast Asians continue to suffer from significant security threats. This study will 
explore why ASEAN has not brought adequate security to the region’s peoples despite 
ASEAN’s decision to create the people-oriented APSC. 
The research question guiding this study is simple, but no comprehensive answer is 
readily forthcoming because so diverse a population of actors and security issues has been 
involved in the creation of the APSC. Hence, rather than adopt a traditional state-centric 
approach, this study starts from the human-security concept to explore the creation of the 
APSC. I argue that traditional state-centric approaches have failed to rigorously explore 
security issues in Southeast Asia, owing to discrepancies between the state-centric approaches 
and Southeast Asian security culture. The human-security concept discursively embraces both 
the diversity of threats in the world and the wisdom of having diverse actors address these 
diverse threats. Because the human-security concept is not a theoretical approach, I 
endeavour in this study to transform the concept into a theory before embarking on an 
exploration of the ongoing effort to create the APSC. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, 
LITERATURE REVIEW, AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Research Background 
In October 2003, leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)1 issued the 
Bali Concord II (ASEAN Concord II) at the 9th ASEAN Summit, held in Bali. This concord 
manifested ASEAN’s decision to create the ASEAN Community (AC), founded on three 
pillars: the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), 
and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).  
Since issuing the Bali Concord II in 2003, ASEAN has been developing the AC in 
preparation for its actual establishment. At the 11th ASEAN Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur in 
December 2005, ASEAN decided to establish the ASEAN Charter, which would serve as the 
legal and institutional framework for the AC. At the 12th ASEAN Summit, held in the 
Philippines in January 2007, ASEAN leaders agreed to push forward the realisation of the AC 
from 2020 to 2015. In 2008, ASEAN declared at the 13th ASEAN Summit that the ASC 
would henceforth be the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), and in December of 
that year, ASEAN members ratified the ASEAN Charter and entered it into force. In the 
ASEAN Charter, ASEAN pledged to “promote a people-oriented ASEAN” (ASEAN, 2007: 
18-24). From 2008 to 2009, the ASEAN Secretariat published the blueprints of the APSC, the 
AEC, and the ASCC.  Tommy Koh, who is Ambassador-at-Large at Singapore’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, predicted the course of ASEAN development after ASEAN members’ 
ratification of the ASEAN Charter: 
 
Our ten economies [ASEAN members] are progressively being integrated into a single 
economy which will enable us to compete more effectively with China and India. At the 
same time, ASEAN is also evolving into a security community and a socio-cultural 
community. With the adoption of the Charter, ASEAN could reinvent itself into a more 
rational, coherent and dynamic organization. (Koh, 2008: 11) 
 
The APSC is both an important and a unique pillar in the AC. The importance centres 
                                                 
1
 ASEAN was established in 1967 by its original members Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. Brunei and Vietnam joined the association in 1984 and 1995 respectively. Laos and Myanmar joined 
in 1997, and the latest member—Cambodia—joined in 1999. 
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on ASEAN’s plan for the APSC to address issues directly linked to people’s living standards, 
dignity, safety, and security (please see Table 1.1). Thus, the APSC is an essential pillar in 
terms of ASEAN’s stated goal of becoming a “people-oriented” association. The APSC’s 
uniqueness is rooted in the APSC’s intimate links to the ASCC and the ASEAN Charter. In 
the blueprint of the APSC, ASEAN pledged to address non-traditional security issues 
(ASEAN, 2009a: 12) and promoted human rights, but in practice, ASEAN embedded most of 
them in the ASCC (please see Table 1.1). In addition, the APSC states that it “shall promote 
political development in adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good 
governance, respect for and promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as inscribed in the ASEAN Charter” (ASEAN, 2009a: 1-2). Thus, whether or not 
ASEAN can successfully create the APSC hinges on the extent to which ASEAN addresses 
non-traditional security issues in the ASCC and adheres to the ASEAN Charter.  
 
Table 1.1 The issues targeted for collaborative discussion and action by ASEAN 
The AC’s 
Two Pillars 
The Issues related to these two pillars 
APSC 
governance, human rights, corruption, democracy, South China Sea, 
maritime cooperation, conflict management and conflict resolution, 
post-conflict peace-building, humanitarian assistance, non-
traditional security issues (e.g., drug and human trafficking, 
terrorism, illicit small arms and light weapons, and cyber crimes) 
ASCC 
education, human-resource development, decent work, information 
and communication technology (ICT), science & technology (S&T), 
entrepreneurial skills for vulnerable people, civil-service 
capabilities, poverty, food security and safety, healthcare and 
healthy lifestyles, communicable diseases, drug problems, natural-
disaster management, rights and welfare of vulnerable people, 
environmental sustainability, ASEAN identity, ASEAN cultural 
heritage, and narrowing the development gap 
        Sources: the blueprints of the APSC and the ASCC 
 
Why is the APSC one of the pillars in the AC? Two motivations underlie ASEAN’s 
efforts to create the APSC. The first motivation concerns ASEAN’s goal of increasing its 
capacity to address security issues. Between ASEAN’s inception in 1967 and the early 1990s, 
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ASEAN members sought to manage regional security issues by adopting the principle of non-
interference and the principle of non-use of force (Acharya, 2009b: 99-143), which ASEAN 
embedded in two important documents: 1976’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia (abbreviated as TAC) and adopted ASEAN Way (i.e., ASEAN members’ commitment to 
the non-binding character of member decisions and to the importance of informal 
consultation and diplomacy among members). ASEAN’s mediation in the Cambodian 
conflict is an example of ASEAN’s adherence to TAC and the ASEAN Way. Because 
Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia in late 1978 breached ASEAN’s principle of 
non-interference, the association set out to defend the principle by calling for Vietnam’s 
immediate withdrawal from Cambodia (ASEAN, June 28-30, 1979, ASEAN, June 25-26, 
1980). In addition, ASEAN used the ASEAN Way to help resolve the Cambodian conflict. 
Notable, ASEAN sought to attract Vietnam back to the negotiating table through the creative 
use of informal meetings, sometimes referred to as “cocktail diplomacy” (Acharya, 2009b: 
113). As argued by many scholars possessing authoritative knowledge of Southeast Asia’s 
security issues, ASEAN’s practical adoption of the principle of non-interference and non-use 
of force and the ASEAN Way has helped avert serious inter-state conflicts between ASEAN 
members (Busse, 1999: 53-5, Sharpe, 2003, Acharya, 1997: 328-33). 
However, despite successes in the Cold War period, ASEAN’s capacity to address 
security issues gradually declined from 1997. The association began contending with such 
treats as regional economic turmoil, transnational crime (particularly terrorism and human 
and drug trafficking), outbreaks of epidemiological diseases, and natural disasters. These 
threats have at best degraded people’s living standards and have at worst claimed people’s 
lives. From the perspective of many ASEAN governments, the most serious consequence of 
these insecurities have tended to be the possibility that a given government would suffer 
either diminished power or indeed a thorough fall from power. Interestingly, neither the 
principle of non-interference nor the ASEAN Way has addressed those insecurities (Bellamy 
and Drummond, 2011: 186). Instead, both the principle of non-interference and the ASEAN 
Way have compounded these insecurities (see sections 6.1.1.1.1, 6.1.1.1.2, and 6.1.1.2.1). 
The international community and academic circles have started questioning ASEAN’s 
problem-solving capacity. In order to improve its capacity for addressing insecurities, 
ASEAN has decided since 2003 to transform itself into a more institutionalised association 
through the creation of the APSC. 
The second motivation underlying ASEAN’s efforts to create the APSC concerns 
ASEAN’s desire to strengthen its regional influence (Collins, 2013: 63). In the late 1980s, 
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ASEAN enhanced its influence in East Asia, by means primarily of economic and political 
factors. Economically, ASEAN members experienced remarkable growth during this period. 
As can be seen from Table 1.2, from 1980 to 1993, the growth of the original ASEAN 
members’ gross domestic product (GDP) except for the Philippines, ranged from 6.9% to 
8.1%. From 1989 to 1993, the average growth of the GDP in ASEAN members exceeded 
over 8% (again except for the Philippines). ASEAN also prepared to achieve regional 
economic integration during this same period of time. In January 1992, ASEAN members 
proposed creating the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) at the 4th ASEAN Summit, held in 
Singapore. According to the proposal, ASEAN’s members would shift to liberal market 
economies comprising over 500 million populations. Politically during the late 1980 and the 
late 1990s, ASEAN notched several triumphs, including participation in the successful 
mediation of the Cambodian conflict in 1989. In addition, in 1994, with the support of 
Australia, Japan, and China, ASEAN created the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),2 which 
was the first regional platform in East Asia to discuss security issues. No less important is the 
fact that external countries regarded ASEAN as an important actor in Southeast Asia. Thus, 
external countries subsequently sought chances to strengthened economic and political 
relations with ASEAN. 
Despite the aforementioned successes, a series of insecurities beginning in the 1990s 
revealed ASEAN’s inability to address certain challenges and gave the Chinese government 
an opportunity to extend its influence in Southeast Asia. When ASEAN was beset by 
challenges that emerged in the late 1990s, China strengthened its economic and diplomatic 
weight. China has since become the “big boss” in Southeast Asia (Dosch, 2007). 
Economically, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar have become recipients of significant Chinese 
assistance, and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have 
vigorously sought Chinese investment. Politically, ASEAN has become dependent on China 
as a ‘catalyst’ for strengthened regional security cooperation regarding such matters as non-
traditional security issues (Arase, 2010) and disputes over the South China Sea (Dosch, 2007). 
                                                 
2
 In 1994, ASEAN created ARF, which ahs functioned as the first multilateral dialogue framework addressing 
political and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. There have been, so far, twenty-eight participants. ARF 
has served to enhance regional stability and to ease mutual suspicion through regular meetings and political 
dialogue. Its norms and principles are based on TAC and the ASEAN Way, and all ASEAN members 
periodically occupy ARF’s Chair. Within ARF, the instruments for achieving regional peace and stability involve 
various confidence-building measures (CBMs), the preventive diplomacy (PD), and elaborations of approaches 
to conflicts. 
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ASEAN’s regional profile was declining influence from the late 1990s forward, while China 
was expanding its influence in Southeast Asia. In order to redress its own ebbing power, 
ASEAN in 2003 decided to strengthen its members’ cooperation with one another through the 
further integration of their political and security systems. 
 
Table 1.2 Original ASEAN members’ GDP performance between 1980 and 1993 (%) 
Year / 
Nations 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
1980 8.7 7.4 5.1 10.0 5.2 
1981 8.1 6.9 3.4 10.7 5.9 
1982 1.1 5.9 3.6 7.2 5.4 
1983 8.4 6.3 1.9 8.5 5.6 
1984 7.2 7.8 -7.3 8.8 5.8 
1985 3.5 -1.1 -7.3 -0.7 4.6 
1986 6.0 1.2 3.4 1.3 5.5 
1987 5.3 5.4 4.3 10.8 9.5 
1988 6.4 9.9 6.8 11.1 13.3 
1989 9.1 9.1 6.2 10.2 12.2 
1990 9.0 9.0 3.0 10.0 11.2 
1991 8.9 9.5 -0.6 6.7 8.6 
1992 7.2 8.9 0.3 7.1 8.1 
1993 7.3 9.9 2.1 11.5 8.3 
Average 6.9 6.9 1.8 7.8 8.1 
       Sources: http://www.worldbank.org/ 
 
In order to create the APSC, ASEAN has accepted assistance from external state actors, 
including, Australia, China, Japan, and the United States, and external multi-state actors, 
including the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). In addition, ASEAN has 
provided civil society organisations (CSOs) opportunities to present recommendations to the 
association. Under ASEAN’s efforts and with outside assistance, ASEAN has achieved 
several targets (please see Table 1.3).  
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Table 1.3 ASEAN’s achieved targets regarding diverse issues 
Issues The targets that ASEAN has achieved 
Human rights and 
people’s dignity 
• Issued the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (January 
2007) 
• Created the regional human-rights body known as 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (AICHR) (October 2009) 
• Created the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Women and Children 
(ACWC) (April 2010) 
• Issued the Declaration on the Enhancement of Welfare 
and Development of ASEAN Women and Children 
(October 2010) 
• Issued the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Role 
and Participation of the Persons with Disabilities in 
ASEAN Community (November 2011) 
• Issued the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
(November 2012) 
Transnational crimes 
• Issued the ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in 
Persons Particularly Women and Children (November 
2004) 
• Issued the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism 
(January 2007) 
• Issued the Declaration on Drug-Free ASEAN 2015 (April 
2012) 
Natural-disaster 
management 
• Signed the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management 
and Emergency Response (AADMER) (July 2005) 
• Created the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for 
Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA 
Centre) (November 2011) 
Pandemic diseases 
• Issued the ASEAN Declaration of Commitment: Getting 
to Zero New HIV Infections, Zero Discrimination, Zero 
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AIDS-Related Deaths (November 2011) 
Poverty 
• Cooperating with external state-actors to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
Conflict management 
• Created the ASEAN Institute for Peace and 
Reconciliation (AIPR) (December 2013) 
Infrastructure 
development 
• Created physical connections among ASEAN members in 
the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (December 
2010) 
       Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
1.2 Research Purpose 
The research background suggests that the creation of the APSC will help improve Southeast 
Asians’ living standards, Southeast Asians’ dignity, and Southeast Asians’ safety and security. 
Unfortunately, in the APSC-building process, ASEAN has strayed far from its possible 
incarnation as a people-oriented regional body. Myriad examples strongly suggest that 
ASEAN has much distance to cover before reaching its self-proclaimed people-oriented 
objectives: people in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam have suffered from land-grabbing; ethnic 
minorities in Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam have suffered from widespread persecution; the 
regional haze problem spawned by Indonesian bushfires has had measurably negative short-
term and long-term consequences for vast swaths of people (mainly in Brunei, Malaysia, and 
Singapore); the Rohingya minority in Myanmar’s Rakhine state have endured discrimination, 
executions, and torture at the hands of the Myanmar government; people in riparian countries 
downstream of the Mekong have suffered from environmental degradation. Most of the 
aforementioned problems, despite having persisted since the 1950s, have become 
substantially more serious since 2003, when ASEAN began preparing for the establishment 
of the APSC. With these growing problems in mind, let us now consider the three central sets 
of research questions that have guided the current study and that, together, help clarify the 
main research purpose of this study: 
(1) To grasp the first set of research questions, let us quickly review a handful of 
important points. In 2003, ASEAN decided to create the APSC, and during the APSC-
building process, ASEAN has been addressing several security issues, such as transnational 
crime, human rights, poverty, disease, and natural disasters, and has achieved several related 
targets that ASEAN set in the blueprints of the APSC and the ASCC.  Hence, the first set of 
research questions: Why have some security issues either worsened or at best failed to 
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improve? Given ASEAN’s efforts, have Southeast Asian people perceived a tangible 
improvement in their living standards, in respect for their dignity, and in their safety and 
security? If the answer to the previous question is negative, then what are the barriers to 
success in this endeavour? Have the barriers resulted from ASEAN and its members? Or have 
the barriers resulted from Southeast Asians themselves?  
(2) Individual states (most notably Australia, China, Japan, and the U.S.) and 
multilateral organisations (most notably the EU and the UN) have been involved in the 
creation of the APSC: they have expressed their support for and have provided assistance to 
the creation of the APSC. So why exactly have they wanted to be involved in the creation of 
the APSC? How have they been involved in the creation of the APSC? What assistance have 
they provided? Has their assistance benefited Southeast Asians?  
(3) ASEAN has officially provided CSOs a space where they can participate in the 
APSC-building process. Two central questions follow from this fact: How have CSOs been 
involved in the creation of the APSC? And what have CSOs contributed to the creation of the 
APSC?  
Comprehensive answers to these research questions are by no means forthcoming, in 
large part because of the questions’ complexity. The first complexity is that the creation of the 
APSC has mainly addressed not traditional security issues like inter-state conflicts but issues 
directly related to Southeast Asians’ safety and well-being. The second complexity is that not 
only state actors but also non-state actors and individuals have been involved in the creation 
of the APSC. Even, the mainstream international relations (IR) theories that usually help 
scholars explore security issues in Southeast Asia cannot serve as a proper foundation for 
analyses of this issue. In the present study’s literature review, I will explore why mainstream 
IR theories are simply not up to the task of framing rigorous academic inquiries into the 
creation of the APSC. 
In this study, I hypothesise that, if ASEAN creates the APSC (most likely by 2015), the 
APSC will stand a good chance of not functioning properly, even though democratic ASEAN 
members, external powers, and multi-state actors have supported the creation of the APSC. 
Standing in the way of the APSC’s proper functioning are four barriers: Southeast Asian 
people’s ignorance of the AC; non-democratic ASEAN members’ reluctance to adhere to the 
provisions in the APSC and the ASCC; the embedding of ASEAN’s modus operandi in the 
blueprint of the APSC; and ASEAN’s obstruction of CSO input in the creation of the APSC.  
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1.3 Literature Review 
Mainstream theories in IR have been an important research approach for scholars studying 
security issues in Southeast Asia. However, the capacity of mainstream IR theories to 
facilitate rigorous explorations of Southeast Asian security issues has diminished over time. I 
argue here that mainstream IR theories are not suitable for rigorous examinations of the 
APSC. In this section, I will explicate the foundations of mainstream IR theories and scholars’ 
application of these theories to Southeast Asian security issues. Next, I will identify the 
factors constraining these IR theories’ capacity to facilitate analyses of Southeast Asian 
security issues and explain why mainstream IR theories cannot satisfactorily aid serious 
research pertaining to the APSC’s creation. 
 
1.3.1 Mainstream Theories in Southeast Asian IR Research: Realism and Constructivism3 
Realism and constructivism are two among several major mainstream IR theories underlying 
scholars’ exploration of Southeast Asian security issues. Realism dominated the analytical 
framework for studies about Southeast Asian security issues from the early Cold War period 
to about the early post-Cold War period. Constructivism overtook realism as the predominant 
theoretical approach to studying Southeast Asian security issues between the closing years of 
the Cold War and the late 2000s. In this section, I will briefly introduce realism and 
constructivism, including their respective discursive foundations and arguments. The analysis 
will focus on Michael Leifer’s and Amitav Acharya’s writings, because these two individuals 
pioneered the use of realism and constructivism respectively. 
 
                                                 
3
 This study excludes discussion of neo-liberal institutionalism. There are three reasons for this exclusion. First, 
neo-liberal institutionalism emerged in Southeast Asian IR research as a research approach during only a short 
window of time, from the early 1990s to before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1997—a period much 
shorter than realism’s forty-year involvement (from the 1950s to the 1990s) and constructivism’s nearly twenty-
years involvement (from the 1990s to the late 2000s). Second, when neo-liberal institutionalism emerged in 
Southeast Asian IR research, realism was still a dominant research approach; that is neo-liberal institutionalism 
did not replace or even threaten realism’s mainstream academic position in the Southeast Asian IR research field. 
For example, many established scholars at the time relied exclusively on realism to explore the pressing issues 
surrounding the South China Sea (Buszynski, 2002). Third, neo-liberal institutionalism did not trigger academic 
debate, in stark contrast to the highly productive debates that took place between proponents of realism and 
proponents of constructivism. Against this backdrop, neo-liberal institutionalism—though it was a notable 
research approach in the Southeast Asian IR literature—never attained the status of a mainstream theory in the 
field. Thus, I have excluded it from my discussion of IR theories in the current study. 
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1.3.1.1 Discourses and Arguments of Mainstream Theories 
1.3.1.1.1 The Realism Approach: Michael Leifer 
Realism has been the most durable theory in the IR field. In realism discourse, states are the 
main actors in anarchic world (Waltz, 1979: 95), where invasion by other states is probable if 
unmitigated cooperation is unlikely, unless two or more states are galvanised around common 
challenges or concerns. Therefore, in order to avoid being invaded, a state’s first aim is not 
the improvement of its people’s well-being, but national survival (Grieco, 1988: 498). The 
most effective means of survival is for states to strengthen their internal material factors, such 
as military defense, to the maximum capacity possible—this is known as the doctrine of self-
help (Waltz, 1979: 111). However, when states over-enhance their material capabilities, a 
security dilemma among nations is ineluctable (Jervis, 1976: 64) and security dilemma can be 
managed only through a balance of power (Morgenthau, 1949: 181-215). Realism, put simply, 
posits that the anarchical nature of international society requires states to strengthen their 
material factors and seek a balance of power if the states are to survive.  
In Southeast Asian IR studies, the best known realist thinker is Michael Leifer. 
Discussions about IR theories, however, are rare in Leifer’s research essays, nor do the essays 
exemplify a direct application of realism theory to Southeast Asian security phenomena 
(Haacke, 2005: 50). Ralf Emmers, who gained his PhD under Leifer’s supervision, stated that 
“Leifer was less trying to make a contribution to the IR theory debate than he was to making 
a contribution to the study of the international relations of Southeast Asia.”4 In fact, Leifer’s 
research was dependent on participatory field studies within ASEAN-related circles and on 
informal interviews with officials and diplomats (Khong, 2005: 24). Even so, Amitav 
Acharya, whose theoretical stance stands in stark contrast to that of Leifer, has argued that 
Leifer’s perspective was “never self-consciously theoretical” and called his analytical 
approach “classical” rather than “scientific”. However, Emmers did agree that Leifer was 
predominantly a realist.5 The main reason underlying Emmers decision to categorise Leifer as 
a realist was Leifer’s interest in power distribution. Emmers stated that “he [Michael Leifer] 
was not so interested in the great powers, he was much more interested in the smaller 
countries in Southeast Asia but he did assume that power and power distribution were very 
important variables in international relations.”6 Except Emmers, Leifer is widely regarded as 
                                                 
4
 Interview in Singapore, January 18, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei 
5
 Interview in Singapore, January 18, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei 
6
 Interview in Singapore, January 18, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei 
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a realist by scholars who have devoted their work to the debate between realism and 
constructivism in Southeast Asian IR (Batabyal, 2004, Busse, 1999, Eaton and Stubbs, 2006, 
Khong, 1997, Peou, 2002, Haacke, 2005). In short, Leifer has been classified as a realist, 
because his writings are underpinned largely by realist concepts, in particular the concept of 
the balance of power. 
 
1.3.1.1.2 Unlikely Multilateral-Cooperation and the Balance of Power 
Two realist concepts can be identified in Leifer’s corpus. The first is that effective 
cooperation, especially multilateral cooperation, among Southeast Asian countries seems 
unlikely, owing to an absence of common strategic perspectives among these countries 
(Leifer, 1966, Leifer, 1973, Leifer, 1992, Leifer, 1999a: 31-2, Leifer, 2000a). Like other 
realists, Leifer acknowledged not only the threat of international anarchy (Leifer, 1996: 57), 
but also the salience of material factors (Leifer, 1983: 103). At the same time, however, Leifer 
did not regard the absence of a common inter-state government or the presence of a security 
dilemma as the sole cause of difficulty plaguing inter-state cooperation. His arguments seem 
to rest on the assumption that regional historical legacy, such as entrenched feuds and long-
running competition over territory (Leifer, 1980: 11-3), had been and would remain the main 
factor in the divergence of views among member nations (Khong, 2005: 207, Leifer, 1975: 
278, Leifer, 1980: 4-13, Peou, 2002: 129). Additionally, in Leifer’s analysis, most leaders of 
Southeast Asian countries believed that cooperation might lead a neighbouring state to 
interfere in their own countries’ domestic affairs, thereby compounding the difficulty of 
cooperation (Leifer, 1980). Therefore, leaders unsurprisingly eschewed the adoption of 
multilateral cooperation in order to maintain complete sovereignty and autonomy. It is 
interesting to note that Leifer disagreed with David Mitrany’s concept of functionalism. 
Functionalism dictates that states can cooperate on less sensitive issues at first, in areas like 
the economy and culture, before moving toward more serious issues, such as politics and 
security. This cooperation process is known as a “spill-over.” In the case of Southeast Asia, 
however, Leifer argued that regional states showed little willingness to cooperate on 
straightforward issues, let alone collaboration on more sensitive issues (Leifer, 1975: 278-83). 
Leifer’s other realist notion is the balance of power. His use of the idea to explain 
Southeast Asian security issues, however, has drawn out both discussion and criticism 
(Acharya, 2005, Eaton and Stubbs, 2006, Haacke, 2003, Khong, 1997, Peou, 2002: 125-30). 
According to Leifer’s realist argument, given severe intra-regional differences, countries 
facing direct challenges or potential concerns are unlikely to embrace multilateral 
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cooperation. Nevertheless, in the past, many regional states were badly in need of national 
stability, since they worried that the aggressiveness of any given state was a threat to their 
own national survival. Insofar as multilateral-cooperation was unlikely, bilateral cooperation 
based on the principle of balance of power became the primary option for regional states. 
Balance of power requires that all sides have shared goals or that they can achieve individual 
national interests through proposed cooperation. In Leifer’s series of Southeast Asian security 
texts, he used examples to prove that many countries in the region cooperated with 
neighbouring countries or external powers using the principle of balance of power. For 
example, in the 1960s, the governments in Singapore and Malaysia as embryonic independent 
states subscribed to the operative notion that British presence on their territory was beneficial 
to their own national security and stability, since deployment of British troops there could 
mitigate potential concerns (Leifer, 1966: 220-1). In 1977, Malaysia and Thailand engaged in 
military cooperation because they faced a common threat from the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP), which was supported by the Chinese Communist regime (Leifer, 1992: 381). 
Indonesia’s acceptance of the United States as an informal defence partner, and India as a 
formal ASEAN dialogue partner, exemplifies the Indonesian balance-of-power policy against 
the rising power of China (Leifer, 1999b: 102). By the same logic, Singapore’s vulnerability 
in terms of natural resources and geographical proximity (Singapore being located between 
Malaysia and Indonesia) prompted the country’s leadership to support the United States’ 
influential presence in Southeast Asia (Leifer, 2000b: 100-8). 
 
1.3.1.1.3 The Constructivism Approach: Amitav Acharya 
Constructivism is the alternative to realism in IR theory. Like realism, constructivism treats 
the state as an important actor in world affairs. Alexander Wendt argued that one of the main 
principles of constructivism is that “states are the principal units of analysis for inter-national 
political theory” (Wendt, 1994: 385). In addition, Martha Finnemore’s constructivism 
argument—“states are socialized to accept new norms, values, and perceptions of interest by 
international organizations” (Finnemore, 1996: 5)—is based on the approach that treats states 
as the basic analytical unit (Finnemore, 1996).  However, unlike realism’s claim that the 
world is essentially in a state of anarchy, constructivism argues that anarchy is not immutable 
but “what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992). Under this theory, states’ interactions fall into the 
categories of enmity, rivalry, and friendship, or Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures 
(Wendt, 1999: 246-312). Against this backdrop, hostility and cooperation can be seen in the 
interactions between countries. Therefore, studying states’ behaviour or national interests via 
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material factors is insufficient. Also of importance are ideational factors: norms and identities. 
Norms help states “to distinguish between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behaviour” (Acharya, 
2009b: 26, see also Kratochwill, 1989: 70), which can reduce uncertainty among states (Hopf, 
1998: 178), and identities allow states to determine “who I am/ who we are” (Wendt, 1994: 
385), which can help knit states together. 
Constructivism is the other important approach in Southeast Asian IR. The study of 
Southeast Asian security issues focuses specifically on ideational factors: norms and 
identities. Scholars have used norms and identities to explore security and diplomatic issues 
in Southeast Asia. For example, Nikolas Busse argues that ASEAN’s successful management 
of the Cambodian conflict stemmed in large measure from ASEAN’s decision to adopt TAC, 
which has become ASEAN’s norms for addressing regional security issues (Busse, 1999: 48-
51). Likewise, Nguyễn Vũ Tùng explains that one of the key points promoting the 
Vietnamese government to join ASEAN was its norm known commonly as the principle of 
non-interference (Tùng, 2007). Sarah Eaton and Richard Stubbs’ essay argues that ASEAN is 
a powerful regional organisation because of its diffuse norms: namely, TAC and the Zone of 
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Realism posits that power comes from strong 
material capabilities compelling other actors to do what they would otherwise be unwilling to 
do, and yet, ASEAN as a body has significantly smaller material forces at its disposal than 
does China, India, or certainly the United States. However, external powers accept and follow 
ASEAN’s norms. The ratification of TAC by China, India, Japan, and South Korea 
exemplifies the success of ASEAN in this regard (Eaton and Stubbs, 2006).  
It is reasonable to argue that Amitav Acharya,7 the prolific writer on Southeast Asian 
                                                 
7
 Some may argue that Acharya is an anti-state centrist scholar. Acharya and Richard have argued that, although 
the “state is a first point of reference,” it is not “the only or ultimately the most important actor” (Acharya and 
Stubbs, 2006: 132). In addition, Acharya also suggested that, in the realm of Southeast Asian IR, we should pay 
considerably more attention to the woods (i.e., a region) than to the trees (i.e., states) (Acharya, 2005: 106). 
Indeed, on the face of it, Acharya comes across as a researcher who has promoted a holistic approach to 
Southeast Asian security issues. What is more, none of his works pay particular attention to the policies and 
strategies of individual states. However, this observation is not to say that states are insignificant in his works. 
Instead and indeed, states are desiderata. The ASEAN Way exemplifies the critical role played by states in his 
works. As discussed previously, the ASEAN Way reflects a set of principles underlying ASEAN’s norms and 
identities—principles that arose from Indonesian villages and were accepted by ASEAN members as 
constituting the negotiation model optimal for addressing diverse security problems. This fact leads to the 
following question: if ASEAN members were to resist the ASEAN Way as the optimal model for negotiations, 
would the strength of ASEAN’s norms and identities come into question? The answer is impossible to answer 
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norms and identities, typifies the mainstream perspectives of constructivist researchers in the 
field of Southeast Asian IR (Acharya, 2009b, Acharya, 2005, Acharya, 2009a, Acharya, 2000, 
Acharya, 1997, Acharya, 1998b, Acharya, 1998a, Acharya, 2004b). In the context of 
Southeast Asian security research, Acharya’s work is antithetical to Leifer’s, although the 
positions of both authors are consistent with each other regarding the argument that intra-
regional differences in both Southeast Asia (Acharya, 2009b: 54) and East Asia (Acharya, 
1997: 322) have resulted in unlikely multilateral cooperation. Another point of agreement 
between the two authors’ arguments is that other states’ aggressive policies and behaviors 
constitute the most pressing national-security concern (Acharya, 1999). However, in contrast 
to Leifer’s distinct pessimism, Acharya argues that the foundation of optimism characterising 
ASEAN can successfully counter seemingly insurmountable difficulties (Acharya, 1997: 320-
4). 
 
1.3.1.1.4 The Concept of Norms and Identities 
According to Acharya, the principles of non-use of force and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of an independent country constitute ASEAN’s fundamental norms. These norms have 
been “a code of conduct for inter-state behaviours” (Acharya, 1997: 328), which can be found 
in the provisions of TAC (ASEAN, February 24, 1976b), initially ratified by the original five 
ASEAN members in 1976. The norms have guided ASEAN’s handling of regional problems, 
in particular security and political issues. Again, according Acharya, the non-use of force is 
that ASEAN peacefully settle regional problems (Acharya, 2009b: 58-61) and the principle of 
non-interference requires that member-states (1) refrain “from criticising the actions of a 
member government towards its own people”; (2) criticise “the actions of states which were 
deemed to have breached the non-interference principle”; (3) deny “recognition, sanctuary, or 
other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilise or overthrow the government 
of a neighbouring state”; and (4) provide “political support and material assistance to member 
states in their campaign against subversive and destabilising activities” (Acharya, 2009b: 72). 
Acharya regarded Vietnam’s military intervention in Kampuchea in November 1978 “as a 
gross violation of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states as well as 
the principle of non-use of force in interstate relations” (Acharya, 2009b: 116). Thus, ASEAN 
                                                                                                                                                        
because states are the most basic building blocks in support of norm-and-identity creation. Without states’ 
unanimous acceptance of a model, the development of norms and identities within Southeast Asia would 
necessarily fail. Therefore, despite Acharya’s emphasis on the woods, the trees remain the underpinning of his 
writings. Without trees, Acharya’s academic discourse on constructivism would likely never have taken shape. 
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actively played mediator in the Cambodian conflict. For example, ASEAN members adopted 
“Cocktail Diplomacy,” which allowed the Vietnamese and Cambodian factions to sit around a 
table and discuss the situation (Acharya, 2009b: 112-3).  
 Also, Acharya regards ASEAN’s consensual and informal decision-making process as 
part of ASEAN’s identity. ASEAN’s decision-making process has followed the principles of 
informality and consultation (musyawarah) and consensus (mufakat) stemming from the 
informal, relaxed discussion process of Javanese village society (Acharya, 2009a: 82). The 
purpose of informality is to create a comfortable meeting environment where member states 
can cooperate with one another. It is hardly surprising, then, that ASEAN members avoid 
both publicly identifying who is a threat or a concern (Acharya, 1997: 336, Acharya, 1998b: 
61, Acharya, 1999: 131) and discussing sensitive issues among fellow members (Acharya, 
1997: 332). From these facts, it is reasonable to imagine that a military alliance in Southeast 
Asia would be unlikely (Acharya, 1997: 331). Under the model of consultation and consensus, 
moreover, every state’s interests are considered and each perspective expressed, because 
decision-making does not require unanimity (Acharya, 1998b: 62-3). An even more important 
facet of this issue is that, in the effort to achieve the lowest common denominator or 
agreement, ASEAN members usually negotiate with each other before engaging with external 
powers on sensitive security issues. This tactic can weaken intra-regional differences between 
Southeast Asian countries, which result in unlikely instances of multilateral cooperation 
(Acharya, 1998b: 63). 
 
1.3.1.2 The Two Theories’ Gradually Reduced Capacity to Facilitate Analysis of Southeast 
Asian Security Issues 
Realism and constructivism have become mainstream theories among scholars whose 
interests are Southeast Asian security issues, the two most prominent of which are regional 
security affairs (Simon, 1992, Emmers, 2005b, Buszynski, 1990, Busse, 1999) and security 
relations with external powers (particularly the relationships between ASEAN and China) (Ba, 
2006, Dosch, 2007, Stubbs, 2008, Buszynski, 2002). In addition, adherents to realism and 
adherents to constructivism have had intense debates regarding Southeast Asian security 
issues (Acharya, 2005, Jones and Smith, 2002, Khong, 1997, Khong, 2005, Khoo, 2004). 
Although realism and constructivism have successfully helped explain Southeast Asian 
security issues, the capacity of these two theories to facilitate rigorous explorations of 
security issues has come into question. I argue that the main cause of the two theories’ 
declining popularity has to do with discrepancies between each of the two theories, taken 
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singly, and actual Southeast Asian security culture. In the next section, I will explore why 
these theories can help researchers rigorously analyse Southeast Asian security issues dating 
from the period between the 1950s and the late 1990s, but why these same theories are less 
than adequate for analysing the same types of issues as they have emerged in more recent 
years. 
 
1.3.1.2.1 Theoretical Discourse in Line with Security Culture in Southeast Asia8 
Realism and constructivism have successfully helped explain Southeast Asian security issues 
because each theory has been notably applicable to the region’s security culture. From the 
Cold War period to the late 1990s, security culture in Southeast Asia was state-centric. 
During this time, regional states adopted a comprehensive security approach—particularly in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. According to basic assumptions about comprehensive 
security, national insecurities stem not only from the military development and aggressive 
policies of other states, but also from economic and social instability on the domestic front 
(Emmers, 2009: 161). States concluded that in order to achieve national stability, they must 
ensure economic and social development domestically, an objective known as national 
resilience (ketahanan nasional). After states reached their national resilience, emergence of 
regional resilience could be expected (Emmers, 2009: 162).  
At first glance, this concept seems people-oriented, because a region’s nations would 
treat insecurities extending beyond the scope of military matters and into the realm of 
people’s well-being and security (Nishikawa, 2010: 55). In fact, comprehensive security was 
still state-centric. There were two reasons for this characteristic. First, after ASEAN members 
adopted a comprehensive security approach in 1970, regimes’ leaders remained concerned 
                                                 
8
 So far, although few scholars of security studies have directly define the term “security culture,” it has 
emerged in Jörn Dosch’s and Jürgen Haacke’s research. According to their research, security culture refers to 
states’ ways of calculating the seriousness of diverse kinds of security and of responding particularly to the most 
pressing security issues. This phenomenon is not static but evolving (Dosch, 2003, Haacke, 2003). For example, 
according to Jörn Dosch, Southeast Asian security culture in the Cold War period rested on a general perception 
among regional countries—especially ASEAN members—that “traditional” security issues like the Cambodian 
conflict involved fundamental security threats capable of destabilising national security, and thus, ASEAN 
members used their methods of informal consultation and diplomacy to manage these security issues (Dosch, 
2003: 486-8). However, since the end of the Cold War, this security culture has gradually changed: ASEAN 
members have come to regard non-traditional security issues as important in their own right (Dosch, 2003: 485). 
Given the fact that security culture had gradually changed in Southeast Asia, Jörn Dosch argued that ASEAN 
members had been adopting open and institutionalised ways of handling security issues (Dosch, 2003: 485). 
17 
 
mainly with national-security threats involving other states’ aggressive policies and 
behaviours (Acharya, 2009b: 64). For example, original ASEAN members regarded China as 
a potential concern, because the Chinese government expressed sympathy for Southeast 
Asia’s ethnic Chinese, many of whom had suffered unfair treatment at the hands of local 
governments (Leifer, 1980: 13). In addition, the Chinese government had staked a claim to 
the oil-rich Spratly Islands (Leifer, 1997: 157). These cases prompted ASEAN members to 
suspect the Chinese government of interfering in their domestic affairs and of challenging 
their national sovereignty (Acharya, 2009b: 66, 69). The second reason for comprehensive 
security’s state-centrism had to do with states’ role as the main actors addressing potential 
concerns. States’ preferred methods for addressing these concerns reflected the principles 
guiding the “balance of power” theory and the “development of norms and identities” theory. 
For example, in order to counterbalance the unprecedented rise of China, on the one hand, 
ASEAN members established close military and political relationships with external powers, 
yet on the other hand, ASEAN encouraged the Chinese government to join ARF, whose 
modus operandi had been based on ASEAN’s norms and identities. Thus, I argue that 
although ASEAN members adopted a comprehensive security approach, their main concern 
in the Cold War period remained other countries’ aggressive behaviour, in resistance to which 
only states—not other types of actors—could successfully take action.  
During this period in Southeast Asian security culture, researchers could conduct 
rigorous analyses of security issues on the basis of realism and constructivism because the 
two theories are identical to each other—that is, the two theories are state-centric. In Leifer’s 
analysis, states are the source of threats (please see 1.3.1.1.2 section) and states are the only 
actor capable of adequately addressing threats (through skillful applications of balances of 
power and military might). In Acharya’s analysis, the primary source of threats is from state 
and states are the only actor capable of adequately addressing threats (through the 
developments of norms and identities). The difference between Acharya and Leifer lies in 
their views on the methods that states adopt to address state-sourced threats. Because security 
culture in Southeast Asia from the Cold War period to the late 1990s was steeped in a state-
centric discourse, and because the analytical frameworks of realism and constructivism have 
always been state-centric approaches, both realism and constructivism were—and remain—
roundly applicable to research on related security issues dating from this period.  
 
1.3.1.2.2 A Theoretical Discourse Out of Step with Security Culture in Recent Southeast Asia 
State-centric security culture has gradually changed since 1997. Incidents including the 1997 
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financial meltdown, the deadly terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, subsequent 
terrorist attacks in Indonesia, the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
in 2003, and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 have served as catalysts for this change 
(Acharya, 2007: 22-6, Dosch, 2003: 489-93). These crises led to crippling fiscal problems, 
greater income disparities, and widespread unemployment. These calamities severely affected 
individuals and countries. In addition, many countries in Southeast Asia were being beset by 
transnational crimes, like drug trafficking, human trafficking, and serious environmental 
issues, which individually and cumulatively degraded people’s quality of life. Therefore, with 
all of these myriad and untested stresses coming to bear, ASEAN members had to start 
paying attention to new security challenges that were qualitatively different from previous 
challenges insofar as the welfare of human beings was becoming a significant focus in the 
ASEAN agenda. 
However, there was a discrepancy between each of the two dominant theories and the 
developing human-centric Southeast Asian security culture. Threats in the new security 
culture ran the gamut from unpredictable phenomena, such as pandemic outbreaks and 
natural disasters, to intractable non-state human threats, such as religious fundamentalists, 
drug traffickers, and warlords, whose networks are typically supra-national. The diverse 
origins of these new threats rocked the foundations of both realism and constructivism, which 
declare that threats arise only from states. In addition, in the new Southeast Asian security 
culture, states are not the only actor to address threats. Solving challenges beyond state 
borders necessitates cooperation with other actors, such as regional, international, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) (Katsumata, 2004: 240-1), because the negative effects 
of these new threats can spread across regions and indeed around the world. Therefore, 
individual states on their own cannot satisfactorily rise to these challenges. For example, after 
2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, individual states, regional and international 
organisations, and NGOs participated in the tasks of aid and reconstruction (Jayasuriya and 
McCawley, 2010). 
The diverse origins of threats have rendered the two theories’ methodological 
foundations essentially ineffective. In the realm of realism, material factors do not provide a 
feasible way of eradicating many related problems. An increase in countries’ material strength 
is by no means a guarantee that they can avoid the negative effects of pressing threats such as 
epidemiological diseases and natural disasters. Moreover, countries need not pursue a balance 
of power to countervail unpredictable phenomena. Instead, countries should cooperate more 
extensively with counterparts, particularly regarding exchanges of information and cross-
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border educational efforts.  
In the realm of constructivism, the establishment of norms and identities cannot 
adequately resolve threats of diverse origins either. When crises spread, most countries find 
themselves in a difficult situation where they must respond immediately and appropriately. 
The chief motivation underlying countries’ cooperation with one another is the need for 
immediate action in response to critical, direct threats. Two examples of such threats are 
SARS, which struck Asian regions in mid-November 2002, and the 2004 Indian Ocean 
earthquake and tsunami. As an aside, it is important to note that ideational factors may 
sometimes compound problems because of the required period of lengthy consultation 
(Elliott, 2003: 45). In cases involving crises, neither norms nor identities are necessary for 
cross-country cooperation, since the impetus for inter-state cooperation is a given problem’s 
degree of urgency rather than ideational factors. 
 
1.3.1.3 Discrepancies between the Mainstream IR Theories and the APSC 
According to the above analysis, I have shown that the capacity of mainstream IR theories to 
facilitate rigorous explorations of Southeast Asian security issues has diminished because of 
discrepancies between each of the two theories and actual Southeast Asian security culture. 
However, it has yet to be explained in precise terms why the mainstream theories are limited 
in exploring specifically the creation of the APSC. 
I argue that the main cause of the two theories’ limitations in this regard is the APSC’s 
status as a product of human-centric security culture in Southeast Asia. The APSC has several 
human-centric features. The first feature is that the target of the creation of the APSC is to 
improve people’s living standards, enhance people’s dignity, and protect people’s safety and 
security. This target indicates that ASEAN has paid attention to Southeast Asian people. The 
second feature is that different actors have been involved in the creation of the APSC. Both 
ASEAN qua regional organisation and ASEAN’s members are absolutely actors involved in 
the creation of the APSC. Also, Australia, China, the EU, Japan, the UN, and the United 
States have offered their support and assistances regarding the creation of the APSC. CSOs 
have been involved, as well, in the creation of the APSC. Thus, the actors participating the 
APSC’s establishment have included—but not been limited to—states. The first and second 
features of the APSC indicate that the creation of the APSC has rested on the participation of 
three tiers of actors: individuals, state actors, and non-state actors. More precisely, individuals’ 
security has been a target of the APSC, and state- and non-state actors have played roles in 
achieving the target. Diverse actors’ involvement in security issues are in line with the 
20 
 
human-centric quality of the current Southeast Asian security culture. The third feature is that 
the insecurities that ASEAN listed in the blueprints of the APSC and ASCC derive not so 
much from states as from unpredictable phenomena and non-state human threats. Likewise, 
in Southeast Asia’s new security culture, the types of threats are various.  
The human-centric qualities of the APSC have pointed to important discrepancies 
between each of the mainstream IR theories and the creation of the APSC. The first 
discrepancy concerns the mainstream IR theories’ nearly exclusive focus on the state. A 
preoccupation with the well-being of human beings, as such, has never been the central theme 
in discourses hailing from the mainstream IR theories: in realism, people’s safety is 
necessarily dependent on their nation’s security (Waltz, 1979); and as for constructivism, it 
emphasises above all else interactions among states and does so on the basis of norms and 
identities (Wendt, 1999). The second discrepancy between the theories and the APSC issue is 
the theories’ assumption that states must be the main actor to address insecurities. Regarding 
this point, I agree that the mainstream IR theories can help explain why state actors have 
decided to be involved in the creation of the APSC. However, one point that we should not 
ignore is that the discourses of the mainstream IR theories have generally omitted non-state 
actors’ role in efforts to address Southeast Asian insecurities.9 Thus, purist applications of 
mainstream IR theories cannot but overlook—or at best neglect—the roles of CSOs in the 
APSC issue. Third, the discourses of the mainstream IR theories identify the origins of threats 
as almost exclusively states. The mainstream IR theories have never prioritised non-state 
threats over state threats. 
It should be noted here that my explanation of realism’s and constructivism’s 
weaknesses in analysing Southeast Asian security issues does not mean that I deny the 
                                                 
9
 It is plainly the case that constructivists—in addressing security issues—have developed a discourse 
concerning non-state actors. For example, Alan Collins agreed with Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett’s 
argument that a security community can best survive, mainly when its members adhere to member-created 
norms and that the more liberal the members are, the more likely the members will be to adhere to the norms 
(Collins, 2013: 19-24). Drawing on Adler and Barnett’s argument, Alan Collins further argued that non-state 
actors’ participation in a security community’s decision-making process is the key factor for determining 
whether members within the security community are liberal or not (Collins, 2013: 25-6). Probably more 
importantly, non-state actors can help address “the plethora of threats that are classified as non-traditional” 
(Collins, 2013: 26). Although constructivism has treated non-state actors as an element essential to addressing 
security issues, the other mainstream IR theory in the Southeast Asian IR area, realism has refrained from 
treating non-state actors as an important discursive element. Neither constructivism nor realism has developed 
theoretical discourses treating individuals as a main actor in security issues.   
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relevance of these theories’ contributions to the Southeast Asian IR area. What I am 
emphasising is that we have to keep our eye on whether or not theories can continue to 
facilitate rigorous analyses of security issues in a fast-changing world. Robert Keohane’s 
argument on this subject can accurately represent my position on the inherent weaknesses of 
mainstream theories. He said, 
  
Since both world politics and our values keep changing, there is no guarantee that even 
a well-tested theory will remain valid in the future. Each proposition of any theory of 
world politics should therefore be scrutinized carefully to ascertain the range of its 
applicability, its robustness under different conditions, and the likelihood of its being 
overtaken by events. (Keohane, 1986: 5) 
 
1.4 Outline of the Study 
In the above section, I have presented evidence suggesting quite strongly that the two 
mainstream theories of realism and constructivism are, by their very nature, limited in the 
analysis that they can shape regarding the emerging APSC. My next chapter (i.e. chapter two) 
will identify and explore the theory applied in the current study. I will argue that the concept 
of human security (which I will craft into a theory, as I explain below) is the most suitable 
basis for my research endeavours herein because the concept of human security itself has 
three critical qualities that can help rigorously address the uniqueness of current Southeast 
Asian security culture. The first quality is the concept’s assessment of human security as a 
valid component of human-centred security thought. The second quality is the human-
security concept’s inclusion of not only state actors but also non-state actors in assessing 
efforts to address human insecurities (Henk, 2005: 97). The third quality is the human-
security concept’s stipulation that threats to human beings are various (UNDP, 1994: 25-33). 
Because of these qualities, I have adopted the human-security concept as the analytical 
framework in this study. However, one should not overlook the fact that the human-security 
concept is not a theory insofar as the concept lacks a consensual definition (Tadjbakhsh and 
Chenoy, 2007: 9). Thus, before using the human-security concept to explore the emerging 
APSC, I will make a workable theory out of the human-security concept by systematising it 
in a five-step process. First, I will define human security’s referent object. The second step is 
to explain broad and narrow definitions of human security. I argue that when we study 
human-security issues, these two definitions should co-exist. In the third step, I will describe 
the means to achieving human security. The fourth step is to identify and examine who ensure 
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human security. I argue that three types of actors play the most important roles in ensuring 
human security: individuals, state actors, and non-state actors. Also in this step, I will explore 
how and why actors are willing to be involved in human-security issues. In the fifth and final 
step, I will present and rebut the strongest criticism mounted against the human-security 
concept. 
My analysis of the emerging APSC, which I present in chapters three through seven, 
rests on human-security concept. Chapter three explores Southeast Asian people’s response to 
the APSC. Chapters four through six discuss state-actors’ responses to the APSC: chapter four 
analyses ASEAN members, chapter five explores external powers, and chapter six examines 
multilateral organisations. Chapter seven focuses on CSOs’ responses to the creation of the 
APSC. In exploring state and non-state actors’ responses, I will emphasise the actors’ 
strategies, motivations underlying strategies, and the strategies’ effects on the creation of the 
APSC, focusing particularly on—whether the strategies in question have been benefiting or 
hindering efforts to create the APSC (the last section of chapter two presents my rationale for 
emphasising the three factors of strategies, motivations, and strategies’ effects).  
Before exploring each actor’s response to the creation of the APSC, I will historically 
review each actor’s involvement in human-security issues in Southeast Asia. Historical 
review is important because it can, in the context of the current study, clarify why these actors 
have been involved in the creation of the APSC, what these actors have done to strategically 
respond to the creation of the APSC, and what the actors have had as motivations underlying 
the strategies in question. For example, the U.S. government has supported the creation of the 
APSC. Through historical review, we know that the reason for—or the motivation 
underlying—the U.S. government’s support strategies is tied up in the APSC’s possible 
usefulness to the U.S. government’s goal of re-enhancing U.S. influence in Southeast Asia 
(influence that declined between 1989 and 2003). Thus, without historical review, the current 
study would be hopelessly incomplete, lacking in the very concreteness that lends substance 
to studies such as this one. 
Another noteworthy point here is time-frame. Because each ASEAN member has its 
unique historical background, I would be remiss to adopt a unified time-frame in my 
historical review of these members in chapter four. Thus, I will use a pair of approaches to 
shaping the time-frame for my historical review of each ASEAN member’s involvement in 
human security issues. The first approach, which is based on leaders’ shifts in direction, will 
facilitate my discussion of Indonesia, Myanmar, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand. The other approach, which is based on occurrences of important domestic events, 
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will facilitate my discussion of Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. In chapters five 
through seven, I will separate the time-frame for my historical review of each actor’s 
involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues into two periods: the first period will 
extend from the 1950s through 1989 and the second period will extend from 1990 through 
2002. My reason for choosing 1989 as a boundary has to do with historical precedent: in this 
year, the Vietnamese government pulled its troops from Cambodia, where the UN started 
preparing peacekeeping operations in which Australia, China, the EU, Japan, the United 
States, and the UN were directly or indirectly involved. 
In chapters four through seven, I adopt the same approach to time-frame: in the sections 
covering each actor’s involvement in the creation of the APSC, I begin with the year 2003—
the year that ASEAN decided to create the AC—and I extend my discussion up to the present. 
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CHAPTER 2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
Realism and constructivism cannot independently serve as the framework for rigorous 
analyses of the APSC’s creation. What theory, then, serves as the framework for the current 
study’s analysis of this very topic? I argue that the human-security concept is congruous with 
the purpose of the current study’s thesis. Since the late 1990s, discourse on human security 
has become increasingly common in academic and policy circles. However, the topic of 
human security has remained non-theoretical. This is to say that academic researchers and 
policy-makers have used the “concept” of human security rather than the “framework” of 
human security. One of my central aims in this chapter has two parts: first, I shall endeavour 
to forge a theory out of the human-security concept according to a five-step process, and then 
I shall explain how I use human security as an analytical framework in my overall study. My 
second central aim in this chapter is to explain the criteria guiding my selection of sources, 
field-study methods, and questionnaire methods. 
 
2.1 The Five Steps for Developing the Human-Security Theory from the Human-
Security Concept 
In the field of human security, theorists and practitioners agree with one another that the 
concept entails as its main purpose the protection of human beings (Newman, 2010: 79, Henk, 
2005: 96). However, many researchers who have analysed the human-security concept 
usually have not comprehensively discussed the roles that actors must play to ensure human 
security (Nishikawa, 2009: 215-6, Howe and Sims, 2011: 335-8, Acharya, 2001: 444-51, 
Paris, 2001: 89-92). Other research although it discuss the means by which state- and non-
state actors can protect human beings (Peou, 2005: 100-3, Lam, 2006: 149-56, Suhrke, 1999: 
273-5), does so without addressing the repercussions that follow from the adoption of certain 
means. 10  In addition, advocates of human security have not persuasively responded to 
compelling criticism. Scholars’ lack of a robust explanation pertaining to the concept of 
human security has forced this concept be just that: it has remained a concept rather than 
develop into a theory. In order to catalyse the transformation of the human-security concept 
into a theory, I will explain the human-security concept systematically following five steps. 
 
                                                 
10
 Howe and Sims’ essay is among the few to mention such repercussions (Howe and Sims, 2011: 337-8). 
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2.1.1 Individuals as the Reference Object of the Concept of Human Security 
Advocates of the human-security concept and scholars who have studied human-security 
issues have agreed that the human-security concept stems from The Human Development 
Report 1994 (Thomas, 2000: 7, Nishikawa, 2010: 13, Paris, 2001: 89, Newman, 2001: 243, 
Henk, 2005: 93). The Report emphasised that “the concept of security has for too long been 
interpreted narrowly” and that security thinking, which has too often rested only on military 
force, should shift to a human-centric foundation (UNDP, 1994: 3, 22); that is, human beings’ 
safety and living standards should be prioritised. The role of states should be to protect their 
threats coming from any of seven areas: “the economy, food, health, the environment, 
personal issues, the community and politics” (UNDP, 1994: 25-33). In short, in the concept of 
human security, the referent object is human beings. 
It should be noted that some researchers (Hong, 2005, Dosch, 2007: 214) have 
conflated the concept of non-traditional security with the concept of human security. Their 
viewpoint that the concept of non-traditional security falls in line with the concept of human 
security is partly right, because the concept of non-traditional security and the concept of 
human security mutually acknowledge threats’ diverse origins. However, in the concept of 
non-traditional security, the nation is the only actor able to cope with threats whereas in the 
concept of human security, actors coping with threats are various (Paris, 2001: 91, Henk, 
2005: 97). Thus, in the spectrum of security thought, the concept of non-traditional security is 
closer to conventional-national concepts.  
The best illustration of the non-traditional security concept’s greater proximity to the 
traditional security concept than to the human-security concept is Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on 
Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues. In this memorandum, ASEAN 
and China extensively labelled security threats, including human and drug smuggling, sea 
piracy, terrorism, arms smuggling, money laundering, international economic crime, and 
cyber crime. This diverse list of concerns indicates that like the human-security concept, the 
concept of non-traditional security encompasses a recognition of threats’ diverse origins. 
However, the memorandum excluded the role of CSOs in addressing the aforementioned 
insecurities (ASEAN, January 10, 2004), and omission indicative of the belief that states are 
the only legal actors able to cope with threats. Thus, the concept of non-traditional security is 
a state-centric rather than a people-centred concept. Against this backdrop, it is better not to 
regard the non-traditional security concept and the human-security concept having essentially 
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the same content. 
 
2.1.2 Broad and Narrow Definitions of the Concept of Human Security 
Japan and Canada are two countries that, despite basing their diplomatic policies on the 
human-security concept, differ from each other regarding their definition of ‘human security’. 
The Japanese government has argued that “human security comprehensively covers all the 
measures that threaten human survival, daily life, and dignity—for example, environmental 
degradation, violations of human rights, 11  transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, 
refugees, poverty, anti-personnel land-mines and…infectious diseases such as AIDS—and 
strengthens efforts to confront these threats” (cited from Paris, 2001: 90). According to the 
Japanese government’s argument, insecurities, as broadly defined, arise from at least one of 
two types of origins. The first type of origin is the realm of unpredictability, which includes 
such relatively unpredictable threats as pandemic outbreaks and earthquakes. The second type 
of origin from which insecurities arise is the realm of human’s planned activities. For 
example, a government’s incompetence and ignorance may quite predictably result in poverty, 
malnourishment, crime, human-rights violations, and unemployment. These outcomes—if 
they do not directly lead to large-scale problems or imminent death—may at least bring about 
chronic hardship for human beings; thus, scholars have placed Japan’s definition of the 
‘human-security concept’ in the “freedom from want” category (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 
2007: 29). 
The Canadian government has promoted a narrow definition of human security—
human security is “freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives” (cited 
from Paris, 2001: 90). In the narrow definition, insecurities include genocide and ethnic 
cleansing, civil disorder, and brutal political repression, any of which can inflict severe 
suffering on human beings, and is highly likely to result in imminent and large-scale deaths. 
Threat-producers can be ethnic groups, militant religious groups, political parties, or states. 
                                                 
11
 In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to distinguish the concepts of human security from the concept of 
human rights. The concept of human security has “an explanatory power” that the concept of human rights does 
not have, although the concept of human security has attracted criticism regarding its broader context of 
vulnerability; in contrast to human rights, human security emphasises diverse actors and covers a vast dimension 
of human insecurities including not only human-rights violations but also insecurities resulting from sources of 
threats unrelated to human rights (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 127-8). In short, the concept of human 
security is more analytical than the concept of human rights, and human rights constitute just one type of issue 
falling under the banner of human security.  
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More precisely, insecurities associated with the narrow definition may result only from 
threats originating chiefly from human activity, and in comparison with insecurities resulting 
from groups of humans in the broad definition, insecurities associated with the narrow 
definition tend to have graver consequences. Scholars have placed the Canadian definition of 
the human-security concept in the “freedom from fear” category (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 
2007: 30-1). 
Many scholars who have analysed the concept of human security have accepted this 
classification and proposed broad and narrow definitions of the concept as way to introduce 
discussions about human security (Newman, 2001: 240-2, McCormack, 2008: 116, Lam, 
2006: 146-9, Nuruzzaman, 2006: 290-3, Acharya, 2001: 444-9, Paris, 2001: 89-92, 
Nishikawa, 2009: 215-6, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 39-57, James, 2006: 10-6, Ho, 2008: 
104-6, Owen, 2004: 375-6). However, so far, scholars have reached no consensus as to which 
definition of the term ‘human security’ best serve their explorations of human-security issues. 
For example, Keith Krause emphasised that scholars should use the freedom-from-fear 
definition as the basis of an analytical framework to explore human-security issues. His 
argument in favour of prioritising the freedom-from-fear definition is that the definition of 
‘freedom from want’, because it includes any form of insecurity, is “a useless shopping list” 
(Krause, 2004: 367). Jennifer Leanning advocated her preference for a definition of ‘freedom 
from want’ because, as she generally argues, human beings are entitled to have what they 
want within reason (Leanning, 2004: 354-5).  
So which definition is better suited for scholars’ examination of human-security issues? 
I argue that these two definitions should co-exist, because insecurities in both freedom-from-
want and freedom-from-fear areas harm human beings. In addition, it is unlikely that state- 
and non-state actors address only insecurities in freedom-from-want areas, wilfully 
neglecting en masse insecurities in freedom-from-fear areas. For example, Japan typified a 
state advocate of government intervention in freedom-from-want problems, and yet the 
Japanese government has also been involved in freedom-from-fear issues since the 1990s 
(Lam, 2009). Thus, definitions of both ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’ are 
important clarifications in the effort to conceptualise human security. 
 
2.1.3 The Means for Achieving Human Security and Addressing Related Emergent 
Problems 
It is possible to achieve human security by development-oriented and intervention-oriented 
methods, which correlate with the broad and narrow definitions given above (Newman, 2010: 
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80). The first method refers to human-development programmes. From the 1930s to the 
1960s, the term ‘human development’ signified state actors’ planning for investment, 
industrialisation, and the like—all with the aim of helping people address mainly economic 
problems (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 101). Beginning in the 1970s, when scholars and 
practitioners started focusing on human-security issues (particularly famine, poverty, and 
diseases in the third world), ‘human development’ came to signify state actors’ and non-state 
actors’ planning for various insecurities afflicting people—all with the aim of satisfying “the 
diversity of human needs” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007: 104). This focus is in line with the 
broad definition of human security. Thus, human-development programmes usually address 
threats that fall under the category of freedom from want and that include poverty, famine, 
human-rights violations, and disease. For example, the UN created the MDGs in 1999 to help 
improve people’s living standards around the world and since its inception in 1942, Oxfam 
has established numerous projects to help poor people rise out of poverty. 
Japan typifies a country that has embraced a “development-oriented notion of human 
security” (Lam, 2006: 146). In 1992, the Japanese government adopted the Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) Charter. Under this charter, the Japanese government’s 
assistance would focus on environmental conservation, human development, democracy, and 
human rights (Kikkawa, 2007: 255). Most of the issues that the Japanese government 
mentioned in the ODA Charter fall under the freedom-from-want category. In 1998, Japan’s 
Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo declared that the Japanese government’s human-security 
diplomatic policies had been designed to protect the security and safety of individuals and 
communities (Lam, 2013: 179). In May 2005, Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan (MOFA) Yukio Takasu made a statement revealing the Japanese 
government’s commitment to advocating a freedom-from-want definition of human security: 
 
The Japanese understanding of human security is very similar to the comprehensive and 
inclusive concept advocated by UNDP. I believe that Japan’s experience since the end 
of the Second World War in promoting prosperity and the well-being of its people 
through economic and social development makes it particularly well-prepared to 
advocate such a broad concept of human security. (cited from Ho, 2008: 103) 
 
However, efforts to improve human development can have repercussions (Tadjbakhsh 
and Chenoy, 2007: 98-100). First of all, when a country implements human-development 
programmes and similar programmes geared toward improving people’s well-being, certain 
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human insecurities may emerge or worse. For example, in order to ameliorate its people’s 
living standards, the Laotian government resettled certain segments of the populations, but 
this policy inadvertently increased the possibility of people’s exposure to diseases, human 
exploitation, and human trafficking (Howe and Sims, 2011: 350-3). Also, efforts to improve 
human development may lead to social instability if sufficient communication does not occur 
between the instigators of change and the targeted people beforehand. During the early 
Marcos period in the Philippines, the government sought to enhance economic development 
by providing attractive incentives to foreign companies. The Philippines’ economy improved, 
but foreign companies confiscated the peasants’ farms and lands without offering reasonable 
compensation. Many religious organisations sided with the victimised farmers and protested 
against government policy, resulting in tension between the regime and society (Youngblood, 
1978: 509). 
The latter type of method—the intervention-oriented method—is exemplified by the 
responsibility to protect principle (i.e., the RtoP principle), which serves to address mainly 
human insecurities related to freedom from fear. According to a 2005 World Summit 
Outcome document (A/RES/60/1), which attracted support from United Nations members, 
when states are unable to protect their own population or when states themselves become a 
source of threats, the international community has the RtoP; that is, they may protect 
individuals from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (UN, 
October 24, 2005). The purpose of using military force is to protect a troubled population 
rather than to initiate wars. The RtoP principle also calls for peace-maintenance and peace-
building efforts. Sub-methods specific to these efforts include disarmament demobilisation 
and reintegration of factions involved in a conflict, rebuilding of infrastructures, promotion of 
human rights, and implementation of democratic systems, such as elections (ICISS, 2001: 39-
43). 
Canada typifies this method of humanitarian intervention. Since the 1960s, human 
security has been the central pillar of Canadian foreign policy, starting with the establishment 
of the Oslo-Ottawa axis with Norway on UN peacekeeping issues (Suhrke, 1999: 266). So far, 
Canada has been drawn into peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace-building and 
peace-maintenance operations in several countries, including the Congo, Ethiopia, Kosovo, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. In addition, Canada has been the most proactive country 
in terms of supporting the establishment of the International Criminal Court and international 
campaigns against landmines (Suhrke, 1999: 266). In March 1999, the United Nations Trust 
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Fund for Human Security was established through Canadian financial support.12  “In the 
Canadian view, human security is security of the people” (Acharya, 2001: 445). 
However, regarding the implementation of the RtoP principle, two important questions 
among others arise: Who has the power to decide to carry out the RtoP principle? And when 
should the principle be invoked? These questions are intimately linked to grave concerns over 
national sovereignty (Alexandra, 2012: 56). Many states, especially small and non-Western 
states, are worried that a Western power may use the RtoP principle as a pretext for 
interfering in their domestic affairs (Alexandra, 2012: 56). From these states’ perspective, 
implementation of the RtoP principle means that their national sovereignty may be infringed 
upon. Thus, the non-interference principle is their shield against the RtoP principle. Even 
Indonesia, which is recognised as the ASEAN member that has made the greatest 
improvements in the area of human rights and democracy (Dosch, 2008, Boyd and Dosch, 
2010), is apprehensive about the possibility of infringements upon its national sovereignty. 
The Indonesian representative to the UN stated in 2006 that “the concept of the responsibility 
to protect should be approached very carefully, taking into account the sovereignty and 
equality of all states” (cited from Alexandra, 2012: 58). Thus, in certain contexts, it would 
appear likely that implementation of intervention-oriented measures has historically 
encountered more barriers than implementation of development-oriented methods. 
 
2.1.4 Who Ensures Human Security? 
The question of who ensures human security is an important one in the field of human-
security research, particularly where the human-security concept is influential. Three types of 
actors have been recognised by scholars (Peou, 2005: 109, Henk, 2005: 97). The first is the 
individual. Barry Buzan argued that individuals are the most basic element in the security 
research and that “the security of individuals is irreversibly connected to the state” (Buzan, 
1991: 35, 39). The second type of actor is the state. Many human-security scholars have 
agreed that states have played an important role in addressing human insecurities (Henk, 
2005: 97, Peou, 2005: 108-9). The third type of actor is the non-state actor, known 
collectively as CSOs. Research has found that CSOs play an essential role in addressing 
human insecurities (Paris, 2001: 91, Acharya, 2004a, Williams, 1998: 38-41). For example, 
See Seng Tan argued that CSOs have played the important role in conflict management 
                                                 
12
 Japan was the other contributor. It is estimated that Japan’s contribution has amounted to US$227 million 
(Lam, 2006: 148). 
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because they have “technical expertise” and, what is more important, a “commitment to 
human rights and social justice” (Tan, 2005: 52).  
Dan Henk nicely summarised the three types of actors’ involvement in human-security 
issues: 
 
Achievement of human security is almost by definition a collaborative effort involving 
the individual citizen as an active player but also including key role for civil society 
groups and institutions; commercial, nongovernmental, and international organizations; 
and governments of nation-states. (Henk, 2005: 97) 
 
Despite agreement on many matters, scholars in this field debate important points and raise 
intriguing questions. Buzan argued, for example, that the security of individuals is connected 
with states, because when individuals suffer from insecurities, it is highly likely that they first 
seek assistance from their governments (Buzan, 1991). I agree with this point; however, one 
should not overlook the fact that individuals may remove or mitigate insecurities by 
themselves through adoption of moderate or radical measures. This is individuals’ instinct to 
self-protect, a feature of human behaviour for which Buzan offers a distinctly incomplete 
explanation. Regarding state actors, many advocates of human security have agreed that 
states play the role of protecting their own people. However, few scholars have discussed 
why some states are more willing than others to protect their own people, and why some 
multi-state organisations ignore or neglect human insecurities. Regarding CSOs, few scholars 
have discussed the advantages and the obstacles that aid or undermine these organisations as 
they address human-security issues. In this section, I will comprehensively explore the roles 
of CSOs as well as of individuals and states in achieving human-security targets.  
 
2.1.4.1 Individual Actors 
Individuals are the most basic element required to achieve human security (Buzan, 1991: 35), 
although individuals are unlike state-actors insofar as the latter can implement robust 
development programmes usually requiring extensive funding and collaborative experts 
pooled from diverse areas of knowledge. However, when a threat erupts, a human’s instinct 
for survival manifests itself. I argue that humans’ responses to insecurities often reflect 
humans’ instinct for survival.  
People strive to protect themselves in three general ways: people rely on personal 
initiative, people seek assistance from state-actors, and people seek assistance from non-state 
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actors. First, many people attempt to regain their security by themselves, whether through 
moderate or radical means. Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) 
exemplifies moderate methods, insofar as it has mildly but persistently advocated for human 
rights and political participation. By contrast, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), 
as adopted the radical approach of armed struggle, with the objective of creating a sovereign 
Bangsa-moro Republic. Both moderate and radical methods may produce other insecurities 
(Buzan, 1991: 52). Moderate methods may trigger repressive government policies, such as 
the Myanmar junta’s repression of NLD members, whereas radical methods may endanger 
innocent people (Buzan, 1991: 46-7), as was the case with the deaths of non-combatants 
during the conflict between the Philippine government and radical insurgents on the island of 
Mindanao. 
A second type of measure that people may employ when pursuing self-preservation 
centres on their request for assistance from a government (Buzan, 1991: 38), whether it is 
their own country’s or another country’s. A request for government assistance, however, does 
not automatically translate into a provision of government assistance, as many types of 
political regimes—but especially non-democratic ones—offer only perfunctory responses to 
requests for assistance and, not unusually, are the source of threat afflicting a population 
(Buzan, 1991: 43-50). Thus, the success with which people can obtain assistance from their 
own country’s government, much less another country’s government, is frequently 
unimpressive. The best chance of success in requests for government assistance is to be had 
in states enjoying a high degree of democratisation, because the governments of such states 
may attach great significance to their people’s troubles, whether out of concern for electoral 
popularity or from a deep-seated sense of altruism, in which case a government may act 
spontaneously to resolve a problem threatening a segment of the population so that no request 
for assistance from the people is even needed. 
The third measure by which people may attempt to attain assistance situates them in 
connection with regional and international organisations and CSOs. Sometimes, these 
organisations spontaneously help people bogged down in troubles. For example, these entities 
can provide assistance (e.g., educational preventive measures and post-crisis rescue 
operations), can mediate in conflicts, and can impose political and economic sanctions on 
states involved in atrocities. The extent to which these organisations can mitigate human 
insecurity depends on human understanding of plans and policies from state actors and CSOs. 
The better the understanding that people have of how state actors and CSOs can be beneficial, 
the greater the possibility that the organisations can successfully address human insecurity. 
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2.1.4.2 State Actors 
I divide state actors into two types. The first comprises individual states. Individual states can 
plan and conduct programmes to help their own country’s citizens or other countries’ citizens 
and can, with the same aim in mind, request assistance and cooperation from regional and 
international organisations and CSOs. However, it is unlikely that states will arbitrarily 
undertake humanitarian interventions because unavoidably related issues are typically 
sensitive ones involving, first and foremost, national sovereignty. State action in many cases 
must be based on resolutions, which are passed by members in regional and international 
organisations. Generally, states that can help people in extra-territorial regions govern either 
developed or developing countries. The motivation for such states’ adoption of strategies is, 
more often than not, based on the states’ own national interests, which might include the 
acquisition of economic benefits or the promotion of status or influence (Suhrke, 1999). 
Suhrke argued that the reason for the Canadian and Norwegian governments’ promotion of 
the human-security concept is their mutual desire to enhance their respective international 
reputations (Suhrke, 1999: 265-7). 
It should be noted that the extent to which people under a given state enjoy human 
security depends on the state’s type of political system. I argue that the more democratic a 
state is, the more human security its people are likely to have. Authoritarian or totalitarian 
countries, owing to their governments’ lack of political legitimacy, usually face challenges 
from their people (Collins, 2003: 64). According to the Copenhagen School, authoritarian or 
totalitarian countries regard these challenges as not a political problem but a security problem 
that should be removed in various ways, such as declaration of martial law or adoption of 
repressive measures (Collins, 2003: 64-5). In order to prevent widespread challenges from 
emerging in the first place, the regimes in authoritarian or totalitarian countries usually tightly 
control their people and society and suppress dissidents and separatists—actions that 
ironically run the risk of triggering inter-state conflicts and civil upheaval. According to 
Barry Buzan, these states are a source of threats to the people residing in these non-
democratic countries (Buzan, 1991: 43-50). In addition, lack of rule of law and rampant 
corruption are common in the countries. These problems hinder governments’ efforts to 
mitigate human insecurity.13 Against this backdrop, under authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, 
                                                 
13
 These problems have been common in Southeast Asian countries and have hindered governments’ efforts to 
address human insecurities. For example, corruption in the Cambodian government has been rampant, thereby 
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people do not enjoy adequate human security. 
In democratic and semi-democratic countries, governments are similarly concerned 
with acquiring, maintaining, or expanding political power. However, the governments’ 
viability rests on their performance of generally good and righteous deeds, as perceived by a 
significant percentage of the voting population. In order to stay in power, the governments 
should be willing to address human-security issues and should properly respond to people’s 
independent efforts to attain security, whether moderately or radically, because the extent to 
which the governments address human insecurities may help determine the extent to which 
the political parties controlling the governments can secure the confidence of a majority of 
the electorate and, quite possibly, win the next elections—or at least avoid no-confidence 
motions, landslide electoral defeats, and so on (Landman, 2006: 17). In other words, if they 
fail to address human insecurities, political parties that head governments in democratic and 
semi-democratic countries run the significant risk of falling from power.  
There is an exception to this rule. Some states that are politically authoritarian but 
economically developed regiment their own citizens, particularly regarding basic human 
rights. Nevertheless, many of these citizens do not consider their government to be a threat. 
Many citizens do not worry about their government’s tight control of society, because 
political regimes not only offer robust welfare systems that generate government loyalty 
among the people but also incentivise a form of complacency that dampens people’s desire to 
pursue political expression or other rights. However, according to Alan Collins, it is likely 
that these states will gradually shift to democracy, because economic development may bring 
about the emergence of a middle class and entrepreneurs, which may in turn bring about their 
compelling demand for political participation (Collins, 2003: 71). In order to stay in power, 
authoritarian regimes may create channels through which people can release their disaffection, 
and one such channel involves a piecemeal loosening of stifling government strangleholds on 
political participation (Collins, 2003: 70-3). Alan Collins called this gradual shift to 
                                                                                                                                                        
exacerbating people’s hardships there. Most poor Cambodians have depended on government-distributed food, 
much of which has come from foreign donors. However, according to a UN investigation, between January 
2003 and February 2004, 44% of rice targeted for distribution to the poor was “stolen or diverted by government 
officials” (Beresford, 2005: 138). In addition, the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA), which has been 
responsible for the clearing of landmines in Cambodia, has encountered severe problems rooted in corruption. 
Foreign donors have refused to provide funding to the CMAA, which led, at one point, to a 70% reduction in 
CMAA staff (Langran, 2001: 159). Shortages of manpower have, in turn, slowed down the progress of landmine 
removal. 
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democracy  “self-renewal” (Collins, 2003: 65). 
The second type of state actor comprises regional and international organisations 
composed mainly of individual states.14 Regional and international organisations have the 
same functions as do individual states: these organisations plan and conduct development 
programmes and provide humanitarian assistance. Also, regional and international 
organisations have abilities that individual states lack. First, regional and international 
organisations can retain the right to collect funds and manpower from individual states, 
rendering the organisations at times more robust, policy-wise, than the individual states could 
be on their own. Perhaps the most obvious example is the UN: UN members (which are, by 
necessity, individual states) must offer a portion of their own national wealth to the UN, 
which then uses the funds to finance UN activities, including the creation and deployment of 
development projects and peacekeeping operations (Baehr and Gordenker, 2005: 56-7). 
Second, regional and international organisations can impose sanctions on regimes or dispatch 
peacekeeping forces to troubled areas. Again with reference to the UN, one of the functions 
of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is to impose sanctions on countries whose 
governments have routinely and substantially violated people’s human rights (Baehr and 
Gordenker, 2005: 24-5). 
When addressing human-security problems, regional and international organisations are 
by no measure insusceptible to obstacles and other difficulties. First of all, regional and 
international organisations comprise individual states, each having its own distinct set of 
national interests. Thus, it is not easy to for organisations that are largely reliant on these 
individual states to achieve consensus among them. This dependence has had the effect of 
oftentimes delaying or even dampening the organisations’ responses to human insecurity. For 
example, Bellamy and Drummond noted that ASEAN member-states’ different perspectives 
                                                 
14
 For the present study, I have categorised multilateral organisations as state actors. There are two reasons for 
this categorisation. First, multilateral organisations are composed of individual states. In fact, states’ 
membership in these organisations is necessary for these organisations’ very existence. Second, individual states 
play critical roles in operating multilateral organisations. For example, the UN’s member-states are the main 
sponsors regarding peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks. Member-states provide the UN with funding, rescue 
equipment, and troops. Some scholars have regarded both multilateral organisations and CSOs as non-state 
actors (Collins, 2013: 4). I argue that this categorisation is inappropriate. Composed of individual states, 
multilateral organisations’ policies and actions are mainly the work of member-states and closely reflect 
member-states’ interests. Like-minded people create CSOs, whose purpose is not to satisfy states’ interests but to 
improve people’s well-being. In terms of behaviour, multilateral organisations are similar to individual states. 
Thus, multilateral organisations should be categorised as state actors. 
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regarding how to deal with Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar resulted in a significant two-week 
delay, during which time ASEAN debated humanitarian-assistance affairs. “Had disease 
broken out rapidly in the affected areas, the consequences might have been catastrophic” 
(Bellamy and Drummond, 2011: 193). 
Two additional types of difficulty with which some regional organisations have had to 
contend arise from their own norms and from technical issues, both of which may become 
barriers to addressing human insecurities. The potential for norm-based problems is 
powerfully illustrated by the mass killings of Cambodians under the Khmer Rouge in the 
1970s, when ASEAN members were reticent to intervene because they adhered to their 
previously championed norms summarised in the non-interference principle. To ASEAN 
members, running afoul of the principle was a more serious infraction than leaving 
Cambodians to fend for themselves. As for problems arising from technical issues, when 
regional and international organisations undertake rescue actions, their efficiency may be 
impeded by language barriers, different units of measurement, different technological formats, 
and the like (Berdal and Leifer, 1996: 41, 50, Smith, 2003: 62).  
 
2.1.4.3 Non-State Actors 
Non-state actors are commonly referred to as civil-society organisations (the acronym ‘CSOs’ 
is sued throughout this study). CSOs are non-profit and voluntary and many CSOs have as 
their main function the two-fold task of improving people’s living standards and addressing 
human insecurities that people encounter (Kaldor, 2003: 16-7). 
What are the advantages and barriers that characterise CSOs’ involvement in human-
security issues? CSOs’ chief advantage is that unlike regional and international organisation, 
CSOs often—though not always—avoid direct involvement in matters of the state. This 
advantage is so powerful that some CSOs can implement their own programmes more 
efficiently than state actors can implement similar governmental programmes. The key to this 
success, however, comes at a price, as CSOs must generally keep a low-profile to avoid 
coming into conflict with the state. For example, after Cyclone Nargis devastated Myanmar 
many national governments, whether acting collectively, ended up debating with one another 
whether they should abide by the RtoP principle there. Meanwhile, the Buddhist Compassion 
Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, a CSO established in 1996 by Dharma Master Chong Yen, had 
already obtained permission from Myanmar’s government to enter the devastated area (China 
Post, May 11, 2008). 
The barriers preventing CSOs from effectively addressing human-security issues 
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generally stem from the organisations’ scant resources, which manifest as minimal publicity, 
unimpressive advertising, underdeveloped technology, and weak responses to pressures from 
hostile governments. Kamarulzaman Askandar argued that although CSOs in 2003 tried to 
encourage the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Filipino government to 
resurrect their negotiations, the CSOs’ lack of both resources and political influence gravely 
limited their efforts (Askandar, 2005: 47). In recent years, CSOs have been expanding their 
abilities as a result of improved communication technology, such as e-mail and community 
websites (Gilson, 2011: 135). Many CSOs can now publicise their causes readily, in turn 
facilitating fundraising events, recruitment of experts, and cross-CSO networking. In addition, 
many countries in the post-Cold War period have adopted democratic politics and liberal 
markets, the combination of which has promoted states to embrace the development of CSOs 
(Gerard, 2014: 54-63). Therefore, CSOs’ influence has been growing ever more impressive.  
 
2.1.5 Major Criticism of Human Security and Rebuttals to this Criticism 
The concept of human security has been the target of compelling critiques. One critique 
centres on the concept’s main referent object: people. Some researchers in the field place 
equal or often greater emphasis on the roles played by state and non-state actors protecting 
individuals (Lam, 2006: 106, Peou, 2005, Tan, 2005, Henk, 2005: 97). Indeed, in 
international politics, many cases have shown that not only states but also non-state actors 
have played a key role in achieving the goal of human security. However, if achieving the 
goal of human security is dependent on the protection from these actors, there is no difference 
between human security and national security, since “human security has been co-opted and 
thereby diluted by state practices” (Booth, 2007: 325). Therefore, critics of the human-
security concept are “suspicious of human security as a state-sponsored movement” 
(Newman, 2010: 87). 
A second critique centres on human security’s broad spectrum of threat variables. In 
terms of narrow and broad definitions of human-security concepts, threats to human security 
range from physical violence, such as wars and massacres, to daily-life issues, such as hunger 
and disease; even traffic accidents have attracted attention in this regard (Howe and Sims, 
2011: 354). Many researchers have disagreed about broader contexts of dangers. Roland Paris 
asked, “If human security is all these things, what is it not?” (Paris, 2001: 92); as noted earlier 
in this chapter, Keith Krause declared that inclusive definitions of threats amount “a useless 
shopping list”(Krause, 2004: 367); Andrew Mack declared, that “a concept [human security] 
that aspires to explain almost everything in reality explains nothing” (Mack, 2004: 367); 
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Edward Newman argued that a broader range of threats “would be of little use, as it would 
generate an unmanageable array of variables” (Newman, 2004: 358). These criticisms lead to 
the question of whether the human-security concept can be a useful analytical tool. In the 
spirit of these critiques of the human-security concept, I will provide my own contentions 
regarding the matter. 
Although states can be actors in achieving human security, this does not mean that state 
practices necessarily dilute conceptualisations of human-centred security, since the objectives 
of state-provided security based on conventional national-security precepts are significantly 
different from the objectives of state-provided security based on the human-security concept. 
According to conventional national-security precepts, states can develop a material ability to 
achieve national security. Also, they can help other states enhance their own national security. 
The motive for this “generosity” could be religious, practical, or ideological. However, the 
purpose is always to ensure accepted states’ survival or accepted regimes’ continuity.  
According to the concept of human security, the motive for states’ provision of 
assistance is likewise variable. However, the purpose is directly linked to people’s security. 
That is why regardless of whether people live in democratic or authoritarian states or 
developed or under-developed countries, when people suffer from threats, state and non-state 
actors are typically willing to provide assistance: the object that these actors are seeking to 
help is people, not states. For example, after Hurricane Katrina pummelled the Greater New 
Orleans area, many states provided humanitarian assistance to victims, and likewise, when 
Cyclone Nargis lashed Myanmar, foreign countries were willing to offer disaster relief. The 
fact that states are actors serving to realise the goal of human security does not, in itself, 
dilute the concept of human security. 
Some scholars have recently tried to narrow the broad range of threat variables. 
Sorpong Peou combined the definition of ‘freedom from fear’ with the definition of ‘freedom 
from want’ to define ‘human security’ as “freedom from the fear of violent death, political 
subjugation and want” (Peou, 2005: 106). Likewise, Roland Paris categorised both the threats 
to human security and the actors who need protection: to this end, he divided sources of 
threats into military and non-military categories and the protected actors into two pairings: 
the pairing of states and societies and the pairing of groups and individuals (Paris, 2001: 98-
101). Taylor Owen put forward the following position: that “A threshold-based 
conceptualisation, one that limits threats by their severity rather than their cause, allows all 
possible harms to be considered, but selectively limits those that at any time are prioritised 
with the security label” (Owen, 2004: 381). In fact, there is no need to narrow broad ranges of 
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threats, because inclusive threat variables are the basic foundation of the human-security 
concept. 
My response to criticism targeting broad lists of human-security threats is ontological. I 
argue that inclusive threat variables are not a drawback to the concept of human security but a 
fundamental component of the human-security concept. After all, any daily-life object or 
activity could become a threat. For example, Chinese society’s peculiar consumption of the 
masked palm civet seems to have been a critical factor in the transmission of the lethal SARS 
virus, which harmed economies and dramatically changed people’s lives. Technology is 
usually unable to fully contain and eradicate such threats. Human beings are at the mercy of 
this threat-emergence pattern. When threats become adverse realities, people and their 
environments are at risk. For this reason, the human-security concept’s main referent is 
individuals because of their need for protection against the aforementioned insecurities. In the 
absence of such threats, the assumption that individuals constitute security’s main focus 
would be untenable. 
 
2.2 Applying the Human-Security Framework to the Current Study 
According to the above analysis and elaboration, the human-security concept, perhaps, can be 
transformed into a rudimentary human-security analytical framework; that is, into the theory 
that I have proposed to create for this study. The security-related referent in human security is 
human beings, and threats to human beings come from freedom-from-want and freedom-
from-fear factors, many of which can be offset by development-oriented and intervention-
oriented measures usually implemented by state actors and non-state actors: implementation 
of these measures is beyond the ability of separately acting or loosely connected individual, 
although individuals can at least strive to protect themselves by adopting moderate and 
radical methods (please see figure 2.1). 
The creation of the APSC can be regarded as a model similar to the rudimentary 
human-security analytical framework. The APSC target is to create people-oriented 
communities, and this fact alone indicates that, in theory, the security-related referent in the 
creation of the APSC is Southeast Asian people. The issues that ASEAN has planned to 
address in the blueprints of the APSC and ASCC fall under either the freedom-from-want 
category or the freedom-from-fear category. The issues in the freedom-from-want category 
include human rights, disease, transnational crimes, natural-disaster management, and 
poverty. The issues in the freedom-from-fear category include conflict management and post-
conflict peace-building. So far, individuals, state actors, and non-state actors have been 
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involved in the creation of the APSC. Clearly, the creation of the APSC is congruous with the 
human-security analytical framework.  
 
Figure 2.1 Human-security analytical framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Human Development Programmes                                          Humanitarian Intervention 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, congruousness between the model and corresponding facts proves only that 
the human-security concept may be suitable for exploring the issue of APSC’s creation but 
cannot help answer the questions that I posed in this study’s research-purpose section. In 
order to come up with rigorous answers to these questions, we must consider each relevant 
actor’s response to the creation of the APSC. 
In this chapter’s section on individual actors, I mentioned that when encountering 
insecurities, people can protect themselves by taking one or more of three measures: people 
can rely on themselves while enacting either moderate or radical solutions; people can seek 
help from their governments; people can seek help from regional and international 
organisations and CSOs. The creation of the APSC is congruous with the third measure—
when encountering insecurities, people may seek help from regional and international 
organisations, and sometimes these organisations spontaneously come to the assistance of 
such people even in the absence of requests for help. The better the understanding that people 
have of how a multi-state actor can help them counter a human insecurity, the greater the 
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possibility that the multi-state actor can indeed successfully counter the human insecurity. I 
will use this argument to explore several questions regarding Southeast Asian people’s 
responses to the APSC: What are Southeast Asian people’s responses to the APSC? Do they 
know about the creation of the APSC? Have Southeast Asian people perceived improvements 
in their living standards their dignity, their safety, and their security? 
In this chapter’s section on state actors (2.1.4.1), I presented four concepts regarding 
state actors’ and non-state actors’ involvement in human-security issues. These concepts will 
serve as the analytical foundation for my effort to identify and to clarify the motivations, 
strategies, and barriers characterising state and non-states actors’ participation in the creation 
of the APSC. 
The first concept that I discussed earlier in this chapter is the necessary presence of 
motivations guiding states’ involvement in human-security issues. In fact, this concept can 
shed considerable light on why multi-state organisations and CSOs are involved in human-
security issues. For example, as mentioned in chapter one, the motivations underlying 
ASEAN’s creation of the APSC generally concerned a desire on the part of the association (1) 
improve its ability to address insecurities and (2) to re-enhance its influence in East Asia. See 
Seng Tan argued that many CSOs have their own “commitment to human rights and social 
justice” (Tan, 2005: 52) and I argue this commitment can rightly be regarded as a reflection 
of CSOs’ motivations. Two important advantages of analysing state- and non-states actors’ 
motivations may be that we can understand (1) why these actors adopt certain strategies in 
response to human-security issues and (2) how these actors adopt the strategies. Before 
exploring this matter, I will discuss motivations state and non-state actors’ adoption and use 
of related strategies. 
The second and the third concepts regarding state actors’ involvement in human-
security issues can clarify the motivations underlying state and non-states actors’ 
participation in the creation of the APSC. The second concept is the principle that the more 
democratic a state is, the more human security its people are likely to have; and the third 
concept is the perhaps obvious but critical principle that multi-state organisations may 
encounter difficulties when addressing human-security issues. These concepts can help us (1) 
identify barriers to the creation of the APSC, (2) determine whether or not democratic factors 
can become barriers to the creation of the APSC, when ASEAN members strategically 
address the creation of the APSC, and (3) gauge whether or not the norms of regional and 
international organisations can become barriers to the creation of the APSC when multi-state 
actors strategically address the creation of the APSC. 
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Table 2.1 The freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues addressed in the APSC 
blueprints, the ASCC blueprints, and the ASEAN Charter 
 APSC ASCC ASEAN Charter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Freedom 
from 
Want 
governance, human 
rights, corruption, 
democracy, non-
traditional security issues 
(e.g., drug and human 
trafficking, terrorism, 
illicit small arms and 
light weapons, and cyber 
crimes) 
entrepreneurial skills for 
vulnerable people, civil-
service capabilities, 
poverty, food security 
and safety, healthcare and 
healthy lifestyles, 
communicable diseases, 
drug problems, natural-
disaster management, 
rights and welfare of 
vulnerable people, 
environmental 
sustainability, and 
narrowing the 
development gap 
 
human rights, democracy, 
narrowing the 
development gap, 
alleviating poverty 
 
Freedom 
from 
Fear 
conflict management and 
conflict resolution, post-
conflict peace-building 
 
 
– 
peaceful settlement of 
disputes 
Sources: the APSC blueprint, the ASCC blueprint, and the ASEAN Charter 
 
The final concept regards non-state actors: namely the advantages and the barriers that 
can benefit and hinder CSOs’ involvement in human-security issues. The advantages include 
CSOs’ effectiveness in such undertakings, particularly given the fact that CSOs—unlike state 
governments—are not direct participants in national interests. Barriers to CSOs ability to get 
involved in human-security issues include CSOs’ scant or underdeveloped resources and 
government hostility towards CSOs. This concept will guide my examination of CSOs’ 
involvement in the APSC. I will seek to answer two questions in particular: Are the 
advantages from which CSOs benefit when involved in human-security conducive to the 
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creation of the APSC? Or do barriers to CSOs’ involvement in human-security issues hinder 
the creation of the APSC? 
Two points merit our attention here. First, as mentioned in chapter one, whether or not 
ASEAN can successfully create the APSC hinges on the extent to which ASEAN addresses 
non-traditional security issues in the ASCC and adheres to the ASEAN Charter. Thus, the 
current study takes into consideration each actor’s response to the ASEAN Charter and the 
ASCC pillar. 
Second, as mentioned previously in this chapter, both freedom-from-want and freedom-
from-fear elements are important in efforts to conceptualise human-security issues, and I also 
argue that freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues are important, when we study 
human-security topics (see section 2.1.2). Thus, when I historically review each actor’s 
responses to Southeast Asian human-security situations and when I explore types of actors’ 
responses—and individual actors’ responses—to the creation of the APSC, my analysis will 
be based on discussions of freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear themes (Table 2.1 
concerns the issues addressed in the APSC blueprints, the ASCC blueprints, and the ASEAN 
Charter, categorised according to freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear definitions). 
 
2.3 Selection Criteria for this Study’s Sources, Field Study, and Questionnaires 
2.3.1 Selection Criteria for this Study’s Sources 
In the social sciences, researchers commonly use documentary analysis to interpret or explore 
a given topic. The materials in the present study come from one of three types of sources. The 
first type of source comprises academic essays and books. The second type of source is media 
(in order to gain perspectives local to each Southeast Asian country under review here, I have 
accessed mainly local Southeast Asian media, the Brunei Times, the Borneo Post, the 
Inquirer.Net, the Jakarta Post, the Nation, the Philstar, the Star, the Strait Times, and the 
VietNamNet). Official documents constitute the third type of source and include the highly 
relevant series of documents that ASEAN has issued in regard to the APSC. 
 
2.3.2 Field Study 
I conducted a field study for this research. The purpose of the field study was to place me in 
possession of such information as is generally absent from the three aforementioned types of 
sources. I arranged interviews with government officials, scholars, and CSO representatives 
(for a breakdown of these data, please see Table 2.2 and 2.3; and for transcripts, please see 
the appendix). The questions that I asked were based on interviewees’ areas of specialisation. 
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Table 2.2 Field Study in Singapore (January 10, 2012 to January 20, 2012) 
Institutions Interviewees Interview Date Meeting Location 
Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies 
Ian Storey 
(Senior Fellow) 
January 20, 2012 
Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies 
European Union 
Centre 
Lay Hwee Yeo 
(Director of the 
European Union Centre) 
January 16, 2012 
European Union 
Centre 
S. Rajaratnam School 
of International 
Studies 
Ralf Emmers 
(Centre for Non-
Traditional Security 
Studies, Associate 
Professor) 
January 18, 2012 
S. Rajaratnam School 
of International 
Studies 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
Table 2.3 Field Study in Indonesia (January 21, 2012 to February 4, 2012) 
Institutions Interviewees Interview Date Meeting Location 
Indonesian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 
Jose Javares 
(Directorate General of 
ASEAN Cooperation) 
January 31, 2012 
Indonesian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 
Centre for Strategic 
and International 
Studies (CSIS) 
Lina Alexandra 
(Researcher in the CSIS) 
January 25, 2012 CSIS 
ASEAN Secretariat 
Mely Caballero-
Anthony 
(Director, External 
Relations ASEAN 
Political and Security 
Community) 
January 25, 2012 ASEAN Secretariat 
The AICHR 
Rafendi Djamin 
(Representative of 
Indonesia to the 
AICHR) 
January 27, 2012 
Menteng Jakarta 
Pusat 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
45 
 
2.3.3 Questionnaire-Survey 
The individual is an important actor in human-security issues: the individual is the referent 
object, and when encountering insecurities, individuals may seek assistance from state and 
non-state actors (see section 2.1.4). Thus, in the current study, I analyse Southeast Asians’ 
response to the creation of the APSC. In order to gather Southeast Asian people’s 
perspectives regarding the creation of the APSC, I conducted a survey, distributing 
questionnaires to 120 university students of Southeast Asian origins. The questionnaire 
method is appropriate within my study’s parameters because use of questionnaires is an 
effective method by which researchers can tap into people’s understanding or beliefs or 
sentiments regarding any of a host of issues, whether mainstream or obscure. Although the 
collection and the analysis of individuals’ questionnaire-survey responses in IR research area 
has not been common, a few scholars in the Southeast Asian IR field have successfully 
adopted the method to explore diplomatic and security issues. For example, Guido Benny 
collaborated with Kamarulnizam Abdullah on a study concerning “Indonesian Perceptions 
and Attitudes toward the ASEAN Community” (Benny and Abdullah, 2011) and collaborated 
with Ravichandran Moorthy on a study, published more recently, concerning “Is a ‘ASEAN 
Community’ Achievable? A Public Perception Analysis in Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore on the Perceived Obstacles to Regional Community” (Moorthy and Benny, 2012). 
It is important to note that these two essays address Southeast Asian people’s perspectives 
about the creation of the APSC, a topic that is at the heart of the present study. This section 
discusses the countries and people I targeted, my approach to acquiring a sample of 
respondents, and the types of questions my questionnaire featured: open-ended questions or 
close-ended questions. 
 
2.3.3.1 Chosen ASEAN Members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam 
I chose the Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand countries (IMPST) 
and Vietnam for four reasons. First, the IMPST countries participated in the founding of 
ASEAN. Second, the IMPST countries have played an important role in the creation of the 
APSC. For example, the Indonesian government essentially broached the topic of creating the 
APSC. Third, the government of the IMPST countries have promoted national awareness of 
AC-related issues and have even held workshops with this goal in mind. The fourth reason is 
related to Vietnam. In contrast to Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, Vietnam has developed 
notably stable politics and a reasonably prosperous economy. 
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2.3.3.2 Chosen International University Students of Southeast Asian Origin 
In configuring my questionnaire-survey, I concluded that international university students of 
origin would constitute a compelling sample population of respondents. Four factors were 
critical in guiding me to this conclusion. First, the questions in the questionnaires are 
academic, and thus, respondents should have attained an acceptable level of education if they 
were to answer the questions with reasonable acuity of mind. University students would be 
suitable respondents. Second, my limited research budget ruled out the possibility that I 
might travel to each chosen country for data-collection purposes. A quite reasonable 
alternative, however, was for me to distribute the questionnaire to students of Southeast Asian 
origin who were attending universities (mainly in the UK). In addition to being efficient and 
convenient, this approach guaranteed that the responses would come directly from natives of 
the six selected countries. Third, as I would have been unable to communicate with 
respondents in their native language had I travelled to the chosen countries, I would have 
needed to recruit a small army of translators and questionnaire-survey overseers, all of whom 
would have necessarily been proficient in both the spoken and the written language—or 
languages particular to each chosen country.  
 
Table 2.4 Profile of respondents 
Countries 
Gender Age 
Degree that respondents are 
pursuing 
Male Female 18-25 26-33 34-41 Undergraduate Master PhD 
Indonesia 11 9 3 11 6 1 7 12 
Malaysia 10 10 16 4 0 15 4 1 
Philippines 6 14 9 6 5 11 4 5 
Singapore 7 13 9 10 1 6 12 2 
Thailand 8 12 11 8 1 1 18 1 
Vietnam 5 15 17 3 0 9 11 0 
Total 47 73 65 42 13 43 56 21 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
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To have such a staff would have been ideal for an ideal questionnaire-survey, yet given just 
the financial limitations of my research project, no such staff would have been possible. A 
quite reasonable alternative was possible, however. In general, international university 
students of Southeast Asian origin (including, but by no means limited to, those students 
attending universities in English-speaking countries) have reasonably strong English abilities. 
They can intelligently complete questionnaires in English (Table 3.1 presents basic 
information about the respondents). 
 
2.3.3.3 Sampling Method Used for Respondents 
Of the various methods for recruiting study subjects, the snowball-design method was most 
suitable for the current study. When using questionnaires or surveys, researchers outfitted 
with the snowball-design method can identify “respondents to identify additional candidates 
to be interviewed” on the basis of recommendations from a small existing pool of 
respondents (Doyle, 2011). In the current study, I distributed my questionnaire to a selection 
of my Southeast Asian friends who were studying at international universities and requested 
that these respondents distribute my questionnaire to other international universities students 
of Southeast Asian origin who might be willing to respond to the questionnaire. I adopted two 
methods for distributing my questionnaire to potential respondents. The first method was 
electronic distribution, which was made possible primarily by use of email and Facebook. 
The second method was in-person distribution. The surveys were completed from December 
2013 to July 2014. 
 
2.3.3.4 The Reasons to Adopt Closed-Ended and Open-Ended Questions 
Generally, questions in questionnaires can be divided into two types: open-ended and close-
ended. The advantage of close-ended questions is that respondents can answer most of them 
easily, but the main disadvantage is that such questions shed little light on the possible 
complexity or nuance of respondents’ underlying thoughts about the matter under discussion: 
this is so because the answers are confined to “Yes” or “No” responses or to “Agree” or 
“Disagree” responses (Reja et al., 2003: 161). A huge advantage of open-ended question is 
that they enable respondents to express their perspectives about a given topic (Reja et al., 
2003: 161). One intriguing disadvantage of open-ended questions is that they can be time-
consuming for respondents, a factor that, among other outcomes, may decrease the 
willingness of respondents to participate in a questionnaire. 
The current study adopted a combination of close-ended questions and open-ended 
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questions, because some of the questions as I formulated them were conducive to one-word 
or two-word responses whereas other questions were conducive to longer, content-rich 
responses that expressed respondents’ perspectives at length and with useful nuance. Thus, a 
combination of close-ended an open-ended questions stood the best chance of eliciting from 
respondents the substance of their thoughts on a matter. 
 
2.4 Concluding Remarks to this Chapter 
In chapter one’s literature review (see section 1.3), I argued that the state-centric approaches 
have failed to facilitate rigorous explorations of Southeast Asian security issues and that this 
failure is due mainly to discrepancies between state-centric theories and the Southeast Asian 
“new security culture.” The first discrepancy is that in the Southeast Asian new security, 
origins of threats are various, but the state-centric theories focus only on state-sourced threats. 
The second discrepancy is that in the Southeast Asian new security, state and non-state actors 
play important roles in addressing insecurities. However, the state-centric theories pay either 
no attention or woefully little attention to non-state actors. The third discrepancy is that in the 
Southeast Asian new security culture, people usually are the victims of insecurities, but state-
centric theories prioritise states rather than people. The APSC is, itself, a product of the 
Southeast Asian new security culture, with which the state-centric approaches are out of step: 
the targeted outcome of the APSC is a people-oriented ASEAN, a fact that points to 
ASEAN’s growing concern about people in Southeast Asia. Moreover, issues that are 
enshrined in the blueprints of the APSC and the ASCC have been various. And Southeast 
Asians as individuals, state actors, and non-state actors have been involved in the APSC-
building process. Bearing these signs of progress in mind, I argue that the human-security 
concept is congruous with the APSC because the human-security concept has recognised 
various origins of threats, the need for different actors to address threats, and the prioritisation 
of human beings over such traditional markers of progress as military might. However, 
human security is a concept rather than a theoretical approach and, thus, is in need of a 
makeover of sorts: to ultimately acquire the status of a theory, the human-security concept 
must evolve first into an analytical framework. 
I followed five steps in transforming the human-security concept into a theory. In the 
first step, I explained the meaning of human security and distinguished between the human-
security concept and non-traditional security concepts. In the second step, I clarified the 
definitions of freedom from want and freedom from fear. I argue that these two definitions 
should co-exist, when we study human-security issues, because insecurities in both freedom-
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from-want and freedom-from-fear areas harm human beings. In the third step, I explained 
two central methods—the method of instituting human-development programmes and the 
method of enacting humanitarian intervention—to address threat to freedom from want and 
freedom from fear. In this same step, I also explored the repercussions arising from states’ 
and non-states’ implementation of methods for addressing human insecurities. In the fourth 
step, I explored how the basic types of actors respond to and address human insecurities. In 
the fifth and final step, I responded to critiques of human-security concept. By following the 
five steps, I confirmed the presence of three indispensable components of the human-security 
concept: (1) the purpose of human security is the protection of human beings; (2) the types of 
actors striving to achieve this purpose are individual people, state actors, and non-state actors; 
and (3) the two basic means by which the actors can achieve this purpose are human-
development programmes and humanitarian interventions. My analysis in chapters three 
through seven rests on this human-security analytical framework. 
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CHAPTER 3 INDIVIDUAL ACTORS: SOUTHEAST ASIANS 
Chapter three will examine Southeast Asian people’s responses to the AC: Do they know 
about the creation of the APSC? Have Southeast Asian people perceived improvements in 
their living standards their dignity, their safety, or their security? To ascertain the kinds of 
responses that Southeast Asian people would have to such questions, I conducted—for the 
current study—closed-ended and open-ended questionnaire-survey involving 120 
respondents from six ASEAN members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. 
Chapter three comprises three sections. The first section presents a historical review. In 
it, I explore Southeast Asians’ human-security situation from the 1950s to 2002. In the second 
section, I analyse the questionnaire-survey data. The final section presents my concluding 
remarks on the topics covered in this chapter. 
 
3.1 Historical Review: Southeast Asians’ Human Security 
Before exploring the current study’s questionnaire-survey data on Southeast Asians’ 
perceptions of relevant issues, and as a prelude to the study’s further review and analysis of 
other types of actors in this arena, I would like to present a historical review of Southeast 
Asians’ human security. As I argued in chapter two, human beings’ experience of insecurities 
can vary according to whether freedom-from-want or freedom-from-fear factors are in play, 
and the methods that human beings adopt in response to diverse insecurities may vary 
themselves. Bearing these premises in mind, let us consider the following questions: what 
were the threats to Southeast Asians between the 1950s and 2002? How did Southeast Asians 
manage these threats? Are there significant or telling differences between Southeast Asians’ 
human-security situations from the 1950s to the early 1990s and Southeast Asians’ human-
security situations from the early 1990s to 2002? If such differences are discernible, what are 
their underlying factors?  
 
3.1.1 From the 1950s to the early 1990s 
From the 1950s to the early 1990s, the human insecurities that Southeast Asians encountered 
stemmed from often unpredictable phenomena and from rather predictable human activities. 
Affected people searched for solutions to their human insecurities, but solutions were more or 
less fleeting or even illusory. The main reason for the ineffectiveness of proposed solutions 
was the non-democratic essence of Southeast Asian states’ political systems. 
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3.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
From the 1950s, to the early 1990s, threats to Southeast Asians’ freedom from want came 
from unpredictable natural phenomena and human activities. Regarding the former category, 
many Southeast Asians were experienced droughts, earthquakes, epidemics, floods, 
landslides, waves, storm surges, and wind storms. After these natural disasters would strike, 
slightly more predictable problems might arise such as famine, impoverishment, outbreaks of 
epidemiological diseases, and malnutrition. According to the statistics from the Asian 
Disaster Reduction Centre (ADRC), from 1961 to 1990, natural disasters caused 
homelessness for 6,184,224 and led to the serious injury of 50,597 people injured and the 
deaths of 72,301.15 To survive, such crises and to offset their destructiveness, many affected 
Southeast Asians sought solutions on their own. Examples of these kinds of activities abound. 
Just take climate change, which—regardless of its origins—has been a natural phenomenon 
associated with declines in catches of fish during the 1950: not a few Malaysian fishermen 
reacted to the crisis by resorting to piracy as an alternative livelihood (Jasparro and Taylor, 
2008: 244).  
Human activities were another source of insecurities to Southeast Asians’ freedom from 
want during this period. To Southeast Asians, this threat took the form of their government. 
Some Southeast Asians sought solutions to regain their human security, but they encountered 
their governments’ repression. In Cambodia, Muslim fishermen (near the City of Kampong 
Chhnang) protested against the government’s adoption of a collectivisation programme, but 
the communists killed the demonstrators (Kiernan, 1996: 260-1). In Indonesia, in 1973, 
students protested against the government’s incapacity to address several types of insecurities, 
including corruption, income gaps, and unemployment, but the Indonesian government 
dispersed the protesters rather than consider their grievances (Samson, 1974: 162-3). In 
Myanmar in September 1988, citizens demonstrated for the establishment of both their 
human rights and democracy, but the Myanmar government ruthlessly quashed the protestors. 
In the Philippines, in late 1975, Filipinos called for government to raise the minimum wage 
and to loosen controls governing the creation of labour unions, but the Marcos government 
arrested these people (Noble, 1977: 134-5). In Singapore in the mid-1970s, students 
demonstrated against the unemployment problem, and the Singaporean government 
responded promptly to the upheaval by arresting them (Gerard, 2014: 53). In Thailand in 
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 http://www.adrc.asia/publications/databook/DB2000_e.html 
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1973, Thai students protested their government’s incompetence in addressing insecurities, 
including unemployment, lack of human rights, and corruption (Darling, 1974a: 13). The 
governments’ response was predictably repressive, and certainly not progressive. 
Why did government repression so uniformly greet Southeast Asian people’s public 
expression of grievances related to freedom-from-want issues? The main reason lay in the 
political systems at the heart of Southeast Asian countries. From the 1950s to the early 1990s, 
political systems in many Southeast Asian countries were strictly non-democratic. As 
mentioned in chapter two, the non-democratic political system is remarkably efficient at 
erecting obstacles to people’s human security, because non-democratic regimes’ viability rests 
chiefly on placing almost an entire population in a kind of existential stranglehold rather than 
on winning democratic elections. The typical Southeast Asian government from this era was 
highly sensitive to criticism and was keen to stamp out demonstrations, campaigns, and social 
movements, and the like. Against this formidable opposition, Southeast Asians possessed few 
effective means for establishing widespread human security. Peter Kann pointed out, in the 
case of the Philippines, that Marcos declared martial law to consolidate his regime through 
the imposition of tight controls on the Filipino people rather than through the establishment 
of programmes targeting human-security threats themselves (Kann, 1974: 618-21). The 
Marcos reign ensured that most Filipinos would suffer from pronounced income inequalities, 
crime, and a denial of basic human rights (Kann, 1974: 624-28). 
 
3.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
Southeast Asian people’s adoption of radical measures to establish a reasonable degree of 
freedom from want met with repressive measures adopted by the governments in question, 
and a major consequence of all these countermeasures was a spike in freedom-from-fear 
problems. Freedom from fear was a comfort enjoyed by few people living in numerous areas 
throughout the region: the residents of Indonesia’s Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya areas; 
Myanmar’s Arakan, Kachin, Karen, Mon, Shan, and Wa states; Thailand’s Patani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat areas; and the Philippines’ Mindanao islands. In these areas, residents witnessed 
their governments’ nearly continuous neglect of freedom-from-want problems, many of 
which were grave. For example, people in Irian Jaya suffered from the government’s 
inequitable distribution of national resources (Lagerberg, 1979: 105); natural resources in 
Aceh and Mindanao were overwhelmingly exploited by their governments (Islam, 1998: 448, 
Huxley, 2002a: 35, 43); Acehnese cultural and religious traditions were marginalised by the 
Indonesian government (Sjamsuddin, 1985: 63-5); the Thai government chronically 
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overlooked the sufferings of Malay-Muslim populations in Thailand’s three southern 
provinces (Thomas, 1975: 7-10); and governments became practiced at silencing the political 
demands (often for autonomy and independence) made by people living in the above 
mentioned places (Thomson, 1995: 271-4).  
Some of these people, in the face of governmental neglect and hostility, devised radical 
solutions for the establishment of security. In December 1976, the Acehnese revolted against 
the Indonesian government by organising the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, 
GAM). People in Irian Jaya in 1964 created the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua 
Merdeka, OPM) in 1964, which opposed through armed methods Indonesia’s incorporation of 
Irian Jaya. Activists in East Timor established the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste 
Independente (Fretilin) in May 1974 in pursuit of independence. In Myanmar, each state had 
one or more insurgent organizations16 and their causes may have varied from fighting for 
autonomy, independence, and democracy to protecting interests like narcotics trading, but 
their measures were almost always militant. In Thailand’s Muslim southern provinces, there 
were numerous armed groups, but the most influential one was the Patani National Liberation 
Front (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani, BNPP). People in the Philippines’ Mindanao 
islands created the MNLF,17 whose cause was to create a sovereign Bangsamoro Republic 
through armed struggle. These groups adopted radical means to fight for their freedom from 
want, and their governments responded with hard-line measures. Armed conflicts between 
these radical groups and their governments were rooted in numerous grievances and 
motivations surrounding freedom from want, and an irony of all civil wars is that they lead to 
people’s freedom-from-fear insecurities. 
Again, the principle of democracy has played an important role in Southeast Asian 
people’s efforts to counter domestic governmental repression and to establish human security. 
From the 1950s to the early 1990, no Southeast Asian governments possessed a democratic 
system. The governments were suspicious of people’s activities, which posed potential threats 
to the viability of domestic regimes in power. To these regimes, freedom-from-fear issues 
                                                 
16
 Arakan State had the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) and Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO); 
Kachin State had the New Democratic Army and the Kachin Defence Army (KDA); Karen State had the Karen 
National Union (KNU) and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP); Mon State had the New Mon State 
Party (NMSP) and the Mong Tai Army (MTA); Shan State had the Shan State Army South (SSA-S), the Shan 
State National Army (SSNA), and the Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SSNPLO) and 
Wa State had the United Wa State Army (UWSA). 
17
 In 1978, the MNLF was fragmented into the MILF.  
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were more sensitive than freedom-from-want issues, since the latter were related to autonomy 
and political independence. In order to maintain their own territorial integrity, non-
democratic governments usually adopted hard-line measures in response to people’s demands 
for participatory democracy, much less outright autonomy.  
 
3.1.2 From the early 1990s to 2002 
From the 1990s to 2002, many Southeast Asians encountered a decline in their governments’ 
repressive policies, even when people publicly voiced demands for human security. This 
liberalising trend was confined largely to countries where a degree of democratic government 
had taken hold: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Human 
security remained significantly restricted for Southeast Asians residing in non-democratic 
countries: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV). 
 
3.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
From the early 1990s to 2002, threats to Southeast Asians’ freedom from want came from 
frequently unpredictable natural phenomena and from human activities, as had been the case 
in the proceeding era. The negative effects of unpredictable natural phenomena on Southeast 
Asian people did not decline in severity. From 1991 to 2000, natural phenomena resulted in 
the homelessness of 182,787 people, significant injuries to 331,109 people, and the deaths of 
32,029 people.18 
Although Southeast Asian people remained beset by natural disasters, people in IMPST 
experienced less governmental repression than people in CLMV. In fact, widespread public 
pressure led to the collapse of certain Southeast Asian regimes. Such was the case in 1998, 
when Indonesian people protested against the Indonesian government’s incompetence in 
addressing economic problems linked to the financial crisis: President Suharto, as a 
consequence, fell from power. However, people in CLMV still encountered repressive 
government measures. For example, CLMV governments still carried out systematic arrests 
of people who peacefully demonstrating for their freedom from want. 
The differences between the IMPST situation and the CLMV situation had mostly to do 
with governments’ attitudes towards democracy. Beginning in the early 1990s, governments 
in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand implemented democratic systems (although their 
democracies did not mature to the extent to which Western democracies had matured in 
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preceding decades). Governments in Malaysia and Singapore also gradually accepted 
discussion of democracy in their national agenda. These governments’ positive attitudes 
towards democracy were manifested in a survey which was conducted by Freedom House in 
1999. By that year, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore had acquired the status of “partly free” 
countries, and the Philippines and Thailand were considered “free” countries.19 The survey 
suggested that people in these countries encountered varying degrees of reduced 
governmental repression related to people’s pursuit of human security. For example, Damien 
Kingsbury argued that the Indonesian government’s adoption of a democratic system was a 
key factor in the Indonesian people’s relatively free expression of ideas (Kingsbury, 2005: 13-
5). 
By contrast, people in the CLMV countries still suffered from government repression, 
although the situation eased somewhat. Jörn Dosch argued that political transitions occurred 
in many Southeast Asian countries, including even in quite rigidly non-democratic countries 
like Cambodia (Dosch, 2008: 529-30). The growing influence and the growing number of 
CSOs in many Southeast Asian countries during this period exemplified these “structural 
alterations” (Dosch, 2008: 532). In large measure, however, political transitions in the CLMV 
countries were minor and the governments remained non-democratic. The Freedom House 
survey from 1998 and 1999 shows that the CLMV countries had earned a “not free” status 
(even in 2013, the CLMV countries held firmly onto their “not free” Freedom House 
status). 20  In addition, the CSOs expansion did not translate into significant political 
transitions in these countries. After all, CSO activities, despite their considerable diversity, 
differed during this era from people’s pursuit of human security. CSOs existed in the CLMV 
countries precisely because the CSOs’ activities generally created no direct challenge to 
governments’ viability. Kelly Gerard argued that these non-democratic governments’ 
tolerated certain CSOs’ activities precisely because activities “fit with states’ agenda” 
(Gerard, 2014: 60). However, when CLMV citizens protested their respective government’s 
neglect of human rights, corrupt land-grabbing practices, or resistance to democracy, the 
protests were essentially directly questioning the government’s legitimacy and openly 
challenging the government’s viability. In order to consolidate their power, CLMV 
governments were unlikely to tolerate these anti-government activities. Thus, people who 
gained a measure of human security through public protest against their government still 
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encountered repressive government measures in many other aspects of life. 
 
3.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
Governments’ attitudes towards democracy can also help explain freedom-from-fear issues. 
When people in Aceh, East Timor, Irian Jaya, and Mindanao used radical means to establish 
their human security, the Indonesian and the Filipino governments gradually adopted 
moderate responses to the demands, although sporadic armed conflicts between the 
governments and radical groups persisted. The main cause of this mellowing response 
between the early 1990s and the early 2000s centred on the Indonesian and the Filipino 
governments’ gradual embrace of democracy. Some leaders recognised that regime 
consolidation through brutal repression of citizens could be far less effective than empathetic 
inducement of people’s support. For example, Indonesian President SBY engaged in the Aceh 
peace process. He accepted EU and ASEAN members as mediators. SBY’s efforts helped 
him garner 93% of the vote in Aceh during his run for a second presidential term. Thus, the 
Indonesian and the Filipino governments exhibited instances of tolerance for people who had 
been employing radical efforts to establish human security. For example, the Indonesian 
Megawati government in 2001 passed a special autonomy law in reference to Aceh and Irian 
Jaya. In addition, Philippine President Arroyo, during her first presidential term (2001-2004), 
rejected the all-out war policy of her predecessor, President Estrada, and adopted a moderate 
solution to the MILF. 
However, the Myanmar government, known as the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC), remained reluctant to integrate democratic principles into its rule. 
Although from 1988 forward, SLORC negotiating a ceasefire with some armed insurgency 
groups, the government continued to impose repressive measures on other armed insurgency 
groups, such as the KNU and the United Wa State Party (UWSP), largely because these 
groups constituted long-term significant challenges to the government’s legitimacy and 
policies. The KNU’s State illustrates the kinds of challenges that the country’s leadership 
would not tolerate (Smith, 2002: 17).  
 
3.2 Individuals’ Responses to the Creation of the AC 
According to the above historical review of Southeast Asians’ human security from the 1950s 
to 2002, people in pro-democratic countries enjoyed more human security than did people in 
non-democratic countries. Again, this is not to say that improvements in the human security 
of pro-democratic Southeast Asian countries were on par with improvements already attained 
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by many Western countries. Significant human insecurities continued to plague Southeast 
Asia’s pro-democratic countries, and indeed still do. ASEAN’s decision to create the APSC 
by 2015 is a huge opportunity for Southeast Asians, both in pro-democratic and non-
democratic countries, to improve their human security (or, as the case may be, mitigate their 
human insecurity). The planned creation of the APSC has raised many concerns, of which a 
particularly important one is whether Southeast Asians will seize or squander the “huge 
opportunity.” Having conducted a survey addressing this concern, I shall discuss in this 
section the survey itself, its results (which reflect the responses of 120 respondents), and two 
questions central to it: How familiar were respondents with the AC? And did respondents feel 
that their human security had been improving? 
 
3.2.1 Empirical Analysis of Questionnaire Responses 
In this section, I will analyse the two central issues addressed by the questionnaire: whether 
or not—and if so to what extent—respondents were familiar with the AC; and whether or 
not—and if so to what extent—respondents felt that their human security had improved. This 
section will not only present the results of the questionnaire but also illustrate the nuanced 
discourses at the base of respondents’ answers.  
The questionnaire featured three sets of questions (coupled with imperative requests for 
detailed information). The first set of questions consisted of three questions concerning basic 
knowledge about Southeast Asia and ASEAN: (1) How many countries are there in Southeast 
Asia? Please list the countries you know. (2) How many members does ASEAN have? Please 
list the members you know. (3) Is your country part of ASEAN? Please describe what you 
know about ASEAN. 
The second set of questions consisted of one question concerning basic knowledge 
about the AC: Do you know that ASEAN plans to create the AC by 2015? If yes, please 
describe what you know about the AC. 
The third set of questions consisted of three questions concerning people’s human 
security: (1) When living in your country, do you enjoy adequate human rights? Please 
describe any human rights you are denied. (2) Do you think that your government provides 
you with enough security? Please describe any types of security your government is unable to 
provide. (3) Do you have confidence that, if your native country suffers a natural disaster like 
a tsunami or an earthquake, your government can provide rapid, adequate relief? Please give 
reasons for your answer. 
 
 3.2.1.1 Respondents’ Familiarity with
A total of 32 students (29.1%) 
Of the 120 respondents, the group of Thai respondents registered the highest number of 
respondents—15—who knew about the AC’s creation
and Singapore groups, each, registered 
registered 3 respondents; Vietnam, 
that they were aware of ASEAN’s efforts to 
accurate description of the AC should, according to the Bali Concord, 
three pillars of the AC and the purpose of the creation of the AC. 
claimed to know that ASEAN would be creating the AC, only 4 respondents c
the two aforementioned qualities attributable to the AC
of the creation of the AC).  
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Figure 3.1 Respondents (by country) familiar with the AC
       Source: Author’s own compilation
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Vietnam Respondent No. 8 wrote down that the AC is 
 
a community like [the] EU. 
 
Other respondents’ answers focused excessively on the AEC. Indonesia Respondent No. 
7 answered the question, “Do you know that ASEAN plans to create the AC by 2015? Please 
describe what you know about the AC” with the following description of the organisation: 
 
To some extent, the association [ASEAN] is trying to build economic power as [is] [the] 
European Union through a free trade region. When the AC starts, there will be some 
policies to accelerate trade and business among the ASEAN member countries. 
 
In response to the same questions, Thailand Respondent No. 15 offered an interesting attempt 
to describe the AC: 
 
It’s not [the] ASEAN Community, because it was established [a] long time ago. 
However, you may mean [the] AEC (ASEAN Economic Community) that will launch 
economic cooperation in the multi-lateral levels in extents [areas] of taxations, trade 
agreements, labour rights and foreign investments. 
 
Thailand Respondent No. 19’s answer to the question led to this description of the AC: 
 
It aspires to be what the EU is in social, economic and political aspects. I think the 
main objective is economic. 
 
Only 4 of the 32 respondents were able to accurately describe the AC. Indonesia 
Respondent No. 6 offered one such description: 
 
[The] AC is the vision of ASEAN to form a community of people that has common 
regional identity, [is] democratic, [is] living in pace [peace], [has] economic 
integration, [has] prosperity, [is a] caring society, and share[s] cultural heritage. [The] 
AC comprises of [sic] three pillars: political-security, economic, [and] socio-cultural. 
[The] AC mission is not to make ASEAN [a] supranational body in the like [likeness] of 
[the] EU, but to make [a greater] connection among ASEAN people and [to promote] 
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greater understanding among [the] leaders in the ASEAN region about the importance 
and strategi[c] influence of [the] Southeast Asian region in world affairs. 
 
Again in reference to the question “Do you know that ASEAN plans to create the AC by 2015. 
Please describe what you know about the AC,” Singapore Respondent No. 1 characterised the 
AC thus: 
 
[AC] serves to further unify the ASEAN members by creating a more cohesive 
community/network (not that much unlike that of the EU).Founded on several pillars 
including economic and cultural. The economic pillar will look at managing tariffs 
between member states. The cultural pillar focuses on cultural exchanges between 
states. 
 
Philippines Respondent No. 11 was the third respondent to describe the AC adequately: 
 
The AC will be built on three pillars (political-security, economic, socio-cultural). The 
vision is to create the free movement of goods, people and services amongst the ten 
member states. 
 
The fourth and final adequate answer to “what you know about the AC” was Philippines 
Respondent No. 15: 
 
[The] ASEAN Community aims to highlight the objectives of the regional organization 
by creating three pillars…political-security community, economic community, and 
socio-cultural community. Each one has a blueprint of what needs to be done to ensure 
that we create these types of communities. All these aim to promote better cooperation 
and coordination across the different member states. 
 
It should not be surprising that not many respondent shad a sufficient grasp of the AC’s 
general mission. In 2004, Caballero-Anthony argued that “While ASEAN is well into its 
thirty-sixth year, it remains an unknown entity for most of the people of Southeast Asia” 
(Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 577). Thị Thu Hương Đặng also argued that “there is almost no 
sense of community among the people in Southeast Asia” (Đặng, 2008: 8). Several factors 
can explain why only 4 of the 120 respondents were able to describe the AC according to the 
 current study’s standard. For starters, ASEAN has been a 
body and, for this reason, has failed to communicate its mission to Southeast Asian people. 
Perhaps an even more important factor in Southeast Asians’ low awareness o
lack of interest in ASEAN and Southeast Asian affairs.
According to the data, only 
in Southeast Asia and identified all the 
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Figure 3.2 Respondents (by country) 
       Source: Author’s own compilation
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Figure 3.3 Respondents 
        Source: Author’s own compilation
 
Singapore Respondent No. 2 provided the following adequate description of ASEAN:
 
ASEAN is a bloc of 10 nation
political and economic ties. The bloc is working towards free trade, among other 
agreements as outlined in the ASEAN Blueprint 2015. In its history, ASEAN has been 
lauded and, at the same time, criticized for the ‘ASEAN Way’ as its defining approach 
in handling inter-state affairs. ‘The ASEAN Way’ is characterized by a soft approach in 
negotiations and resolving conflicts and policy of non
domestic affairs, among other traits. This has been met with criticism because of how 
long ASEAN nation-states take to reach consensus on any given issues, if at all reached
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arrangement to promote cultural and economic and national development. Initially 
non-communist in orientation, the bloc has come to represent pluralism in social, 
political and normative national traditions, hence giving primacy to sovereignty and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of the state. 
 
A third adequate description of ASEAN came from Vietnam Respondent No. 6: 
 
It is an association first established to counter Communism by 3 founding members 
(probably Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines, I cannot remember exactly). Then it 
has opened to other countries in Southeast Asia and worked on the purpose of 
cooperating and helping each other to develop [the] economy, sharing culture[s], and 
political aspects. It is allowed that tourists from … ASEAN members can get easy 
access to other countries of the Association without having to apply for visa[s]. [The] 
tariff rate for imports from one member into other members is lower. There are many 
advantages to encourage the mutual benefits of trading within ASEAN members. 
 
3.2.1.2 Respondents’ Perspectives on Their Living Standards, Dignity, and Safety 
Since 2003 ASEAN has been preparing the creation of the APSC. However, not many 
respondents felt that their living standards had risen or that their safety was more secure since 
preparations to create the APSC had gotten underway. Regarding the question “When living 
in your country, do you enjoy adequate human rights?” 52 respondents wrote down that they 
lacked adequate human rights (43%). The majority of these respondents were Malaysians—
15 out of the 52 (please fee Figure 3.4). Also, 12 Singaporean respondents expressed their 
opinion that they lacked adequate human rights. 
6 Malaysian respondents claimed that they had not enjoyed the freedoms of either 
religious belief or expression in their native country. For example, Malaysia Respondent No. 
6 offered this commentary: 
 
Islam [is] still [the] priority [as the] state religion but the society in our country is 
multi-cultural. It makes people feel like second [rate] citizen[s], if we are not from the 
state religion. 
 
All twelve Singaporean respondents who felt that they had lacked human rights in their native 
country pointed out that the Singaporean governments has denied them, in particular, the 
 freedom of expression (speech). In discussing the matter, Singapore Respondent No. 2 wrote,
 
There are many ways to do it 
being increasingly regulated with the new MDA [Media Development Authority] rule 
that forces influential bloggers to apply for a publishing license once they reach a 
certain level of followers online
 
Singapore Respondent No. 17 offered these thoughts on the subject:
 
From my perspectives, our government has provided [a] robust welfare system. 
However, we have limited freedom of expression, in particular for political opponents. 
Our governments have used various methods to di
example, our government has adopted defamation suits against its critics.
 
Figure 3.4 Respondents (by country) who expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their 
native
       Source: Author’s own compilation
 
A total of 77 respondents answered in the negative to the question
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In response to human
degradation were common themes responses among the 11 Indonesian respondents wh
the belief that their native country’s government was not providing them with adequate 
human security. Indonesia Respondent No. 1, provided an answer illustrating this pattern:
 
I lives [sic] in Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia. The government
provides enough security and public services to its people. However, inequality is a 
major issue in Indonesia. Corruption that involves local officials, poverty, 
unavailability of basic health services and environmental degradation are some iss
faced by the local government
 
Figure 3.5 Respondents (by country)
provided them with human security
Source: Author’s own compilation
 
Some Malaysian respondents wrote that people in Malaysia have encountered
as endemic crime, poverty, corruption, or racism. Malaysia Respondent No. 17 wrote
 
I do still think that our government is kind of funny as there is no one going to raise the 
problem of being discriminating among the races
0
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
65 
from other countries complained that thei
-security question, poor medical care and environmental 
.  
 who held that their native country’s government 
 
 
…Well, as a student, I do think that my 
5 10 15 20
Respondents who held that 
their government provided 
them with enough human 
security
Respondents who held that 
their government did not 
provide them with enough 
human security
r native country’s 
 
o held 
 
 of Jakarta 
ues 
 
 such problems 
, 
66 
 
country[’s] education system wouldn’t bring us further as bias [is] still present among 
the system. I strongly believe that the racist issue… [is] present, but not among the 
citizen[s], but it [is] being manipulated by government as their tool to [exercise] 
control over us. 
 
Corruption, crime, environmental degradation, job security, poor medical care, and poverty 
are problems cited by Thai students, including Thailand Respondent No. 9: 
 
I think my government [is responsible for a] lack of good care in transportation and 
health care for poor or lower income people. 
 
Filipino students identified insecurities they faced, singling out such problems as corruption, 
crime, environmental degradation, and poverty. Philippines Respondent No. 7 commented on 
all three themes: 
 
There is hardly anything being done to protect the environment. New movements were 
only started due to the demand of the upper class and celebrities. I feel that the local 
police are there most of the time to catch criminals etc, but they do nothing to prevent 
them. Medical care is not free, and almost always very expensive. Hospitals have 
become a place of business, not a place of healing. 
 
Another Filipino respondent (No. 14) echoed the same general sentiment while touching on 
additional themes: 
 
Internet crimes, laws in doing business and education still have lots of holes and are 
not able to protect residents of the country. Issues related to poverty have not been 
solved as there are still a lot of people living in poverty and hunger. Industrial 
economic growth has brought a lot of environmental pollutions to the country. 
 
Sixteen Vietnamese students stated that their government did not provide them with adequate 
human security. The types of problems tended to include corruption, environmental 
degradation, food security, unaffordable medical care, and poverty. Vietnamese Respondent 
No. 7 argued, 
 
 The medical care quality is not as good as in the more develo
[sic] Singapore, Malaysia). The cost for good, effective medical treatments is still very 
high. 
 
Regarding the question, “
or an earthquake, do you have confidence 
relief?” Of the 120 respondents, 62 expressed a lack of confidence in their government’s 
preparedness (please see Figure 3.6
levels of confidence in their government’s ability to manage natural disasters. Singapore 
Respondent No. 1 wrote, 
 
I am aware that our emergency services personnel have been trained for disaster relief 
(and they regularly do go to the aid of other countries). 
 
Figure 3.6 Respondents (by country) who expressed confidence in their native country’s 
government regarding natural
               Source: Author’s own compilation
 
Singapore Respondent No. 5 had this to say:
 
Singapore has mission-
natural disaster both overseas and domestic[ally]. The Singapore Armed Forces and 
0
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
67 
ped ASEAN countries (e.g: 
If your native country suffers a natural disaster like a tsunami 
that your government can provide rapid, adequate 
) (52%). Singaporean respondents expressed the highest 
 
-disaster management 
 
 
ready response teams to provide aid and relief to victims of 
5 10 15 20
Respondents who expressed 
confidence in heir government
Respondents who expressed a 
lack of confidence in their 
government
 
68 
 
Home Team agencies have the financial, technological and human resources to respond 
quickly to ‘stranded’ locations. 
 
With the exception of Singaporean respondents, most respondents from each country 
expressed a lack of confidence in the ability of their native country’s government to manage 
natural disasters. Indonesian Respondent No. 5 offered this balanced assessment: 
 
If the small scale earthquake happens, with the small scale of damage, my government 
can handle it. But for large scale earthquake, like earthquake and tsunami in Aceh 
2004, my government was not ready, especially if it happens in remote area. 
 
Many respondents pointed out that the corruption was a significant barrier to their 
respective government’s ability to address natural disasters. Malaysia Respondent No. 1 gave 
voice to this concern: 
 
We are not given the real information about our financial status and because of the 
recent splurge of the government in useless stuff or buildings. Besides that, many will 
even embezzle money out of the country for personal gain. 
 
Malaysian Respondent No. 16 singled out incompetence on the part of the Malaysian 
government: 
 
Current government is not efficient enough and they may have not enough experience 
on handling natural disaster since Malaysia seldom have [sic] natural disaster. Paid 
government workers also [are] more lazy compared to private non-pay workers. 
 
Likewise, Thailand Respondents No. 8 and No. 11 articulated their belief that the Thai 
government, because of corruption, is unable to cope satisfactorily with natural disasters. 
Thailand Respondent No. 8 argued from historical precedence: 
 
Thailand … experienced … great disaster in the past 2 years and the government of 
Thailand … proved that they cannot handle the situation. I think it is due to high 
corruption in Thailand[’s] political sector. 
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Thailand Respondent No. 11 complained, as well, about corruption—this time in regard to 
the most recent tsunami that struck southern Thailand: 
 
… the population depended on non-profit organizations such as Red Cross and others 
for relief. The funds from government was [sic] too much slower [sic] and was heavily 
corrupted by the time the aids and funds arrived. 
 
Philippines Respondent No. 7 also drew a link between inept natural-disaster management 
and government corruption: 
 
For example, look at what is happening now after Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda. We 
received millions in international aid, but there is controversy happening about whether 
the money was spent on what the victims needed, and whether the money was used 
wisely. The government is so corrupt, and … probably half of the money didn’t go 
where it was supposed to. 
 
Many Vietnamese respondents’ answers point to the firmness of their belief that their 
government lacks adequate resources to address natural disasters effectively. Vietnam 
Respondent No. 1 stated, 
 
There are barriers related to technology that restraint [sic] government’s ability to 
recover the whole area affected. Government budget is insufficient but large support 
from people in different parts of the country may help a lot. 
 
Vietnam Respondent No. 4 voiced a similar concern: 
 
My country is a developing country. So the finance[s], technology or social fund[s] are 
not enough for government to deal with natural disasters. 
 
Many respondents’ complaints about a lack of human rights and a lack of human 
security in their homeland, and many respondents’ strongly expressed lack of confidence in 
their own government, all suggest that ASEAN has done a sub-par job of creating the APSC 
and the ASCC. CSOs have already expressed their disappointment in the ASEAN Charter 
(Collins, 2008: 314) and many media have criticised ASEAN for failing to develop a people-
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oriented AC, often accusing ASEAN of remaining an elitist organisation. Their 
disappointment and criticism point to their possible underlying assumption that if ASEAN 
cannot achieve people-oriented targets, ASEAN members must be the central culprits. Indeed, 
it is a generally accepted principle that state actors have a responsibility to improve people’s 
human security, but I would like to focus here on Southeast Asians’ own responsibility to 
protect and promote their own and one another’s human security, as well. I mentioned in 
chapter two that the extent to which multi-state organisations can mitigate human insecurities 
depends on the wider population’s understanding of multi-state organisations’ plans and 
policies (see section 2.1.4.1). In short, to improve their human security, people should 
familiarise themselves with multi-state organisations. When the Phnom Penh Post 
interviewed ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan, Surin’s argument suggested that 
Southeast Asian people’s awareness of the AC was of tremendous importance. He said,  
 
The new charter now provides for people to participate and make a contribution. If 
people take that seriously, we’ll have a chance to help drive and shape the region and 
the organization. If they don’t, then you can’t blame the leaders. They have made their 
commitment. They have opened up the space. Now it’s for the people of ASEAN to 
seize the opportunity. (Phnom Penh Post, March 9, 2009) 
 
Unfortunately, according to the current study’s finding, few respondents knew about the 
efforts to create the AC. Respondents’ lack of knowledge concerning ASEAN and indeed 
other multi-state organisations may prove detrimental to these respondents’ human security, 
quite simply because their ignorance limits their range of choices in addressing human 
insecurities. For example, ASEAN created the AICHR in October 2009. The AICHR’s 
purpose has been to improve and promote human rights among Southeast Asians. Although it 
is too early to conclude that the AICHR will directly combat Southeast Asians’ human 
insecurity, the AICHR has regularly brought people’s human-insecurity issues to the fore. 
Respondents, if they had adequately familiarised themselves with plans for the creation of the 
AC, could have communicated their pleasure or displeasure with the ongoing development of 
the AC by lodging praise or complaints with the AICHR. 
 
3.3 Concluding Remarks to this Chapter 
Chapter two’s section on individual actors (2.1.4.1) mentioned that human beings 
instinctually seek to preserve their own human security by any of a host of means. We can 
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find recent historical instances in which Southeast Asian people have employed diverse 
methods to protect themselves from insecurities. However, whether their methods were 
effective or not often depended in large part on their respective governments’ political system. 
People’s adoption of self-protective measures may stand a better chance of eliciting a positive 
response from democratic governments than from non-democratic ones. And in this regard, I 
argued in chapter two’s state-actors section (2.1.4.2) that the more democratic a state is, the 
more human security its people are likely to have. 
In order to get a glimpse into Southeast Asian people’s response to the APSC, I 
conducted the questionnaire-survey discussed above. I designed a closed-ended and open-
ended questionnaire-survey and, by using the snowball-design method, distributed the 
questionnaires to students of Southeast Asian origin who were attending universities (mainly 
the UK). The questionnaire elicited from respondents their views on the creation of the APSC: 
specifically, the questionnaire helped clarify whether the extend to which respondents knew 
about the AC, whether respondents were satisfied with their current human-security situation, 
and whether respondents had confidence in their own government regarding its capacity to 
handle natural disasters. 
One of the most compelling findings gleaned from this questionnaire-survey centres on 
an apparent mismatch between claim of knowledge and demonstrated knowledge: of the 120 
respondents, 32 claimed to know that ASEAN would create the AC by 2015, yet only four of 
these 32 respondents could adequately describe the AC. In addition, the questionnaire-survey 
findings suggest that many of the respondents did not perceive themselves as benefactors of 
adequate human rights in their homeland, did not regard their own government as effective 
providers of human security, and did not have much confidence in their own government’s 
ability to manage natural disasters. These and other themes in the respondents’ responses to 
the questionnaire-survey items constitute tangible evidence pointing to the possibility that 
ASEAN has not done enough to inform the public of its intentions regarding creation of the 
AC. People should strive on gain familiarity with prominent, relevant multi-state 
organisations, because the less awareness people have of such organisations, the fewer the 
choices people have in addressing a variety of serious insecurities. 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
CHAPTER 4 STATE ACTORS I: ASEAN MEMBER-STATES 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand created ASEAN in 1967. 
Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia joined ASEAN in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
However, since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has been a heterogeneous organisation. 
Politically, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand currently have relatively pro-democratic 
political systems. Malaysia and Singapore are soft-authoritarian polities. Brunei possesses an 
absolute monarchy. Laos and Vietnam are quasi-socialist. Myanmar is ruled by a military 
junta,21 and the government of Cambodia is authoritarian. Economically, development among 
members has its disparities. Brunei and Singapore are developed members, and Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are developing countries. Economic development in 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam lags far behind the economic development in the 
developed and developing member-countries. Because of political and economic differences 
among ASEAN members, it is not easy for the members to reach a consensus when trying to 
render decisions: after all, each member has its own unique set of interests to consider. 
Likewise, regarding the APSC, each member has adopted its own strategies and motivations 
underlying its strategies. Exploration of members’ strategies and motivations underlying 
strategies is important. As I mentioned in chapter two, state and non-state actors involved in 
human-security issues have their own strategies and their own motivations underlying these 
strategies (see section 2.1.4.2). Rigorous exploration of strategies and motivations can help us 
identify the barriers to the creation of the APSC. In chapter four, I will analyse each member-
state’s strategies and underlying motivations. In the conclusion, I will explore significant 
barriers to the creation of the APSC. 
 
4.1 Brunei Darussalam 
Probably because Brunei is a small country in terms of size and population, it has not 
typically been in the academic or media spotlight. However, the Brunei government is among 
the few Southeast Asian countries to have steadily provided human security to its citizens, 
thanks to the country’s abundant natural resources. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the 
Brunei government has adopted support strategies. In this section of my study, I will first 
historically review how the Bruneian government has provided its people with human 
security, and will then explore the Bruneian government’s strategies for creating the APSC 
                                                 
21
 In late 2010, the Myanmar government implemented political reforms. They released political prisoners and 
hold the by-elections in April 2011.  
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and the motivations underlying these strategies. 
 
4.1.1 Historical Review: Since Independence in 1984 to 2002 
In this historical review, I will explore how the Bruneian government has provided its people 
with human security. Thanks to considerable crude oil and liquefied natural gas reserves, the 
Bruneian government has been able to provide its people with an impressive welfare system, 
but the Bruneian government has restricted people’s political participation. Interestingly, the 
Bruneian government has not encountered significant challenges from the people. 
 
4.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
The Bruneian government, reigned over by Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah since independence, has 
provided its people with quite robust freedom from want. The main reason for this impressive 
provision of such freedom concerns Brunei’s considerable crude oil and liquefied natural gas 
reserves. In 1986, oil production in Brunei reached about 181,000 barrels per day and natural 
gas production could reach as much as 293 billion cubic feet per year.22  The Bruneian 
government’s revenues from hydrocarbon sectors have provided the fiscal basis for a citizen-
oriented welfare system. The government imposes no income tax on the country’s citizens. In 
addition, education and healthcare have been free and fuel prices have been subsidised. The 
Bruneian government has helped keep its citizens a good distance from famine, poverty, and 
malnutrition. In 2000, Brunei ranked 32 out of the 174 countries on the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI). 
However, Brunei’s people did not have the freedom of political participation. The 
Brunei government restricted people’s political participation. In May 1985, Malay 
businessmen and professionals established the Brunei National Democratic Party (Partai 
Kebangsaan Demokratik Brunei, BNDP). The BNDP’s goal was to implement a democratic 
system, including referendums and the Sultan’s resignation from the position of Prime 
Minister (Singh, 1988: 67-8). However, from the Sultan’s perspective, “The party system led 
to chaos, it doesn’t work out in Brunei” (cited from Hamzah, 1989: 92). Finally, the BNDP 
was banned and the leaders of the BNDP were arrested, including BNDP President Abdul 
Latif Hamid and BNDP Secretary-General Abdul Latif Chuchu. Because no opposition 
parties existed in Brunei, unsurprisingly, the Sultan and his relatives controlled Brunei’s 
administration. Indeed, the important Ministers positions were held by either the Sultan 
                                                 
22
 http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=BX 
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himself or his relatives. For example, the Sultan acted as both the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Defense; the Sultan’s younger brothers Pengoram Muda Mohamed and Pengiran 
Muda Jefri acted as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance respectively 
(Singh, 1988: 66). 
Interestingly, even though Brunei’s people have lacked the right of political 
participation, the Bruneian government has not encountered significant challenges from the 
people. In chapter two’s section on states, I mentioned that the more democratic a state is, the 
more human security its people are likely to have (see section 2.1.4.2). However, an 
exception to this rule consists of states that possess developed economies but authoritarian 
politics. In these states, people do not challenge their governments, because the government 
provides a robust welfare system to them. Brunei is an exemplary instance of this theme. 
According to Abu Bakar Hamzah and Hans Blomqvist, improvement of the Bruneians living 
standards has been advantageous for the government itself, because the robust welfare system 
could keep “social discontent at a low level” (Blomqvist, 1993: 174, Hamzah, 1989: 96-7). 
Given the government’s welfare system, Bruneians could tolerate the lack of political 
participation. 
After the Cold War, several threats to Bruneians emerged, but the Bruneian government 
took countermeasures. First, the crime rate increased. The Sultan was particularly concerned 
about the problem of illicit drugs. Regarding drug crimes, in 1992, 595 people were arrested 
by the Brunei government (Cleary and Francis, 1994: 61). In 2001, 547 people were arrested 
by the Brunei government (Sulaiman, 2003: 72). Although the figures slightly decreased, the 
problem of illicit drugs had not improved. Therefore, the government has imposed heavy 
punishments on people violating relevant laws. People found carrying over 50 grams of 
methyl amphetamines would receive the death penalty (Sulaiman, 2003: 73). Second, in order 
to ensure environmental sustainability, the Ministry of Industry and Primary Resources has 
regulated logging23 and rehabilitated forests. In addition, the Brunei government has created a 
national park—Ulu Temburong National Park—in 1991, and the Brunei government 
encouraged ecotourism the country (Siddique, 1992: 97).24 
 
                                                 
23
 After a few years, Brunei imported timber from outside countries rather than log its own forest resources 
(Duraman and Hashim, 1998: 59). 
24
 Now, of all ASEAN’s member states, Brunei has the highest percentage of rainforest coverage (78%) and the 
lowest deforestation rates (an annual change rate of less than 0.5%) (Brunei Times, December 8, 2011). 
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4.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
Neither ethnic tensions nor civil wars have beset Brunei. Noteworthy is the fact that the 
Brunei government contributed to the mission of post-conflict peace-building in Cambodia. 
Regarding Cambodian post-conflict peace-building, the Bruneian government donated US$1 
million for rehabilitation and reconstruction purposes and sent twelve personnel from the 
Royal Brunei Police Force and three personnel from the Royal Brunei Armed Forces to 
participate in a  peace-keeping mission (Mani, 1993: 101).  
 
4.1.2 Exploration of the Bruneian Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
4.1.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Bruneian Government’s Strategies 
According to the above historical review, we know that the Bruneian government has 
provided human security to its people. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that after 
ASEAN decided to create the APSC, the Bruneian government’s strategy has been to support 
this target. 
The Bruneian government’s adoption of a strategy of support for the creation of the 
APSC has rested on two central motivations. The first motivation has been economic. Brunei 
is a country heavily dependent on the oil and gas sectors. However, the oil production in 
Brunei has been decreasing. Between 2006 and 2012, oil production declined from 220,000 
barrels per day to 141,000 barrels per day.25  Consequently, economic diversification has 
become an important issue in the Bruneian government. For the Bruneian government, 
development of the halal section has been important to diversifying the Bruneian economy, 
because there has been “large demand for halal products both from within the country and 
from the large global Muslim population,” all of which may promote the development of 
small and medium enterprises in Brunei (Thambipillai, 2008: 96). Creation of the APSC gave 
the Bruneian government an opportunity to diversifying the economy, as the Bruneian 
government has come to consider Mindanao a “future hub for halal food production” (Brunei 
Times, December 3, 2010). If the Filipino government adheres in practice to the provisions in 
the APSC’s blueprint and faithfully restores peace in Mindanao, the Bruneian government 
will likely expand its market of halal products and services to Mindanao. Since October 2004, 
hence, Brunei joined the International Monitoring Team (IMT) and enthusiastically helped 
the Filipino government restore peace in Mindanao. 
The other motivation underlying the Bruneian government’s support strategies has been 
                                                 
25
 http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=bx 
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to ameliorate environmental problems. According to Azman Ahmad, since the 2000s, 
Bruneian people have suffered from environmental problems, including improperly treated 
waste and dangerous levels of water pollution (Ahmad, 2005: 102). In addition, Bruneian 
people have been affected by transboundary haze pollution. It needs assistance from regional 
organisations. In 2007, when Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah attended in the 13th ASEAN 
Summit, he called for ASEAN members to address environmental issues and strengthen 
cooperation in the ASCC.26 The Bruneian government’s adoption of strategic support for the 
APSC can help the government ameliorate the negative effects of environmental problems 
through multilateral cooperation. 
 
4.1.2.2 The Bruneian Government’s Strategies 
4.1.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
Regarding the freedom-from-want issues, the Bruneian government has emphasised 
environmental issues found in the blueprints of the APSC and the ASCC: these issues include 
water-resource management and the haze-prevention problem (ASEAN, 2009b: 14-5, 19). At 
the 12th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (AMME), held in September 2012 
in order to enhance regional cooperation on environmental issues, the Bruneian Minister of 
Development signed the Bangkok Resolution on ASEAN Environmental Cooperation and 
emphasised the following point: 
 
Brunei Darussalam’s continuous support of the noble objective of achieving the vision 
of a resilient ASEAN Community and to have a sustainable environment. (Brunei Times, 
September 29, 2012) 
 
In addition, when Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah attended the 2nd Asia-Pacific Water Summit, he 
urged participant countries, including ASEAN members, to pay more attention to water issues, 
which had already led to tension between countries, affected people’s health, and produced 
natural disasters (Borneo Bulletin, May 21, 2013). Regarding the haze-prevention problem, 
ASEAN’s adoption of the ASEAN Sub-Regional Haze Monitoring System was under 
Bruneian chairmanship. This system can identify the cause of forest fires through a sharing of 
satellite data. 
 
                                                 
26
 http://www.aspirasi-ndp.com/en/archive/SultanCallsCharterNewBeginningForAsean.html 
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4.1.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Bruneian government has given substantive assistance to the Philippines. The Bruneian 
government’s assistance in Mindanao lived up to the freedom-from-fear principle in the 
APSC: “lay the ground for reconciliation and all other necessary measures to secure peace 
and stability, thus preventing the affected areas from falling again to conflicts in the future” 
(ASEAN, 2009a: 11). Since October 2004, the Brunei government joined the IMT to monitor 
the ceasefire agreement, which had been signed by the Philippines government and the MILF 
in 2002. As mentioned in a previous section, the motivation of the Bruneian government to 
join the peace process in Mindanao was that the Bruneian government expected to diversify 
its economy by investing in the halal sector in Mindanao. Although the Bruneian 
government’s motivation to be involved in the Mindanao peace process has had distinctly 
self-serving economic objectives, neighbouring countries have recognised the importance and 
indeed the effectiveness of the Bruneian government’s. Handriyo Kusumo, the Indonesian 
Ambassador to Brunei, lauded the government, declaring, 
 
Brunei has been playing an important role in the peacekeeping process in the southern 
Philippines, as part of the International Monitoring Team, thus reflecting Brunei as a 
peace-loving country. (Brunei Times, January 29, 2011) 
 
4.1.3 Summary 
The Bruneian government has established a good record of providing human security to the 
Bruneian people. Since Bruneian independence, the Bruneian government has provided its 
people with human security. Despite the population’s lack of political participation, no 
significant popular challenges to the government have arisen. Internationally, the Bruneian 
government has provided freedom-from-fear assistance to people in other countries. At the 
same time, Bruneians have suffered from domestic environmental problems that sometimes 
have international origins. The Bruneian government has adopted measures to counter these 
challenges. The Bruneian government’s support for the creation of the APSC relative to 
freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues can, it would seem, help the government 
address the aforementioned problems. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the Bruneian 
government has been strategically supporting to the creation of the APSC. 
 
4.2 Cambodia 
Since Cambodian independence in 1953, none of the country’s rulers—from Prince Norodom 
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Sihanouk to current Prime Minister Hun Sen—have been able to provide their people with a 
sufficient degree of human security. Indeed, these rulers have been sources of considerable 
threat to the welfare of the people. Their greed for power and wealth has exacerbated human 
insecurities. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Cambodian government’s strategies 
have been beneficial not to the Cambodian people but to the current regime itself. In this 
section of my study, I will historically review how each Cambodian regime has deteriorated 
the Cambodian people’s human security. Next, I will explore the strategies that the 
government has adopted in response to the APSC. 
 
4.2.1 Historical Review: Since Independence in 1953 to 2002 
This section of the historical review will address the shifting political positions of Cambodian 
leaders during these decades. The first part of this section discusses human security under the 
Sihanouk, Lon Nol, Pol Pot, and Heng Samrin regimes, and the second part discusses human 
security under the Hun Sen regime.  
 
4.2.1.1 Human Security under the Sihanouk, Lon Nol, Pol Pot, and Heng Samrin Regimes 
Barry Buzan argued that “the individual citizen faces many threats which emanate either 
directly or indirectly from the state” (Buzan, 1991: 44). Indeed, from the Shihanouk to Heng 
Samrin Regimes, no Cambodian government provided human security to its people. If we 
read the Asian Survey journal’s essays examining the Cambodian social and political situation 
as it evolved the 1970s to the late 1980s, we can readily observe that scholars emphasised the 
Cambodian government’s incompetence in addressing social and economic problems 
(Jackson, 1978: 87-90, Kirk, 1971), the Cambodian government’s regimentation on its people 
(Kirk, 1974: 92), the Cambodian government’s complicity in atrocities carried out against its 
people (Quinn, 1977: 53, Chanda, 1987: 121), and Cambodians’ abysmal living environments 
(Quinn, 1977: 53, Becker, 1984: 47). Under these regimes, Cambodian people lost their right 
of freedom from want and freedom from fear. 
 
4.2.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk was unable to minimise his people’s pronounced hardships. 
During Sihanouk’s period of rule, Cambodia had poor infrastructure, no light industry, and 
benighted economic conditions. These problems resulted in several human insecurities. Poor 
road conditions prevented delivery of food, which resulted in poverty and famine; lack of 
light industry meant that people’s living standards were  low; the ailing economy led to rises 
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in both food prices and unemployment (Kirk, 1971). The government’s incompetence 
compelled many people to revolt. A few years before the coup against Sihanouk in 1970, 
Cambodians protested in several places including Kompong Cham and Battambang (Smith, 
1968: 73-4), but the Sihanouk government harshly suppressed these demonstrations. Donald 
Kirk argued that the Sihanouk government’s incompetence in addressing several problems in 
Cambodia was the main reason for his downfall (Kirk, 1971: 239-45). 
After Sihanouk’s downfall, the U.S.-backed Lon Nol came to power. However, Lon Nol 
failed to solve the problems that had existed during Sihanouk’s reign. Famine and 
malnutrition were common among people. According to figures from the U.S. government, 
two million people in Cambodia suffered from famine and malnutrition (Poole, 1972: 153). 
Although the Lon Nol regime enjoyed U.S. financial assistance, it ended up being directly 
embezzled by officials (Poole, 1972: 154). All the while, public discontent with the 
government was growing. For example, in 1974, students and teachers demonstrated against 
Lon Nol’s corruption and incompetence, triggering a serious conflict between police and 
demonstrators (Kirk, 1975: 57-8). 
During the Khmer Rouge regime, Pol Pot callously disregarded human life. Culture, the 
education system, national currency, private property, and religious ceremonies were 
abolished by the Khmer Rouge regime (Kiljunen, 1984: 17-8). In addition, the government of 
Kampuchea moved people from urban to rural areas for the purposes of a mass 
collectivisation project, requiring the cultivation of rice and the creation of irrigation systems. 
The mass mobilisation of people resulted in many human insecurities, like famine, 
malnutrition, and disease. Moreover, when the Khmer Rouge relocated people, family 
members were forcibly separated (Quinn, 1977: 52). Thus, family structures were disrupted. 
In November 1978, Vietnam initiated an invasion of Cambodia and created the People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), led by Heng Samrin. Like previous Cambodian regimes, the 
PRK was nothing more than yet another threat to Cambodians’ well-being. Most Cambodians, 
in particular children, suffered from disease, malnutrition, and poverty (Becker, 1984: 47). 
The Heng Samrin government compounded, rather than resolve, long-standing problems. For 
example, in 1980, bad weather decimated that year’s rice harvest. Although the Red Cross 
and the UN provided rice to Cambodia, the most severely affected people could not benefit 
from the assistance, since, according to Leifer, “the Heng Samrin government was using rice 
as an instrument of political control, providing it to loyal supporters” (Leifer, 1981: 99).  
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4.2.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
In the Sihanouk period, his regime’s vacillating diplomatic policies negatively affected the 
people on a widespread basis. In 1955, Sihanouk declared that Cambodia was a neutral state. 
However, he established close friendships with China and North Vietnam and allowed them 
to create military facilities in eastern Cambodia and use a Cambodian port system. 
Meanwhile, he asked for assistance from the United States. When North Vietnamese forces 
increased in Cambodia, Sihanouk agreed that Washington could bombard North Vietnam’s 
forces in Cambodia. Sihanouk was a culprit in the transformation of Cambodia into a 
battlefield. No accurate figures exist as to how many Cambodians died because of his 
vacillating policies. However, the repercussions are evident. One example is often cited: 
when North Vietnam and the United States waged war in Cambodia, they planted numerous 
anti-personnel mines, which have since claimed thousands of people’s lives (Davies, 1994: 
11). 
When Lon Nol achieved power in 1975, his Forces Armées Nationales Khmères 
(FANK) waged war with the Front Uni National du Kampuchéa (FUNK), which had been 
established by Sihanouk and the Khmer communists. Meanwhile, the U.S. bombing raids in 
Cambodia remained in place. Between 1970 and 1974, the civil war resulted in around 
600,000 to 800,000 deaths, the forced exile of 120,000 ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia to 
Vietnam, and 2,000,000 Cambodians refugees (Peou, 2005: 109-10). 
Pol Pot’s regime was the most brutal. Under the Khmer Rouge regime, Cambodia 
became a killing field. Communist cadres adopted various approaches to carrying out its mass 
killing. Khmer Rouge cadres would employ such weapons as bayonets, machine-guns, 
mortars, and tanks, and would beat, drown and starve people to death (Kiernan, 1996: 251-
309). Cases of fratricide were widely noted during this period (Kiernan, 1996: 263, 296). 
Violence-driven deaths during the Pol Pot regime numbered about 1.5 million, and refugees 
numbered about 600,000 (Ashworth, 1979: 6). 
The PRK ended the brutal Khmer Rouge regime but did not end Cambodians’ 
nightmare. Civil wars among the warring parties in Cambodia continued to rage. Armed 
conflict between the PRK and the anti-Vietnamese resistance forces led to a flood of refugees 
(Chanda, 1987: 121). In addition, the PRK employed “voluntary labour” to build border 
fortifications. Some of labours were injured or died during the work (Chanda, 1987: 118).  
 
4.2.1.2 Human Security under the Hun Sen’s Government (1997-2002) 
Vietnamese troops’ withdrawal from Cambodia in September 1989 offered hope for an end to 
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the civil wars afflicting generations of Cambodians. In February 1992, through Resolution 
745, the UNSC created the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). 
The aim of UNTAC was to deal with the ceasefire among the four factions: the Khmer 
Rouge’s Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge 
Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC), the Khmer People’s National 
Liberation Front (KPNLF), and the State of Cambodia (SOC). Although the PDK refused to 
cooperate and join the negotiations, historical democratic elections in Cambodia, under the 
auspices of the United Nations, were held in 1993, where the FUNCINPEC secured 45% of 
the vote, followed by Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)’s 38% and 3% won by Son 
Sann’s Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) (Um, 1994: 75). Norodom Ranarridh and 
Hun Sen created the coalition government. Ranarridh assumed the position of first Prime 
Minister and Hun Sen assumed the position of second Prime Minister. In 1997, Hun Sen 
staged a coup d’état against Norodom Ranariddh. After the coup, Hun Sen exercised sole 
power in Cambodia. By the end of 1998, the remnants of the Khmer communists had 
surrendered to the Cambodian government. Widespread violent civil conflicts were over.  
By 1997, scholars and Cambodian officials thought that Cambodia would achieve 
political stability and peace. Irene Langran argued that “the end of civil conflict in late 1998 
helped to consolidate domestic stability” (Langran, 2000: 26). Prak Chantha, Secretary of 
State, Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training in Cambodia, echoed the sentiment: “this 
year is the first year when the hospitals are not full of dreadfully injured soldiers and civilians. 
This is a year of hope for a new and better future. Khmer are no longer fighting Khmer, our 
country is at peace” (cited from Langran, 2000: 25). I argue, however, that a cessation of civil 
wars in Cambodia did not free the country’s people from all serious insecurities: the Hun Sen 
government has been a threat to Cambodians, eschewing a democratic political system, while 
regularly holding purely superficial elections. Martin Gainsborough regarded political culture 
in Cambodia as undemocratic and as rife with “elitism, paternalism, and  money politics” 
(Gainsborough, 2012: 38-9). As I mentioned in chapter two’s section on state actors (2.1.4.2), 
a central priority—if not the central priority—for non-democratic states is to consolidate 
regime power rather than concern itself with citizens’ human security. In order to stay in 
power, non-democratic governments usually tightly control their people’s human rights. As 
Ingrid Landau pointed out, local CSOs grew rapidly in the 1990s because international donor 
agencies provided financial and technical assistance to them (Landau, 2008: 247), and yet the 
Cambodian government devoted many of its resources to repressing CSOs’ leaders (Landau, 
2008: 247). Thus, even though violent civil conflicts have come to an end in Cambodia, the 
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Hun Sen government has not only neglected people’s human security but managed to pose 
significant threats to Cambodia, as well. 
 
4.2.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
The Hun Sen government was unable to enhance people’s living standards. The Cambodian 
government failed to repair roads and bridges that had been destroyed in the civil wars. In 
turn, unrepaired roads and bridges blocked the delivery of much-needed food and medical 
assistance to rural areas. In addition, the Cambodian government was unable to ameliorate 
the country’s abysmal health services. According to the UN Development Program, life 
expectancy at birth in 1998 was only 53.5 years (UNDP, 2000: 159). Furthermore, the 
progress of the government to clear unexploded landmines was slow. In Cambodia, there 
were more than 6 million landmines (Um, 1994: 78) and about 100 people would suffer 
horrendous injuries or death by landmines monthly (Langran, 2000: 30). Finally, during Hun 
Sen’s period of rule, illegal logging in Cambodia has been a serious business. Deforestation, 
in turn, has greatly harmed people’s livelihoods27  (Peou, 1999: 23) and has triggered or 
compounded natural disasters.`  
Moreover, the Cambodian government has violently limited political participation. In 
1998, Cambodia held national elections, but the opposition parties questioned election 
irregularities. They protested against the Hun Sen CPP government and attacked Hun Sen’s 
residence. Hun Sen ordered the arrest of protestors and a crackdown on demonstrations (Peou, 
1999: 22). In addition, the FUNCINPEC and the SPP promoted the commune election, which 
would serve to decentralise the authority’s power. CPP leader Hun Sen refused their 
suggestion. The advocates of the commune election were arrested by order of Hun Sen’s 
government (Un and Ledgerwood, 2002: 102) and are thought to have been murdered under 
circumstances pointing to the government (Human Rights Watch, January 19, 2002). 
 
4.2.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
Regarding the Cambodian people’s freedom from fear, Hun Sen has been dithering over 
granting justice to the victims of the Pol Pot regime’s human-rights violations. In 1997, Hun 
Sen called for the international community to help bring surviving leaders of the Khmer 
Rouge to justice for their horrendous acts (Langran, 2000: 27). In 2003, the UN and the 
                                                 
27
 For example, many rural Cambodians have been dependent on resin trees. These people collect resin and sell 
it to supplement their family income, particularly during poor rice harvests. 
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Cambodian government signed the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) Agreement and put it into force in 2005. As noted by Fen Osler Hampson, 
punishment of perpetrators through legal instruments, such as the International Criminal 
Court can “stop gross human rights violation such as genocide, political murder, and rape” 
(Hampson, 2002: 21-3).  
Theoretically, Hun Sen’s demand was positive, because the Cambodian government 
tried to realise justice. However, Un and Ledgerwood argued that Hun Sen’s attitude towards 
the trial of former Khmer Rouge leaders “has swung back and forth between condemnation 
and support of a trial” (Un and Ledgerwood, 2002: 100). Indeed, before the ECCC tried for 
former Khmer Rouge leaders, Hun Sen’s behaviour hampered efforts to bring Khmer Rouge 
leaders to justice. In 2000, Hun Sen stated that he opposed trying Ieng Sary, who had served 
as foreign minister and deputy prime minister under the Pol Pot regime (Marston, 2002: 99). 
In addition, former Khmer Rouge guerrilla commander Sam Bith became a general in the 
Cambodian army, which attracted criticism from the international community (Langran, 2001: 
160). A “culture of impunity” (Un and Ledgerwood, 2002: 101) in Cambodia has taken shape. 
 
4.2.2 Exploration of the Cambodian Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
4.2.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Cambodian Government’s Strategies 
The above historical review illustrates the threats that the Sihanouk to Heng Samrin regimes 
have posed for Cambodian people in general. After the UN-sponsored peace-keeping mission 
Cambodia in 1991, most Cambodians have known lives free of civil wars, but the Hun Sen 
government has not prioritised human-security issues. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the 
strategies adopted by the Cambodian government in response to the creation of the APSC 
have not prioritised human-security issues: on the one hand, these strategies have hindered 
CSOs’ participation in the APSC building process, and on the other hand, they have adhered 
to the principle of non-interference.  
The motivation underlying the Cambodian government’s opposition to CSOs’ 
participation in the APSC building process has centred on the Hun Sen regime’s desire to 
consolidate its viability. According to Martin Gainsborough, since the 1990s, more and more 
Cambodian people have protested against the Cambodian government and people’s 
demonstrations have led to tensions between the Cambodian government and sizable swaths 
of the population (Gainsborough, 2012: 41-2). These people have challenged the Cambodian 
government’s policies and called for the establishment of democracy nationwide. Hun Sen 
has regarded these vocal activists as a potential threat to the government’s viability. However, 
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ASEAN has permitted CSOs’ participation in the APSC building process (ASEAN, 2009a: 11, 
ASEAN, 2009b: 10, 14, 16), which indicates that CSOs had opportunity—limited though 
they may be—to join ASEAN’s decision-making process. From the Cambodian government’s 
perspective, CSOs’ participation in ASEAN’s decision-making process may facilitate people 
to challenge government, thus strengthening unwanted challenges to the Cambodian 
government’s viability. Consequently, to consolidate its regime’s viability, the Cambodian 
government has prevented CSOs from participating in the APSC-building process. 
The motivations underlying the strategy of adherence to the principle of non-
interference reflect the overriding objective of protecting national sovereignty. Ralf Emmers 
argued that since Cambodian participation in ASEAN got underway in 1999, “the TAC 
provides Cambodia with an instrument to manage its relations with both Thailand and 
Vietnam” because the principle of non-interference in the TAC could “keep the two powers 
from expanding into its territory” (Emmers, 2005a: 81-2). In addition, the principle of non-
interference has been a powerful pretext for the Cambodian government’s rebuttals to 
Western countries’ criticism of the regime in power. For example, in 1999, the international 
community criticised Hun Sen’s decision to reject the UN proposal that the international 
community participate in the trial of former Khmer Rouge leaders. However, Hun Sen argued 
that the international community’s participation in the trial would infringe upon Cambodian 
sovereignty and destabilise the state (Langran, 2000: 27). It is reasonable to say that the 
principle of non-interference has been a shield serving to protect Cambodian national 
sovereignty from neighbouring countries’ assertive behaviour and the international 
community’s sometimes harsh criticism. Thus, it is not difficult to find that the Cambodian 
government’s discourse of adherence to the non-interference principle is closely associated 
with the creation of the APSC. When the Cambodian government prepared to hold the 20th 
ASEAN Summit, Prime Minister Hun Sen declared that “we [Cambodia] will put all our 
efforts to chair the ASEAN with responsibilities in 2012 in order to push ASEAN towards 
One Community, One Destiny” and “ASEAN would stick to the principle of non-interference 
in internal affairs of member states” (People Daily, Januray 5, 2012 ). 
 
4.2.2.2 The Cambodian Government’s Strategies 
4.2.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
In general, the Cambodian government has supported the freedom-from-want element in the 
APSC. In 2012, when Cambodia took over the 20th chairmanship of ASEAN, Prime Minister 
Hun Sen outlined a 7-point Phnom Penh Agenda: “A Strengthened mechanism for financial 
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stability, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative, multilateralisation, and a doubling of the 
resources of the mechanism from USD 12 billion to USD 240 billion; timely implementation 
of the Road Map for ASEAN Community Building; priority for the ASEAN Economic 
Community; promotion of the speed implementation of the Master Plan for Connectivity; 
protection for migrant workers; urgent priority for the effective functioning of regional 
disaster management mechanism; promotion of cooperation in the agriculture sectors to 
ensure regional food security” (ASEAN, April 4, 2012). Points three through seven concern 
freedom-from-want issues. For example, implementation of the Master Plan for Connectivity 
has as its central objective the development of roads and highways connecting certain 
ASEAN members geographically to one another, thereby enhancing economic prosperity and, 
in turn, reducing poverty. 
Although the Hun Sen provided a 7-point Phnom Penh Agenda, the Cambodian 
government has spared no effort to hinder CSOs’ efforts to participate in the APSC-building 
process. Some entity banned Cambodian domestic CSO representatives from the 30-minute 
dialogue between CSOs and the government officials at the 14th and 15th ASEAN Summits.28 
The Cambodian government has come under suspicion of being the entity ordering the ban. 
In the 14th ASEAN Summit, Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong alleged the 
following: 
 
I would like to clarify that Cambodia’s delegation…did not prevent Pen Somony from 
entering the meeting. The Thai organisers did not allow these two representatives to 
join after the government complained [that] the groups did not have names on the civil 
society list. (Phnom Penh Post, March 2, 2009) 
 
At the 15th ASEAN Summit, Hor Namhong stated, “The foreign ministers of ASEAN 
have agreed that the only civil society organisations that had the right to attend the meeting 
with leaders of ASEAN were civil society groups sent by their governments to participate [in 
the summit]” (Phnom Penh Post, October 26, 2009). Regardless of which country (Thailand 
or Cambodia or both) imposed the ban, the Cambodian government’s handling of CSOs’ 
absence at the APSC’s building process was indisputable. 
In 2012, when Cambodia assumed ASEAN’s chairmanship, the Cambodian government 
                                                 
28
 Pen Somony and Khin Ohmarwere barred from joining the 14th ASEAN Summit, and Ney Vannda was barred 
from participating in the 15th ASEAN Summit. 
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continued to oppose CSO participation in the APSC-building process. Take the ASEAN Civil 
Society Conference (ACSC) as an example. Organised by the Solidarity for Asian People’s 
Advocacy (SAPA) network, ACSC provides CSOs a channel through which they can voice 
their recommendations regarding the creation of the APSC. In 2012, ACSC planned to hold 
workshops in the Lucky Star Hotel in Cambodia’s capital city of Phnom Penh to discuss 
human-rights issues and human insecurities, like land grabbing; however, the hotel threatened 
to cut power to conference rooms and to change padlocks on conference rooms if the 
workshops went ahead (Gerard, 2014: 121). CSOs in the ACSC suspected that the 
Cambodian government was the mastermind behind objections to the ACSC’s activities 
(Gerard, 2014: 121) (for more detail on this particular incident, see chapter seven). Kelly 
Gerard noted that the Cambodian government’s efforts to impede CSOs from participating in 
the APSC-building process have weakened ASEAN members’ opportunities to gain 
information from experts regarding human insecurities, including drug and human trafficking, 
human rights, natural-disaster management, and environmental pollution (Gerard, 2014: 121).  
The Cambodian government’s opposition to CSOs’ participation in the APSC-building 
process suggests that the government regarded CSOs as a potential challenge to its regime 
viability. Hun Sen publicly expressed his views on how his government should handle 
political dissidents and CSOs—“I govern not only to make the opposition party and group 
weak, but to make the opposition group die” (cited from Header, 2012: 111). 
 
4.2.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Cambodian government has expressed enthusiasm for the task of addressing and 
resolving freedom-from-fear issues. In March 2010, the Cambodian government created the 
Peacekeeping Training Centre, which was sponsored by the United States. U.S. forces trained 
Cambodian soldiers in the art of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. So far, the Royal 
Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) has joined international peacekeeping operations in 
Central Africa, Chad, Lebanon, Nepal and Sudan. The Cambodian government’s creation of 
the Peacekeeping Training Center has meant that the Cambodian government is preparing to 
create “a network among existing ASEAN Member States’ peacekeeping centres to conduct 
joint planning, training and sharing of experience” (ASEAN, 2009a: 11).  
However, the Cambodian government has supported and adhered to the principle of 
non-interference on the pretext of protecting the country’s national sovereignty, but the non-
interference principle is inconsistent with the peacekeeping operations. Rizal Sukma argued 
that a barrier to ASEAN’s enshrinement of the RtoP principle is ASEAN members’ adherence 
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to the principle of non-interference (Sukma, 2012: 143-4). It is important to bear in mind here 
that an important means to achieving the RtoP principle is reliance on peacekeeping 
operations. Thus, it is unlikely that these two concepts can co-exist without stirring up a great 
deal of tumult. The Cambodian government’s participation in international peacekeeping 
operations should not be taken as evidence that the Cambodian government has lessened its 
support for the principle of non-interference, because this participation does not affected the 
standing of the principle of non-interference in ASEAN. It is likely that the Cambodian 
government would invoke the principle of non-interference rather than cite the RtoP or 
authorise peacekeeping operations if human rights violations were to take place in an ASEAN 
member’s country. Thus, given the fact that the Cambodian government has been a stalwart 
supporter of the principle of non-interference, whether the Cambodian Peacekeeping Training 
Centre can contribute to the APSC’s freedom-from-fear element remains to be seen. 
 
4.2.3 Summary 
Since Cambodian independence, every regime in Cambodia has failed to provide for people’s 
human-security needs. During the Cambodian peace-keeping process, the international 
community rebuilt infrastructure in Cambodia and brought democracy and human rights to 
Cambodia. However, democracy in Cambodia did not take root, because Prime Minister Hun 
Sen regarded people’s activities to gain their human security as a potential challenges to his 
regime’s continuity and stability. Against this backdrop, he arrested opposition politicians and 
restricted people’s human rights.  
Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Cambodian government on the one hand has 
opposed CSOs’ participation in the APSC building process and on the other hand has 
supported and adhered to the principle of non-interference. Clearly, the Cambodian 
government’s strategy has been beneficial not to the country’s people but the regime in power. 
The Cambodian government’s opposition to CSOs’ participation in the APSC has prevented 
ASEAN members from discussing human-security issues with CSO experts specialising in 
such topics as drug and human trafficking, natural-disaster management, and human rights. 
Moreover, the Cambodian government’s support for the principle of non-interference may 
hamper the country’s involvement in regional peacekeeping operations. 
 
4.3 Indonesia 
In terms of population, territory, and natural resources, Indonesia has asserted for itself a 
significant leadership role in Southeast Asia. However, like many Southeast Asian states, in 
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the Cold War period, the Indonesian government was authoritarian and failed to provide 
adequate human security to its people. When transitioning to democracy, the Indonesian 
government started expressing an observable concern about human-security issues. 
Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Indonesian government became one of its active 
supporters. This section will include a historical review of how the Indonesian government 
has treated people’s human security and what the Indonesian government’s strategies have 
been relative to the creation of the APSC. 
 
4.3.1 Historical Review: From the 1950s to 2002 
The section, which presents a historical review of Indonesia from the 1950s to 2002, is 
divided into two parts. The first part discusses human security under the Sukarno and Suharto 
regimes, and the second part discusses human security under the Habibie, Wahid, and 
Megawati governments. 
 
4.3.1.1 Human Security under the Sukarno and Suharto Regimes 
Like many Southeast Asian governments, in the Cold War period, the Sukarno and Suharto 
regimes failed to provide adequate human security to the Indonesian people. The Suharto 
government, although it helped lift many Indonesians out of poverty, it cultivated a culture of 
cronyism in Indonesia and committed appalling atrocities in Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya. 
 
4.3.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
In the Sukarno era, the Indonesian government did not provide people a substantial degree of 
freedom from want. There were two reasons for this failure. First of all, Sukarno paid 
considerably more attention to national security (Pauker, 1963: 73-5) than to either the 
economy or human development. Sukarno admitted that the reason for his government’s 
neglect of the eight-year economic development plan, launched in January 1961, rested on 
the government’s allocation of most of its budget to national security (Pauker, 1963: 73). 
Second, Sukarno never solved the problem of rampant corruption. Public servants’ corruption 
prevented poor people from sharing in national resources and affected Indonesian tax revenue. 
Against this backdrop, most Indonesians have lived in poverty. According to the World Bank, 
in 1967, two years after Sukarno stepped down, Indonesians were among the poorest people 
in the world, a country where per capita GNP was only US$50 (World Bank, 1990: 3). In 
addition, “infrastructure, rice-field irrigation systems, and manufacturing and transportation 
equipment” were all undeveloped (Pauker, 1981: 233).  
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Suharto’s regime too failed to provide freedom from want to Indonesians. After 
Suharto’s rise to power in the mid-1960s, he emphasised that economic progress would bring 
national and social stability. Indeed, economic development in Indonesia exhibited 
impressive performances. From 1980 and 1989, GDP in Indonesia grew by an average annual 
rate of 6.4%.29 However, in 1980, Indonesia remained one of the poorest countries in the 
world and life expectancy was only 48 years (Pauker, 1981: 234). From 1985 to 1987, only 
38% of the Indonesian population was able access safe water (UNDP, 1990: 102). 
Unresolved rampant corruption remained one of the factors producing human insecurity. 
Greedy officials, including Suharto and his relatives (Kingsbury, 2005: 97-9), siphoned off 
national resources for their own use. The vulnerable was unable to get assistance. Although 
the Suharto government created a Commission for Corruption in 1970, this commission was 
useless in combating corruption (Samson, 1973: 138): corruption had strongly taken root in 
Indonesian society. 
As the Indonesian economy developed, the government gave privileged positions to 
select members of the business community, especially Indonesians of Chinese ancestry 
(Bertrand, 2004: 66). Indonesian political dissident Slamet Bratanata said that “to most 
Indonesians, the word ‘Chinese’ is synonymous with corruption” (cited from Schwarz, 1994: 
98). Government favouritism for certain businesses created a patron-client network that rather 
than counter poverty in Indonesia, widened the gap between rich and poor there. Income 
discrepancies caused widespread resentment among the indigenous Indonesians and Chinese 
Indonesians. Anti-Chinese sentiments and actions were not uncommon in Indonesia.  
Regarding human rights, the Suharto regime restricted people’s freedom of association. 
The Suharto government issued Regulation No. 8/1985 (UU Ormas), which declared that all 
mass organisations, including political parties and NGOs, had to adopt Pancasila (an official 
state philosophy) as their ideology (Hadiwinata, 2003: 95-6). The Indonesian government 
could dismiss or punish any organisation that did not obey the regulation. Hadiwinata argued 
that the Suharto government’s efforts to discourage NGO development stemmed from the 
leadership’s concern that “NGOs’ greater access to the international community might 
increase international pressures on Suharto’s authoritarian rule and boost demands for 
democratisation” (Hadiwinata, 2003: 99). Also, the Indonesian government restricted 
people’s freedom of expression, forcing such media as Expo, Topik, and, Fokus to shut down, 
because the Indonesian government charged their publications with tarnishing the 
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government’s reputation (Weatherbee, 1985: 191).  
 
4.3.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Sukarno and Suharto regimes’ failure to establish, preserve, or enhance freedom from 
fear extended to Indonesians in particular areas, like Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya. The 
Indonesian government long ignored Acehnese, East Timorese, and Papuan demands 
regarding such matter as living standards, political autonomy, and independence, triggering 
violent upheaval by people in these regions in pursuit of their human security (Sjamsuddin, 
1985: 34-72, Lagerberg, 1979: 104-118, Budiardjo and Liong, 1984). The Sukarno and 
Suharto regimes responded with military repression. 
Sukarno’s regime was not a culprit in the armed conflicts involving local rebels in East 
Timor or in Irian Jaya and the Indonesian army: these conflicts occurred after Sukarno had 
stepped down from power. However, he was responsible for the Acehnese people’s 
egregiously compromised human security. Sukarno successfully persuaded Aceh to join 
Indonesia but he did not deliver on his promise to grant autonomy to Aceh. Sukarno’s 
government ruthlessly repressed Acehnese who organised a rebellion against the Indonesian 
government. During the conflict, the Indonesian army engaged in significant armed conflict 
with Acehnese and slaughtered, raped, and robbed many Acehnese non-combatants. Some 
Acehnese were tortured to death (Sjamsuddin, 1985: 83-156). 
During the Suharto period, the Acehnese people’s hardships remained unaddressed, and 
the East Timorese and the Papuans lost the freedom from fear. Like Sukarno, Suharto adopted 
brutal methods meted out against the Acehnese. In October 1976, Teung Ku Hasan di Tiro 
declared Acehnese independence and the creation of the GAM, and the Indonesian 
government immediately responded by ordering acts of military repression. Growing 
resistance to this repression forced Suharto to increase troops levels in Aceh from 6,000 to 
12,000 personnel (Sulistiyanto, 2001: 441). The Indonesian military’s torture and murder of 
Acehnese occurred daily. One set of figures suggest that from 1989 to 1998, 1,958 people 
disappeared, 1,321 were killed, 3,430 were tortured, and 209 and 160 people suffered from 
sexual abuse and robbery (Sulistiyanto, 2001: 442). 
After Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975, the Indonesian military and policy 
authority slaughtered residents, regardless of age or gender. In Lacluta, at least 400 people 
were killed by Indonesian soldiers; “200 villagers in Kraras were burned alive”; Indonesian 
soldiers killed 500 people in Bibileu; Malim Luro’s villagers were run over by a bulldozer; 
Colonel Prabowo, Suharto’s son-in-law, ordered soldiers to kill 20 people in Bere-Coli 
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(Taylor, 1991: 101-3). In addition, the Indonesian army and police arrested many East 
Timorese without legal justification. The Indonesian army tortured them by means of 
“beatings, burning with cigarettes, sexual abuse, electric-shock treatment, systematic cutting 
of the skin and crushing of limbs” (Taylor, 1991: 107).  
After Suharto’s assumption of power, he approved of the government’s retaliations 
against Papuans. The Indonesian air forces bombarded many towns in Irian Jaya, and military 
forces killed people, looted their homes and burned their possessions, resulting in heavy 
casualties and refugees. The Indonesian military would incessantly attack refugee camps, 
under the pretext that the refugees were members of the OPM (Osborne, 1985: 44). In 
addition, the Indonesian military arrested and tortured many people. Indonesian soldiers 
provided little food and clean water to victims and tortured victims of this suffering.  
 
4.3.1.2 Human Security under the Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati Governments 
In 1997, the Asian financial crisis seriously affected the Indonesian economy. Suharto was 
unable to cope with the dramatic depreciation of currencies and massive inflation that 
triggered widespread public demonstrations. Ultimately, they forced Suharto to resign. After 
the demise of the Suharto regime, the Indonesian government gradually developed 
democratic characteristics. From Habibie to Megawati, the Indonesian government amended 
the constitution four times. Constitutional amendments confirmed the length of presidential 
terms, limited the president’s executive power, decentralised “authority from the central 
government to provincial and regional governments,” created “additional constitutional 
bodies such as the House of Regional Representatives and the Constitutional Court” (Ghoshal, 
2004: 522), and ensured people’s right to directly elect the president and legislators. 
In terms of human security, the most important aspect of the implementation of a 
democratic system was probably the government’s considerable willingness to provide 
human security to its people. As mentioned in chapter two on state actors (2.1.4.2), 
democratic government’s viability far more dependent on winning elections than on 
controlling the society and its people. In order to stay in power, the ruling parties in Indonesia 
exhibited a willingness to address human-security issues because to neglect the issues could 
have resulted in electoral defeat—and removal from power—for the reigning government. 
We can find that Wahid’s ouster and Megawati’s loss in 2004’s presidential election stemmed 
largely from their inability to address human insecurities (Kingsbury, 2005: 200-5) 
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4.3.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, Suharto’s vice president B.J. Habibie became the 
Indonesian president. During B.J. Habibie’s brief presidency, he enhanced human rights. 
Many labourers and activists created union organisations without suffering persecution under 
the law (Hadiz, 2002: 135-6) and the Habibie government launched a five-year human-rights 
action plan and ratified international human-rights conventions (Kingsbury, 2005: 276). In 
addition, he released political prisoners and removed government restrictions on media (Bird, 
1998: 30). Damien Kingsbury argued that Habibie was a key figure in Indonesian’s shift to 
democracy (Kingsbury, 2005: 275). 
In 1999, the People’s Consultative Assembly (Makjelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) 
elected Abdurrahman Wahid to the Indonesian presidency. Wahid failed to provide the 
nation’s people with adequate human security. One area of many in which human security 
suffered was labour: for example, the Wahid government regulated that “a worker who went 
on strike for five days would be regarded as having resigned from his or her position” (Hadiz, 
2002: 139). Meanwhile, the Wahid government found itself mired in corruption scandals and 
unable to cope with Indonesia’s ravaged economy, the cumulative effects of which worsened 
existing social problems and created new ones (Malley, 2002: 124). Finally, the MPR 
removed Wahid, and Wahid’s vice president Megawati Soekarnoputri assumed the presidency. 
Megawati, during her presidency, failed to cope with several types of human 
insecurities. Although Megawati continued to enhance Indonesians’ human rights by, for 
instance, helping create a national human-rights committee, she failed to enhance the 
country’s ailing economy and, in particular, to appreciably lower the high unemployment rate. 
In addition, terrorist attacks in Bali and Jakarta and the SARS outbreak hurt the tourism 
industry in Indonesia (Kipp, 2004: 65) and, thus, compounded Indonesians’ economic 
hardships. In 2004’s presidential election, SBY defeated Megawati and assumed the mantle 
of the Indonesian presidency. 
 
4.3.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
Regarding freedom-from-fear issues, Suharto’s successors were more tolerant of people’s 
resistance to power structures. Although confrontation between dissident groups and the 
government still occurred, at least non-violent resolutions emerged as a means by which the 
government might address such issues as the secessionist movement. 
After Habibie took over the presidency, he agreed to hold a referendum in East Timor, 
which was sponsored by the UN. Although the Indonesian army had murdered hundreds of 
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East Timorese and had destroyed infrastructure, attracting criticism from the international 
community, most East Timorese voters emerged to cast their ballot for independence in 
August 1999. The Habibie government accepted the international community as a mediator 
during the vote: the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) conducted a 
peacekeeping mission in East Timor and the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor 
(UNTAET) assisted East Timor’s nation-building affairs. Finally, East Timor proclaimed 
independence. The Indonesian army’s atrocities targeting East Timorese came to an end. 
Although the Wahid government failed to cope with several freedom-from-want issues, 
according to William Liddle, the Wahid government adopted political rather than violent 
measures to address secessionist problems in Aceh and Irian Jaya (Liddle, 2001: 213-4). 
Regarding the Aceh problem, in 2000, the Wahid government and GAM agreed to a three-
month ceasefire, known more commonly as a “humanitarian pause” and regarding Irian Jaya, 
the Wahid government accepted the proposition that this region could “fly its own flag” 
(Liddle, 2001: 214). Although the Wahid government’s political measures did not solve the 
long-running separatist movements in Aceh or Irian Jaya, Indonesian leaders started adopting 
more non-violent measures to handle these and other situations. 
The Megawati government tried to solve the problem in Aceh. In 2001, the Indonesian 
Parliament passed a special autonomy law in reference to Aceh. According to the law, Aceh 
could receive 70% of revenues from oil and gas exploitation and could apply Sharia law. In 
December 2002, given the Indonesian government’s acceptance of the US assistance, the 
Indonesian government ratified the Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement (CoHA) 
with the GAM. According to the CoHA, the Indonesian army agreed to gradually withdraw 
from Aceh and the GAM agreed to be disarmed. Although activists in Aceh rejected the 
special autonomy law (Lanti, 2002: 120-1) and the peace agreement failed, which led to a 
serious confrontation between the GAM and the Indonesian government, the actions that 
Megawati adopted to address the confrontation between the government and the GAM are 
proof that the government is likely pursuing a peaceful resolution to the problems in Aceh. 
The Megawati government made an effort to restore peace in Papua. Like Aceh, the 
government passed a special autonomy law pertaining to Papua, so that Papua could receive 
70% of revenues from oil and gas exploitation. Although demands of independence in Papua 
remained audible (Lanti, 2002: 121), confrontation between radical Papuans and the 
government gradually eased. 
 
94 
 
4.3.2 Exploration of the Indonesian Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
4.3.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Indonesian Government’s Strategies 
After the fall of the Suharto regime, the Indonesian government gradually accepted a 
democratic system that addressed human-security issues. The success with which elected 
government officials addressed human insecurities went far in determining whether or not 
these officials stayed in power. After 2004’s presidential election, SBY became the 
Indonesian president. He continued to implement political reform. For example, SBY 
combated corruption. In particular, the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK), which Megawati had created in 2002, enjoyed great 
achievements during SBY’s presidency. The KPK investigated and prosecuted legislators, 
ministers, and officials suspected of corrupt practices. Because of the KPK’s efficiency, the 
Indonesian government salvaged US$14.5 million bound for corrupt ends, and many 
Indonesians were satisfied with the KPK’s work (Aspinall, 2010: 110). In addition, the SBY 
government kept engaging Aceh in the peace process. In the immediate aftermath of the 
tsunami in Aceh, the SBY regime accepted EU and ASEAN members as mediators. The 
Indonesian government ratified the Helsinki Accords with the GAM in August 2005. The 
GAM agreed to disarm and renounce independence while opening itself to joint Indonesian 
democratic elections.30 SBY’s efforts in the direction of Acehnese freedom from fear helped 
him garner 93% of the vote in Aceh during SBY’s bid for a second presidential term 
(Aspinall, 2010: 113). 
Clearly, from Wahid to SBY, the Indonesian government has gradually shifted into the 
democratic portion of the political spectrum. Jörn Dosch argued that this democratisation has 
influenced the Indonesian government’s involvement in ASEAN’s agenda. On the one hand, 
the Indonesian government “does not feel constrained anymore by the ASEAN Way of 
diplomacy,” and on the other hand, the Indonesian government has “adopted an approach of 
pushing for agendas that reflect liberal values” (Dosch, 2008: 537). Indeed, since ASEAN’s 
decision to create the APSC in 2003, the strategies of the Indonesian government as then 
consistent with active support for both in freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear 
objectives. What are the motivations underlying the Indonesian government’s strategies? 
The central motivation is the Indonesian government’s desire to restore its leadership 
role in ASEAN (Collins, 2013: 62, Emmers, 2005b: 661). Ralf Emmers argued that from the 
1960s to the early 1990s, Indonesia played a “benevolent” leadership role in ASEAN. Rather 
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than practice regional coercion for the sake of amassing hegemonic power, Indonesia actively 
mediated regional affairs, like the Cambodian conflict and disputes surrounding the South 
China Sea  (Emmers, 2005b: 649-52). However, in the late 1990s, two incidents downgraded 
Indonesia’s leadership status. The first incident concerned East Timor’s independence in 2001. 
Indonesia became a potential concern for its neighbouring countries because they feared that 
East Timor’s separation from Indonesia would trigger declarations of independence from 
other Indonesian provinces, thus resulting in a regional refugee problem and promoting 
secessionist movements in Mindanao and Muslim-majority provinces in southern Thailand 
(Dupont, 2000: 164). Second, 1997’s financial crisis and a series of domestic terrorist attacks 
led to social instability and political turbulence in Indonesia, harming its government’s 
standing in Southeast Asia (Emmers, 2005b: 660).  
Creation of the APSC gave the Indonesian government an opportunity to re-enhance its 
leadership in ASEAN (Emmers, 2005b: 661). It should come as no surprise that the 
Indonesian government’s strategy for creating the APSC has been one of active support and 
has prompted the government to present several fresh ideas related to the project—two such 
ideas being the creation of a regional peacekeeping force and the creation of the ASEAN 
Institute for Peace and Reconciliation. According to Anthony Smith, it was the 9th Summit 
(where ASEAN issued the Bali Concord II, which was drafted by the Indonesian government) 
that Indonesia re-assumed “the role of group leader, or at least demonstrated Jakarta’s desire 
to begin to steer the direction of the grouping again” (Smith, 2004: 423). 
 
4.3.2.2 The Indonesian Government’s Strategies 
4.3.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
The Indonesian government has actively supported the freedom-from-want element in the 
APSC, in particular human rights and democracy. The Indonesian government was among the 
few members to promote the function of the AICHR. Before the creation of the AICHR, 
Indonesia actively supported the establishment of a regional human-rights institution. After 
the creation of the AICHR, the Indonesian government appointed Rafendi Djamin to the 
position of Indonesian representative in the AICHR. He is the only AICHR representatives 
who hails from civil society (Anwar, 2010: 134).  
In addition, the Indonesian government has sought to empower people by encouraging 
CSOs to join in the ASEAN decision-making process. During the process of drafting the 
ASEAN Charter, President SBY made the following statement: 
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The People and civil society should be deeply involved in the process of attaining the 
ASEAN Community and ASEAN Charter. (Jakarta Post, April 21, 2006) 
 
President SBY kept his word. When Indonesia assumed the 18th ASEAN chairmanship in 
May 2011, CSOs were one of the participants in the subsequent ASEAN Summit. More 
importantly, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and Indonesian bloggers jointly created the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Community. The aim of this association has been to 
enhance Indonesians’ awareness of the AC (Jakarta Post, May 14, 2011). This type of policy 
has not emerged in other members’ domestic contexts. In recent years, the government in 
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos in fact arrested domestic bloggers who had allegedly posted 
anti-government articles. 
In fact, when ASEAN drafted the ASEAN Charter, the Indonesian government voiced 
its support for efforts to improve human rights and democracy, which were long-standing 
taboos in the previous ASEAN agendas. The Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda 
declared, 
 
Indonesia will try to include human rights and democratic values in the charter so that 
we have a stronger legal basis for the formation of a human rights mechanism, 
commission or even court. (Jakarta Post, January 9, 2007) 
 
Indonesia’s insistence on this step was opposed by non- and semi- democratic members, 
such as Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and even Singapore (Dosch, 2008: 536-7, Jakarta Post, 
June 15, 2007). However, the Indonesian government remained steadfast in laying down the 
human rights and democracy provisos in the Charter. Ikrar Nusa Bakti, from the Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences, commented on the matter:  
 
I think Indonesia now is the most democratic country in ASEAN. We should not let 
ourselves be bogged down by other ASEAN members. (Jakarta Post, June 15, 2007) 
 
The Indonesian government’s efforts to promote human-rights and democracy element in the 
APSC and embody human rights and democracy in the ASEAN Charter rest on the premise 
that “if we can do it with all of problems, you can do it too” (cited from Murphy, 2009: 72).  
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4.3.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
Indonesia has been in the vanguard of efforts to enhance the element of freedom from fear in 
the APSC. First, the Indonesian government at the 9th ASEAN Summit held in October 2003 
suggested creating a regional peacekeeping force: the ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. The 
reason for this suggestion was that “most conflicts in the world today are not between states 
but within states, and internal strife has a way of spilling over from the embattled country to 
the rest of the region” (Jakarta Post, February 26, 2004). Though supported by the UN, the 
Indonesian suggestion was rejected by ASEAN members. However, the Indonesian 
government has been pushing the idea of creating a regional peacekeeping force.31 
Interestingly, after the Indonesian government proposed this idea, ASEAN members 
accepted implementation of the regional-peacekeeping task’s cooperation. At the 5thASEAN 
Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), held on May 19, 2011, ASEAN Defence Ministers 
adopted “The Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres 
Network.” According to this paper, ASEAN members agreed to “facilitate and utilize existing 
national peacekeeping centres to conduct planning, training, and exchange of experiences for 
peacekeeping operations with a view to developing a regional arrangement for the 
maintenance of peace and stability in ASEAN member states” (ASEAN, May 19, 2011) 
Second, the Indonesian government has advocated the creation of the AIPR, an issue 
that ASEAN had considered in the APSC blueprint (ASEAN, 2009a: 10). Under the 
Indonesian government’s auspices, ASEAN created the AIPR in December 2013. Lina 
Alexandra argued that the Indonesian government has had ambitions to re-enhance its 
influence in ASEAN through support of the APSC’s freedom-from-fear element: 
 
Well, we [Indonesia] certainly accommodate non-traditional security issues. For 
example, we came up with the idea for the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center. 
But we want more from the ASEAN Political-Security Community. For example, we 
want to come up with an Institute for Peace and Reconciliation. We want to come up 
with a Network of Peacekeeping Center. We want to come up with a dispute-settlement 
mechanism, which should be more effective than the ASEAN High Council.32 
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 Interview in Jakarta, January 25, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei. 
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 Interview in Jakarta, January 25, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei. 
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4.3.3 Summary 
In the Sukarno and Suharto era, the Indonesian government failed to provide human security 
to Indonesians. Regarding freedom from want, the government did not enhance people’s 
living standards and violated people’s human rights. Regarding freedom from fear, the 
government’s treatment of insurgency movements was egregious. After Suharto’s downfall in 
May 1998, successors accepted democratisation. Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati were 
concerned about human-security issues. However, their ability to address human insecurities 
helped determine whether they stayed in power or not. 
During the APSC’s formulation, the Indonesian government played a supportive role. 
Regarding the freedom-from-want element, the government actively supported the creation of 
a regional human-rights mechanism and encouraged CSOs to join the ASEAN decision-
making process. Regarding freedom from fear, the fact that the Indonesian government 
suggested creating a regional peacekeeping force led to ASEAN’s cooperative engagement in 
peacekeeping efforts. The motivation underlying the Indonesian government’s supportive 
strategies has been a desire to re-enhance its leadership position in ASEAN. Thailand’s media 
stated that “Jakarta has set out with a very big ambition to transform ASEAN into a global 
game-changer—something no other ASEAN members have so far dared to think of” (The 
Nation, April 27, 2011).  
 
4.4 Laos 
In 1975, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) toppled the monarchy and established 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR). As soon as the Lao communists took power, 
their ability to address human insecurities proved itself to be incompetent. Even though the 
Lao government in 1986 adopted economic reforms that have enhanced its people’s living 
standards, the government has restricted people’s human rights and failed to address domestic 
human insecurities. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Lao government has not 
supported issues that might pose risks to the regime’s continuity and stability. This section 
presents a historical review of the human-security situation under the LPRP’s governance and 
then discusses the Lao regime’s strategies for dealing with the creation of the APSC. 
  
4.4.1 Historical Review: 1975 to 2002 
This historical review section is divided into two parts. The first part discusses human-
security conditions under the LPRPs’ regime from 1975 up to the period directly preceding 
the economic reforms in 1986, and the second part discusses human security under the 
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LPRP’s regime from 1986’s reforms to 2002 
 
4.4.1.1 Human Security before the Economic Reforms in 1986 
When the LPRP came to power in 1975, the Lao government failed to provide its people 
adequate human security. In the freedom-from-want area, the Lao government restricted 
people’s human right and did not improve people’s living standards. In the freedom-from-fear 
area, the Lao government used repressive measures against ethnic minorities. 
 
4.4.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
The LPRP took power in 1975, and pursued its adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology. Politically, 
the Lao government—rather than create a constitution protecting people’s human rights—
restricted people’s human rights. The Lao government arrested people who expressed anti-
government sentiment and people who were deemed too close to foreigners, sending these 
political and cultural prisoners to re-education camps (Thayer, 1984: 53). The conditions at 
these re-education camps were awful, and food shortages and disease were common 
afflictions (Brown and Zasloff, 1980: 109). In 1979, political prisoners numbered somewhere 
between 10,000 and 20,000 (Brown and Zasloff, 1980: 109). 
Economically, the Lao government adopted collectivisation of agricultural production. 
From 1978 to 1985, the government launched the Three-Year Development Plan (1978-1980) 
and the First Five-Year Development Plan 1981-1985. The Lao government claimed that 
these plans would boost agriculture production (John, 2006: 177). However, these plans did 
little to enhance people’s living standards (Bedlington, 1982: 96-7). In fact, these plans 
resulted in poverty and famine, which created massive refugee flows (Bedlington, 1981: 110). 
Ronald Bruce St John argued that the government’s purpose in adopting the development 
plans was to control people in rural areas (John, 2006: 177).  
 
4.4.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Lao one-party government has not tolerated Hmong highlanders, some of whom have 
attacked the government and opposed government policies. Beginning in 1975, the 
government discouraged people from using traditional farming practices, including slash-and-
burn rice cultivation. The government declared that this method devastated the environment 
(Ireson and Ireson, 1991: 929). Thus, the government resettled people who had been living in 
the uplands to the lowlands, where cultivation of paddy rice was common. In truth, according 
to Carol Ireson and Randall Ireson’s research, government officials were worried not about 
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environmental devastation but about obstacles to the government’s own exploitation of the 
environment: the fear was land burning would compromise forest resources, on the basis of 
which these officials—with an eye towards personal gain—hoped to export environmental 
products (Ireson and Ireson, 1991: 932). The Lao government brutally treated people who did 
not cooperate with its resettlement policies, in particular the Hmong minority. In order to 
carry out the forced relocation of the Hmong people, the government burned Hmong people’s 
homes (Ireson and Ireson, 1991: 935). In addition, in order to repress Hmong rebels who 
attacked government outposts and who opposed the government’s resettlement and 
agricultural policies, the Lao government called for help from Vietnam troops against Hmong 
people (Brown and Zasloff, 1979: 98). The Lao government obviously committed atrocities 
against its own people. 
 
4.4.1.2 Human Security after the 1986 Economic Reforms 
After the First Five-Year Development Plan, the Lao government adopted economic and 
political reforms. Economically, in 1986’s Fourth Party Congress, the government launched a 
series of market-oriented economic reforms, known collectively as the Second Five-Year 
Plan from 1986 to 1990, where the aim was to improve the population’s standard of living, 
including an increase in food production, an amelioration of poor infrastructure, and 
improvements in the education and health sectors (Meng, 1987: 183-4). Politically, the Lao 
government in 1991 created a new constitution, which embodied democracy and human 
rights. According to Kyaw Yin Hlaing’s research, Lao people’s living standards gradually 
improved in the 1990s (Hlaing, 2006). Indeed, according to 1992’s HDI, Laos fell under the 
category of “low human development” countries (UNDP, 1994: 130), but in 2002’s HDI, 
Laos found itself on the list of “medium human development” countries (UNDP, 2004: 148). 
However, the Lao government has failed to address human insecurities, many of which have 
emerged as a byproduct of domestic economic development, and has continued to restrict 
people’s human rights and persecute ethnic minorities. 
 
4.4.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
After the 1986 economic reforms, many countries, especially China and Thailand, invested in 
Laos’ tourism, energy, and mining industries. For example, China and Thailand invested in 
dam building. In addition, foreign investors financed the construction of bridges between 
Laos and its neighbouring countries, such as the bridge connecting Thailand’s Chiang Rai 
Province and Laos’ Luand Namtha Province (Stuart-Fox, 1995: 63). The Lao government 
101 
 
profited fiscally from hydroelectric exports and transnational connections.  
However, the Lao government’s economic development created human insecurity. A 
case in point: the construction of hydropower stations displaced people and harmed the 
environment (Stuart-Fox, 1995: 183). Furthermore, after construction of a transnational road 
network, the rate of HIV/AIDS transmission increased, since brothels started dotting the 
thoroughfare, providing sex services to truck drivers (Stuart-Fox, 2007: 171). However, the 
Lao government persisted in launching economic development and had no solutions for these 
consequences, not all of which were unanticipated. For example, the International Rivers had 
warned the government that development of the Nam Theun 2 Dam would harm the 
environment, including places where local people were living,33 but the plans for Nam Theun 
2 Dam went forward, unchanged. 
Regarding human rights, the government arrested many democratic activists. In the 
1990s, the Lao government arrested such people who supported a multi-party political system 
as Thongsouk Saisangkhi, who was an assistant to the Minister for Science and Technology. 
In 1999, the Lao government arrested six students and a teacher who had both protested 
against the government’s incompetence in addressing economic problems and distributed 
flyers calling for the government to release political prisoners and to practice democracy, 
including the establishment of elections and a multiparty political system (Thayer, 2000: 45). 
In October 2001, the government arrested five European activists who, in front of the 
presidential palace, had demonstrated against both the government’s violation of human 
rights and the country’s non-democratic political system (Bourdet, 2002: 114). It is 
reasonable to say that even though the Lao government created the new Constitution in 1991, 
the single-party regime did not launch a democratic political system and continued to violate 
people’s human rights. 
 
4.4.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
Article 8 of the 1991 constitution declares that the document serves “to protect, preserve and 
promote the fine customs and cultures of [people’s] own tribes” (Howe, 2013: 152). However, 
regarding anti-government rebels, the Lao government’s policy was harshly repressive. In 
1990, the Lao government entered into armed conflict with the United Lao National 
Liberation Front (ULNLF). The government killed forty ULNLF’s members (Gunn, 1991: 
89). In 2000, the Lao government asked Vietnamese troops to assist the government in 
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suppressing a Hmong rebellion in Xiang Khouang Province (John, 2006: 185). And in 2003, 
the Lao government’s military clashed with Hmong anti-government rebels again. Outside 
military options, the Lao government adopted a strategy of starvation against these rebels, 
which attracted perhaps most notably Amnesty International’s firm criticism (Thayer, 2004: 
103) 
 
4.4.2 Exploration of the Lao Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
4.4.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Lao Government’s Strategies 
According to the above historical review, we know that the Lao government failed to address 
their human insecurities. In light of these facts, two questions pertaining to the current study’s 
topic stand out: Has the Lao government supported the creation of the APSC? And what 
strategies has the Lao government adopted in response to the creation of the APSC? 
The Lao government’s adoption of strategies for responding to the creation of the APSC 
has rested on a central objective: to undermine certain provisions in the APSC, particularly 
those addressing human rights and freedom-from-fear issues. The motivation underlying this 
objective, in turn, has been the Lao government’s desire to consolidate regime viability. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the Lao government in 1986 adopted economic reforms 
that gradually enhanced people’s living standards. Yves argued that “Laotian leaders regard 
improvement of economic performance as the best way to ensure their legitimacy and the 
continuity of the one-party state” (Bourdet, 1996: 90). Likewise, Kyaw Yin Hlaing argued 
that economic development has been a method by which the Lao government has sought to 
consolidate its political legitimacy (Hlaing, 2006: 142). According to Kyaw’s research, this 
method tended to be useful. In his research, Kyaw interviewed 25 Laotians, of whom 20 “did 
not think that their government should be replaced” and thought that “their country was very 
stable” (Hlaing, 2006: 143). In addition, anti-government activities, whether carried out by 
political dissidents or ethnic minorities, were very weak (Hlaing, 2006: 143-4). Kyaw’s 
research suggests the possibility that the Lao government enjoyed a consolidated political 
legitimacy.  
However, since the mid-2000s, the Lao government’s legitimacy has encountered 
potent challenges. Political dissidents and CSOs have called for human rights and democracy 
in the country and have sometimes remorselessly criticised government incompetence 
(Gainsborough, 2012: 41-2). In addition, Western countries and international NGOs have 
criticised the Lao government’s violation of human rights and lack of democracy. For 
example, in 2004, the U.S. House of Representative urged the Lao government to establish 
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democratic system and release political prisoners. In 2007, Amnesty International’s report 
similarly criticised the Lao government’s brutal repression of the minority population of 
Hmong highlanders (Amnesty International, March 2007). Demands from political dissidents 
and CSOs and criticism from the international community have placed pressure on the Lao 
government, which, in defending itself, has resorted to the principle of non-interference. For 
example, the Lao government objected to U.S. interference in Lao internal affairs (Pholsena, 
2005: 181). These examples of back-and-forth disputes suggest that the political legitimacy 
of the Lao government has been not as consolidated as Kyaw’s research would suggest. 
Creation of the APSC has been a potential risk to the Lao government, because the 
objectives linked to the APSC have included promotion of human rights, pacific settlement of 
disputes, and reconciliation among states and peoples. The Lao government’s support of these 
objectives could directly or indirectly encourage the development of domestic dissent among 
opposition groups and anti-government activities among ethnic minorities. Thus, the Lao 
government’s strategic response to the creation of the APSC has, on the whole, been to 
undermine the APSC’s element capable of undermining the regime’s viability. 
 
4.4.2.2 The Laotian Government’s Strategies 
4.4.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
After the Lao government agreed to create the APSC and ratified the ASEAN Charter, Prime 
Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh signed an agreement allowing Lao citizens to create NGOs 
and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(Jönsson, 2010: 241). The Lao government seemed to be implementing various rules, 
guidelines, and principles reflective of the APSC’s general spirit.  
In fact, the Lao government has undermined the human-rights element in the APSC. 
For example, when ASEAN decided to embed human-rights language in the ASEAN Charter 
and create the regional human-rights body, the Lao government claimed that “they were not 
ready for the immediate establishment of such a body [regional human-rights body] and 
ASEAN members might be allowed to join the body at a later date” (The Star, July 31, 2007). 
In addition, in 2009, when the Thai government called for Myanmar’s military regime 
to release Aung San Suu Kyi, the Lao government opposed the Thai government’s request 
and insisted that ASEAN should adhere to the principle of non-interference (Jönsson, 2010: 
245). Media and scholars have questioned how ASEAN created the APSC without addressing 
human-rights problems in Myanmar. Thus, human-rights violations in Myanmar have 
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constituted a barrier to ASEAN’s creation of the APSC. The Lao government’s opposition to 
the Thai government’s demand that the Myanmar regime release Aung San Suu Kyi and the 
Lao government’s support of the principle of non-interference suggest that the Lao 
government has not sincerely developed the APSC.  
 
4.4.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Lao government has been worried that its support for the APSC’s freedom-from-fear 
element may encourage Laos’ ethnic minorities to engage in anti-government activities. Thus, 
in order to consolidate the regime’s viability, the Lao government has undermined this 
freedom-from-fear element. The Lao government on the domestic front has continued to 
brutalise its Hmong highlander minority. For example, in April 2006, Lao government troops 
attacked Hmong people foraging for food. The attack resulted in 26 dead, most of whom 
were children and women (Amnesty International, March 2007: 11). Although the Amnesty 
International issues the public statement to criticise the Lao government, the Lao authority’s 
response was a denial of responsibility for the attack.34 The Lao government’s inhumane 
treatment of its Hmong population has led to displaced refugees escaping to Thailand. 
However, when the international community expressed concern about the Thai government’s 
expulsion of Hmong people to Laos, the Lao government responded that the Hmong refugees 
were not Lao citizens and that they were rightfully Thailand’s problem (Jakarta Post, 
December 27, 2009). 
 
4.4.3 Summary 
Since the LPRP’s ascendancy to power in 1975, the Lao government has been unable to 
provide adequate human security to its people. From 1975 to just before the economic 
reforms in 1986, the Lao government was a source of tangible threat to the country’s general 
population. Between 1986 and 2002, a time of economic reforms, the Lao government 
gradually enhanced people’s living standards, yet restricted people’s human rights and 
persecuted ethnic minorities. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the strategies 
adopted by the Lao government in response to the creation of the APSC have functioned to 
undermine certain provisions in the APSC, particularly those addressing human rights and 
freedom-from-fear issues. The motivation underlying the Lao government’s manoeuvres in 
these regards has been to consolidate the regime’s viability. The Lao government has 
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understood that what their authoritarian and undemocratic regime has needed is political 
legitimacy, and this strategy—in theory—should maximise the Lao government’s realisation 
of its goals.  
 
4.5 Malaysia 
Since 1963, when Malay integrated Sarawak, Sabah, and Singapore (Singapore separated 
from Malaysia in 1965), the Malaysian government has provided its population with good 
conditions for human security. However, like many ruling governments in Southeast Asian 
countries, the Malaysian government has failed to provide its people with adequate human 
rights. Interestingly, regarding the creation of the APSC where its spirit is people-oriented 
and its target is protection of human rights, the Malaysian government has been a voice of 
advocacy. In this section, I will first historically review human-security conditions under the 
Malaysian government and then explore both the strategies adopted by the Malaysian 
government in response to the creation of the APSC and the motivations underlying the 
Malaysian government’s strategies. 
 
4.5.1 Historical Review: From 1957 to 2002 
The following historical review will discuss human-security conditions as they existed during 
the period ranging from the Tunku Abdul Rahman to the Mahathir Mohamad governments. 
The discussion will focus particularly on how these leaders limited people’s human rights. 
 
4.5.1.1 Human Security from Tunku Abdul Rahman to Mahathir bin Mohamad Governments 
Since independence in 1963, Malaysian leaders have engaged in domestic economic 
development. The Malaysian government has promoted foreign investment in the country and 
exported electronic components, helping promote steady economic growth. From 1988 to 
1996, GDP growth in Malaysia exceeded 8.5% each year, and average annual growth in the 
GDP was 9.5%. 35  This tremendous expansion of the economy enhanced people’s living 
standards. According to the HDI index in 1992 and 2002, Malaysia ranked 4th respectively in 
the category of medium human development (UNDP, 2004: 140, UNDP, 1994: 129). 
Politically, the government has adopted a democratic political system, although the National 
Front (Barisan Nasional, BN), which has comprised the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress 
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(MIC), has dominated  Malaysian politics since the National Front’s formation in 1973. Thus, 
Malaysians have experienced regular elections and universal suffrage, and opposition parties 
have had a political space in which to operate. However, the Malaysian government has 
failed to provide its people with adequate human rights. In addition, from the 1960s to the 
early 1990s, armed conflicts between the Malaysian government and the MCP resulted in 
heavy casualties.  
 
4.5.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
The first Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, designed two important laws that 
violated human rights. First, in 1960, Tunku Abdul Raham launched the Internal Security Act 
(ISA). Under the ISA, the police could arrest people without trial. For Tunku Abdul Raham, 
the ISA was a principal method for discouraging domestic communist factions, but his 
successors used the ISA to repress a wide swath of political dissidents. In addition, in 1966, 
Tunku Abdul Raham enacted the Societies Act. Under this Act, associations could not exist 
without formal permission from the government. Abdul Razak Hussein, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman’s successor, also designed legislation to discourage dissidents. In 1971, Razak 
enacted the Universities and University Colleges Act (UUCA) to curb student’s movement. In 
1974, the Razak government amended this act. The amendment prohibited student—in the 
absence of university approval—from being members of parties or trade unions (Milne, 1976: 
190).  
Mahathir Mohamad also used the ISA to discourage political opponents. There are no 
exact figures as to how many people were arrested under the ISA during the Mahathir era. 
The most famous cases, however, are likely the arrests of both the Al Arqam movement’s 
leader Ashaari Muhammad and the government minister Anwar Ibrahim. In 1994, under the 
ISA, the Mahathir government arrested the Al Arqam movement’s leader Ashaari Muhammad 
and related people on the charge of engaging in deviationist teachings. The arrest sparked 
criticism from the international community. Many people believed that the main reason for 
the arrests was the Malaysian government’s concern that the Arqam group might threaten the 
regime’s stability and continuity (Hassan, 1995: 190). Kenneth Christie and Denny Roy 
argued that the Mahathir government’s crackdown on the Arqam group “represented a 
fundamental violation of human rights and freedom, including freedom of expression, 
religion and the right to a livelihood” (Christie and Roy, 2001: 41). In 1998, the Mahathir 
government arrested Deputy and Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim under the ISA. Anwar 
suffered inhuman treatment. For example, “Anwar appeared in court with a black eye and a 
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medical report showed that he had traces of arsenic in his blood” (Christie and Roy, 2001: 44). 
Governments from Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United States criticised the 
Mahathir government’s violations of human rights (Felker, 1999: 52).36  
It should be noted here that during the period from the Tunku Abdul Rahman to the 
Mahathir Mohamad governments, Malaysia had pronounced ethnic problems between ethnic 
Malays and ethnic Chinese. The country’s affirmative-action policy for Malays may be an 
important reason for these ethnic problems (Rogers, 1972: 171-2). After racial riots erupted 
on May 13, 1969, Razak introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP), whose purpose was to 
eradicate “poverty among all ethnic groups” and restructure “Malaysian society to eliminate 
the identification of communal groups with economic activity” (Rogers, 1972: 171). Under 
this policy, ethnic Malays enjoyed more privileges than non-ethnic Malays. For example, the 
state guaranteed that ethnic Malays could have 30% ownership of all commerce and industry 
for 20 years. The country’s affirmative-action policy, thus, seems to have helped trigger the 
aforementioned resentment and strife. In terms of human security, it appears likely that 
affirmative-action policies benefiting ethnic Malays have contributed to problems of social 
inequality and racism. 
However, The Malaysian government has not satisfactorily resolved the cleavage 
between ethnic Malays and ethnic Chinese in the country. In fact, the Malaysian government 
has quite blatantly favoured the ethnic-Malay community. For example, when Najib became 
Prime Minister in 2009, he pledged to achieve ethnic harmony (O’Shannassy, 2011: 175). 
However, according to Najib, “To say all religions are equal before Allah is against the 
Islamic belief”—a position clearly favouring Muslims over non-Muslims (O’Shannassy, 
2012: 168). Unsurprisingly, according to a questionnaire-survey that I conducted for this 
dissertation, 10 of the 20 Malayan respondents reported having encountered ethnic or racial 
discrimination. 
 
4.5.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
Regarding freedom-from-fear issues, the Malaysian regimes—ranging from Tunku Abdul 
Rahman to Mahathir bin Mohamad—were beset by the anti-government of the MCP. Tunku 
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seizure of the presidency from Suharto (Narine, 2002: 187-8). 
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Abdul Rahman responded to the MCP by enacting the ISA and attacked the MCP base camps. 
Abdul Razak Hussein also adopted the preferred strategies of Tunku Abdul Rahman. In 
addition, Abdul Razak Hussein played the Chinese card. He visited China in 1974 and 
reached a consensus with the Chinese government: non-interference in each other’s internal 
affairs (Milne, 1975: 166). The purpose of reaching the consensus was, for the Malaysian 
leadership, to stop the Chinese government’s sponsorship of the MCP. By the time of 
Mahathir’s rule, the MCP’s influence on the Malaysian government had gradually declined. 
In December 1989, the MCP surrendered to the Mahathir regime. During the communist 
revolutionary struggle, the MCP killed about 10,000 Malaysians, including soldiers and 
civilians (Nathan, 1990: 210). 
 
4.5.2 Exploration of the Malaysian Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
4.5.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Malaysian Government’s Strategies 
In October 2003, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi became Malaysia’s fifth prime minister. He 
ameliorated the country’s human-rights conditions. For example, he adopted political reforms 
that resulted in “improved governance, stronger political institutions, and a softer approach to 
human rights” (Welsh, 2005: 153-4). Domestically, current Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mohamad Najib bin Abdul Razak enhanced the human-rights situation for the country’s 
people, although his efforts have met limited success. One of the more notable successes took 
place in April 2012, when the Malaysian government replaced the ISA with the Security 
Offenses (Special Measures) Act. The new act gave detainees the right to meet with their 
relatives and to consult with their lawyers (Case, 2013: 136). In addition, the Malaysian 
government amended the UUCA. Today in Malaysia, students can join parties and trade 
unions (Case, 2013: 136). 
Have the Badawi and Najib governments supported the creation of the APSC? The 
Malaysian government’s strategies have been geared toward advocacy of the creation of the 
APSC, and the motivations underlying these strategies have involved the Malaysian 
government’s ambitions in ASEAN. Engagement in ASEAN affairs has been a cornerstone in 
Malaysian diplomacy. The Malaysian government has used ASEAN as a platform to ensure 
national security. For example, according Acharya, the Malaysian government’s goal in 
proposing the creation of the ZOPFAN in 1971 was to exclude Chinese government 
interference in ASEAN members’ domestic affairs (Acharya, 2009b: 66). In the post-Cold 
War period, Malaysia has had a deep desire to be a principal leader in ASEAN. This ambition 
was quite obvious during the domestic political instability that gripped Indonesia in the 1990s. 
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For example, Mahathir’s anti-Western statements led ASEAN members to oppose Western 
countries in spats over human-rights issues. In addition, in order to enhance ASEAN’s 
international status, the Malaysian government encouraged ASEAN to open its doors to 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Furthermore, the Malaysian government attempted 
to play the role of a pioneering leader in ASEAN’s task of integrating regional economic. For 
example, the Malaysian government actively promoted the creation of the East Asia 
Economic Caucus (EAEC), which was the economic regional arrangement excluding Western 
countries’ participation. In 1997, Mahathir delivered a speech at the annual seminar of the 
World Bank, declaring that the Malaysian government was willing to help poor countries 
(Mahathir and Irwan, 2007:103). Mirzan Mahathir and Fazil Irwan noted this effort, on the 
part of the Malaysian government, to manifest its leadership and progressiveness in relation 
to neighbouring countries (Mahathir and Irwan, 2007: 104) 
However, Indonesia—not Malaysia—has been the best recognised leader in ASEAN. In 
recent years, moreover, Indonesia has experienced great improvements in its domestic 
human-rights and democracy records. Indonesia as a chief source of leadership in ASEAN 
has re-emerged as a potent possibility, if not a reality. In comparison with the Indonesian 
situation, Mahathir’s anti-Western sentiments tarnished Malaysian national reputation. For 
example, after the UN-supervised ballot for self-determination on August 30, 1999 in East 
Timor, the Indonesian Army murdered hundreds of East Timorese and wreaked havoc on 
much-needed infrastructure in the region. Surprisingly, Mahathir—rather than criticise these 
atrocities—“blamed the West for manipulating Timorese separatism to weaken or even 
dismember Indonesia” (Felker, 2000: 59). Because of Mahathir’s absurd statement, East 
Timor’s leader objected to Malaysia’s leadership role in East Timorese peace-keeping tasks in 
(Felker, 2000: 59). 
Both the Badawi and the Najib governments have regarded the creation of the APSC as 
a chance to enhance Malaysian influence in ASEAN. During the APSC building process, 
Najib publicly said that “Malaysia has to lead in the process of getting ASEAN’s act together 
in respect of the goal to become a modern regional block” (Borneo Post, April 9, 2014). 
Against this backdrop, the Badawi’s government has been the vanguard in promoting human 
rights, revising the principle of non-interference, and promoting CSOs’ participation in the 
ASEAN decision-making process. And to considerable effect, both the Badawi and the Najib 
governments have actively engaged in the Mindanao peace process. 
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4.5.2.2 The Malaysian Government’s Strategies 
4.5.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
With the exception of the Indonesian government, the Malaysian government has been the 
most prominent ASEAN member to promote human rights. During the drafting of the 
ASEAN Charter, the Malaysian government insisted that the language of human rights be 
enshrined in the charter itself. The Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar 
commented on this matter directly: 
 
We must be seen not to be allergic, or not supportive of human rights … if for any 
reason, the human rights provision is not in the charter, then people will think ASEAN 
is not pro-human rights and that is nonsense. We are for human rights, we are for civil 
liberties, we are for rule of law, we want to see good governments. (The Star, July 31, 
2007) 
 
The Malaysian government also suggested that the ASEAN Charter should have a 
provision for the creation of a regional human rights body (The Star, July 30, 2007). Finally, 
human rights took shape in both Article 1.7 and Article 2. 2. i of chapter 1 of the ASEAN 
Charter (ASEAN, 2007: 1). Regarding the creation of a regional human-rights body, the 
blueprint of the APSC clearly regulates that ASEAN would create the regional human-rights 
body (ASEAN, 2009a: 5). The ASEAN human-rights body is the AICHR, created in October 
2011.  
In addition, during the APSC building process, Malaysia was the first member to 
propose reviewing the principle of non-interference as a way to address the emergence of 
more and more new insecurities. Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said that “a cardinal principle of 
ASEAN, the non-interference policy, should be carefully refined and updated to tackle the 
new challenges facing the 10-member organisation” (cited from Mahathir and Irwan, 2007: 
108). 
The Malaysian government has been in the vanguard of encouraging CSOs to join the 
ASEAN decision-making process. At the 11th ASEAN Summit, Abdullah expressed his 
support for the creation of the ACSC and invited the ACSC to be held in parallel with the 
ASEAN Summit. Kelly Gerard argued that Abdullah’s friendly attitudes to CSOs “reflected 
not only his liberal outlook but also his desire to set himself apart from his predecessor, 
Mahathir” (Gerard, 2013: 418). 
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4.5.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Malaysian government has played the leading role in enhancing freedom-from-fear 
element in the APSC. The Malaysian government has made substantial contributions to 
ending—or limiting the effects of—civil wars between the Filipino government and the 
MILF in Mindanao (Castro, 2012: 213). Since the mid-2000s, the Malaysian government has 
participated in peace process in Mindanao. As of early 2014, the Malaysian government has 
hosted, in total, 43 rounds of such talks in Kuala Lumpur (The Star, March 27, 2014) and has 
invited Japan to assist in these efforts, partly because the Malaysian government lacks 
relevant resources possessed in abundance by Japan (Lam, 2008: 54). Finally, in March 2014, 
the Filipino government and the MILF signed a peace treaty. The successful Malaysian 
mediation in Mindanao garnered domestic and international appreciation for the Filipino 
government. Filipino President Benigno Aquino himself noted his gratitude to Malaysia for 
the accomplishment:  
 
I wish to thank Prime Minister Najib Razak for the significant support your government 
has demonstrated in facilitating and hosting the peace talks between my government 
and the MILF. I speak on behalf of our people when I say the Filipinos will never 
forget an act of kindness. (The Star, February 28, 2014) 
 
Prime Minister Najib Razak expressed the opinion that the Malaysian government’s 
continuous efforts in mediating civil wars involving ASEAN members stemmed in large 
measures from the desire to see the successful creation of the AC by 2015. Specifically, he 
stated,  
 
Malaysia wants to do more to help resolve armed conflicts in the region ahead of the 
setting up of the ASEAN Community at the end of 2015. When ASEAN becomes a 
community, we must help to end any conflicts in the region and spare no effort to seek a 
political settlement to the conflicts. (The Star, March 28, 2014) 
 
4.5.3 Summary 
After Malaysian independence, the Malaysian government provided its people with 
admirable living standards, but restricted people’s human rights. Interestingly, the Badawi 
and the Najib governments have strategically advocated the creation of the APSC. The 
Malaysian government has played the leading role in promoting human rights, revising the 
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principle of non-interference, promoting CSOs’ participation in ASEAN’s decision-making 
process, and participating in the Mindanao peace process. It is reasonable to conclude that, 
aside from except Indonesia, Malaysia has stood out as a forceful supporter of the creation of 
the APSC. 
 
4.6 Myanmar 
Myanmar is a country rich in natural resources, diverse in its ethnic groups, and pluralistic in 
its religious tendencies. However, from 1962 to 2002, the Myanmar government was a source 
of threat to its people: Myanmar regimes brutally suppressed demonstrators and failed to 
address several prominent types of human insecurities, all while the Myanmar armed forces 
(Tatmadaw) kept up a nearly continuous assault against armed ethnic opposition groups. 
Given the country’s historical context, it is hardly surprising that the Myanmar government 
adopted only rhetorical support for the creation of the APSC. However, during APSC 
building process, the Myanmar military regime adopted political reforms. This breakthrough 
has positively influenced the regime’s strategic relationship to the APSC’s creation. In this 
section, I will review how Myanmar’s government has addressed human-security issues since 
the Ne Win period. The next section will explore specific aspects of the military regime 
strategy with respect to the creation of the APSC. 
 
4.6.1 Historical Review: 1962–2002 
The historical review section has two parts. The first part discusses the human-security 
situation under the leadership of Ne Win from 1962 to 1988, and the second part discusses 
the human-security situation after the Ne Win Era to 2002. 
 
4.6.1.1 Human Security during the Ne Win Era (1962–1988) 
In 1962, Ne Win ousted the democratic U Nu government. Almost immediately thereafter, Ne 
Win became a nearly ever-present threat to the country’s people.  
 
4.6.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
After coming to power in 1962, the Ne Win government inculpated itself in exacerbating 
people’s human insecurities. Richard Butwell argued that the health sector was one of the Ne 
Win regime’s few “bright spots” (Butwell, 1972: 910-1). According to his research, during 
the Ne Win era, the government doubled the budget for expanding in the number and quality 
of hospitals, hospital beds, doctors, and rural health centres (Butwell, 1972: 911). Indeed, 
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according to the World Development Report 1986, health statistics between 1965 and 1984 
exhibited significant improvement: life expectancy increased from 46 to 57 years (male) and 
49 to 60 years (female), and the infant mortality rate decreased from 125 to 67 per every 
1,000 (World Bank, 1986: 232). However, the truth behind these statistics is that Burma 
ranked seventh among the world’s worst countries regarding life expectancy and infant 
mortality, and Burma was the only Southeast Asian country among the top 10 worst countries 
(World Bank, 1986: 232), meaning that Ne Win’s efforts did not translate into relatively 
substantial improvements across Burma. 
In addition, Ne Win restricted people’s human rights. During this period, people did not 
have freedom of association, because creation of political parties was banned. The only legal 
party in Burma was Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) (Butwell, 1972: 
902). In addition, the Ne Win regime adopted repressive measures against people’s freedom 
of expression and assembly. In March 1988, people, mainly students, demonstrated against 
incompetent governance, specially addressing economic hardship, but Ne Win’s regime 
harshly suppressed the demonstrators. Burmese Riot Security Police (the Lon Htein) beat and 
stabbed students to death (Watcher, 1989: 175). In June 1988, when students protested the 
government again, brutal repression against protestors ensued. Although Ne Win resigned 
after the protest and appointed Sein Lwin as the new Burmese leader, Ne Win’s harsh 
repression continued to reverberate among enraged students, whose demonstrations against 
the government persisted, resulting in the 1988 pro-democracy movement.  
 
4.6.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
Since independence in 1948, the Burmese government has been plagued by the problem of 
multiethnic insurgencies. In 1952, in order to build “a strong Burmese nation,” the Burmese 
government regulated that “all government business was to be conducted in the Burman 
language, Burmese history would be taught from the perspective of Burman nationalism, and 
the sole language used in education would be Burman” (Collins, 2003: 28-9). Alan Collins 
argued that this assimilation did not build “a strong Burmese nation” but resulted in armed 
insurgency groups whose function was to fight the central authorities (Collins, 2003: 28-9). 
During the Ne Win era, the government attempted to address these long-running ethnic 
conflicts. For example, Ne Win invited armed-insurgency groups to join peace talks and he 
guaranteed that Burmese and ethnic minorities would be equal economically and socially 
(Butwell, 1972: 907-8). However, Ne Win’s regime remained poised to use brutal military 
tactics in its crackdown on armed ethnic opposition groups.  
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Ne Win’s counter-insurgency campaigns targeted armed ethnic groups in the Chin, 
Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan States, leading to heavy casualties. For 
example, in 1980, the Tatmadaw attacked the KNU units on the Burma-Thai border. The 
Tatmadaw and the KNU’s military arm-Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) fiercely 
resisted each other, leading to about 100 to 200 Burmese soldiers dead (Silverstein, 1981: 
217). In addition, in the 1980s, the Burmese government negotiated with the Kachin 
Independence Organization (KIO) and particularly with its leader, U Bran Seng, but the 
government did not grant the community autonomy or even political freedom (Silverstein, 
1982: 184). The long-standing armed conflict between the Burmese government and the KIO 
persisted. Between 1961 and 1986, casualties of Kachins numbered over 30,000 and 
displaced Kachins and Kachin refugees numbered over 130,000 (Smith, 2002: 16) 
 
4.6.1.2 Human Security after the Ne Win Dictatorship (1989-2002) 
After political turmoil gripped Burma in 1988, General Saw Maung seized power and the 
Tatmadaw created the SLORC. In 1989, the SLORC changed country’s name from Burma to 
Myanmar. In May 1990, the Saw Maung regime held elections and allowed the NLD, the 
main opposition party, to participate therein. The NLD won a landslide victory. They took 
80% of the seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Assembly) and nearly 60% of the overall 
votes (Guyot, 1991: 210). Derek Tonkin argued that this election is proof of the Myanmar 
people’s preference for a democratic system (Tonkin, 2007: 35). However, the SLORC 
refused to accept the results of the election. Many members and supporters of the NLD had to 
concede power, large numbers were arrested (Guyot, 1991: 221), and Aung San Suu Kyi was 
placed under house arrest. Thus, the SLORC continued to rule Myanmar. However, like the 
Ne Win regime, the SLORC restricted people’s human rights and failed to address several 
important types of human insecurities. In the freedom-from-fear area, the SLORC continued 
its counter-insurgency campaigns against a handful of armed insurgency groups. In short, the 
SLORC remained a source of threats to its people. 
 
4.6.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
In April 1991, General Than Shwe became Myanmar’s new Prime Minister and the SLORC 
chairman. He released some political prisoners and allowed reporters and scholars to 
Myanmar (Steinberg, 1993: 176-7). On the surface, Than Shwe attempted to change the 
Myanmar government’s abysmal human-rights record. In fact, the Than Shwe regime was 
nothing more than yet another source of threats to the people. The regime continued to 
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repress people’s capacity for political participation. It still arrested members of the NLD 
(Seekins, 1999: 16). In addition, the Than Shwe regime created the Union Solidarity and 
Development Association (USDA) in 1993. The task of this choreographed organisation was 
to vilify Aung San Suu Kyi and make mischief in the NLD. The military-ruled government’s 
subterfuge led to serious conflict between the USDA and the NLD in May 2003. The conflict, 
which is referred to as the so-called Depayin Incident, resulted in 70 people dead and 100 
injured (Hlaing, 2004: 88). 
In addition, the military regime was one of the culprits in the increased infection rates 
of HIV/AIDS in Myanmar. In Myanmar, the number of people living with HIV/AIDS 
increased constantly between 1991 and 2004, with the figures jumping from below 50,000 to 
over 250,000 (UNAIDS, March 31, 2012: 9). Unsafe sex and intravenous drug use were the 
main causes for the spread of HIV/AIDS. Although the use of condoms and methadone 
treatment can effectively decrease HIV transmission rates, according to Cohen’s research, the 
government declared that they would arrest any woman caught carrying a condom because 
the government regarded such women as prostitutes; moreover, the government regarded 
methadone as an illegal narcotic rather than as an effective drug-treatment option (Cohen, 
2003: 1653-4). 
The military regime’s wrongdoings surfaced in the problem of trade in illicit drugs. In 
February 1974, Ne Win’s government enacted laws to prohibit crops used for the production 
of narcotics, and accepted assistance from the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control 
(UNFDAC), all under the auspices of Phase I and Phase II of the UN/Burma Programme for 
Drug Abuse Control. Since 1989, the military regime has been a signatory to a ceasefire 
agreement with many armed ethnic groups. Even with some armed insurgency groups that 
were dependent on the narcotics trade, the military regime has signed ceasefire agreements; 
however, in exchange for the ceasefire, the military has granted these groups permission to 
engage in the drug trade (Steinberg, 1993: 182). In addition, some observers have suspected 
the military regime itself of involvement in the narcotics trade (Badgley, 1994: 154). Richard 
Gibson and John Haseman concluded that the Myanmar government has been “willing” to 
address the narcotics problem, but because of growing armed ethnic groups and rampant 
corruption in the police and military, the Myanmar government has been increasingly at the 
mercy of the narcotics problem (Gibson and Haseman, 2003). 
 
4.6.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
Since 1989, the military regime has signed ceasefire agreements with many armed ethnic 
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groups. However, the regime did not make tangible progress in pursuing national 
reconciliation. For example, the military continued to repress the KNU. In 1994, the military 
regime attacked the KNU its refugee camps in Thailand (Callahan, 1996: 163) and in 1998, 
the pro-SPDC Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) burned down KNU refugee camps 
in Thailand. Victims fled into the “malaria-infested jungle” (Seekins, 1999: 16).  
In addition, the military government was a surreptitious actor in the racial tensions 
between Buddhists and Muslims in Rakhine State. In 2001, the Buddhist Rakhine and the 
Muslim Rohingya in Arakan State clashed with each other, and these conflicts led to heavy 
casualties and the destruction of mosques and Muslims’ homes. However, police and soldiers 
simply looked on with folded arms and did not intervene until the desperate Muslims 
themselves fought back (Human Rights Watch, July 18, 2002: 9-11). According to an 
interview that Human Rights Watch conducted with Muslim victims, the Myanmar 
government was surreptitiously involved in the racial conflict, because the monks who were 
clashing with Muslims were carrying hand-phones that were not available to people in 
Myanmar except for police and army personnel (Human Rights Watch, July 18, 2002: 8). 
These racial tensions have led to displaced Muslim refugees, who have relocated to refugee 
camps in Bangladesh. The military regime has been unwilling to accept them back into 
Myanmar (Amnesty International, June 21, 2007). 
 
4.6.2 Exploration of the Myanmar Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
4.6.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Myanmar Government’s Strategies 
According to the current study’s historical review, we know that the Myanmar government 
was a source of threats to its people. It is hardly surprising that the Myanmar government’s 
strategies for the APSC rested chiefly on expressions of rhetorical support. In fact, the 
Myanmar government did not adhere to the provisions in the APSC’s blueprint. The 
motivation underlying the Myanmar government’s use of the strategies was a desire on the 
part of the regime to consolidate its continuity and stability.  
According to Jürgen Haacke, the Myanmar government did not publicly oppose the 
creation of the APSC but accepted it (Haacke, 2006: 43). Indeed, since participation in 
ASEAN in 1997, the Myanmar government has gained several advantages from ASEAN. For 
example, the Myanmar government strengthened its legitimacy, received economic benefits 
from ASEAN members, and gained ASEAN members’ political support in countering 
Western countries’ criticism of the Myanmar government’s human-rights record (Haacke, 
2006: 42-6, Acharya, 2009b: 133). There should be little surprise that the Myanmar 
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government, rather than oppose the creation of the APSC, vocally supported it. 
However, the Myanmar government’s support was nothing more than rhetorical, 
because actual promotion of democracy and human rights as laid out in the APSC blueprint 
would lead to the military regime’s instability, if the Myanmar government had adhered to 
this provision. The Myanmar government’s cautious approach to the blueprint’s human-rights 
and democratic elements can be observed in a meeting between the Myanmar government 
and ASEAN members. In 2005, when the Malaysian foreign minister Syed Hamid visited 
Myanmar to persuade the Myanmar government to release Aung San Suu Kyi and accept 
democracy, SLORC chairman Than Shwe expressed the Myanmar government’s 
cautiousness—the Myanmar government was worried that development of democracy would 
trigger “Iraq-style unrest” in Myanmar (Haacke, 2006: 56). The Myanmar government, 
though rhetorically supportive of the creation of the APSC, did not adhere in practice to the 
provisions laid out in the APSC’s blueprint. 
Interestingly, the military regime’s strategically rhetorical support softened somewhat at 
the end of 2010. The main cause of this turnaround was the Myanmar government’s adoption 
of political reforms at about this time, and two factors facilitated the political reforms. 
The first factor is closely associated with the desire on the part of the Myanmar 
government to strengthen its political and diplomatic autonomy. In the aftermath of the 
suppression of the 1988 protests, the international community pressured the military 
government to enhance its dismal human-rights record and to implement democracy. Much of 
this pressure rested on the community’s adoption of economic and political sanctions and, 
more generally, public opprobrium. However, the military government remained intransigent, 
since they had gained the Chinese government’s economic and political support. 
Economically, the Chinese government was the main material donor to Myanmar. They 
provided significant aid and loans, which amounted to US$530 million from 1997 to 2006 
(Haacke, 2010: 119). In addition, prosperous trade on the border between the two countries 
resulted in substantial Chinese investments in Myanmar and the Chinese government’s 
assistance in constructing Myanmar’s infrastructure, which helped develop that country’s 
domestic economy. Politically, the Chinese always sided with the military regime. The 
Chinese government completely supported the military regime’s sham democratic reforms, 
such as the seven-point “roadmap” (Haacke, 2010: 120). When the United States planned to 
integrate Myanmar’s issues into the UNSC agenda in 2006, the Chinese government vetoed 
the American suggestion (Simon, 2007b: 69). 
However, the military regime’s overwhelming dependence on China transformed 
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Myanmar into a client of the Chinese government. What is more importantly, the Chinese 
government’s political aid could not quash the ceaseless criticism from the international 
community. Ian Storey commented on this trend: 
 
I don’t think the generals in Myanmar have ever been very happy about this 
relationship with China. Basically, they had no choice in 1988-89, but to turn to China. 
It was more of a marriage of convenience than a love match. They’ve tried over years 
to reduce that dependence by joining ASEAN and then trying to pursue closer 
relationships with India and Russia and other countries, but every time they have been 
forced to rely even more on China. This is another attempt, I think, to reduce that 
dependence.37 
 
The second factor is that the Myanmar government wanted to preserve its membership 
in ASEAN. After acquiring ASEAN membership in 1997, the Myanmar government 
benefited from a consolidation of legitimacy, economic assistance, and political support 
(Haacke, 2006: 42-6, Acharya, 2009b: 133). However, since the mid-2000s, ASEAN 
members have exerted pressure on the Myanmar government regarding domestic democratic 
and human-rights issues, because of the military regime’s recalcitrance in enhancing its 
internal politics and human-rights—a recalcitrance that has tarnished ASEAN’s reputation. 
The most serious criticism probably came from Mahathir Mohamad. In 2003, he suggested 
expelling Myanmar from ASEAN (Jakarta Post, July 25, 2003). If other ASEAN members 
had adopted the suggestion which they did not, the political legitimacy of Myanmar’s regime 
would have suffered a blow, itself putting at risk the regime’s continuity and stability. 
The impact of these factors on Myanmar’s politics has grown stronger since ASEAN’s 
decision to create the AC in 2003. The influence of the Chinese government has penetrated 
Myanmar’s long-running civil conflicts (Haacke, 2010: 126-7). Owing to its important border 
trade in the area, the Chinese government established good relations with armed ethnic 
opposition groups, such as the UWSA, and Chinese state companies were suspected of 
selling weapons to the UWSA, effectively preventing the military regime from stamping out 
multiethnic insurgencies (Haacke, 2010: 126-7). In addition, during the creation of the 
ASEAN Charter, the Chairman of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) Tan Sri Musa Hitam, 
suggested that the ASEAN Charter should feature a provision for punishing members that do 
                                                 
37
 Interview in Singapore, January 20, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei.  
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not abide by the ASEAN Charter (The Star, September 12, 2007). Against this backdrop, the 
military regime has understood that acceptance of democracy and human rights is the 
ultimate strategy by which to temper Chinese influence on Myanmar’s politics and diplomacy 
and to preserve Myanmar membership in ASEAN, even though promotion of human rights 
and democracy may stagger the Myanmar regime. Finally, at the end of 2010, the military 
regime adopted a series of political reforms, while changing its strategies for handling the 
creation of the APSC: the regime was now less a rhetorician and more and actual adherent. 
 
4.6.2.2 The Myanmar Government’s Strategies 
4.6.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
As regards the APSC’s freedom-from-want element, Myanmar’s ruling government 
expressed their rhetorical support. In November 2007, Myanmar’s Foreign Minister Nyan 
Win expressed his opinion that the military junta was willing to sign the ASEAN Charter and 
to respect democracy and human rights (AsiaNews, November 19, 2007). In 2008, the 
Myanmar government signed the ASEAN Charter and pledged to adhere to the charter. 
Foreign Minister Nyan Win said that the Myanmar government had a keen “desire to create a 
caring and sharing community” (Brunei Times, July 22, 2008). The Myanmar government’s 
commitment constituted an apparently promising start to the task of improving domestic 
democracy and an abysmal domestic human-rights record. 
However, when Cyclone Nargis stuck the Irrawaddy Delta Division of Myanmar in 
May 2008, the military government completely ignore their prior commitment to the ASEAN 
Charter. The Nargis cyclone resulted in, according to statistics released by Myanmar’s 
government, 84,537 deaths, 53,836 missing persons, and 19,359 injured persons (cited from 
Özerdem, 2005: 697). Victims lacked food, water, and shelters. They drank water in ditches 
and streams that had been made hazardous to human health owing to the presence of animal 
and human remains (Seekins, 2009: 167). Despite all this, the military regime refused to grant 
visas to foreign rescue teams and to accept assistance provided by foreign countries. Andrew 
Selth argued that the Myanmar government’s central concern was “foreign interference in 
Myanmar’s affairs” (Selth, 2008: 380, 389-94). 
In addition, the Myanmar government opposed giving real power to a regional human-
rights body. In July 2008, when Myanmar Prime Minister Nyan Win discussed with ASEAN 
members the creation of the proposed regional human-rights body, he opposed its potential 
capacity both to monitor human-rights situations in each member states and to investigate 
human-rights violations; moreover, he insisted that the regional human-rights body had to be 
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a merely consultative mechanism (Simon, 2009: 56). 
Interestingly, the military government’s rhetorical strategy started changing by the end 
of 2010. At that time, the military made an important decision: they released many political 
prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi; they restored many human rights to the people; and 
they halted construction on the China-sponsored Myitsone Dam, which had contravened the 
Myanmar people’s will (Turnell, 2012: 157).  
The Myanmar government also changed its strategic response to the creation of the 
APSC. In November 2011, the military government pledged that it would “continue to work 
actively with ASEAN member states in community building and for the achievement of the 
common goals” (Xinhua, November 21, 2011). The first test of the military regime’s 
commitment was 2012’s by-elections. Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD received permission 
to participate in this election, which the Myanmar government allowed foreign observers and 
journalists to witness. The observers positively assessed the election, in which the NLD won 
43 of the 45 available seats. The military government’s successful election was consistent 
with the APSC’s provision promoting democracy. 
There has been no talk of expelling Myanmar from ASEAN. Instead, at the twentieth 
ASEAN Summit, held in Phnom Penh in April 2012, ASEAN members called for the 
international community ease its sanctions imposed on Myanmar (ASEAN, April 3-4, 2012). 
In addition, ASEAN agreed that Myanmar should take over the chairmanship of the ASEAN 
Summit in 2014. At the same time, the military government’s adherent strategy remained in 
place throughout 2013. In June 2013, the Myanmar Foreign Ministry’s deputy director 
general of ASEAN affairs, Aung Htoo, asserted that the military government, upon assuming 
the chairmanship in 2014, would specifically focus on the following issues: a “people-
centered ASEAN, [a] convention on trafficking in persons and migrant workers” (Jakarta 
Post, June 17, 2013).  
 
4.6.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
After the military regime agreed to create the APCS, the freedom-from-fear provisions 
seemingly demanded that the government promptly end its civil wars and reconstruct war-
torn areas. However, the leadership did not adhere to the provisions for post-conflict peace-
building in the APSC blueprint (ASEAN, 2009a: 11). The military regime neither reduced 
hostilities involving the KNU and UWSA nor renounced the use of force as a way of 
addressing long-running civil conflicts. In August 2009, Tatmadaw seized Laogai, which had 
been an area occupied by several armed ethnic groups, including the Myanmar National 
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Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the UWSA, and the National Democratic Alliance 
Army (NDAA). The military government’s seizure of Laogai resulted in 37,000 refugees 
(Seekins, 2010: 201-2). 
After adoption of political reforms, the Myanmar government planned to sign a 
ceasefire agreement with armed ethnic groups, in adherence to the freedom-from-fear 
provision—pacific settlement of disputes—in the APSC blueprint. In 2013, the disputants 
reached a breakthrough in attempting to wind down these long-running ethnic conflicts. The 
military regime invited armed ethnic groups, including the most recalcitrant organisations, 
the KIO, the KNU, and the China-linked UWSA to enter into peace talks and sign a peace 
agreement. These organisations accepted the invitation. The Shan State Army leader, Yawd 
Serk, said, “The president’s announcement of reconciliation and invitation to the armed 
groups is why we came here. I trust him, that’s why I’m here and why we’ve stopped fighting” 
(Forum, January 30, 2013). The director of both the cease-fire negotiations and their 
implementation at the Myanmar Peace Center, Min Zaw Oo, echoed this sentiment: “Cease-
fire agreements in the past do not include political settlement or not even a [sic] political 
discussions.  But, this time the government already proclaimed that this discussion doesn’t 
stop short at cease-fire agreement and that will lead to a political dialogue, toward a political 
settlement” (Vocie of America, May 31, 2013). Declarations of good intention from both sides 
were a positive sign that the problem of Myanmar’s ethnic disturbances might finally be 
resolved. As of May 2014, the erstwhile opposing sides have held three peace talks, each in 
different location: Myitkyina (November 2013), Hpa-an (the capital of the Kayin State) 
(March 2014), and Rangoon (April 2014). 
 
4.6.3 Summary 
From 1962 to 2002, the Myanmar government posed a threat to the country’s people. The 
government failed to address human insecurities, restricted human rights, and attacked armed 
ethnic groups. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the military regime’s main strategy 
initially was rhetorical support for the APSC blueprint’s provisions, to which the regime did 
not adhere in practice. However, because the Myanmar government gradually experienced a 
decline in its political and diplomatic autonomy and was worried about being expelled from 
ASEAN, the Myanmar government adopted political reforms. Political reform has shifted the 
Myanmar government’s APSC strategies in the direction of an adherent stance. So far, the 
military regime has in no way assisted the creation of the APSC. However, the regime’s 
promotion of democracy and its ceasefire with armed ethnic groups have been consistent with 
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the APSC’s overarching spirit. 
 
4.7 The Philippines 
In 1946, the Philippines gained independence from the United States. From the 1965 to 2002, 
the Philippines experienced the rulership of five presidents: Ferdinand Marcos, Corazon 
Aquino, Fidel V. Ramos, Joseph Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (in her first 
presidential term). The critical difference among these leaders regarding each one’s provision 
of human security lies in whether they genuinely practiced democracy. During the APSC 
building process, the Philippines have experienced two presidents: Arroyo (her second 
presidential term) and Benigno S. Aquino III. The key point of difference between their 
respective contributions to the APSC centred also on the topic of democracy. In this section, I 
will historically review how each Philippine government has addressed human-security issues 
since the Marcos period, and in the next section, I will explore the Arroyo and Aquino III 
strategies for handling the creation of the APSC. 
 
4.7.1 Historical Review: From 1965 to 2002 
The historical-review section comprises two parts. The first part discusses the human-security 
situation under the Marcos administration from 1965 to 1986. The second part discusses the 
human-security situation under the administrations of Corazon Aquino, Ramos, Estrada, and 
Arroyo (first presidential term). 
 
4.7.1.1 Human Security during the Marcos Era 
In December 1965, Filipinos elected Marcos to the presidency. During his first presidential 
term, he launched several social-development programmes and built schools, roads, and 
electricity in rural areas (Kann, 1974: 615). However, to extend his presidency, he declared 
martial law on September 22, 1972, significantly damaging the very democratic institutions 
that had helped him acquire political power. Marcos embraced martial law to establish a 
“New Society,” which would boast low crime rate, adept governance and no communist 
interference (Adkins, 1973: 148). Early on, Marcos actively pursued his tri-fold target. 
According to Peter Kann, the Marcos government decreased crime rates, reduced corruption, 
and increased funds allocated for rural development (Kann, 1974: 619-620, 626-627). 
However, declaration of martial law was nothing more than a tool with which Marcos sought 
to continue his regime. Political dissent and separatist movements were among the significant 
challenges the setting his regime’s continuity and territorial integrity, and in response, Marcos 
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adopted repressive measures. During these years, the Marcos regime failed to address several 
important types of domestic human insecurities. 
 
4.7.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
Under martial law, Marcos restricted people’s human rights. First, Marcos limited people’s 
freedom of political participation. Opposition parties’ leaders and political dissidents were 
detained or murdered. The most conspicuous example of this line of action is the 
assassination of the Liberal Party leader Benigno Aquino at the Manila International Airport 
on August 21, 1983. Many people believed that Marcos was the mastermind of the brutal 
assault, although he blamed the Aquino slaying on communists (Silliman, 1984: 154). In 
addition, Marcos controlled people’s freedom of expression. The Marcos government banned 
the right of demonstration and prohibited the clergy in the Philippines from participating in 
trade-union activity (Noble, 1976: 185). Some clergy who continued to help vulnerable 
people and to criticise the government’s wrongdoings were either deported or secretly killed 
(Youngblood, 1978). Senator Jose W. Diokno criticised Marcos’ martial law:  
 
Martial law was never intended and cannot by its very nature be used to try and solve 
social problems. Martial law cannot solve poverty and economic development, which 
are human centered. Martial law is authoritarian and authoritarianism assumes that the 
people do not know what is good for them. (cited from Nether, 1980: 157) 
 
In addition, the Marcos government failed to address several human insecurities. 
Filipinos suffered inflation, rising food and production prices, high unemployment rates in 
urban and particularly in rural area (Adkins, 1972: 82), malnourishment (Nether, 1980: 164), 
and unsatisfactory responses to natural disasters. The Marcos’ government failed to recover 
fully from the negative consequences of these human insecurities. For example, the 
Philippines has been prone to many types of natural disasters, such as droughts, earthquakes, 
floods, and volcanic eruption, but the Marcos government provided few measures that might 
help the people minimise these natural disasters’ devastating effects. Unsurprisingly, when 
natural disasters hit the Philippines, heavy casualties and damages occur repeatedly.  
 
4.7.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
The non-democratic Marcos government adopted a hard-line approach to dealing with radical 
anti-government elements. Marcos suppressed radical insurgent Islamist groups. In February 
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1974, not long after the declaration of martial law, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 
clashed with radical insurgent Islamist groups, including the MNLF. This conflict led to the 
death and disappearance of some 10,000 people (Carmen, 1975: 136). In September 1976, 
Marcos met with representatives of the MNLF and signed the Tripoli Agreement, under 
which Mindanao gained autonomy for 13 provinces and 9 cities, but the MNLF had to 
surrender its pursuit of political independence (Islam, 1998: 449). Although this agreement 
brought about a temporary lull in the fighting on Mindanao, clashes between the two sides 
broke out after Marcos announced plans in 1977 to hold a referendum in the southern 
Philippine provinces regarding their desire to join Mindanao: the MNLF believed that the 
referendum was a trick by Marcos to chip away at the MNLF’s strength (Machado, 1978: 
208). Armed conflicts between the government and the MNLF led to approximately 600 
deaths (Machado, 1978: 208). 
Marcos also adopted a hard-line approach to the indigenous communist insurgencies 
that under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New 
People’s Army (NPA). These conflicts resulted in heavy casualties as well, but the Marcos 
government never negotiated with the CPP-NPA for a ceasefire agreement. This reluctance 
reflected the government’s keen awareness that its anti-communist stance in the past had 
effectively discouraged his critics from weighing in too heavily on his harsh and corrupt 
policies. For example, the Marcos government declared that some clergy in the Philippines 
had consorted with the CPP-NPA against the government (Carmen, 1975: 138). Against this 
backdrop, the government arrested some clergy on this pretext, charging them with 
subversion and murder, while avoiding harsh penalties from anti-communist states around the 
world (Youngblood, 1983: 211). 
 
4.7.1.2 Human Security after the Fall of President Marcos 
Both the Marcos government’s suspected involvement in assassinating the opposition leader 
Benigno Aquino and the Marcos government’s incompetent handling of human insecurities 
led, in 1986, to the People Power movement. Although Marcos won the presidential election 
in February 1986, the election was rife with fraud. Many Filipinos protested this unfair, 
unclean election. Indeed, many Filipinos refused to accept the results of the election and 
called for Marcos’ immediate resignation. Finally, through a U.S. offering of political asylum, 
Marcos escaped to Hawaii, and the previously vanquished presidential candidate Corazon 
Aquino became the new president of the Philippines. This section will discuss the human-
security situation after the fall of President Marcos.  
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4.7.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
After fall of President Marcos, Corazon Aquino became the Filipino president. During the 
Corazon Aquino period, the Philippines still lacked advanced infrastructure, elites remained 
firmly in control of the political scene, and the distribution of social welfare was noticeably 
unfair (Brillantes, 1993: 225, Timberman, 1990: 173). Despite these evident failings, 
Brillantes argued that Aquino strengthened the country’s human-rights record (Brillantes, 
1993: 225). For example, she created a new constitution protecting such basic human rights 
as the freedoms of speech, press, and association (Yu, 2005: 224) and create the Commission 
on Human Rights in 1986. Because of her efforts, democracy returned to the Philippines, 
which then legally consolidated various human rights.  
Corazon Aquino’s successor, Ramos, initially supported the democratic system, but 
then attempted to extend his presidential term through an amendment to the Philippine 
constitution (Hernandez, 1997: 208). He eventually chose to preserve the country’s fledgling 
democratic system. During the Ramos period from 1992 to 1998, Ramos attracted substantial 
foreign investments to the Philippines, bolstering economic growth there and indirectly but 
palpably enhancing people’s living standards (Hernandez, 1997: 210). In addition, in order to 
protect overseas Filipino workers, the Ramos government signed the United Nations 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families in November 1993 and acceded to its implementation in July 
1995.  
Unlike Corazon Aquino and Ramos, Estrada disregarded democracy in the Philippines. 
For example, in order to extend his power, he attempted to amend the constitutional 
provisions governing presidential terms (Bolongaita, 2000: 69-70). In addition, his 
presidency was steeped in corruption and his “policy decisions were made during late night 
drinking and gambling sessions” (Labrador, 2001: 222). Thus, some policies that the Estrada 
government proposed for the amelioration of human insecurity were simply inept. For 
example, Gabriella Montinola noted that in order to enhance living standards in rural areas, 
Estrada approved the use of agricultural land for residential and commercial use, but he did 
not create any compensatory mechanism for the subsequently afflicted farmers (Montinola, 
1999: 66). Estrada’s corruption and his government’s ineptitude led to the second People 
Power movement in early 2001, which quickly forced Estrada’s resignation. His vice 
president—Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo—replaced him as the nation’s president that same year. 
During her replacement presidential term (2001-2004), Arroyo maintained a passable, if 
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not shining, democratic system in the Philippines.38 Although the Arroyo government was 
unable to address high poverty rates, the Arroyo government combated criminal activities, as 
in 2003, when the Arroyo government passed the “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act,” 
providing clear measures and programs for the prevention of human-trafficking and for the 
protection of its victims. 
 
4.7.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
After the fall of President Marcos, Corazon Aquino restored democracy and human rights in 
the Philippines. Although conflicts between the government and these armed groups 
continued, 39  Corazon Aquino attempted to negotiate with the CPP-NPA and the MNLF 
regarding ceasefire agreements (Villegas, 1987: 196).  
During Ramos’ presidency, conflicts between the government and the CPP-NPA were 
on-going, but the relationship between the government and the MNLF enjoyed a 
breakthrough. Under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and 
Indonesia, the Philippine government signed the peace agreement with a MNLF. Following 
this agreement, both sides in 1996 established the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and 
Development (SPCPD), whose chairmanship was occupied by Nur Misuari, founder and 
leader of the MNLF, and whose purpose was to “plan, coordinate, and oversee the 
implementation of administrative support to local government units and assist with election- 
and referendum-related activities” (Hernandez, 1997: 206).  
Joseph Estrada’s government adopted a hard-line approach to insurgent groups. To the 
MILF, which was an offshoot of the MNLF forming in 1978, Estrada’s strategy was at times 
“all-out war” (Labrador, 2002: 141), although he negotiated with the MILF on occasion. 
Estrada also repressed the CPP-NPA. The swelling ranks of the CPP-NPA once prompted 
Estrada to declare, “You do not baby a rebellion, you crush it” (cited from Bolongaita, 2000: 
76). 
During Arroyo’s first presidential term, she rejected Estrada’s all-out war policy and 
adopted a moderate solution to the MILF. She accepted Malaysia as a mediator, and the 
                                                 
38
 For example, the general election in 2001was rife with vote buying, murder, and fraud, and Arroyo herself 
was involved in a 2004 presidential scandal.  
39
 The main reason for continuing conflicts was Corazon Aquino’s disagreement with the MNLF’s requirements: 
the autonomous regions had to include the provinces in Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan (totaling 23 provinces), 
the MNLF’s leader had to be the person with the power to appoint officials in Mindanao, and autonomous 
regions had to have their own army (Hernandez, 1988: 36). 
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Philippine government signed a ceasefire agreement with the MILF in August 2001. 
Regarding the CPP-NPA, even though armed conflict between the government and the CPP-
NPA continued (Montesano, 2004: 95-6), the Arroyo government attempted to peacefully 
address this communist insurgency movement. For example, the Arroyo government accepted 
Norway’s mediating role in talks between the two sides, which engaged in negotiations from 
February to April 2004.  
 
4.7.2 Exploration of the Filipino Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
4.7.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Filipino Government’s Strategies 
We know that, according to the historical review, the Filipino government was willing to 
provide human security to its people when leaders accepted or abided by democracy. During 
the APSC-building process, the Philippines experience two presidents: Arroyo (second 
presidential term) and Benigno S. Aquino III. Have these two leaders supported or opposed 
the creation of the APSC? What strategies have the two leaders adopted in response to the 
creation of the APSC? And what motivations have underlain their strategies? 
Both leaders have differed from each other regarding their strategic responses to the 
creation of the APSC, but the motivations behind their respective strategies have been similar 
to each other. Arroyo’s strategic response to the APSC centred on rhetorical support. The 
motivation behind her strategies was to shift public scrutiny away from her electoral scandal 
and, thereby, to stabilise her vulnerable government. In Arroyo’s first presidential term, she 
maintained democracy stateside, although the quality of democracy was unimpressive. In her 
second term, in order to extend her presidency, she disregarded democracy in the Philippines. 
For example, in June 2005, Arroyo admitted that she had phoned an official in the 
Commission on Elections, but she denied that she had committed electoral fraud. Her sullied 
reputation as a champion of democracy in the Philippines garnered criticism from public and 
political opponents, which significantly weakened her government (Hutchcroft, 2008: 144-6). 
Political opponents also seized on such legal approaches to destabilising her hold on power as 
impeachment proceedings. According to Hutchcroft, Arroyo distanced herself from the 
electoral scandal by declaring political reform—a shift from the then-current presidential 
system to a parliamentary system (Hutchcroft, 2008:146). Also, creation of the APSC 
provided Arroyo a good chance to divert unwanted attention from her electoral scandal. 
However, the Arroyo government’s rhetorical support for creating the APSC had little 
practical effect on efforts to establish this body. 
Aquino’s APSC-oriented strategies have been, on the whole, supportive of the project. 
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The motivation underlying the strategies has been to consolidate his regime’s stability. As 
noted in chapter two of the current work, many contemporary leaders in democracies have 
had to address human insecurities in order to win over a majority of the electorate for a 
subsequent term in office. In this regard, the Philippine constitution as it governs the 
presidency allows for only one term of six years. The reason for Aquino’s supportive stance 
rested mainly on the country’s contemporary political history, punctuated by the People 
Power Movement’s overthrow of Marcos and Estrada. Philippine leaders have come to fear 
People Power: for example, when political opponents and NGOs sought to force Arroyo’s 
resignation, she banned all unapproved protests, because she knew the strength of the People 
Power phenomenon (Hedman, 2006: 188). Thus, after assuming the presidency, Aquino 
vowed to address several human insecurities, such as rampant extrajudicial killings, poverty, 
and low living standards (Abinales, 2011: 168-71), and creation of the APSC offered him a 
reasonable opportunity to stand by his commitments, all while consolidating his regime’s 
stability. 
 
4.7.2.2 The Filipino Government’s Strategies 
4.7.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
During the APSC-building process, Arroyo used her image as an advocate of human rights 
and democracy in the ASEAN Charter to shift people’s focus away from her electoral scandal. 
In 2007, the year that Arroyo faced the strongest criticism during her presidency, because of a 
presidential impeachment bribery scandal, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto 
Romulo issued a statement on Myanmar’s dismal internal politics and human-rights 
violations. He stated, in particular, “The Charter is good; but if you sign it, then you must 
implement what is there” (Inquirer.net, November 18, 2007). Arroyo also commented on the 
matter: 
 
Not only are we committed to seeing political reforms in Myanmar. Our Senate will not 
ratify the Charter, unless they see real political reforms take place in Myanmar. So we 
must work together to make the tough choices to make ASEAN real and Aung San Suu 
Kyi free. (PhilStar, January 27, 2008) 
 
However, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago declared that she did not “see any strong 
opposition to the Charter in the Senate” and she is one of the senators who actively supported 
ratification of the ASEAN Charter (Inquirer.net, August 28, 2008). Miriam’s declaration 
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suggests that the Arroyo government’s various APSC-related statements were political 
tactical moves. In addition, in 2009, the Filipino government opposed the presence of Sister 
Crescencia L. Lucero, Executive Director of the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines at a 
meeting between the ASEAN leaders and the ACSC. This human-right organisation had 
criticised Arroyo’s detention of a rebel leader and had “questioned the sincerity of her 
attempts to build peace with communist rebel groups” (Gerard, 2014: 123). If Arroyo 
genuinely supported the creation of the APSC, she would not have blocked Crescencia L. 
Lucero from attending the meeting and would have actively addressed insurgent problems 
without resorting to the detention of a rebel leader. Moreover, in June 2008, typhoon 
Fengshen resulted in 1,200 deaths and damaged agriculture and infrastructure in parts of the 
Philippines (Hicken, 2009: 197). Prompted by these events, in October 2008, the UNDP 
suggested that the Philippines should establish its own specialised disaster-management 
agency (PhilStar, October 25, 2009)—a suggestion that directly revealed the Arroyo 
administration’s few useful policies in response to natural disasters’ negative effects, despite 
the emphasis on such policies in the ASCC blueprint (ASEAN, 2009b: 11).40 
The Aquino administration’s strategic stance toward the APSC has been supportive. 
After assuming the Philippine Presidency, Aquino has vowed to address several types of 
human insecurities. Aquino’s substantive support for the APSC has brought Aquino closer to 
materialising his commitment to handling human insecurities. Unlike Arroyo’s substanceless 
contributions to natural-disaster remediation, the Aquino’s government issued the Philippine 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010. In line with this act, the government 
institutionalised diverse approaches to offsetting the negative effects of natural disasters, 
relying heavily on knowledge-building among the general public as well as among specialists, 
adoption of tried and true preparatory disaster-response methods like coordination among 
official agencies, and adoption of post-disaster recovery strategies like enhanced 
governmental cooperation with CSOs. In the aftermath of typhoon Yolanda, which lashed the 
Central Philippines on November 2013, Aquino suggested that ASEAN not only implement 
the AADMER but also strengthen the AHA Center (Rappler, May 11, 2014). 
                                                 
40
 It cannot be denied that during Arroyo’s second presidency, she oversaw passage of the law known as the 
Magna Carta for Women (Republic Act 9710), which has served to protect females’ human rights and to help 
females avoid domestic violence. In addition, in the twelfth ASEAN Summit, the Philippines wasa notably 
active member supporting the ratification of the ASEAN Declaration on the Rights of Migrant Workers. 
However, the real impetus behind Arroyo’s support for these two human-rights issues was the pressure that 
domestic human-rights activists and CSOs were placing on the Arroyo government in these regards. 
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Aquino improved Filipinos’ human rights, too. For example, he protected overseas 
Filipino workers’ human rights, in line with the ASCC provision C.2.28 (ASEAN, 2009b: 12-
3). The Philippines government prohibited its citizens from working in fifteen countries 
where the labour environment did not meet standards laid out in the Migrant Workers and 
Overseas Filipino Act (Jakarta Post, July 4, 2012). The standards regulate that the receiving 
country must have passed “labour and social laws protecting the rights of migrant workers,” 
must be “a signatory to multilateral conventions,” must have issued “declarations or 
resolutions relating to the protection of migrant workers,” must have entered in to a “bilateral 
agreement or arrangement with the government protecting the rights of overseas Filipino 
workers,” and must have in place “positive, concrete measures to protect the rights of migrant 
workers.”41 
 
4.7.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
Arroyo’s strategy as it pertains to the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC rested on 
rhetorical support. In the beginning of her second presidential term, Arroyo continued to 
negotiate with the MILF, to which she planned on extending more autonomy, and accepted 
Malaysia to be a mediator. Under the new plan, the MILF would have their own law-
enforcement, military, educational, and banking systems (Hicken, 2009: 194). However, 
Arroyo’s plan was rhetorical rather than substantive, and the two sides continued to clash 
violently resulting in significant civilian collateral: 500,000 displaced (Hicken, 2009: 195). In 
addition, Arroyo shifted from her previously moderate handling of the CPP-NPA to a hard-
line approach in Arroyo’s second term (Hicken, 2009: 195).  
Aquino substantively pursued the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC. In 2011, the 
Philippine government entered into negotiations with MILF chairman Murad Ebrahim in 
Tokyo. The MILF refused the Philippine government’s offer to “expand autonomy for the 
existing Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)42 along with an offer of major 
economic development, a lasting peace accord, and historical acknowledgement of the 
Muslim struggle” (Castro, 2012: 213). However, the Aquino government did not 
consequently launch a military campaign against the MILF. Instead, the Philippine 
government remained willing to continue peaceful negotiations (Castro, 2012: 213). In this 
                                                 
41
 http://poea.gov.ph/rules/ra8042.pdf 
42
 The ARMM was created in August 1989. According to the ARMM, Basilan, Lanao De Sur, Maguindanao, 
Sulu and Tawi-Tawi acquired autonomy. 
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sense, the Aquino government abided by the provision for promoting “peace and stability in 
the region” (APSC A.1.9). In April 2012 in Kuala Lumpur, the Philippine government 
(referred to sometimes simply as the GPH) signed the GPH–MILF Decision Points on 
Principles. According to this document, the Philippines recognised the legal status of the 
MILF’s autonomy (Castro, 2013: 113). In 2013, the Department of Public Works and 
Highways in the Philippines government allocated around US$77 million to Mindanao for  
infrastructure development in order to expedite the economic integration of Mindanao into 
the AC (Manila Times, August 16, 2013). Chairman of the Mindanao–Development Authority 
Luwalhati Antonino identified the benefits of this integration: “Growth corridors can spur 
economic activities in rural areas and urban centers, providing more opportunities for our 
industries and enabling them to participate in the ASEAN Community through our export 
gateways” (Manila Times, August 16, 2013). In March 2014, the Philippine government and 
the MILF signed a peace treaty. Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Legal, Political and 
Security Affairs Marshall Djoko Suyanto commented on the peace agreement: 
 
The national security of each country will contribute hugely to the regional security. 
The regional security will also have a direct impact to [sic] the other pillars [of the 
integration] such as the economic pillar and the social cultural pillars that we are trying 
to build. I totally support and [am] totally grateful also that these [peace] opportunities 
are leading toward a better [ASEAN community]. (Manila Times, February 13, 2014) 
 
The Aquino government also ameliorated tensions between itself and the National 
Democratic Front (NDF), which had been allied with the CPP-NPA. The Aquino government 
released some imprisoned communists, and the NDF expressed a willingness to negotiate 
with the Philippine government (Castro, 2012: 213)—a promising start for both sides’ pursuit 
of a peace agreement. 
The Aquino government pursued the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC—the 
government addressed the conflicts with the MILF and ameliorated tensions with the 
communists. Aquino commented on his government’s efforts in this direction: 
 
Included in our work to establish a strong, stable and peaceful ASEAN community is 
the task of building on the values and best practices of our institutions in addressing 
intra-, inter- and regional conflicts. (Inquirer.net, May 12, 2014) 
 
132 
 
4.7.3 Summary 
The Marcos dictatorship, in order to extend its rule, declared martial law in the Philippines, 
damaging democratic institutions in the country. Armed with martial law, the government 
became a formidable threat to the people. Presidents Corazon Aquino and Ramos restored 
democracy and returned a measure of human security to the people, but Estrada’s inept 
assumption of the presidency led to a flood of human insecurity afflicting Filipinos. Arroyo, 
during her first presidential term, placed the emphasis back on democracy and human security. 
It is reasonable to say that the Filipino governments’ provision of human security to its 
people exemplifies the concept that I mentioned in chapter two’s state actors section 
(2.1.4.2)—the more democratic a state is, the more human security its people are likely to 
have. Likewise in terms of ASEAN, the more democratic a state’s government have been, the 
more supportive they have been toward the task of developing the APSC. Both Arroyo and 
Aquino III have regarded this development as a chance for them to consolidate their 
government, though from different angles. The creation of the APSC from Arroyo’s 
perspective opened up a need for political tactics, and thus, Arroyo’s corresponding support 
was frequently rhetorical. By contrast, Aquino III accepted democracy quite palpably and, 
thus,supported materially efforts to create the APSC. 
 
4.8 Singapore 
Since Singaporean independence, the Singaporean government has provided quite robust 
human security to its people. The new generation of Singaporean leaders, including Goh 
Chok Tong and Lee Hsien Loong, have enhanced human rights in the country. Regarding the 
creation of the APSC, the Singaporean government’s strategies have been supportive. In this 
section of my study, I will historically review the human-security situation under Lee Kuan 
Yew’s and Goh Chok Tong’s governance. Next, I will explore the strategies that the 
Singaporean government has adopted in response to the APSC and the motivation underlying 
the strategies. 
 
4.8.1 Historical Review: Since Independence in 1965 to 2002 
This historical review will be divided into two parts: the first part discusses the human-
security situation under the Lee Kuan Yew government and the second part discusses the 
human-security situation under the Goh Chok Tong government. 
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4.8.1.1 Human Security during the Lee Kuan Yew Period 
After Singaporean independence in 1965 (marking Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia), 
Lee Kuan Yew ruled Singapore for 25 years. The Lee Kuan Yew government provided robust 
human security to its people, but like many undemocratic regimes in Southeast Asia during 
the Cold War period, the Lee Kuan Yew government did not provide adequate human rights 
to its people. 
 
4.8.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
The Lee Kuan Yew government provided quite robust freedom from want to its people. After 
Singaporean independence in 1965, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew enacted a series of 
policies directly and indirectly enhancing people’s living standards. First, he created a 
bilingualism policy. Although the original purpose of enacting this language policy was to 
minimise the Chinese image of chauvinism in Singaporean politics (Tilman and Tilman, 1977: 
148), the Singaporeans could still legitimately speak both Chinese and English. Second, the 
Lee Kuan Yew government created many vocational training plans to enhance labour’s 
productivity through skill enhancement (Rogers, 1972: 174). Third, Lee Kuan Yew believed 
what a country needed was rigid discipline. Thus, his government created strict laws, such as 
corporal punishment. These policies have shaped Singapore’s reputation as “a safe haven for 
investment” (Quah, 1984: 184). Many foreign companies have invested in Singapore. Their 
investment and their establishment of business headquarters in Singapore have brought the 
country substantial national revenue, many job opportunities for Singaporeans, and rapid 
economic development (Rogers, 1972: 174). 
Like its counterparts in Southeast Asia, post-independence Singapore—specifically 
under Lee Kuan Yew—limited people’s human rights. The Lee Kuan Yew government 
limited people’s freedom of expression. In one instance,  executives for Nanyang Siang Pau 
(a major Chinese-language Singaporean newspaper) were detained by the government 
without trial for allegedly “glorifying China and fomenting Chinese chauvinism” (Rogers, 
1972: 175). Lee Kuan Yew also limited people’s freedom of political participation. For 
example, he used libel lawsuits to stifle political opponents whose articles and statements 
challenged and questioned the Singaporean government. These stiff fines would leave 
political opponents insolvent and force their departure from Parliamentary positions. In 1986, 
a key member of the Workers’ Party (WP), Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam, who had been 
elected to Parliament from the constituency of Anson, surrendered his seat after losing a libel 
suit and paying a stiff fine (To, 1987: 243). 
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4.8.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
Even though Singapore is a multiethnic state comprised of 75% Chinese, 15% Malays, and 
10% Indians, ethnic groups have, for the most part, gotten along with each other 
harmoniously. In addition, although the Singaporean government limited people’s human 
rights, it did not commit any serious violations of human rights or engage in extrajudicial 
killings. Thus, armed conflicts and significant racial tensions in Singapore involving 
demographic segments of the population and the government were absent during the 
government of Lee Kuan Yew.  
 
4.8.1.2 Human Security under the Goh Chok Tong Period 
In 1990, Lee Kuan Yew relinquished the Prime Minister to Goh Chok Tong. At the time of 
this transition, Shee Poon Kim predicted that Goh Chok Tong’s governance of Singapore 
would be similar to Lee Kuan Yew’s: the country would be run “efficiently and effectively”, 
even though the Goh government, more than its predecessor, would have to face such 
challenges as growing popular demand for democracy and human rights (Kim, 1991: 173-4). 
The Goh government encountered domestic popular demands for democracy and human 
rights, but expanded Singaporeans’ human rights. 
 
4.8.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
The Goh government continued to maintain high living standards for many Singaporeans. 
Singapore remained to be the one of the countries providing robust human security to their 
people—Singapore ranked 25 out of the 177 countries on the 2002 HDI (UNDP, 2004). In 
addition, the Goh government tried to help poor people in Singapore. For example, the 
government created the New Singapore Share (NSS) scheme. Under this scheme, the poorest 
21% of adults would receive “government bonds providing dividends for a fixed number of 
year” (Huxley, 2002b: 158). 
Although most Singaporeans had tolerated their government’s soft-authoritarian 
governance, election results in the 1980s revealed that some Singaporeans expected the 
government to support the existence of opposition parties. 43  Thus, Prime Minister Goh 
loosened governmental controls on people’s human rights to direct more popular support 
                                                 
43
 For example, the PAP government gained 75.5% of the vote in 1980’s general election, but in the 1984 
election, they garnered only 62.9% of the votes (Chee, 1986: 160). 
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toward the ruling party, the People’s Action Party (PAP). To this end, the Goh government 
made Hong Lim Park the setting for an area known as the Speaker’s Corner, where people 
could publicly express their opinions relatively freely. Even, demonstrations were accepted, 
so long as the demonstrators—or presenters for that matter—made sure to register with the 
Kreta Ayer Neighbourhood Police Post at some point during the thirty days prior to the 
scheduled event.  
 
4.8.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
During the Goh government, civil wars and ethnic tension remained absent in Singapore. 
However, the Goh government engaged in several peacebuilding tasks. Most important 
among the international activities in which the Singaporean government have been involved 
are those concerning East Timor. Singapore was the first country to participate in the 
INTERFET; after the UNTAET succeeded the INERFET, the Singaporean government 
provided the new effort with medical teams, staff officers, and forty Singaporean police 
officers; and during the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), the 
Singaporean government continued to help nation-building in East Timor. In total, the 
Singaporean government strengthened these efforts with 1,200 personnel, including 
Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF) peacekeepers, Singapore Police Force (SPF) officers, 
medical logistics support personnel, and staff officers (Singh, 2004). 
 
4.8.2 Exploration of the Singaporean Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
4.8.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Singaporean Government’s Strategies 
We know from the historical review that the Singaporean government provided robust human 
security to its people during the period extending from Lee Kuan Yew’s rule to Goh Chok 
Tong’s. Although the Lee Kuan Yew government limited people’s human rights, the Goh 
government expanded Singaporeans’ human rights. In August 2004, Lee Hsien Loong 
became Singapore’s third prime minister. Under government, the Singaporeans have 
continued to enjoy high living standards. In addition, his government has continued to 
improve domestic human-rights conditions. Since June 2008, for example, his government 
has allowed people to deliver speeches in the Speakers’ Corner without first requiring them to 
obtain police permits (Rodan, 2005: 141). 
Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Lee Hsian Loong government’s strategies have 
been supportive, and the motivation underlying the supportive strategies has been the 
Singaporean government’s desire to reduce the potential negative effects of transnational 
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security threats. From its independence in 1965 to the early 1990s, Singapore’s geographic 
location between the formidable regional powers of Indonesia and Malaysia constituted a 
critical inherent vulnerability, as did Singapore’s lack of natural resources. Owing to these 
concerns, the Singaporean government’s security perspective was state-centric: minimise the 
possibility of invasion by neighbouring countries and of regional instability in general. In 
meeting these challenges, according to Michael Leifer, the Singaporean government secured 
its foreign policies atop two central pillars. The first pillar has called for active participation 
in regional multi-lateral bodies, such as ASEAN, and has helped Singapore improve 
diplomatic relations with its neighbouring countries. The second pillar has called for the 
establishment of military relations with extra-regional powers, in particular the United States. 
This pillar has led to improvements in the Singaporean armed forces (Leifer, 2000b: 32-41, 
100-8). 
However, since the mid-1990s, Singapore has faced various types of threats. From its 
neighbouring countries, Singapore has had to contend with haze pollution and illegal 
migration, both of which have contributed to other types of human insecurities, like 
respiratory ailments and increasing crime rates. Hussin Mutalib argued that Singapore has 
been vulnerable amidst globalisation. For example, even though ethnic tensions have been 
notably minor in Singapore, Hussin Mutalib asserted that economic retrogression as posed by 
the global economic recession would lead to pronounced ethnic tensions, particularly “if the 
ethnic Malay minority, often occupying a relatively low socio-economic status vis-à-vis other 
ethnic communities, were to stagnate and be left behind” (Mutalib, 2002: 139). In response to 
such concerns, the Singaporean government has shifted its security approach from one 
steeped in the state-centric discourse to one based on “‘Total Defence’, which encompasses 
social, economic, psychological and military” element  (Mutalib, 2002: 132). 
The creation of the APSC has been in line with the Singaporean “Total Defence” 
concept, because the issues embedded in the APSC blueprint have been the precise issues 
with which Singapore has had to contend. Thus, the Singaporean government has adopted 
strategies supportive of the APSC. Lay Hwee Yeo noted how important the APSC is to the 
Singaporean government is: 
 
As a very small country, the sense of being vulnerable has always been there. So, of 
course, if the regional environment is good, then that helps Singapore to feel a little bit 
more secure, but it will never be the case, because the policy-makers have always 
believed it is in a very challenging environment and it’s going to get even more 
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challenging and volatile for the region. It has always positioned itself to try to make 
sure that it continues to be active, and to be able to influence developments within 
ASEAN is very important. That’s why it has always tried to tell ASEAN that it must not 
become too nationalistic in some ways and to tone down some of the rhetoric.44 
 
See Seng Tan and Alvin Chew also argued that the Singaporean government needs regional 
cooperation to satisfactorily address various insecurities besetting Singapore, and the 
mechanisms facilitative of regional integration (i.e., creation of the AC, ratification of the 
ASEAN Charter, and creation of the ADMM) have become a catalyst for spurring regional 
cooperation over various threats—cooperation that would benefit the Singaporean 
government (Tan and Chew, 2008: 252-7). 
 
4.8.2.2 The Singaporean Government’s Strategies 
4.8.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
The Singaporean government’s strategic approach to handling the APSC’s freedom-from-
want elements has been supportive. The elements that the Singaporean government have 
supported include combating transnational crime (e.g., terrorism and drug and human 
trafficking), putting in place disaster-management systems, reducing haze pollution, and 
narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor. Take as an example this last element: in 
2013, the Singaporean government declared that it would create national health-care 
insurance for Singaporeans; and under this health-insurance scheme, people with middle and 
low income could receive medical subsidies (Jakarta Post, August 25, 2013). 
Perhaps another element has attracted the most attention from the Singaporean 
government—reducing transboundary haze pollution. The ASCC blueprint proposed that one 
approach to ameliorating haze pollution issues would be a general reliance on the ASEAN 
Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ASEAN, 2009b: 14). However, Indonesia, the 
main producer of regional haze pollution, has been unwilling to ratify this agreement. The 
Singaporean government has, in this regard, been exerting nearly constant pressure on the 
Indonesian government to sign the agreement (Straits Times, July 9, 2013). In addition, the 
Singaporean government has “called for ASEAN to adopt a joint haze monitoring system” 
that can identify the cause of forest fires through a sharing of satellite data (Straits Times, 
October 8, 2013). Finally, in September 2013, the Indonesian government declared its 
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 Interview in Singapore, January 16, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei 
138 
 
willingness to sign the Haze Agreement, but insisted that their newfound willingness to was 
in no way a response to the pressures exerted by the Singaporean government (Jakarta Post, 
September 28, 2013).  
 
4.8.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Singaporean government has also supported the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC. 
After ASEAN decided to create the APSC by 2015, the Singaporean government has 
participated in military exercises with other ASEAN states where the purposes were to 
increase participating countries ability to respond to disasters, whether of natural or human 
origins. In July 2011, the Singaporean government hosted the ASEAN Militaries’ 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (AHX) with Indonesia. The 
purpose of launching this exercise was to “enhance ASEAN’s capacity and capability to 
quickly and decisively respond to natural disasters” (MINDEF, July 14, 2011). Joint 
Operations Brigadier-General’s Director Ngien Hoon Ping from the SAF expected that the 
exercise might contribute to peace and security in Southeast Asia (MINDEF, July 12, 2011). 
In addition, the Singaporean government successfully held the ASEAN Militaries’ HADR 
Exercise with the Bruneian government in June 2013. During the exercise, the SAF 
constructed a modular structure that would “serve as a shelter and relief base for casualties 
and displaced personnel” (MINDEF, June 13, 2013).  
 
4.8.3 Summary 
As mentioned in chapter 2’s section on state actors (2.1.4.2), some states that are politically 
authoritarian but economically developed have failed to provide adequate human rights to 
their people, but these same states run little risk that their people will rise up to challenge 
their respective governments, which—after all—are the sole provider of quite robust human 
security to the people. Not only Brunei (please see 4.1) but also Singapore fall into this 
category. Since Singaporean independence in 1965, the Singaporean government, as headed 
by Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chok Tong, and Lee Hsien Loong, has provided its people a high 
degree of human security. Although the Lee Kuan Yew period witnessed the Singaporean 
government limit people’s human rights, the Goh Chok Tong and the Lee Hsien Loong 
governments have set Singapore on a path of self-renewal characterised by improvements in 
the country’s human-rights situation. According to the survey in the current study (chapter 3), 
of the six chosen ASEAN members, Singaporean interviewees constituted the group most 
satisfied with their government’s provision of human security and most confident in their 
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government’s ability to address natural disasters (please see Figure 3.5 and 3.6). The 
Singaporean government has strategically supported efforts to create the APSC, and the 
motivation underlying this support has been an understandable desire to reduce the potential 
negative effects of transnational security threats. Regarding the freedom-from-want element, 
the Singaporean government has actively addressed haze pollution and regarding the 
freedom-from-fear element, the Singaporean government has participated in several training 
exercises related to natural-disaster management and peacekeeping. 
 
4.9 Thailand 
After Thai military and civilian officials overthrew the country’s absolute monarchy in June 
1932, 45  Thailand became a constitutional monarchy, but the country experienced long-
running political turmoil that led to numerous coups d’état. For Thai leaders, their main 
concern tended to be their regime’s stability and continuity rather than people’s human 
security. However, since the May Uprising in 1992, the Thai government has gradually 
provided adequate human security to its people. As regards efforts to create the APSC, three 
leaders in Thailand stand out as important players: Thaksin Shinawatra, Abhisit Vejjajiva, and 
Yingluck Shinawatra. Thaksin’s strategic approach to the APSC differed from Abhisit’s and 
Yingluck’s. In this section of my study, I will review how the Thai government, in recent 
decades, has provided human security to the Thai people. Next, I will explore the Thai 
government’s strategic approaches to the APSC and the motivations underlying them. 
 
4.9.1 Historical Review: From 1932 to 2002 
The historical-review section comprises two parts. The first part discusses the human-security 
situation between the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932 and before 1991’s 
Suchinda-led coup. The second part discusses the human-security situation from the uprising 
in May 1992 to 2002. 
 
4.9.1.1 Historical Review: From 1932coup to the 1991 Suchinda-Led Coup 
During the period stretching from 1932 to 1991,46 Thailand experienced significant domestic 
political turmoil, which triggered numerous coups d’état. When coups were successful, the 
                                                 
45
 In this coup, military officials replaced the king as the principal ruler of Thailand, but the newly empowered 
officials still recognised the king as the symbolic spiritual leader of Thailand.  
46
 From 1932 to the early 1970s, Thailand was ruled almost exclusively by military juntas. 
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usual first action of the new regime was to abrogate the previous constitution and create a 
new one to strengthen the new leadership’s hold on power. To Thai leaders, regime continuity 
and stability tended to be more important than the diminishment of the insecurities afflicting 
the wider population. Against this backdrop, the Thai government failed to provide adequate 
human security to its people. 
 
4.9.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
From 1932 to 1991, Thai people were beset by several human insecurities: inflation coupled 
with deflationary pressures on the price of rice (Race, 1974: 194, Niksch, 1981: 229), 
diseases and natural disasters 47  (Punyaratabandhu-Bhakdi, 1984: 192, Christensen, 1990: 
184), illegal logging were among the most prominent problems (Niksch, 1989: 181), high 
unemployment rate, and limited human rights (Darling, 1974a: 13). However, no Thai leaders 
provided effective measures to offset these human insecurities.  
Thai people protested the Thai government’s incompetence. The most serious of these 
protests were likely the student revolts taking place in 1973 and 1976. Triggers of the 1973 
revolt included corruption among government officials, unemployment, the American 
military presence in Thailand 48  and government restrictions on human rights. The Thai 
government adopted hard-line measures to respond to the protesting students. The violent 
conflict between students and the government led to approximately 65 deaths and 1,000 
injuries (Neher, 1975: 1103). King Phumiphon Adulyadet mediated in the conflict, eventually 
helping to end it.49 In 1976, students protested the return to Thailand of ex-Prime Minister 
Thanom Kittikachornn, who had been forced into exile for his role in the crackdown on the 
1973 revolt. The Thai government brutally repressed the protestors. Christie and Roy 
described the harrowing savagery of the crackdown—“students were burned to death, hanged 
from trees and shot at point blank range” (Christie and Roy, 2001: 168) 
 
                                                 
47
 According to statistics from the ADRC, from 1961 to 1990, natural disasters and related diseases caused the 
deaths of 2,325 in Thailand. http://www.adrc.asia/publications/databook/DB2000_e.html 
48
 Students worried that the American military presence in Thailand might infringe upon Thai sovereignty and, 
more generally, negatively influence Thai society. 
49
 One consequence of the turmoil was the forced exile of Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachornn, Deputy Prime 
Minister Praphat Charusathien, and Thanom’s son, Colonel Narong Kittikachorn. Sanya Thammasak, who was 
the rector of Thammasat University and an adviser to the King, created a new civilian government. 
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4.9.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Thai government between 1932 and 1991 failed to provide a modicum of freedom from 
want to its people living in southern Thailand’s Malay Muslim-majority provinces: Pattani, 
Yala, and Narathiwat. According to Astri Suhrke, the Thai government placed three general 
types of restrictions on Malay Muslims in these provinces. The first type of restriction was 
educational. The Thai government forcibly closed pondoks (rural Islamic religious schools), 
thereby compelling children to attend only Siamese primary schools and to accept a secular 
education (Suhrke, 1977: 238-9). The second type of restriction was economic. Although 
southern Thailand possessed abundant natural resources of tin and rubber, Thai Buddhists and 
Thai Chinese exercised notably disproportionate control over these economic advantages. 
Local Malay Muslims were unable to share in the benefits, resulting in distinct income 
inequalities (Suhrke, 1977: 241). The third type of restriction was administrative. Ideally, 
local officials in any given region should strive to resolve or at least minimise societal 
difficulties afflicting the local populations. However, most local government officials in the 
aforementioned southern provinces did not speak Malay, a situation that heightened the 
mistrust between local people and the government (Suhrke, 1977: 239).  
People in these provinces used both radical and moderate methods to attain a degree of 
freedom from want. And both of these methods led to freedom-from-fear crises in the 
southern provinces. Radical Muslims closed down schools, kidnapped school teachers, and 
attacked police stations (Thomas, 1975: 18). Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir, the leader of the 
Islamic Religious Council in Thailand, adopted a moderate method. He submitted claims to 
the government describing the southern Malay Muslims’ demands. However, his arrest in 
1948 preceded his disappearance in 1954, and the Thai government was suspected of having 
masterminded a plot to remove the Muslim leader from the political scene (Liow, 2006: 29).  
 
4.9.1.2 Historical Review: From Black May in 1992 to 2002 
In May 1992, Thai people protested the Suchinda government’s disregard of democracy, and 
the subsequent train of events led to the 1997 People’s Constitution (Kuhonta, 2008: 377). 
Meanwhile, conflicts between the Thai government and Islamic separatists in southern 
Thailand enjoyed a lull. 
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4.9.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
The aforementioned protests that erupted in may 199250 stand in contrast to the 1973 student 
demonstrations, as most activists participating in the May crisis were middle class. General 
Suchinda’s crackdown on the demonstrators resulted in 52 people dead and 200 people 
missing (Maisrikrod, 1993: 331-2). The King mediated between the government and the 
masses once again. Finally, the military regime ceded place to a civilian government in which 
the prime minister was Anand Panyarachun.  
After the uprising, the Thai government prepared to create a new constitution. In 1997, 
the Thai government ratified the People’s Constitution, which led to many political reforms, 
although critics argued that the document wrongly expanded Thaksin Shinawatra’s political 
power (Kuhonta, 2008). For example, Thailand created independent watchdog agencies, like 
the Constitutional Court, the National Counter Corruption Commission, the Administrative 
Court, and the Election Commission. In the period extending from the end of the May 
bloodshed to 2001 (before Thaksin became Thai Prime Minister), the Thai political system 
closely approximated democracy, and coups d’état were dormant. Meanwhile, the Thai 
government paid more attention than in the past to people’s human-security issues. In 
addressing various freedom-from-want issues, the government took several steps, three of 
which were legislative: the Prevention and Suppression of Prostitution Act (1996), the 
Measures in Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Women and Children Act (1997), 
and the Labour Protection Act (1998). In addition, none of the leaders, ranging from Anand 
Panyarachun, Chuan Leekpai, and Banharn Silpa-archa to Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (a retired 
general), imposed significant restrictions on people’s human rights. 
 
4.9.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
From the late 1980s to early 2002,  the Thai government temporarily rescinded its heavy-
                                                 
50
 In 1991, supreme commander General Sunthorn Kongsompong, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, Admiral 
Praphat Krisanachan, and Air Chief Marshal Kaset Rojananil staged a coup against Prime Minister Chatichai 
Choonhavan. As usual, the constitution was abrogated after the coup. The military junta promised that it would 
return democracy to the people and hold an election in February 1992. General Suchinda also made the 
commitment that he would not intervene in politics and would not occupy the position of Prime Minister. After 
the pro-military coalition failed to nominate Narong Wongwan to the position of Thai Prime Minister (the 
failure was due chiefly to the nominee’s involvement in drug trafficking), the pro-military coalition nominated 
General Suchinda Kraprayoon for the position of Prime Minister—a position that he secured. This situation 
enraged Thailand and people staged mass demonstrations in May 1992 against the government. 
143 
 
handed approach toward Islamic activists (Liow, 2006: 27). Thus, some local people enjoyed 
a brief improvement in their short-term freedom-from-fear situation. However, after Thaksin 
came into power in 2001, the Thai government reinstated its harsh repressive measures 
targeting Islamic activists. 
 
4.9.2 Exploration of the Thai Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
4.9.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Thai Government’s Strategies 
According to the historical review in this chapter’s section on Thailand, we know that the 
Thai government has gradually improved human security for the Thai people. Given this 
trend, it is reasonable to wonder, has the Thai government supported or opposed the APSC? 
And what strategies has the Thai government adopted in response to the creation of the APSC? 
During the APSC-building process, Thailand had experienced three leaders: Thaksin, Abhisit, 
and Yingluck.51 Thaksin’s strategies in dealing with the creation of the APSC differed from 
Abhisit’s and Yinkluck’s, but the motivations underlying these leaders’ strategies were similar.  
Thaksin’s strategies were to ignore the provisions in the APSC blueprints, and the 
motivation underlying this approach was his desire to consolidate his regime’s stability. In 
2001, Thaksin Shinawatra became Thai Prime Minister, and soon made use of several 
methods intended to effect regime consolidation. According to Ganesan, adoption of 
populism was the central method (Ganesan, 2004: 29-30). He generously provided subsidies 
to the poor in Thailand, such as “debt relief, low-cost health care and development funds” 
(Montesano, 2002: 94). Thaksin’s populist policies helped his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party win 
the 2005 election and he secured a majority of the cast ballots in the northern and the 
northeast provinces (Albritton, 2006: 141). The other main method involved the manipulation 
of democratic institutions. Of particular note was his effort to place close family relations in 
“independent” watchdog agencies, such as the Constitutional Court and the National Counter 
Corruption Commission, which the Thai government had created according to the 1997 
People’s Constitution. Kuhonta argued that Thaksin’s interference in independent agencies 
explains why Thaksin received an acquittal from the Constitutional Court regarding his 
hidden assets valued at 4.5 billion baht (Kuhonta, 2008: 386). Suppression of dissents was a 
third common method of which Thaksin availed himself while attempting to consolidate his 
                                                 
51
 Before Abhisit, both Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat were prime ministers in Thailand, but the 
years they held the position were shorter than one year, in contrast to Abhisit and Yingluck, each of whom 
remained in power for over two years. This section, therefore, refrains from exploring Samak Sundaravej’s and 
Somchai Wongsawat’s strategic approaches to the creation of the APSC. 
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regime. Thaksin’s populism and the harm his actions visited upon Thailand’s democracy 
attracted criticism (Ganesan, 2004: 32). However, Thaksin used various ways to silence 
voices of opposition. For example, the Thaksin government used the Anti-Money Laundering 
Office to investigate the Nation editors Suthichai Yoon, Thephai Yong, and Sopon Onkgara 
(Mutebi, 2003: 105). However, the creation of the APSC was an obstacle to Thaksin’s pursuit 
of regime consolidation. The main cause of this obstacle was the APSC’s promotion of 
human rights and democracy, which was inconsistent with Thaksin’s version of regime 
stability. In pursuing political power immune from political criticism, Thaksin failed to 
adhere to the provisions in the APSC. 
Both Abhisit and Yingluck adopted generally supportive strategies in responding to the 
APSC. The motivations underlying their strategies tended to centre on consolidation of 
regime stability. Since the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932, Thai people have 
protested against the government when they have experienced a worsening of their human-
security objectives, including those pursuant to human rights, democracy, and the economy. 
The Thai people’s demonstrations have led to the downfall and resignation of notable leaders. 
The May 1992 uprising is a good example of this pattern. The Thaksin regime, owing partly 
to its effective silencing of challengers, enjoyed considerable immunity from popular 
expression of discontent. However, mass discontent seemed to have a stronger effect on the 
Abhisit and Yingluck governments, as suggested by these two leaders’ encounters with 
domestic political turmoil, which took the form of confrontations between pro-Thaksin 
groups (the Red-Shirt) and anti-Thaksin groups (the Yellow-Shirt) (Dalpino, 2011, Ockey, 
2013). Such confrontations led to a degree of regime instability, where a policy misstep might 
exacerbate ongoing political turmoil. Hoping to avoid an escalation of political turmoil and 
understandably keen to consolidate regime stability, Abhisit and Yingluck would have had 
few choices but to strategically support the creation of the APSC. 
 
4.9.2.2 The Thai Government’s Strategies 
4.9.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
In order to consolidate his regime’s stability, Thaksin did not adhere to the provisions in the 
APSC blueprint. For example, he limited people’s freedom of expression. Before Thailand’s 
participation in the 2003 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference, the Thai 
government prohibited human-rights activists’ arrival in Thailand and threatened them with 
arrest if they or their colleagues attempted to launch protests (Mutebi, 2004: 79). 
It should be noted that in 2003, Thaksin launched “war on drugs.” The spirit of this 
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campaign was in line with one of the targets in the APSC: a drug-free ASEAN by 2015 
(ASEAN, 2009a: 12). However, Thaksin “authorised the police to use ‘extreme measures’” to 
combat illicit drugs, and as a consequence, many people were arrested without due process 
and killed in plain violation of basic civil rights (Mutebi, 2004: 80-1, Ganesan, 2004: 31-2). 
These facts suggest that Thaksin failed to consider the human-rights element in the APSC 
when launching this campaign. 
Likewise, in order to consolidate regime stability, the Abhisit and Yingluck 
governments supported the creation of the APSC. Consider, for example, the events of 2009, 
when Abhisit was preparing for Thailand’s assumption of the 14th ASEAN Chairmanship: 
domestic political confrontation reached its apex in Thailand due to conflict between the Red 
shirt and the Yellow shirt. At one point, Pro-Thaksin demonstrators employed violence to 
unrail the ASEAN Summit, which was held in March 2009. According to Kitti Prasirtsuk, this 
incident “severely tarnished Thailand’s reputation” and placed pressure on the Abhisit 
government to solve the conflicts (Prasirtsuk, 2010: 204-5). There is a good reason to 
conclude, therefore, that the Abhisit government supported the creation of the APSC, in 
particular the human-rights element, because the supportive strategies might help his regime 
avert further domestic political turmoil capable of jeopardising Abhisit’s rule. For example, 
the Abhisit government supported the creation of the AICHR and moreover, the Abhisit 
government was among the few ASEAN members to be transparent in the process of 
selecting the AICHR’s representative (The Nation, December 14, 2009). 
Yingluck Shinawatra came to power in August 2011. She also experienced political 
confrontation on the domestic front. For example, Yingluck prepared to reconcile domestic 
political turmoil by granting amnesty to political prisoners which would have benefited the 
ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra, in exile since 2006. Her reconciliation plan led to 
political confrontations between the Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirtsstraining the Yingluck 
regime’s stability (Ockey, 2013: 129-30). In order to avoid other political turmoil, the 
Yinkgluck government supported the creation of the APSC. During the APSC-building 
process, Yingluck empowered domestic women, a goal that has been a major target of the 
ASCC (Provision A.16) (ASEAN, 2009b: 5, 12). In order to “prepare Thai women for the 
ASEAN Community” (The Government Public Relations Department, December 6, 2012), 
the Yingluck government specifically created the National Development Fund for Women. 
According to this project, women can acquire low-interest or even zero-interest loans, while 
the fund itself “will be used to develop their [women’s] occupations, generate employment 
and income, promote their welfare, ease their problems, and enhance the potential of 
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women’s networks” (The Government Public Relations Department, December 6, 2012). 
 
4.9.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
Thaksin did not adhere to the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC. After Thaksin’s rise to 
political power, confrontation between the Thai government and Muslim secessionists 
intensified. On April 28, 2004, Muslims, mostly youths, attacked police stations, checkpoints 
and military installations throughout Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala. This wave of violence led 
to many deaths (108 militants and 5 police and military officials) and to the creation of a 
refugee population in Malaysia (Liow, 2006: 36, Funston, 2010: 242). The most severe 
confrontation between the Thai government and Muslims was in the historic Krisek (Krue Se) 
Mosque in Pattani. After attacking police and military posts, a group of Muslims returned to 
the Krisek Mosque. The Thai government lay siege to the building, with the ensuing violence 
eventually claiming 32 militants lives (Liow, 2006: 37). Tensions between the government 
and the Muslim community continued unabated, and after a few months, another violent 
incident took place, this time in Tak Bai: police killed seven protestors in front of a police 
station and detained many other protesters and sent them to the Inkayit Military Camp in 
Pattani Province. Seventy-five people died of suffocation during the journey (Funston, 2010: 
243). 
At the 2004 ASEAN Summit, Malaysia and Indonesia attempted to discuss the unrest in 
southern Thailand. Prime Minister Thaksin threatened to leave the summit if members treated 
the issue as an item on the ASEAN agenda (Weatherbee, 2005: 160). However, the 2004 
ASEAN summit was important for the APSC, because ASEAN planned to issue the ASEAN 
Security Community Plan of Action. Thaksin’s attitude to domestic freedom-from-fear 
problem suggested that creation of the APSC was not among his leading priorities. 
The Abhisit and Yingluck governments supported the freedom-from-fear element in the 
APSC. Indeed, during the Abhisit and Yingluck periods, sporadic conflicts in southern 
Thailand broke out. However, neither of the leaders reacted with repressive measures. In 
addition, both Abhisit and Yingluck has been a participant in freedom-from-fear meetings. 
For example, the Abhisit government was represented at the 2nd ADMM, which adopted the 
Three-Year Work Program (2008-2010), whose target was to create the ASEAN 
Peacekeeping Centers Network. The Yingluck government participated in the 5th ADMM 
which adopted the Concept Paper on the Establishment of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers 
Network (ASEAN, May 19, 2011). Both Abhisit and Yingluck supported further cooperation 
in regional peacekeeping affairs. 
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4.9.3 Summary 
From 1932 to 1991, Thailand experienced repeated cycles of political struggle and coups 
d’état. During this period, the Thai government tended to be more concerned about regime 
viability than about people’s human security. Thus, the Thai government failed to provide 
adequate human security to its people. After the popular uprising in May 1992, the 
government provided substantially improved freedom from want to its people, and conflicts 
in southern Thailand dipped into a lull. Regarding the creation of the APSC, Thailand 
experienced the Thaksin, Abhisit, and Yingluck governments. Thaksin’s strategies for dealing 
with the creation of the APSC differed from Abhisit’s and Yingluck’s: Thaksin did not adhere 
to the provisions in the APSC; by contrast, Abhisit and Yingluck supported the creation of the 
APSC. However, the motivations underlying the diverse strategies of these three leaders were 
fairly uniform: consolidate regime stability. However, violent political upheaval in Thailand 
may not come to a resolution anytime soon, as Yingluck was ousted just recently, in late May 
2014, by her political opponents. Thus, whether the Thai government will continue to support 
the APSC is a matter of speculation 
 
4.10 Vietnam 
After the Vietnamese reunification in 1976, the Vietnamese government failed to provide 
adequate human security to its people. In 1986, the Vietnamese government adopted a market 
economy, which has ameliorated people’s hardships. In addition, the Vietnamese government 
has maintained political and social stability. Thus, Vietnam has been considered the most 
stable country among ASEAN’s newcomers, in contrast to Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. 
However, after adoption of liberal economy, the Vietnamese government has failed to provide 
adequate human security to its people and continued to limit people’s human rights. 
Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Vietnamese government has been lack of genuine 
support. In this section, I will historically review the human security under the Vietnamese 
government from 1976 to 2002. The next section will analyse the Vietnamese government’s 
strategic approach to the creation of the APSC 
 
4.10.1 Historical Review: From 1976 to 2002 
The historical review of Vietnam is divided into two sections. The first section discusses 
human security under the Vietnamese government from 1976 (the reunification of Vietnam) 
to 1985 (the year before Vietnam’s adoption of the Đổi Mới reforms). The second section 
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discusses human security under the Vietnamese government from 1986 (the year of 
Vietnam’s adoption of the Đổi Mới reforms) to 2002. 
 
4.10.1.1 From 1976 to 1985 (Before the Đổi Mới Reforms) 
After the reunification of Vietnam in 1976, the Vietnamese government followed Marxist-
Leninist doctrine, adopting a centrally planned economy. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese 
government initiated an invasion of Kampuchea which consumed the Vietnamese 
government’s available financial resources. In these circumstances, the Vietnamese 
government failed—and indeed was probably unable—to make satisfactory inroads against 
human insecurities besetting the Vietnamese people. 
 
4.10.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
During this period, the Vietnamese government’s ineptitude imposed human insecurities on 
its people. Vietnam faced serious economic problems, including high unemployment rates, 
food shortages, spiraling inflation, and trade deficits (Niehaus, 1979: 86). These problems 
created or greatly exacerbated people’s hardship. In Ho Chi Minh City, “some 300,000 
families were living under extremely adverse conditions, with 120,000 houses lacking 
electricity, 195,000 having no water, and 120,000 with no toilet facilities; 70,000 people were 
living on one square mile of land in the Cholon district” (Esterline, 1987: 93-4). However, the 
Vietnamese government failed to address these problems, instead creating inept policies that 
served chiefly to compound people’s hardships. For example, the Vietnamese government 
adopted a collectivisation programme, permitting the government to confiscate people’s 
businesses and belongings. In addition, in 1977, the Vietnamese government created the New 
Economic Zone. According to this policy, the government would relocate people to 
uncultivated areas prone to outbreaks of famine and disease. Both of these inept policies did 
little or nothing to resolve people’s hardships while forcing large numbers of people to 
become refugees (Niehaus, 1979: 86-7). 
The Vietnamese government has also restricted people’s human rights. Since 
reunification in 1976, the government has adopted a one-party political system, granting total 
control over Vietnam to the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). In keeping with this 
authoritarian approach, the government has eliminated any potential threats to its viability, 
arresting and intimidating leaders of Islamic, Catholic, and Buddhist organisations 
(McWilliams, 1983: 67). In addition, the Vietnamese government forced people whose 
ideology was not in line with Marxism-Leninism to re-education camps. According to 
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Douglas Pike, from 1975 to 1977, about 2.5 million Vietnamese were forcibly re-educated 
(Pike, 1978: 72). People whom the government released from camps found themselves still 
without human rights. McWilliams noted that these people were under government 
surveillance and met with discrimination when seeking a job or an education (McWilliams, 
1983: 67). 
 
4.10.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Vietnamese government adopted a hard-line approach to armed insurgency movements. 
After North Vietnam reunited with South Vietnam in 1976, the Vietnamese government 
restricted human rights within the expanded borders. The victims included Christian 
Montagnards, an ethnic minority living in the Central Highlands. The Vietnamese 
government restricted their freedom of religion, took their lands, relocated and arrested them, 
and did not grant them the autonomy that Hồ Chí Minh had promised them during the 
Vietnam War period (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 16-20). The United Front for the 
Liberation of Oppressed Races (Front Unifié de Lutte des Races Opprimées, FULRO), which 
was established by Montagnards in 1964 in association with the U.S. government’s war 
against North Vietnamese communists (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 9), fought to obtain 
human security. The Vietnamese government responded with brutal repression. According to 
Human Rights Watch’s report, between 1975 and 1979, about 8,000 Montagnards were killed 
or arrested by the Vietnamese government (Vietnam Committee on Human Rights, 2012: 7). 
 
4.10.1.2 From the Establishment of Đổi Mới in 1986 to 2002 
In the late Cold War period, the Vietnamese government adopted a market economy which 
enhanced the Vietnamese economy and ameliorated people’s low living standards. In 1995, 
Vietnam joined ASEAN, an event that essentially ended that country’s isolation in the 
international community. However, the Vietnamese government failed to address several 
pressing types of human insecurities and while continuing to limit Vietnamese people’s 
human rights. 
 
4.10.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
In 1986, the Party’s sixth national congress initiated Đổi Mới the function of which was to 
attract foreign investments capable of boosting Vietnam’s benighted economy. After the 
Vietnamese government adopted a market economy, GDP in Vietnam increased from average 
of 6.5% annually between 1986 and 1995 to an average of 7.33% annually between 1996 and 
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2005.52 Meanwhile, poverty rates in Vietnam dropped from 1992–1993’s 58% to 2002’s 29% 
(Luong, 2006: 151).  
However, several human insecurities in the freedom-from-want area emerged alongside 
the economic development. The first was environmental devastation. According to the 
UNDP’s survey, 375,000 acres of forest in Vietnam were annually destroyed and exploited by 
foreign investors (Goodman, 1995: 96). Economic growth also led to a development gap. 
Living conditions in rural areas were characterised by unrepaired roads and a lack of 
infrastructure and access to clean water (Goodman, 1995: 96). Meanwhile, human and drug 
trafficking, exploitation of children and women, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and land-grabbing 
by the Vietnamese government were worsening (Sidel, 1998: 82-3, 87). However, the 
Vietnamese government failed to address these human insecurities, not least of all because 
some Vietnamese officials were heavily involved in some of the most egregious criminal 
activities, like drag trafficking (Sidel, 1998: 82) and land-grabbing.  
In addition, the Vietnamese government limited people’s human rights. For example, In 
the 2000s, the Vietnamese government arrested Dr. Nguyễn Đan Quế and former military 
official Nguyễn Khắc Toàn. Both of them had passed domestic human-rights information to 
the United States (Hung, 2004: 303). Hung argued that for the Vietnamese government, “the 
campaign against political dissent was more successful than the fight against corruption” 
(Hung, 2004: 306). 
 
4.10.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Vietnamese government still adopted a hard-line approach to Montagnards. FULRO 
surrendered to UNTAC in Cambodia in 1992, but the Vietnamese government believed that 
remnants of FULRO were still agitating for independence from Vietnam. Thus, the 
Vietnamese government continuously repressed Montagnards. In the Central Highlands, the 
Vietnamese government destroyed churches, which had symbolised the Montagnards’ 
religious convictions (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 61), and arrested people who practiced 
their religious activities. In 2001, Montagnards protested against the creation of the 
economic-defence zones, which had led to land-grabbing problem, but the Vietnamese 
government deployed its military to quell the protests (Guan, 2002: 349). 
The Vietnamese government adopted a moderate method for establishing peace with 
the Montagnards. Secretary-General Nông Đức Mạnh called for “local officials to work 
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closely with tribal leaders” and “he directed that ethnic minorities be given access to 
educational opportunities and that recruitment of ethnic minorities for government service be 
stepped up” (Thayer, 2002: 86). In addition, according to Ang Cheng Guan, the Vietnamese 
government legalised Montagnards use of their own language, provided subsidies to poor 
farmers, and pledged to develop the regions’ economy (Guan, 2002: 349). However, unrest 
re-emerged in 2004. Even though the Vietnamese government’s economic liberalisation 
improved people’s living standards, Margot Cohen argued that the Montagnards problem was 
striking evidence of the Vietnamese government’s failure to address the issues of “land rights, 
ethnic-minority status, religious freedom, and political autonomy” (Cohen, 2001: 25). 
 
4.10.2 Exploration of the Vietnam Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
4.10.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Vietnamese Government’s Strategies 
As discussed in the above historical review, the Vietnamese government domestically has 
improved people’s living standards by initiating economic liberalisation, but has failed to 
address human insecurities and has continued to impose on the Vietnamese people’s human 
rights. Regarding the APSC, which—once operational—is slated to address human-security 
issues and improve human rights, a question critical to this study arises: has the Vietnamese 
government supported or opposed it? 
The Vietnamese government’s strategies for responding to the creation of the APSC 
have centred on rhetorical support for human rights, freedom-from-fear objectives, and the 
like; and the motivations underlying the strategies have centred on regime consolidation. 
Since Vietnam’s participation in ASEAN got underway in 1995, the country’s membership in 
the association has provided the government several tangible benefits. Jörn Dosch argued that 
the Vietnamese government gained three “golden opportunities” from its membership in 
ASEAN: ASEAN was a bridge permitting the Vietnamese government to play noteworthy 
roles in international affairs, including first and foremost participation in the international 
organisation of ASEAN itself; ASEAN could counterbalance China’s rising influence in 
Southeast Asia; and Vietnam could improve its relationships with other ASEAN members 
(Dosch, 2006: 241-6). Dosch also noted that this “golden opportunity” has become a “golden 
cage,” because the Vietnamese government has found that, with the exception of the non-
interference principle, ASEAN’s modus operandi—the ASEAN way—has been unable to 
prevent unilateral Chinese actions in the South China Sea (Dosch, 2006: 247-50). However, I 
argued that ASEAN has remained a cornerstone in Vietnamese diplomacy, because the 
Vietnamese government has needed ASEAN members’ cooperation to ameliorate the 
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negative effects of natural disasters, environmental pollution, and transnational crimes. For 
example, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development Cao Đức Phát declared, “The 
ASEAN Community must cooperate more profoundly at all levels to promote sustainable 
forest management and development. The use of forest land for hydro-power plants, roads 
and agricultural production had reduced the quality and quantity of natural forests….ASEAN 
members should raise their voices over trans-border forest protection” (VietNamNet, June 29, 
2012). In addition, the Vietnamese government has been a stalwart supporter of the principle 
of non-interference (Dosch, 2006: 246), because the principle of non-interference has 
remained a shield with which the Vietnamese government has warded off criticism from the 
international community regarding human-right violations in Vietnam.  
Not all is consonant in this arrangement, however, as a development gap has emerged 
between Vietnam and ASEAN: owing mainly to democratic members’ efforts, ASEAN has 
gradually expanded its focus on issues pertaining to human rights and democracy, whereas 
Vietnam has remained undemocratic and has been slow to improve its human-rights record. 
According to Freedom House, in 2002 Vietnam made the organisation’s list of “not free” 
countries, a list that Vietnam remained on in 2012.53 As mentioned in chapter two, non-
democratic regimes’ viability rests on their ability to control the domestic population and 
society. ASEAN’s creation of the APSC, by contrast, embodies an elevated respect for and 
promotion of human rights, something that is out line with the Vietnamese government’s 
approach to regime consolidation. Thus, if it were to extend genuine support to the APSC, the 
Vietnamese government would quite likely undermine its viability. However, as mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, ASEAN has been a cornerstone for the Vietnamese government’s 
interests. This curious aggregation of circumstances has resulted in a situation where the 
Vietnamese governments’ rhetorical support for human-rights and freedom-from-fear 
element in the APSC has tended to be the most suitable strategy through which the 
government can thus deal with the APSC: the Vietnamese government perhaps can avoid 
seriously damaging viability while nevertheless benefiting from membership in ASEAN. The 
irony of course is that, because its strategies have been rhetorical, the Vietnamese 
government has continued to limit human rights and repress ethnic minorities. 
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4.10.2.2 The Vietnamese Government’s Strategies 
4.10.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
The Vietnamese government has displayed its rhetorical support for the APSC’s freedom-
from-want element, in particular in human-rights issues. During the process of drafting the 
ASEAN Charter, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng stated that Vietnam was not 
ready to accept the ASEAN Charter’s enshrinement of human-rights provisions (The Star, 
July 31, 2007). After a few months, at the 13th ASEAN Summit, Prime Minister Dũng said 
that “Vietnam welcomes approval of ASEAN Charter” (VietNam-UN.Org, November 27, 
2007). Finally, the Vietnamese government ratified the ASEAN Charter in March 2008. In 
addition, in 2009, the Vietnamese government expressed their support to creation of the 
regional human-rights body (VietNam-UN.Org, February 3, 2009). Moreover, Prime Minister 
Dũng “welcomed ASEAN’s adoption of an ASEAN Statement on Human Rights—the first 
political document of the group that looks to enhance human rights cooperation in the region. 
It will adhere to goals and principles outlined in the ASEAN Charter, and contribute to 
materializing the people-centred ASEAN community” (VietNamNet, November 19, 2012).  
Carlyle Thayer argued that in recent years, the growth of domestic dissidents despite 
state repression has put the Vietnamese government under pressure (Thayer, 2009: 17-22). 
General Secretary Lê Khả Phiêu expressed the Vietnamese government’s position on the 
development of human rights and democracy in his country:  
 
Vietnamese people had only one desire, the path to national independence and 
socialism [and] only under the leadership of the Community Party of Vietnam could 
that goal be reached. Our people won’t allow any political power sharing with any other 
forces. Any idea to promote “absolute democracy,” to put human rights above 
sovereignty, or support multiparty or political pluralism…are lies and cheating. (cited 
from Hung, 2000: 104) 
 
Thus, the Vietnamese government, in order to ensure its regime’s viability, has not 
genuinely developed human-rights elements in the APSC. Regarding the creation of the 
human-rights body, the Vietnamese government insisted that the body must rest on the 
principle of non-interference (VietNam-UN.Org, February 3, 2009), and this insistence points 
to Vietnamese government’s preference of a human-rights body without teeth. In addition, the 
Vietnamese government, although it ratified the ASEAN Charter, has regularly violated 
human rights domestically, for example arresting Vietnamese people who openly or even 
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privately pursue human security. In June 2011, writer Trần Khải Thanh Thuỷ was arrested by 
the government because he supported implementation of a multi-party system (Jakarta Post, 
June 25, 2011).  
 
4.10.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
Regarding the freedom-from-fear element in the APSC, the Vietnamese government followed 
through with its rhetorical support for certain ideals. In 2010, the Vietnamese government 
welcomed UN independent experts to Vietnam, where they could witness the improving 
living standards of Montagnards (VietNamNet, March 2, 2011). The Vietnamese 
government’s invitation seemed to be in line with the freedom-from-fear element in the 
APSC. However, according to Ms. Gay McDougall, the UN independent expert invited by 
the Vietnamese government to visit Montagnards’ areas of residence, everything she observed 
had been arranged calculatedly: people who met Ms. McDougall uniformly reiterated that the 
Vietnamese government did not repress them and Vietnamese officials followed her 
everywhere she set foot in Vietnam (Vietnam Committee on Human Rights, 2012: 7). The 
Vietnamese government, in truth, has continued to repress Montagnards. In 2010, the 
Vietnamese government arrested many Montagnards and accused them of “seeking to revive 
FULRO sympathies and illegal worship” (Vietnam Committee on Human Rights, 2012: 17).  
 
4.10.3 Summary 
From Vietnam’s reunification in 1976 to the period directly preceding the Vietnamese 
government’s adoption of Đổi Mới, the Vietnamese government failed to provide adequate 
human security to its people. After launching Đổi Mới, the Vietnamese government improved 
people’s living standards but failed to address human insecurities and limited human rights. 
In order to ensure its regime’s viability, the Vietnamese government has strategically adopted 
rhetorical support, which can help the Vietnamese government continue to gain advantages 
from ASEAN and to consolidate its regime.  
 
4.11 Concluding Remarks to this Chapter 
4.11.1 What Are Barriers to the Creation of the APSC? 
Having explored not only each ASEAN member’s strategies for handling the creation of the 
APSC but also the motivations underlying the strategies, we can roughly divide the members’ 
strategies into two categories: support for the creation of the APSC and non-support of the 
creation of the APSC (please see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
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The members supporting the creation of the APSC are ASEAN’s founding states and 
Brunei (please see Table 4.1). The commonality among these members is that their 
governments support a measurable degree of substantive democracy. Although failing to 
provide adequate human security to their people, the post-reform governments in Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand (to a lesser extent during Thaksin’s rule) have started 
addressing domestic human insecurities, including freedom-from-want and freedom-from-
fear issues. This situation reflects the concept I mentioned in chapter two’s section on state 
actors (2.1.4.2): the more democratic a state is, the more human security its people are likely 
to have. Although Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore are soft authoritarian members, 
governments’ self-renewal has ensured the extension of tangible human security to each 
nation’s population. Both pro-democracy and soft authoritarian members have regarded the 
creation of the APSC as an opportunity to enhance their own influence in ASEAN (see 
Indonesia and Malaysia), to address human insecurities (see Brunei and Singapore), to 
promote regime consolidation (see the Philippines and Thailand), and to develop the 
domestic economy (see Brunei). These members have achieved several targets in the APSC 
blueprint: the language of human rights and democracy has been embodied in the 
aforementioned blueprint, the ASEAN Charter itself, the creation of the AICHR and the AIPR, 
and reconciliation between GAM and the Indonesian government and between the MILF and 
the Filipino government. 
The group of non-supportive states tells its own story. This group comprises CLMV, all 
of which are countries that joined ASEAN in the 1990s. It is reasonable to say that these 
members, before joining ASEAN, were a source of threats to domestic populations. Famine, 
malnutrition, contagious diseases, refugees, massacre, and government crackdowns were 
common threats in these ASEAN members and each of these threats was attributable at least 
in part to government malfeasance. In the late 1980s, although the Myanmar government was 
still failing to provide human security to its people, Laos and Vietnam adopted economic 
liberalisation and subsequently improve their respective domestic populations’ living 
standards. In neighbouring Cambodia, the UN conducted peacekeeping operations with the 
effect of restoring peace there. However, these relatively new ASEAN members have failed 
to address their domestic human insecurities and continue to limit their own people’s human 
rights. Indeed, a prominent commonality among these members is that their governments 
have been reluctant to accept democracy. Thus, according to the concept that I mentioned in 
chapter two’s state-actors section (2.1.4.2), a regime’s viability is based on the regime’s tight 
control of the domestic population and the country’s society as a whole and on unvarnished 
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repression of secessionist movements. Unlike ASEAN’s pro-democratic members, the CLMV 
quadrumvirate have regarded the creation of the APSC as a risk to their respective regimes’ 
viability, because provisions of promoting human rights and democracy might encourage the 
growth of domestic political dissent, CSOs, and human-rights activism. Thus, we can see that 
CLMV’s strategies have functioned to undermine the human-rights element, to rhetorically 
support the human-rights element (as well as freedom-from-fear goals), or a combination of 
the two.  
 
Table 4.1 Strategies and motivations of ASEAN members supporting the creation of the 
APSC 
Members Strategies Motivations 
Brunei 
• Support the creation of the APSC • Diversify domestic economy 
• Address transnational threats 
Indonesia 
• Support the creation of the APSC • Re-enhance its leadership in 
ASEAN 
Malaysia 
• Support the creation of the APSC • Improve its influence in 
ASEAN 
Philippines 
• Support the creation of the APSC 
(Arroyo’s presidency excepted) 
• Consolidate regime 
Singapore • Support the creation of the APSC • Address transnational threats 
Thailand 
• Support the creation of the APSC 
(Thaksin prime minister excepted) 
• Consolidate regime 
  Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
CLMV’s lack of genuine support for the creation of the APSC has become a barrier to 
ASEAN’s creation of the APSC. For example, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand supported 
the creation of the AICHR. Vietnam also expressed its support in this direction, but insisted 
that the AICHR be based on the principle of non-interference. Finally, ASEAN created the 
AICHR in 2009, yet the AICHR’s terms of reference clearly state that “the AICHR shall be 
guided by the principle of the non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member 
states” (ASEAN, October 2009: 4). Thus, the AICHR has been nothing more than a regional 
human-rights body that, limited to promoting people’s human rights, is wholly incapable of 
protecting them.  
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Table 4.2 Strategies and motivations of ASEAN members not supporting the creation of the 
APSC 
Members Strategies Motivations 
Cambodia 
• Hinder CSOs’ participation in the 
APSC-building process 
• Support the principle of non-
interference 
• Consolidate regime 
Laos 
• Undermine such provisions in the 
APSC as pertain to human rights 
and freedom from fear  
• Consolidate regime 
Myanmar 
• Rhetorically support the creation 
of the APSC (before Myanmar’s 
adoption of political reform at the 
end of 2010) 
• Consolidate regime 
Vietnam 
• Rhetorically support human-rights 
elements and freedom-from-fear 
initiatives 
• Consolidate regime 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
Division among ASEAN’s member-states has created the potential  for a crisis. 
According to Barry Desker, ASEAN’s slow drift toward people-oriented targets has led to the 
concern that “Indonesia might withdraw from ASEAN” (cited from Collins, 2013: 157). 
Some Indonesian scholars, such as Rizal Sukma, have similarly argued that “ASEAN is too 
small for Indonesia, because Indonesia is now a G20 member, it’s a middle power and the 
largest Muslim country in the world…. ASEAN is such a frustrating experience, because it’s 
moving slowly.”54 Indonesia’s withdrawal from ASEAN is unlikely to occur (Collins, 2013: 
157), at least in the immediate years ahead, but Indonesia’s role in ASEAN should be to help 
cultivate ASEAN into a regional organisation that attends substantively to Southeast Asians’ 
safety and living standards. Indonesian frustration suggests that the non-democratic group’s 
resistance to sensitive issues has remained defiant, which does not bode well for a people-
oriented APSC.  
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CHAPTER 5 STATE ACTORS II: EXTERNAL POWERS 
Australia, China, Japan, and the United States have been involved in Southeast Asian human-
security issues since the 1950s. As mentioned in chapter two’s state actors section (2.1.4.2), 
states that are involved in human-security issues have their motivations. The motivations 
underlying these countries’ involvement in Southeast Asia have been various, including the 
desire to improve their own regional influence, to expand an ideology they support, and to 
protect their own people’s human security. Different motivations have engendered different 
results. Some countries’ involvement has improved Southeast Asian people’s human security, 
but some countries’ involvement has created human insecurities. Also regarding the creation 
of the APSC, external powers have had their own motivations. In chapter five, I will analyse 
the strategies of four external powers—Australia, China, Japan, and the United States—and 
their underlying motivations. In the conclusion, I will explore whether these countries’ 
involvement in the creation of the APSC has helped tear down or erect barriers to the APSC. 
 
5.1 Australia 
Since the 1950s, the Australian government has been involved in human-security issues in 
Southeast Asia. The Australian government has helped Southeast Asian countries address 
several freedom-from-want issues and participated in and contributed to freedom-from-fear 
efforts. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Australian government has continued to play 
an important role helping ASEAN to create the APSC. In this section, I will review why and 
how the Australian government has responded historically to regional human-security issues 
and explore what the Australian government’s strategic response has been to the creation of 
the APSC and how the Australian government has implemented this strategy 
 
5.1.1 Historical Review: From the 1950s to 2002 
The historical review section here is divided into two parts. These two parts discuss how and 
why the Australian government was involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. The 
time-frame in the first part extends from the 1950s to 1989 and in the second part from 1990 
to 2002. 
 
5.1.1.1 From the 1950s to 1989 
During this period, the main motivation underlying Australian government’s involvement in 
human-security issues in Southeast Asia was opposition to communist expansion. The 
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Australian government was worried that expansion of communism in Southeast Asia would 
affect the safety of Australian national security. The Australian government’s approaches to 
preventing communist expansion generally divided along two lines: (1) engagement in multi-
lateral cooperative development programmes providing economic and social assistance to 
Australia’s neighbouring countries and (2) participation in wars between the capitalist and 
communist blocs. The second approach gradually lost favour as American military forces 
haphazardly began reducing their presence in South Vietnam in the early 1970s, as formalised 
in 1969 by the Nixon administration. 
 
5.1.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
The Colombo Plan was a multi-lateral development programme that the Australian 
government engaged in providing economic and social assistance to Southeast Asia (Alves, 
1993: 522). At a conference of Commonwealth foreign ministers, held in Colombo from 
January 9 to 15, 1950, Australian Minister for External Affairs Percy C. Spender, along with 
Ceylonese Finance Minister J.R. Jayawardence, proposed economic and technical assistance 
to under-developed states, including Ceylon, India, Pakistan, and such British colonies as 
Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei. This effort was the so-called 
Colombo Plan. Many scholars noted that the purpose of the Australian government’s 
participation in the Colombo Plan was to prevent the spread of communism to Australia and 
its neighbours through an improvement in people’s living standards (Ward, 1951: 199, Varma, 
1974: 202-3, James, 1955: 41). Spender’s proposal was supported by members of the 
Australian parliament (Varma, 1974: 202-5). Early on in the implementation of the Colombo 
Plan, Australian assistance extended only to India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, but after the new 
participants joined the Colombo Plan, whether as aid donors like the United States (1951) and 
Japan (1954) or as aid recipients like Laos (1951), Burma (1952), Indonesia (1953), and the 
Philippines (1954), Australian donations expanded to all beneficiary countries (James, 1955: 
29). The areas of assistance included agriculture (irrigation and power production), transport, 
communications, social services (housing, health, and education), and industry and mining. 
By the end of 1954, Australian donations amounted to A$17.8 million, while the country had 
been devoting many experts and much equipment to the task of developing technology in the 
aforementioned areas and countries (Varma, 1974: 196). Although the Colombo Plan met 
with a degree of suspicion from recipient countries,55 some Southeast Asians’ living standards 
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improved. For example, some recipients enjoyed increased rice production and increased 
construction of roads, hospitals, houses, and schools (Blackton, 1951: 29, Symon, 1952: 193). 
 
5.1.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Australian government’s involvement in freedom-from-fear issues in Southeast Asia was 
driven by the same motivation: halt and turn back potential and real advance of communism. 
Against this backdrop, Australia’s Liberal Country Party government sent troops to Vietnam, 
where between 1964 and 1972, over 50,000 Australian troops served (Cheeseman, 1994: 248). 
The Vietnam War resulted in heavy casualties throughout the divided region and produced 
massive refugee flows. However, after the American pullout from Vietnam in the 1970s, the 
Australian government adopted an anti-war policy. For example, the Australian government 
publicly condemned that American bombing of Hanoi after the U.S. government decided to 
pull out from Vietnam. The Minister for Overseas Trade and Secondary Industry Jim Cairns 
issued scathing remarks on the matter, characterising the bombing policy as “the act of one 
man [i.e., U.S. President Nixon] insensible to world opinion” and “the most brutal, 
indiscriminate slaughter of defenceless men, women and children in living memory” 
(Ingleson, 1980: 293).  
After the American pullout from Vietnam in the 1970s, the Australian government 
helped ASEAN address Indochinese refugees’ problems. Early on, the Australian government 
was unwilling to accept the resettlement of Indochinese refugees in Australia itself (Ravenhill, 
1998: 277). After negotiating with ASEAN members (Ravenhill, 1998: 277), the Australian 
government accepted refugees and donated US$3.4 million to the UN Commissioner for 
Refugees, the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and the 
International Red Cross (Ingleson, 1980: 296).  
 
5.1.1.2 From 1990 to 2002 
After the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia in 1989, the Australian 
government remained involved in human-security issues in Southeast Asia, but the Australian 
government’s main motivation shifted from fighting communism to promoting its human-
security policy in the international community. Since the 1990s, leaders like Prime Minister 
Paul Keating (1991-1996) and Prime Minister John Howard (1996-2007) have gradually 
                                                                                                                                                        
declared motivations of donor states. From the perspective of these wary politicians, the real motivation was 
exploitation of recipients’ raw materials (Varma, 1974: 205-6). 
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enshrined the human-security concept in the Australian government’s overall foreign-policy 
platform (Camilleri, 2012). With these trends in mind, we can observe how the Australian 
government has engaged in Southeast Asian human-security issues, including the creation of 
human-development programmes and participation in peacekeeping tasks. 
 
5.1.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Australian government has actively provided assistance 
around the world to communities afflicted by human insecurities. Anthony Burke argued that 
the Australian government integrates its “homeland security, defence policy, and international 
security diplomacy into a working whole, anchors them in a core commitment to human 
security” and consider human security “a fundamental goal” in Australian security policy 
(Burke, 2012). In this context, the Australian government has provided assistance to several 
countries, including countries in Southeast Asia. For example, the Australian government has 
addressed specifically the problem of HIV-transmission rates in Southeast Asia. In July 2002, 
the Australian government created the Asia Regional HIV/AIDS Project (ARHP) to mitigate 
the transmission of HIV/AIDS. The participants in this project were Myanmar, Vietnam, and 
China (Yunnan and Guangxi Provinces). The Australian government provided financial 
assistance (A$15.8 million), educational activities, and training to health officers in these 
targeted countries (December 2007: Australian Government). In addition, the Australian 
government has helped clear Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) in Laos. The Australian 
government has provided A$20 million and conducted UXO clearance, has assisted UXO 
victims through the provision of prosthetics and orthotics (Australian Government, 2010: 3). 
The Australian government’s assistance was substantive, as attested to by Laos’ Director of 
the National Regulatory Authority for UXO / Mine Action Sector Phoukhieo 
Chanthasomboune: 
 
Australia is one of the key sponsors of the First Meeting of the State Parties to the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions. We are extremely grateful to the Australian 
Government for this, as well as for its longstanding support to the UXO Sector in the 
Lao PDR. Australian aid to key actors of the UXO Sector has enabled the development 
of qualitative and innovative initiatives in terms of clearance, rick education, victim 
assistance and advocacy. We believe that these initiatives are essential to help the Lao 
PDR to implement its new obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
(Australian Government, 2010: 1) 
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5.1.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
From 1990 to 2002, the Australian government’s human-security policy manifested itself in 
freedom-from-fear issues. Katsumi Ishizuka argued that the motivation underlying the 
Australian government’s involvement in peacekeeping operations was to maintain the 
country’s “status as a middle power” (Ishizuka, 2006: 152).  
The Australian government has engaged in Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues: 
peacekeeping tasks in Cambodia and East Timor. The Australian government’s provision of 
manpower to peacekeeping missions in Cambodia merit special attention. Between 1991 and 
1992, the Australian government provided 65 Army Communicators to the United Nations 
Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), and after the creation of UNTAC, the Australian 
government provided 480 military personnel to UNTAC’s Force Communications Unit 
(Londey, 2004: 169, 173).  
In the case of East Timor, the Australian government provided significant assistance. 
After the UN-supervised independence referendum was held in East Timor in August 1999, 
where over 78% of the vote supported independence, thousands of East Timorese, in 
particular those supporting the independence of East Timor, were slaughtered by the TNI in 
Dili. The Howard government in Australia paid considerable attention to the problem of East 
Timor, even though the Indonesian government strongly rejected the Australian government’s 
role as a leader in peacekeeping tasks (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005b: 132). Australia led 
the INTERFET, which involved participants from Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand, their chief mission being to conduct peace-keeping operations in East Timor. 
Australia provided 5,500 personnel, a number that was far more than the sum of personnel, 
2,464, from all other ASEAN participants (Dupont, 2000: 167). After the UNSC established 
UNTAET on October 25, 1999, the Australian government assigned 2,000 personnel to 
UNTAET (Ishizuka, 2006: 156).  
 
5.1.2 Exploration of the Australian Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
5.1.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Australian Government’s Strategies 
According to the above historical review, we know that the Australian government has been 
involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues since the 1950s. Has the Australian 
government continued to be involved in the creation of the APSC whose spirit has been 
people-oriented? If yes, what strategies has the Australian government has adopted in 
response to the creation of the APSC? And what motivations have underlain these strategies? 
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Since ASEAN’s decision to create the APSC, the Australian government has provided 
its assistance to ASEAN. I argue that the Australian government’s strategies have supported 
the creation of the APSC and that the motivations underlying these strategies have centred on 
protecting people within Australia from various human insecurities. Since the early 2000s, 
Australians have been beset by various threats, such as terrorism (e.g., the 2002 Bali 
bombings), human and drug trafficking, the 2003 SARS crisis, refugee flows,56  and the 
spread of HIV/AIDS. The Australian government has reiterated the importance of the human-
security concept and has based national security policy on this concept. According to Joseph 
A. Camilleri’s calculations, the number of official Australian statements involving the 
human-security concept increased from six in the Keating period to twenty-nine in the 
Howard period to thirty-eight in the Rudd period (Camilleri, 2012). With a clear eye toward 
protecting its people, the Australian government has also sought to strengthen cooperation 
with neighbouring countries (Burke, 2012), and Camilleri argued that “ASEAN has been the 
principal focus of Australian interest” in this direction (Camilleri, 2012).  
Creation of the APSC, centred as it is on addressing several human insecurities, has 
given the Australian government an opportunity to further strengthen the country’s 
cooperation with ASEAN. In August 2007, the Australian government with ASEAN signed 
the Joint Declaration on the ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Partnership (2008-2013). In 
this declaration, the Australian government expressed its intention to assist ASEAN regarding 
several of the APSC blueprint’s freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues, such as 
combating transnational crime, and the Australian government pledged to provide financial 
and technical assistance for countering natural disasters (ASEAN, August 2007). 
 
5.1.2.2 The Australian Government’s Strategies 
5.1.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
After ASEAN decided to create the APSC, the first related support from the Australian 
government was a programme for combating human trafficking. In 2006, the Australian 
government created the Asia Regional Trafficking in Persons (ARTIP) Project (which 
operated from August 2006 to August 2011), funded by AusAid (A$20 million). Australian 
Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd explained why the Australian government launched the ARTIP: 
                                                 
56
 When the TNU killed many East Timorese after the independence ballot in August 1999, refugees escaped to 
Australia. In recent years, people in Southeast Asia who have been afflicted by political persecution and racial 
discrimination in their own countries have been illegally entering Australia via human-trafficking rings based in 
Malaysia and Indonesia. 
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“We still find around the world today we have a real problem with slavery. We have a 
problem with bonded labour and we have a problem with trafficking, sex trafficking, in 
particular involving children. And…an important part of the business of politics is to give 
voice to the voiceless…That’s part of our job through what we do with the foreign aid 
program” (cited from Bazeley and Dottridge, 2011: 5). The range of assistance covered 
information exchanges, the training of specialists like judges and prosecutors, and the 
development to law enforcement (Bazeley and Dottridge, 2011). Initially, there were only 
four ASEAN-participants: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand. Between 2008 and 2009, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines joined the project, in that order. Since 2013, the 
Australian government has been conducting the Australia-Asia Program to Combat 
Trafficking in Persons (AAPTIP) (2013-2018), to which the Australian government has 
promised funds amounting to A$50 million. 
 The Australian government has supported to natural-disaster management. From the 
Australian government’s perspective, natural disasters “cannot be viewed or addressed solely 
through a national security lens,” and thus, it is necessary to cooperate with neighbouring 
countries (Burke, 2012). Holding this view, the Australian government has been one of the 
external powers to support the creation of the AHA Centre. In 2012, the Australian 
government approved a grant of A$1million for the creation of the AHA Center and 
rhetorically aligned itself with efforts to implement AADMER (ASEAN, July 24, 2012a). In 
addition, the Australian government has been the main donor when natural disasters hit 
Southeast Asian countries. For example, the Australian government provided assistance to 
Aceh in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami in 2004 and provided 
assistance to central Java in 2006 following the earthquake there (Snyder, 2006: 335). 
 It should be noted that the Australian government has not only provided assistance for 
the APSC’s freedom-from-want issues, which have been directly linked to Australian people’s 
security, but also provided support for other issues, such as human rights. For example, at the 
2010 ASEAN-Australia Summit, the Australian government expressed its support for the 
AICHR’s creation (ASEAN, October 30, 2010) and at the 24th ASEAN-Australia Forum, the 
Australian government further suggested cooperation between the AICHR and the Australian 
Human Rights Commission (AHRC) (ASEAN, September 6, 2011). The Australian 
government met its commitment. The AICHR and the AHRC jointly held the Workshop on 
Corporate Social Responsibility in November 2012. 
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5.1.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Australian government has provided assistance for the freedom-from-fear element in the 
APSC because freedom-from-fear issues have been linked to Australian people’s human 
security. Although according to Burke, the Australian government has not regarded asylum 
seekers as a threat (Burke, 2012), refugees could contribute to such human insecurities as 
human trafficking. Thus, the Australian government has helped ASEAN members improve 
their capacity for undertaking peacekeeping operations, in turn helping reduce the occurrence 
of conflicts that result in refugee flows. 
For example, at 2008’s 22nd AAF, the Australian government stated its willingness to 
support ASEAN’s convening of the ADMM, where regional peacekeeping has been one of 
the widely discussed topics on the agenda, and to host the ADMM Plus, whose participants 
would include ASEAN members and ASEAN’s dialogue partners (ASEAN, May 22, 2008). 
When the first ADMM Plus was held in 2010, the Australian government participated in 
ADMM-Plus Expert Working Groups, which conduct practical cooperation on counter-
terrorism efforts, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military medical responses, and 
peacekeeping operations (ASEAN). 
In addition, the Australian government provided assistance to individual ASEAN 
members. In September 2012, the Australian and Indonesian government signed the Defence 
Cooperation Arrangement. According to this arrangement, peacekeeping operations constitute 
one of the areas in which both sides would cooperate. In May 2013, both sides successfully 
conducted a desktop peacekeeping exercise (Garuda Kookaburra). In April 2014, the 
Indonesian government created the Indonesia Peace and Security Centre, which is the biggest 
peacekeeping training centre in Southeast Asia and which has as a sponsor the Australian 
government (with additional financial support coming from the United Sates government, 
incidentally) (Australian Government Department of Defence, 2013: 59). The Australian 
government has cooperated with Malaysia and Thailand to strengthen their peacekeeping 
ability by bringing together experts from these Southeast Asian countries, NGOs, and the UN 
for the exploration and design of training programmes (Australian Government Department 
of Defence, May 25, 2011, 2013: 59-60) 
 
5.1.3 Summary 
Since the 1950s, the Australian government has been involved in human-security issues in 
Southeast Asia. Although the motivations underlying this involvement have varied across 
historical periods, it has been largely positive, except for Australia’s participation in the wars 
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involving the United States and Vietnam in 1950s. The Australian government has provided 
assistance for the creation of the APSC. However, in 2013, a conservative Liberal Party-led 
coalition won national elections, and the new prime minister, Tony Abbott, declared that the 
Australian government would cut the foreign-aid budget while increasing the budget for 
domestic infrastructure (Jakarta Post, September 8, 2013). This policy left a haze of 
uncertainty as to whether the Australian government would substantively and financially 
assist the creation of the APSC. 
 
5.2 China 
Since the victory of communists forces in Mainland China in 1949, the Chinese Communist 
regime has inserted itself in human-security issues throughout Southeast Asia. Different 
motivations for this involvement have produced different results for human security. 
Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Chinese government’s strategy has been to shower 
assistance and support on the project. Again, because of its different motivations, the Chinese 
government has prioritised assistance and support for freedom-from-want goals while 
limiting its engagement in freedom-from-fear goals. In this section, I will review the period 
between 1949 and 2002, examining both the motivations for the Chinese government’s 
involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues and the Chinese government’s 
approaches to handling these issues. I will then explore in greater detail the Chinese 
government’s strategic response to the creation of the APSC. 
 
5.2.1 Historical Review: From the 1950s to 2002 
The historical review section on China has two parts, both of which discuss how the Chinese 
government was involved in and addressed Southeast Asian human-security issues. The time-
frame in the first part spans from the 1950s to 1989 and in the second part covers the period 
between 1990 and 2002. 
 
5.2.1.1 From the 1950s to 1989 
Beginning in the 1950s and extending all the way up to 1989, the Chinese government was 
involved in human-security issues in Southeast Asia. Regarding the freedom-from-want area, 
the Chinese government provided assistance to Southeast Asian ethnic Chinese, many of 
whom suffered unfair treatment at the hands of their respective governments. The Chinese 
government’s motivations for making this assistance available tended to emanate from the 
government’s firmly held belief that it had a responsibility to protect overseas Chinese 
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(Skinner, 1959: 144). In the freedom-from-fear area, the Chinese government lavished 
several indigenous communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia with substantive assistance like 
armaments, military training, and moral support. The Chinese government’s motivations for 
issuing this kind of support almost always derived from a desire to expand its communist 
influence in Southeast Asia. The Chinese government’s underwriting of insurgencies 
protracted civil wars in Southeast Asian countries, claiming many people’s lives and 
poisoning ideological discussion.  
 
5.2.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
The Chinese government’s involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-want issues was 
associated with Southeast Asia’s far-flung ethnic Chinese. For example, in Indonesia, the 
Chinese minority suffered from their government’s policies, which resulted in the closure of 
Chinese language schools, the eradication of the Chinese press, the denial of Indonesian 
citizenship to Chinese people born outside Indonesia; and prohibitions on Chinese people’s 
remittances to family in China (Fitzgerald, 1973: 40-1). The Chinese government protested 
against the Indonesian government’s treatment of ethnic Chinese and encouraged local 
Chinese to resist (Sukma, 1999: 30). In December 1959, the Chinese government repatriated 
over 100,000 overseas Chinese who had been residing in Indonesia (Wong, 1984: 44). John 
Wong argued that the material and moral support provided by the Chinese government to 
these minority populations of ethnic Chinese was rooted in a powerful sense of responsibility 
of obligation felt by the Chinese leadership (Wong, 1984: 44). 
In the late 1950s, the Chinese government’s interventions in situations involving of 
overseas Chinese gradually declined. Skinner argued that this decline took place because the 
China’s policy of protection had been (understandably) souring diplomatic relations between 
China and Southeast Asian countries—countries from which the Chinese government needed 
political recognition (Skinner, 1959: 145-6). However, a few examples from recent history 
suggest that the Chinese government did not jettison the policy in either the 1960s or the 
1970s. When, from 1965 to 1966, Suharto staged a coup and took actions resulting in the 
deaths of several thousand communists (most of whom were ethnic Chinese), the Chinese 
government publicly excoriated the Suharto regime for its actions (Ramanathan, 1994: 121). 
In addition, the Chinese government provided assistance to ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, who, 
because of the political turmoil and violence, had become refugees. In the late 1970s, the 
Vietnamese government used force to evict ethnic Chinese from their residences in Hanoi, 
Haiphong, and Nam Dinh. These refugees escaped to China and Hong Kong, as well as to 
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other Southeast Asian states, like Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines—often by sea or 
land routes. During their period of exile, these refugees faced the increased threat of 
infectious disease and malnutrition. The Chinese government provided humanitarian 
assistance to these refugees and directly oversaw the resettlement of 200,000 refugees, 
providing many Vietnamese refugees with living accommodations and jobs in the provinces 
of Guangxi, Guangdong, Fujian and Beihai (Alley, 1980: 4). 
 
5.2.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Chinese government addressed freedom-from-fear issues by involving itself in civil wars 
between communist insurgencies and governments in Southeast Asian countries. The Chinese 
government’s principal motivation was to expand China’s communist-entrenched influence in 
Southeast Asia. Chinese officials Liu Shao-qi, Vice-Chairman of the World Federation of 
Trade Unions, said that “it is necessary to create strong people’s armies of liberation, skilled 
in fighting against the enemy, under the leadership of the Communist Party, and also 
supporting bases for the operation of these armies…the armed struggle is the main form of 
struggle in the national liberation movement in many colonies and semi-colonies” (cited from 
Purcell, 1950: 195). Resting on convictions like this one, the Chinese government provided 
substantive assistance, such as weapons, moral support, and military training to Southeast 
Asian communist insurgencies. For example, the cadres of the Communist Party of Thailand 
(CPT) were trained in China; the Chinese government provided weapons and personnel to the 
Communist Party of Burma (CPB); the Chinese government supported the PKI, the MPC and 
the Philippine Communist Party (PCP) (Martin, 1977: 23-42). Southeast Asian governments 
felt that the Chinese government had expanded its influence through exports of communism 
that were neither requested or desired (Leifer, 1980: 13). Thus, many Southeast Asian 
countries regarded China as a great concern to their national security. In addition, the Chinese 
government’s assistance protracted civil wars in Southeast Asian countries, claiming many 
people’s lives. For example, the Chinese government’s support of and assistance to the PKI 
fuelled its growing. Suharto disliked the PKI’s increasing prominence and, thus, purged the 
principal members of the organisation, persecuting innocent ethnic Chinese in the process 
(Ramanathan, 1994: 118).  
 
5.2.1.2 From 1990 to 2002 
The Chinese government was involved in human-rights issues, economic crises, and 
peacekeeping operations in Southeast Asia from 1990 to 2002. The motivations underlying 
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this involvement particularly as they regarded the human-rights issues and the peacekeeping 
operations, were generally aligned with the principle of non-interference. When the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) killed peaceful demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the 
Chinese government brought down on itself heated criticism from Western countries. Chinese 
people’s demonstrations and Western countries’ criticism were so intense that the Chinese 
government regarded its legitimacy and its stability under significant threat (Ba, 2003: 630, 
Yang, 2003: 313). In order to counter the criticism from the West, the Chinese government 
designed a human-rights discourse, referred to as the “New International Order” (NIO) (Jie, 
1993: 235), which spiritedly invoked the principle of non-interference as it pertained to the 
human-rights issues of an independent country. The post-Tiananmen Chinese government 
emphasised that Western countries should not criticise the human-rights situations in 
Southeast Asian countries, as well as in China, and backed up several Southeast Asian 
regimes that had poor or even egregious human-rights records. In addition, because of the 
Chinese government’s adherence—selective though it might be—to the principle of non-
interference, China limited its Southeast Asian peacekeeping operations. 
The Chinese government’s motivations for getting involved in regional economic crises 
hinged on its desire to become a regional leader. In the late 1980s, the gradual lessening of 
US-Soviet antagonism prompted the Chinese government to lessen its own interventions in 
the affairs of overseas Chinese and in leftist social revolutions throughout Southeast Asia. In 
fact, the Chinese government gradually normalised diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian 
countries. However, the Chinese government’s increase in national defense outlays led to 
concerns among some Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Against this backdrop, the Chinese government presented China as a benign leader providing 
humanitarian assistance which manifested in the event of the 1997 financial crisis (Ba, 2003: 
637). 
 
5.2.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
Between 1990 and 2002, Chinese leaders regarded the Western concept of human rights as a 
threat to their government’s legitimacy and stability, and thus sought to counter the concept 
by introducing in 1991 their own human-rights discourse, commonly referred to as the NIO, 
which embraced “non-interference with internal affairs” and “economic equality” (Jie, 1993: 
235). In establishing NIO, the Chinese government solicited assistance from ASEAN 
member-states, all of which agreed to work with China on this matter (Jie, 1993: 235).  
However, the Chinese government’s NIO-based human-rights discourse indirectly 
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resulted in human insecurities. Take for example the human-rights violations attributable to 
the Myanmar government, whose restrictions on the domestic population’s human rights led 
Western countries to castigate the regime and to impose economic sanctions on it. The 
Chinese government’s attitude toward Myanmar, not so incidentally, was to abide by the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Hence, the Chinese government 
has continued its relations with Myanmar economically, militarily, politically and socially. 
Economically, the Chinese government enhanced trade with Myanmar and purchased natural 
resources from it, which presented the junta there with a steady revenue stream (Haacke, 
2010: 120); militarily, the Chinese government has been the biggest arms supplier to 
Myanmar, and has provided its regime with military training and infrastructural support 
(Seekins, 1997: 534); politically, the Chinese government opposed the international 
community’s sanctions on the Myanmar government and supported its hypocritical proposal 
for democratic reform, like 2003’s “Seven-Point Roadmap” (Haacke, 2010: 120, 124-5); 
socially, the Chinese government helped create bridges and roads in the border region 
between China and Myanmar (Seekins, 1997: 530-1). Partly because of the Chinese 
government’s substantive and rhetorical support, economic sanctions did not shut down the 
Myanmar government, which continued to violate its people’s human rights. Donald M. 
Seekins made the following observation in this regard:  
 
China’s military support makes it easy for SLORC hardliners to use their instrument of 
preference—brute force—to govern, but the militarization of Burmese society will only 
lead to more violence and instability as the generals turn away from non-violent 
alternatives that alone can bring the country social peace and development. (Seekins, 
1997: 539) 
 
During the 1997 financial crisis, the Chinese government generously provided 
economic assistance to nearly crippled Southeast Asian countries so that they could better 
address the economic hardships that had dramatically downgraded many Southeast Asians’ 
living standards. Alice Ba argued that the 1997’s financial meltdown provided the Chinese 
government an opportunity to play the role of a leader in Southeast Asia (Ba, 2003: 635). The 
Chinese government promised the affected Southeast Asian countries to refrain from 
devaluing its own currency and, in particular, provided considerable economic assistance to 
Thailand (Ba, 2003: 637).  
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5.2.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
As regards freedom from fear, the Chinese government was involved in peacekeeping 
missions in Cambodia and East Timor. The Chinese government’s involvement in Southeast 
Asian freedom-from-fear issues was based on adherence to the non-interference principle, as 
was the government’s involvement in the region’s freedom-from-want issues. For example, in 
the Cambodian case, although Chinese authorities supported the creation of UNTAC, the 
Chinese Ambassador in the UN, Li Zhaoxiing, claimed that “outside forces should not 
interfere in the internal affairs of Cambodia” (cited from Fravel, 1996: 1110). In the East 
Timor case, the Chinese government abided by the principle they emphasised, non-
interference in the internal affairs of states. From the Chinese government’s perspective, 
peacekeeping contributors’ deployment of military units to countries would violate the 
principle of non-interference (Fravel, 1996: 1112). The Chinese government dispatched only 
“civilian police forces rather than military forces to East Timor” (Zhongying, 2005: 98). 
Interestingly, the Chinese government contravened the principle of non-interference. 
During the Cambodian peace process, the Chinese government provided economic and arms 
assistance to the Khmer Rouge (Bert, 1993: 329), strengthening the PDK. The PDK 
continued its armed struggle, attacked UN peacekeepers, and refused to join the peace 
process (Brown, 1993: 85). Wayne Bert argued that the Chinese government’s assistance 
indirectly protracted civil wars in Cambodia (Bert, 1993: 329), which prevented Cambodians 
from achieving even a paltry degree of freedom from fear.  
 
5.2.2 Exploration of the Chinese Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
5.2.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the Chinese Government’s Strategies 
According to the above historical review of China, the Chinese government’s involvement in 
Southeast Asian human-security issues had positive and negative results. One the one hand, 
the Chinese government helped both ethnic-Chinese refugees and economically compromised 
Southeast Asian countries; on the other hand, the Chinese government intervened in civil 
wars between Southeast Asian governments and indigenous communist parties, resulting in 
human insecurities. In the wake of these benefits and drawbacks to Chinese intervention in 
Southeast Asia, two questions arise: Has the Chinese government supported or opposed the 
creation of the APSC? And what the motivations has underlain the Chinese government’s 
strategies? 
I argue that the Chinese government, responding to the creation of the APSC, has 
adopted dual strategies: support the freedom-from-want element, but downplay the 
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importance of the freedom-from-fear element. The first motivation guiding the Chinese 
government’s strategic response to the APSC’s freedom-from-want elements has been a 
desire to maintain China’s leadership role in Southeast Asia. Since the late 1980s, the Chinese 
government has steadily developed its economy, military, and political system, and 
meanwhile, Southeast Asian countries have voiced concerns about possible Chinese 
aggression in the region. Some ASEAN countries have expressed particular concern about 
China’s extraordinary rising power relative to the Spratly Islands (Ba, 2003: 628). Thus, the 
Chinese government has tried to paint an image of itself as a benign, even a positive, 
presence in Southeast Asia. The best example is the Chinese government’s outpouring of 
financial assistance to ASEAN-member countries afflicted by the regional economic turmoil 
in 1997 and 1998. According to several recent scholars, the Chinese government has 
successfully created soft power (Cho and Jeong, 2008). However, a few ASEAN members, 
like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, have quite evidently voiced concern about 
China’s rising regional profile, thus giving Japan, and the United States opportunities to 
develop their own lines of influence in the region. For example, Leszek Buszynski argued 
that Chinese unilateral actions concerning disputes about the South China Sea constituted the 
main reason for the sceptical eye with which the Filipino government still regards China and 
for the ongoing military relationship that the Filipino government has with the United States 
(Buszynski, 2002). These countries’ growing engagement in Southeast Asian affairs is a 
challenge to the Chinese government’s existing leadership position there. Take the example of 
cooperation between Japan and ASEAN regarding the creation of the East Asian Community 
(EAC): the Chinese government understood that “if Japan and ASEAN achieve closer ties 
under EAC and alienate China, this will undermine Beijing’s quest for regional leadership” 
(Ji, 2006: 20). In particular, these countries have engaged in issues that the Chinese 
government has turned away from, issues concerning human rights (Cronin, 2009: 155-6, 
Chheang, 2010: 362-3). Thus, in order to consolidate its leadership in Southeast Asia, the 
Chinese government has actively supported the creation of the APSC: the Chinese 
government was among the earliest external countries to express support for the creation of 
the AC—a fact attested to by an official statement of the 8th ASEAN-China Summit (ASEAN, 
November 29, 2004b); the Chinese government has showered ASEAN members with 
considerable financial assistance; and, the Chinese government has created the ASEAN–
China Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC) whose function is to review the possibility of 
cooperation between China and ASEAN.  
However, as mentioned in chapter 2 (see section 2.1.3), when state actors implement 
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human-development programmes, it is likely that the programmes will result in certain 
human insecurities. The Chinese government’s involvement in human-development 
programmes in Southeast Asia during the APSC-building process has created several human 
insecurities, in response to which the Chinese government has yet to propose viable 
resolutions. 
The second motivation for the Chinese government’s dual strategy toward the APSC-
building process has been a firm adherence to the principle of non-interference. Since seizing 
power in 1949, the Chinese government has acquired exceptionally poor human-rights 
records, exemplified by the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961), the Cultural Revolution 
(1966–1970), and the Tiananmen Square massacre (1989). In particular, the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square event prompted an outpouring of criticism and even sanctions from Western countries, 
in this way posing challenges to the Chinese government’s legitimacy and stability. In order 
to avoid a repeat of this situation, the Chinese government has created its own human-rights 
discourse which has emphasised the sanctity of the principle of non-interference. The 
Chinese government’s methods have been successful, at least in Southeast Asia. In the 1990s, 
ASEAN members did not criticise the Chinese government despite the emergence of such 
human-rights problems as those surrounding the Chinese government’s response to Falun 
Gong and the Tibetan independence movement. However, since the 2000s, some ASEAN 
members, like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have been gradually democratising. 
In addition, these members have watered down the principle of non-interference (Katsumata, 
2004). During the drafting of the ASEAN Charter, the Malaysian governments attempted to 
review the principle (Mahathir and Irwan, 2007: 108), and CSOs in Indonesia in 2006 
suggested that the Indonesian government should vocally admonish China for its baleful 
human-rights record (Alexandra, 2012: 66). These ASEAN members’ attempt to review the 
principle of non-interference may create, in the near future, a situation where the Chinese 
government, if it seriously violates human rights, will come under withering criticism from 
these members—all in the context of a weakened principle of non-interference. Such 
criticism could indirectly chip away at the Chinese government’s legitimacy and stability. 
Thus, while both China and ASEAN cooperate over the APSC’s creation, the Chinese 
government has adhered to the principle of non-interference (ASEAN, October 2010) and has 
avoided talking about—or has simplified—the language of human rights and freedom-from-
fear issues. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese government’s publicly displayed resolve to support 
creating the APSC and to shower assistance on ASEAN has been far more palpable than any 
such resolve the Chinese government has displayed in support of creating a people-oriented 
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ASEAN where human rights and freedom-from-fear elements can trump the principle of non-
interference. 
 
5.2.2.2 The Chinese Government’s Strategies 
5.2.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
The Chinese government has provided considerable assistance to various causes reflective of 
the APSC’s freedom-from-want element. In October 2003, China and ASEAN issued the 
Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of ASEAN and PRC on Strategic 
Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. In this declaration, China emphasised the importance of 
cooperation with ASEAN regarding non-traditional security issues, and in 2004, China and 
ASEAN institutionalised this type of cooperation: the two parties signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Governments of the Member Countries of ASEAN and the PRC 
on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues. According to this 
memorandum, China would be responsible for creating workshops and training courses and 
would cover the participants’ and trainers’ expenses, including the cost of meals, travel, and 
accommodations (ASEAN, January 10, 2004). In 2009, the Chinese government initiated the 
first formal ASEAN Plus China Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC). In 
2010, ASEAN and China issued the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on 
ASEAN–China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2011–2015). And just recently 
(in 2013), the Chinese government dispatched troops for jointly held regional natural-disaster 
drills hosted by the Brunei government. In brief, the freedom-from-want causes in which the 
Chinese government has engaged itself have been various (please see Table 5.1) 
David Arase argued that cooperation between China and ASEAN is beneficial for 
ASEAN, because China could be a leader possessing “power and resources, as well as  the 
motivation and political ability to coordinate interests and broker deals with groups” (Arase, 
2010: 820). Indeed, the cooperation between China and ASEAN mentioned above is evidence 
that the Chinese government has tended to play a leading role—not only initiating the 
cooperation-based plans but also covering expenditures associated with workshops and 
training courses. The Chinese government, on the whole, has expanded its influence by 
supporting the creation of the APSC.  
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Table 5.1 A summary of the information of the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint 
Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2011–2015) 
Issues Details 
Human rights57 
cooperation in human-rights issues through “regional dialogues, the 
exchanges of best practices and other capacity building initiatives 
aimed at enhancing the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”; creation of the AICHR. 
Non-traditional 
security issues 
cooperation in combating drug and human trafficking, terrorism, and 
money laundering through the implementation and enhancement of 
existing mechanisms, like the ASEAN–China MOU on Cooperation in 
the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues (2010–2014); exchanges of 
information and other forms of cooperation in academic areas 
Poverty reduction 
implementation of the ASEAN–China Rural Development Promotion 
Program; cooperation in sub-regional development programs, such as 
the GMS and the Brunei–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines East ASEAN 
Growth Area (BIMP–EAGA); a commitment to holding “the ASEAN–
China Social Development and Poverty Reduction Forum” and related 
workshops and seminars 
Transport 
cooperation 
financial and technological support for the ASEAN Master Plan on 
Connectivity; construction of infrastructure, such as roads and railways 
Public health and 
infectious diseases 
“cooperation on preventing and controlling cross-border animal and 
plant diseases by exchanging information, techniques and experiences 
on early warning, epidemic surveillance and development of vaccine to 
improve animal and plant disease prevention networks and disease 
notification system”; the ASEAN–China Health Ministers’ Meeting as a 
platform for facilitating “policy dialogue and exchanges”; cooperation 
“in preparedness and responses against pandemic influenza and 
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 Despite having promised to cooperate with ASEAN regarding improvements in human rights, the Chinese 
government did not help resolve Myanmar’s human-rights problems, which acted as a barrier to ASEAN’s 
creation of the APSC. The Chinese government obeyed the principle of non-interference. In 2009, when a 
Myanmar court sentenced Aung San Suu Kyi to 18 months of house arrest, an action that attracted significant 
criticism from the international community; however, the Chinese government declared that “the international 
society should fully respect Myanmar’s judicial sovereignty” (Jakarta Post, August 14, 2009). 
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[provision of] ASEAN Members States with the supply of vaccines, 
antiviral drugs and Personal Protective Equipment.” 
Environmental 
issues 
sustainable development and management in the GMS; implementation 
of the China–ASEAN Strategy on Environmental Protection 
Cooperation 2009–2015; development of the ASEAN–China 
Environmental Cooperation Centre; establishment of the ASEAN–
China Environmental Ministerial Meeting mechanism 
Disaster 
management 
exploration of creating the ASEAN–China Senior Officials’ 
Consultations mechanism on Disaster Management and the ASEAN–
China Cooperation Agreement on Disaster Reduction and Relief 
Sources: the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for 
Peace and Prosperity (2011-2015) 
 
The Chinese government ambitious can also be found in the Greater Mekong Sub-
region (GMS), which has been the target in the ASCC’s blueprint to narrow the development 
gap among participants and reduce poverty through the development of infrastructure, the 
enhancement of trade, and increases in foreign investment (ASEAN, 2009b: 24). The Chinese 
government built several dams in the Upper Mekong (mainly in Yunnan province). Since 
September 2006, the Chinese government has supplied electricity to Vietnam  and invested in 
an electricity-generation facilities in Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (Dosch, 2007: 230-1), the 
Myitsone Dam in Myanmar being one example. In November 2002, the Chinese government 
signed the Agreement on the Exchange of Hydrological Data, according to which, the 
Chinese government should “provide daily readings on water levels in the upper Lancang 
[Mekong is called Lancang in China] so that downstream countries would have advance 
warnings for floods” (Liebman, 2005: 292). According to Jörn Dosch, China has achieved 
hegemony in Southeast Asia through cooperation between China and ASEAN members 
(Dosch, 2007). 
However, several issues surrounding human insecurities should be noted. The Chinese 
government has been engaging and investing in the GMS but more and more researchers 
have warned that extensive development in the Mekong River Basin would create an 
ecological disaster: decreased waterways, deforestation, floods, and species extinction 
ranging from animals and fish to plants (Cronin, 2009: 151-4, Chheang, 2010: 365-6, Dosch 
and Hensengerth, 2005: 278-9). Although the Chinese government has pledged to cooperate 
with the Mekong-region countries regarding a sustainable environment in the Mekong River 
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Basin (ASEAN, October 2010), the Chinese government’s establishment of dams in Yunnan 
Province has produced several human insecurities: the flow of the Mekong in the downstream 
riparian states has been unpredictable; water quality and availability have been downgraded 
and reduced, already endangering several species and undercutting lower basin people who 
have subsisted on fisheries and water for irrigation (Liebman, 2005: 293-4). Regarding these 
human insecurities, a Cambodian official voiced helplessness: “What can we do? They 
[China] are upstream. They [China] are a richer country operating in their own sovereign 
territory. How can we stop them?” (cited from Liebman, 2005: 290). However, the Chinese 
government refused to join the Mekong River Commission (MRC) (Menniken, 2007: 109). 
Alex Liebman described the Chinese government’s attitude toward efforts manipulate the 
Mekong River system:  
 
China is not behaving as a benevolent hegemon; rather, China is using its power to 
achieve its ends with little consideration for those downstream. (Liebman, 2005: 293) 
 
In addition, creation of the Myistsone Dam in Myanmar has displaced 12,000 people and 
damaged the local environment (International Rivers, September 28, 2011). In 2011, the 
Myanmar government halted construction on the dam (Turnell, 2012: 157).  
.  
5.2.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
In comparison with the APSC’s freedom-from-want element, the Chinese government has not 
deeply engaged in the APSC’s freedom-from-fear element. At the Peacekeeping Experts’ 
Meeting of the ARF, PLA Admiral Sun Jianguo emphasised the Chinese government’s 
international-peacekeeping achievements, noting that, as of “2013, China has taken part in 23 
UN peacekeeping operations, and deployed more than 24,000 troops. China is willing to 
contribute more to world peace and security” (Xinhua, October 17, 2013). 
In fact, the Chinese government’s position on peacekeeping tasks has reflected a rather 
strict adherence to the principle of non-interference. With the exception of examples 
mentioned in the previous section (Cambodia and East Timor), international peacekeeping 
tasks demonstrate the China government’s nearly unswerving adherence to the principle of 
non-interference, whether in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, or Haiti (Fravel, 1996: 
1110-5). Thus, there should be little surprise that the Chinese government has exhibited 
limited support for the APSC’s freedom-from-fear element. While ASEAN has been creating 
the APSC, Indonesia and the Philippines and their respective external mediators have 
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successfully resolved civil wars in Aceh and Mindanao. In neither of these efforts to broker 
peace did the Chinese government provide assistance or mediate; nor, yet again, did the 
Chinese government substantively contribute to the creation of peacekeeping training centres 
in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. 
 
5.2.3 Summary 
Since the 1950s, the Chinese government has been involved in Southeast Asian human-
security issues. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the Chinese government helped ethnic 
Chinese residing in Southeast Asia in order to fulfil its obligation. And between the 1950s to 
the late 1960s, in order to expand its communist influence, the Chinese government provided 
assistance to communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia contributing to the protraction of civil 
wars between regional communist groups and national governments in Southeast Asia. After 
the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising, the Chinese government’s desire to be a regional leader 
was the central motivation underlying the effort on the part of the government to reach out to 
other nations in such diverse ways as extending economic assistance. However, the Chinese 
government’s NIO, based on adherence to the principle of non-interference, did little to 
improve the human-rights situation in Southeast Asia. Regarding specifically the creation of 
the APSC, the Chinese government has pursued to general goals: (1) to maintain and expand 
its leadership position in Southeast Asia and (2) to adhere to the principle of non-interference. 
Consequently, the Chinese government has showered assistance and support on freedom-
from-want efforts in the region, but has been noticeably less engaged in freedom-from-fear 
efforts there.  
 
5.3 Japan 
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the Japanese government has been involved in 
Southeast Asian human-security issues and the Japanese government’s motivations have been 
various over the decades. Regarding the creation of the APSC, the Japanese government has 
provided support and assistance in terms of both freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear 
issues. In this section, I will review why and how the Japanese government has been involved 
in Southeast Asian human-security issues. I will then explore what the Japanese government’s 
motivation and strategic response have been in regards to the creation of the APSC. 
 
5.3.1 Historical Review: From the 1950s to 2002 
The historical review of the Japanese government’s involvement in Southeast Asian human-
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security issues is divided into two parts here. The time-frame for the first part extends from 
the 1950s to 1989, and the time-frame for the second part extends from 1990 to 2002. 
 
5.3.1.1 From the 1950s to 1989 
During this period, the motivation of the Japanese government’s involvement in Southeast 
Asian freedom-from-want issues was to counter its infamous national reputation. Owing to 
the Japanese government’s colonial policy—the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere—
and its militarism in Southeast Asia during World War II, Southeast Asian countries feared a 
re-emergence of Japan’s imperial ambitions and Southeast Asian people viewed Japan with 
antipathy (Hellmann, 1979: 1192). In order to offset its deeply wounded international 
reputation, the postwar Japanese government provided development assistance to Southeast 
Asian countries. However, Southeast Asian countries suspected that the assistance was a 
manoeuvre by the Japanese government to gain “control over an emerging Asian regional 
economy” and to integrate “the Asian economies under Japanese leadership” (Rix, 2001: 78). 
In addition, general populations in Indonesia and Thailand remained, for the most part, 
fiercely anti-Japanese. These people protested Japanese companies’ culture of bribes and tax 
evasion in particular (Darling, 1974a: 11-2). 
The legacy of Japanese colonialism and militarism managed to recede a bit farther into 
the past after 1977, when Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo issued the Fukuda Doctrine. 
According to this doctrine, “Japan will not become a military power; Japan will promote 
‘heart-to-heart’ understanding with ASEAN nations in all fields; Japan will cooperate with 
ASEAN as an ‘equal partner’ while working for stable relations with the Indochinese nations; 
Japan will double aid in five years, while increasing imports from and investment in 
Southeast Asian nations” (cited from Hellmann, 1979: 1195-6). After the Fukuda Doctrine, 
the Japanese government strengthened its financial and technical assistance to Southeast Asia. 
The Japanese government’s genuine engagement in freedom-from-want issues in Southeast 
Asia offset the nation’s wartime legacy. 
The chief motivation for the Japanese government’s involvement in Southeast Asian 
freedom-from-fear issues—centred as they were on the Cambodian conflict—was related to 
economic and security concerns. Regarding economic concerns, the Japanese government 
was worried that the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia would lead to 
regional political instability capable of degrading the Japanese government’s economic 
interests there (Singh, 2010: 395). Regarding security concerns, the Japanese government 
treated the Soviet Union, which had close links with Vietnam, as a potential threat (Kesavan, 
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1985: 1127). Thus, the Japanese government expressed an anti-war position and a willingness 
to pursue a peaceful resolution to the Cambodian conflict. 
 
5.3.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
Between the 1950s and 1989, the Japanese government provided ODA, which included 
financial and technical assistance to Southeast Asian countries. The purpose of the ODA was 
to enhance people’s living standards and reduce poverty. Between the 1950s and the 1960s, 
the Japanese government made available US$1.2 billion for this very purpose (Hellmann, 
1979: 1192). The assistance covered such investments as technology improvements, grant aid, 
and loans. Even the communist regime in Vietnam was a recipient of the Japanese 
government’s assistance. From 1975 to 1978, the Japanese government provided ¥27.5 billion 
to Vietnam (Soeya, 1993: 99). Hellmann and Akira Onishi argued respectively that the 
overriding motivation for the Japanese government’s provision of economic and social 
assistance to Southeast Asian countries was a desire to erase Japan’s historical legacy of 
colonialism and militarism (Hellmann, 1979: 1192, Onishi, 1971: 413-9). 
 However, the Japanese government’s development assistance did not remove the stain 
of Japan’s imperial legacy. Some Southeast Asian countries’ leaders suspected that the 
Japanese government’s ODA was simply an attractive guise by which the country might 
extract economic interests from the region in a kind of free-market, postwar imperialism (Rix, 
2001: 78). In addition, the Japanese sentiments emerged in Indonesia and Thailand (Haddad, 
1980: 11-12). Not a few people in Southeast Asia viewed Japan as a “capitalistic exploiter 
solely interested in markets and profits” (Haddad, 1980: 12). In response to its countries 
persistently negative reputation, the Japanese government—rather than change its ODA 
policy—further strengthened it. Between 1980 and 1990, ASEAN members, Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand entirely received US$3.7 
billion (Rix, 2001: 71). Bhubhindar Singh argued that the Japanese government’s efforts 
eased ASEAN members’ mistrust of Japan and strengthened members’ acceptance of a 
notable role for the Japanese government in the process of Southeast Asian economic 
integration (Singh, 2002: 285-6).  
 
5.3.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
During this period, the Japanese government was also involved in Southeast Asian freedom-
from-fear issues—surrounding the Cambodian conflicts, for the most part. Singh argued that 
the motivations underlying the Japanese government’s involvement in the conflicts had to do 
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with economics and security. Regarding the former, the Japanese government tried to protect 
its economic interests in Southeast Asia. Regarding the latter, the Japanese government 
regarded the Soviet Unions’ disturbing establishment of a military base in Vietnam as a 
‘potential’ threat to Japan (Kesavan, 1985: 1127) which would “challenge the regional 
balance of power unfavourably to Japan’s interests” (Singh, 2010: 395). Accordingly, the 
Japanese government expressed an anti-war position and a willingness to mediate the 
Cambodian conflict (Kesavan, 1985: 1127). 
During the period of the Cambodian civil wars, which extended from the 1970s to the 
early 1990s, the Japanese government adopted an anti-war position. When the Vietnamese 
army launched an invasion into Kampuchea in 1978, Japanese Ambassador to the UN Abe 
Isao stated that the Japanese government’s position was anti-war (Kesavan, 1985: 1128). In 
addition, the Japanese government expressed an interest in helping broker and keep peace in 
Cambodia. At the 1984’s AMM, the Japanese representative first expressed Japan’s desire to 
play a peacemaking role in Cambodia and, specifically, to help cover the expenses of 
Cambodian peacekeeping operations and to provide economic and technical assistance in 
reconstructing the devastated Cambodia (Kesavan, 1985: 1131).  
 
5.3.1.2 From 1990 to 2002 
Between 1990 and 2002, an important motivation underlying the Japanese government’s 
involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues was to maintain Japan’s national 
reputation by means of human-security diplomacy. Between the 1950s and 1989, the 
Japanese government had watered down its wartime legacy by providing development 
assistance to Southeast Asian countries and by expressing a desire to participate in 
peacemaking efforts in Cambodia. Resting on the human-security concept, the Japanese 
government’s human-security policies during the Cold War appear to have been successful, 
and thus, to maintain its national reputation after 1989, the Japanese government has 
continued to base its involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues on the human-
security concept. 
It should be noted that since the start of the post-Cold War period, the Japanese 
government has strengthened its human-security diplomacy. The Japanese government 
adopted the ODA Charter to bolster freedom from want (please see section 2.1.3). And as for 
freedom from fear, in September 1991, the Japanese government passed the Law Concerning 
Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations. Article 9 of 
Japan’s 1947 constitution states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
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sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international 
disputes” (日本国憲法 , 2011: 24), and this principle frequently limited the Japanese 
government’s engagement in freedom-from-fear issues. However, according to this new law, 
Japan’s Self-Defence Force (SDF) could participate in peacekeeping operations under the 
auspices of the UN. In 2000, the Japanese government formally declared that human security 
would be one of the pillars of Japanese diplomacy (Kikkawa, 2007: 257). 
 
5.3.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
In order to maintain its national reputation, the Japanese government continued to provide 
development assistance to Southeast Asian countries from 1990 to 2002. For example, in 
Laos, Japan was the biggest development-assistance donor (Bourdet, 1997: 76), providing 
financial assistance for road and bridges construction (Stuart-Fox, 1998: 77). Myanmar also 
received development assistance from the Japanese government: in 1995, the Japanese 
government constructed a nursing school in Myanmar; and in 2001, the Japanese government 
allocated US$28.6 million for the reconstruction of turbines in a hydropower dam capable of 
meeting 20% of Myanmar’s entire electricity needs (Dalpino, 2007: 218, 224).58 In addition, 
after the 1997 financial meltdown, the Japanese government was the larger donor to help 
Southeast Asian affected countries, which was US$30 billion package (Lam, 2006: 150). 
Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo’s statement in 1998 suggests that the human-security concept 
was central to Japanese government’s strategic provision of assistance to Southeast Asian 
countries. He stated that Japan should prioritise human security, which, when considered 
within a theoretical framework,  
 
is a concept that takes a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and 
dignity and stresses the need to respond to such threats. The economic crisis 
confronting the Asian countries today has been a direct blow to their socially 
vulnerable—the poor, women, and children, and the elderly— threatening their survival 
and dignity. We need urgently to implement measures for the socially vulnerable who 
are affected by the Asian economic crisis. (cited from Lam, 2013: 179) 
 
Drawing on this view of the human-security concept, the Japanese government has 
                                                 
58However, when the Myanmar government put Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest again in 2005, the 
Japanese government suspended its development assistance to the country (Dalpino, 2007: 224). 
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increased its national reputation by implementing human-security diplomacy. According to 
Soeya, this diplomacy has shaped Japan into the form of a “middle power” (Soeya, 2005). 
ASEAN members have been willing to cooperate with the Japanese government in political 
and security issues, as was evident when Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo 
Siazon argued that cooperation between ASEAN and Japan “must progress beyond economic 
issues to include matters of peace and security” (Singh, 2010: 399). 
 
5.3.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
The Japanese government’s engagement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues in this 
period was more active than in the period extending from the 1950s to the late 1980s, chiefly 
because under the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping 
Operations and Other Operations, the Japanese government could send troops to join 
international peacekeeping tasks. Between 1990 and 2002, the Japanese government engaged 
in peacemaking in Cambodia and East Timor. 
In the case of Cambodia, the Japanese government made considerable contributions. 
The Japanese government sent 1,200 troops of the SDF to Cambodia, where they engaged in 
peacekeeping tasks (Um, 1994: 73), constituting the first time that the SDF conducted 
peacekeeping operations in a foreign country. In addition, the Japanese government 
conducted peacebuilding in Cambodia, clearing land mines, collecting small arms and light 
weapons from insurgents, supporting efforts to bring to trial the brutal Khmer Rouge leaders, 
and reconstructing schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, ports, electrical systems, and water-
treatment facilities (Lam, 2012: 117, Dobson, 2003: 122). The Japanese government’s 
contribution to Cambodian peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding tasks has improved 
Japan’s national reputation in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian countries welcomed the 
Japanese government’s efforts there, and Mahathir “hoped that the SDF would, in the future, 
be able to participate fully in peacekeeping operations without restrictions imposed by the 
Japanese Diet” (Singh, 2002: 292-3). 
East Timor was the Japanese government’s other major peacemaking operation. The 
Japanese government regarded its participation in the East Timor peacekeeping operation as 
an opportunity to improve Japan’s national contributions to the world (Gorjão, 2002: 770). 
The situation in East Timor had been especially perilous. In the wake of the murder of 
hundreds of East Timorese by pro-Jakarta militias in 1999, the Japanese government 
deployed 2,300 SDF personnel to East Timor, undertaking what constituted Japan’s largest-
scale participation in peacekeeping operations (Kikkawa, 2007: 258).  
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5.3.2 Exploration of the Japanese Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
5.3.2.1 The Motivations underlying the Japanese Government’s Strategies 
As discussed in the above historical review, we know that the Japanese government’s 
involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues from the 1950s to 2002 rested mainly 
on the country’s diplomatic policies replete with the human-security concept. The Japanese 
government’s strategies in response to the creation of the APSC, whose target is a people-
oriented ASEAN, have been supportive.  
The motivation underlying the Japanese government’s strategies has been to increase 
the country’s influence in Southeast Asia. In the Cold War period, the Japanese government 
played a positive role in human-security issues in Southeast Asia, particularly in contrast to 
the Chinese government, which was an obstacle to peacefully resolving the Cambodian 
conflict (please see 5.2.1.2.2). However, in the post-Cold War period, the Chinese 
government showered significant assistance on Southeast Asian countries, despite paying 
little attention to Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues. The Chinese government’s 
growing leadership role in Southeast Asian posed a challenge to the Japanese government’s 
carefully cultivated positive position in this area (Singh, 2002: 288). For example, although, 
during the outbreak of the economic Asian crisis in 1997, the Japanese government provided 
the greatest financial assistance to Southeast Asian countries, and yet they still regarded 
China as a ‘more responsible actor’ than Japan (Singh, 2002: 288).  
Nevertheless, the Japanese government remains focused on its objective: in order to 
consolidate its influence in this area, the Japanese government continues to strengthen its 
engagement in Southeast Asian human-security issues (Lam, 2006: 142). For example, during 
the outbreak of SARS, the Japanese government aided in the quarantine of the disease 
through medical assistance and financial support; as regards the tsunami disaster close on the 
heels of SARS, the Japanese government made financial donations of about US$500 million 
in order to help the countless surviving victims and specifically deployed about a thousand 
troops to Aceh, the area that bore the brunt of the tsunami (Lam, 2006: 150-4). Interestingly, 
in the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, the Chinese government—despite its 
strong economic strength—provided relief efforts only US$83 million (Hook et al., 2005: 
226), a rather paltry sum compared to the Japanese government’s US$500 million. In 2002, 
the Japanese government adopted a more active policy to increase its influence in Southeast 
Asia. The Japanese government proposed the creation of the EAC. In December 2003, 
ASEAN agreed to the Japanese-sponsored EAC and signed the Tokyo Declaration with the 
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Japanese government. The function of the EAC has been to balance China’s rising profile in 
Southeast Asia, in part by strengthening Japan’s influence there (Ji, 2006: 20-1). You Ji 
argued that “closer cooperation with ASEAN is one convenient way to improve Tokyo’s 
status in the region [Southeast Asia]” (Ji, 2006: 20). 
ASEAN’s decision to create the APSC gave the Japanese government an additional 
opportunity to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN. The Japanese government has, thus, 
provided substantive support for the creation of the APSC. In particular, the Japanese 
government established the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) in 2006 and in the same 
year, approved the provision of US$64 million to the JAIF, which would use the funds in 
support of several human-security issues (MOFA, March 27, 2006). In 2007, when delivering 
a speech in Indonesia, current Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that the Economic 
Partnership Agreement, cooperative efforts in the Mekong Region, and assistance in peace-
building missions have been the Japanese government’s three pillars for supporting the 
creation of the AC (MOFA, August 20, 2007). The second and the third items have been 
essential factors in efforts to realise the APSC. Abe’s statement indicates that the Japanese 
government would focus on the APSC-related issues to which the Chinese government had 
been paying little attention—issues such as those concerning freedom from fear and human 
insecurities arising from Chinese assistance (e.g., cooperation in the Mekong Basin) (please 
see section 5.2.2.2.1). 
 
5.3.2.2 The Japanese Government’s Strategy 
5.3.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
In order to increase its influence in Southeast Asia, the Japanese government has provided 
assistance to the APSC’s freedom-from-want issues. Regarding natural-disaster management, 
the Japanese government has been an important supporter of the AHA Centre, providing it 
with new communications equipment. The Japanese government supported a project for the 
“Establishment of a Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN” capable of 
strengthening the AHA Centre’s abilities (MOFA, March 2013: 41). In addition, the 
government sent natural-disasters experts to the AHA Centre to educate its staff on how to 
manage and operate the organisation and held workshops where AHA staff and ASEAN 
members could share with one another their knowledge of disaster-related risk reduction 
(MOFA, March 2013: 42). In 2013, in order to strengthen ASEAN members’ ability to 
manage natural disasters, the Japanese government pledged ¥30 billion for the creation of 
infrastructure in ASEAN countries and for the training of 1,000 natural-disaster experts from 
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ASEAN countries (Japan Times, December 12, 2013). 
The Japanese government was also actively involved in Mekong River projects. At the 
first Mekong–Japan Summit, the Japanese government launched cooperation in several areas. 
For example, the Japanese government initiated several projects pertaining to environmental 
and climate change issues, such as the Project for Establishment of Disastrous Weather 
Monitoring System in Laos, the Memorandum on Flood Control in Vietnam, and the Project 
on Capacity Development in Disaster Management in Thailand.59 In addition, the Japanese 
government undertook development programmes to improve peoples’ living standards, 
helping clear unexploded ordinance in Laos and promoting expectant mothers’ and children’s 
health in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.60 
In the Mekong River area, the Japanese government has been involved in various 
projects (e.g., flood-control management) stemming from problems created by the Chinese 
government’s investment in dam building (please see section 5.2.2.2.1). During an August 
2007 speech delivered by Prime Minister Abe in Indonesia, he pledged that the Japanese 
government would help solve some of these problems experienced by Mekong riparian 
countries (MOFA, August 20, 2007). Abe did not directly point out that the problems in 
question had resulted from the Chinese government’s investments there, but the above 
exploration of Japanese government’s recent efforts in the Mekong River area strongly 
suggests that these efforts are functioning to increase Japan’s influence, perhaps in 
competition with China. And it is likely that the efforts will continue. At the fifth Mekong–
Japan Summit, the Japanese government reiterated that its engagement in the Mekong River 
area remained one of the pillars supporting the creation of the AC by 2015 (MOFA, 
December 14, 2013). Takashi Shiraishi, expert in the National Graduate Institute for Policy 
Studies in Tokyo, nicely described the Japanese governments’ strategies. “Abe is trying to 
deepen Japans’ relationship with ASEAN countries to counter Chinas’ growing economic and 
military presence in the region” (Japan Times, December 14, 2013). 
 
5.3.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
To increase its influence in Southeast Asia, the Japanese government has addressed the 
APSC’s freedom-from-fear element, as well as its freedom-from-want element. The Japanese 
government has engaged in peace-building in Aceh and Mindanao. Before ASEAN decided 
                                                 
59
 Please see http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/mekong/summit02/index.htm 
60
 Please see http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/mekong/summit02/index.htm 
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to create the APSC in 2003, the Japanese government had engaged in the civil war in Aceh. 
In December 2002, the Japanese government hosted the “Preparatory Conference on Peace 
and Reconstruction in Aceh.” At this conference, the Japanese government pledged to provide 
financial support of US$6.2 million to people affected by the war and to provide substantive 
assistance, such as training programs, to local officials; Japan, moreover, would “consider 
supporting programs for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Aceh” (Lam, 2009: 
63). After the Indonesian government ratified the Helsinki Accords with the GAM in August 
2005, the EU and ASEAN (Malaysia and Brunei) sent troops to Aceh, where they conducted 
peace-monitoring, but the Japanese government did not participate in this peace-monitoring 
team (Lam, 2013: 188), as the action was not under the auspices of the UN (Lam, 2009: 71). 
Nevertheless, the Japanese government re-constructed roads and sanitary and water systems 
and restored sewage-processing infrastructure in Aceh (Lam, 2009: 70), and these 
undertakings amount to peacebuilding tasks. 
Regarding the case of Mindanao, the Japanese government stated that its policy of 
ending the area’s civil war was guided by the human-security concept (Lam, 2008: 53). 
Before ASEAN decided to create the APSC, the Japanese government had engaged in 
humanitarian-development programme. When Philippine President Arroyo declared that she 
would stop Estrada’s all-out-war policy in Mindanao, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro 
expressed his support for the change in policy (Lam, 2009: 51). The Japanese government 
hosted several meetings with the MILF leader Ebrahim Murad and provided humanitarian 
assistance to Mindanao (Lam, 2008: 50, 52). After ASEAN decided to create the APSC, the 
Japanese government joined the IMT in 2006 to monitor peace process in Mindanao.  
Like the Japanese government’s support of the APSC’s freedom-from-want element, the 
Japanese government’s peace-building efforts in Aceh and Mindanao also stemmed from a 
desire to increase its influence Japan’s influence in Southeast Asia. Lam Peng Er argued that 
peace-building has become the “third path” along which the Japanese government has 
pursued international esteem (Lam, 2008: 46), and he further argued  that the peacebuilding 
task, as a form of international intervention, has been a relied-upon method by which Japan 
has sought to counterbalance China’s rising regional profile in this region (Lam, 2008: 46-7). 
Alongside its peacebuilding in Aceh and Mindanao has been the Japanese government’s 
support of ASEAN members’ peacekeeping capacity. In 2010, the government provided 
US$1 million, through the UNDP–Japan Partnership Fund, to the Malaysian Peacekeeping 
Training Centre (MPTC) (MOFA, October 27, 2011). Given the Japanese government’s 
financial assistance, the MPTC was able to hold several seminars, such as the Gender and 
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Peacekeeping Seminar in November 2011. By engaging in the APSC’s freedom-from-fear 
element, the Japanese government has established its position that peace-building missions 
constitute one of the pillars upon which Japan shall facilitate ASEAN’s creation of the APSC. 
 
5.3.3 Summary 
Since the start of the Cold War, the Japanese government has been involved in Southeast 
Asian human-security issues. In order to enhance its historically sullied national reputation 
and consolidate its influence in Southeast Asia, the Japanese government has provided 
development assistance to regional countries. Between 1990 and 2002, the Japanese 
government continued to address Southeast Asian human-security issues in the form of 
human-security diplomacy. To increase its influence in Southeast Asia, the Japanese 
government’s has strategically supported the creation of the APSC. According to the IPSOS 
Hong Kong-conducted opinion poll regarding Southeast Asian people’s perspectives on a set 
of given countries (America, Australia, China, France, Germany, India, New Zealand, Russia, 
South Korea, and the UK), Japan was the most reliable country (33%), the most important 
partner (60%), and the most important future partner (60%) (MOFA, March 2014: 17, 33, 35). 
In addition, 89% of respondents agreed that the Japanese government’s “Proactive 
Contribution to Peace” in the Asian region was valuable (MOFA, March 2014: 42). It is 
reasonable to say that the Japanese government has enhanced its reputation and influence in 
Southeast Asia. 
 
5.4 The United States 
Since the onset of the Cold War period, the U.S. government has been involved in Southeast 
Asian human-security issues. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. government’s involvement 
created human insecurities in the region; and throughout the post-Cold War period, the U.S. 
government’s involvement there has led to resentment on the part of ordinary Southeast 
Asians and their governments. Interestingly, however, the U.S. government’s strategic 
responses to the creation of the APSC, so far, have not created any such negative responses. 
In this section, I will review how the U.S. government has been involved in Southeast Asian 
human-security issues and what the U.S. government’s motivations have been during the 
Cold War and post-Cold War periods. I will, furthermore, explore in detail the U.S. 
government’s strategic responses to the creation of the APSC and the motivations underlying 
the strategies.   
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5.4.1 Historical Review: From the 1950 to 2002 
This study’s historical review of the U.S. government’s involvement in Southeast Asian 
human-security issues is divided into two parts: the first part covers the period extending 
from the 1950s to 1989; and the second part, the period from 1990 to 2002. 
 
5.4.1.1 From the 1950s to 1989 
During the Cold War period, the motivations underlying the U.S. government’s involvement 
in Southeast Asian human-security issues centred on the prevention of communism’s 
expansion in this region. Southeast Asia has had abundant natural resources, like tin and 
rubber, and busy waterways, like the Lombok Strait and the Malacca Strait, which have been 
important for the U.S. government and its non-communist allies (Darling, 1974b: 610-1). 
According to Frank Darling, U.S. foreign-policy thinking was that if Southeast Asia were to 
come under control partial or total communist control, the U.S. government and its ally’s 
interests in this area would face serious challenges in accessing these important natural 
resources (Darling, 1974b: 610-1). Thus, the U.S. government was actively involved in 
Southeast Asian human-security issues: in the freedom-from-want area, to strengthen 
Southeast Asians’ own resistance to communist ideology, the U.S. government provided 
economic assistance for enhancement of living standards; in freedom-from-fear area, the U.S. 
government used military power to prevent South Vietnam from falling to North Vietnam. 
However, the U.S.’ government’s Cold War-era involvement in Southeast Asian human-
security issues created human insecurities throughout the region. 
 
5.4.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
In the freedom-from-want area, the U.S. government provided economic assistance to non-
democratic Southeast Asian countries. Before the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, the 
chief intention underlying the U.S. government’s assistance was to increase Southeast Asian 
people’s ability to resist communist ideology through an enhancement of these people’s living 
standards. Beginning in 1950, the U.S. government showered economic assistance on such 
countries in mainland Southeast Asia as Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand 
(Darling, 1974b: 618). 
However, the greater part of American economic assistance went to the recipient 
governments’ militaries, although the U.S. attempted to separate military assistance from 
economic assistance (Darling, 1974b: 616-8). Whether the U.S. government’s aid enhanced 
people’s living standards or not remains unclear. However, the U.S. government’s aid 
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indirectly produced human insecurities. In South Vietnam, the Ngô Đình Diệm family 
embezzled American aid (Kolko, 1969: 114), thus preventing it from reaching the poor and 
needy people for whom it had been nominally designated. In the Philippines, President 
Marcos used American aid to strengthen his military, which he then used to repress 
secessionists in Mindanao (Grossholtz, 1974: 106).  
After the U.S. military’s withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, the ideological element in 
the U.S. government’s assistance took on a far softer tone, and in its place emerged the 
increasingly prominent element of humanitarian-support. Two examples of this shift are 
noteworthy. Between 1977 and 1979, when Laos suffered from a nationwide famine, the U.S. 
government offered the country food assistance (John, 2006: 176). And the U.S. government 
offered financial assistance to improve the rural public-health situation in Myanmar 
(Silverstein, 1981: 214). 
 
5.4.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
Prevention of communist expansion in Southeast Asia also drove the U.S. government to get 
involved in the freedom-from-fear issue in this region, most notably giving rise to the 
Vietnam War. The war led to 3.5 million wounded and killed on both the Vietnamese and the 
U.S. sides, and produced a mass exodus of refugees fleeing over land to Thailand and China 
or over seas to Malaysia, Indonesia and Hong Kong (Ashworth, 1979). 
Perhaps, the most serious legacy of American military intervention in Vietnam was the 
global superpower’s use of anti-personnel chemical weapons. Napalm bombs inflicted great 
suffering indiscriminately, severely burning people’s skin by lighting it on fire, and these fires 
were difficult to put out because the ingredients of polystyrene and benzene would form a 
sticky blazing substance adhering with gross efficiency to human skin. The order that the U.S. 
government gave to American pilots was to “hit every hamlet within the area” (Neilands, 
1970: 213). Between 1963 and 1966,  American troops dropped over 76,000 tons of napalm 
bombs on the region (Neilands, 1970: 213).  
 
5.4.1.2 From 1990 to 2002 
From 1990 to 2002, ideological considerations were not at the heart of the U.S. government’s 
motivations for getting involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. The U.S. 
government’s motivations changed to promote human rights. During the Clinton period, the 
U.S. government emphasised the diplomatic policy of “engagement and enlargement” whose 
importance was economic liberalisation, promotion of democratisation, and promotion of 
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human rights. In this context, the U.S. government addressed several instances of human-
rights violations in Southeast Asia, criticising and imposing sanctions on Southeast Asian 
countries known to have egregious human-rights records. However, these involvements have 
led to disputes between the U.S. government and Southeast Asian national governments 
emphasising the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of independent countries. 
 
5.4.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
After the demise of the Cold War, the U.S. government involved itself in human-rights 
violations occurring in Southeast Asia. As for the Myanmar government’s abysmal human-
rights record, the U.S. government fiercely criticised the leadership there and imposed 
economic and political sanctions on it—politically, the U.S. government banned the granting 
of U.S. entry visas to Myanmar’s military rulers and, economically, the U.S. government 
banned Myanmar exports United States (Steinberg, 2010: 115). In addition, in 1998, the U.S. 
Vice President Al Gore decried Mahathir’s arrest of Anwar Ibrahim on accusations of sodomy 
and corruption, which violated Anwar’s human rights. 
The U.S. government’s imposition of sanctions and criticism on Southeast Asian states 
accused of human-rights abuses did not prompt the states to improve their human-rights 
record. For example, in 1997, ASEAN enlarged itself by including Myanmar as a member-
state, regardless of U.S. criticism of Myanmar’s woeful human-rights record. In general, the 
U.S. criticism of allegedly abusive Southeast Asian states led to diplomatic disputes, as 
occurred when, in 1999, Vice President Al Gores’ criticism of Malaysia soured the 
relationship between the two countries (Simon, 2004a: 71). Why did the U.S. government’s 
involvement in Southeast Asian human-rights issues fail to yield positive results? The answer 
is that most Southeast Asian governments adhered to the principle of non-interference. They 
regarded the U.S. government’s human-rights concerns as undue interference in regional and 
domestic affairs (Brown, 1995: 402). In this context, the governments in Southeast Asia often 
opposed the U.S. government’s hard-line approach to handling regional human-rights issues, 
and thus, diplomatic bitterness was, in hindsight, a predictable outcome. 
 
5.4.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
It promoting human rights, the U.S. government essentially left itself no choice but to get 
involved in Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues. The U.S. government adopted a hard-
line approach to handling the freedom-from-fear issues in the region. For example, 
Indonesian troops’ slaughter of East Timorese in 1991 (known as the Dili Massacre) 
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promoted the U.S. government to stop military cooperation with and economic assistance to 
Indonesia. The violence continued however. Pro-Jakarta militias committed depredations 
against the population in East Timor in the wake of a UN-sponsored referendum on 
independence in August 1999. The U.S. government again responded firmly, criticising the 
Indonesian government’s inability or unwillingness to keep the peace in East Timor (Simon, 
1999: 35).  
As with its response to freedom-from-want issues, the U.S. government’s involvement 
in freedom-from-fear issues yielded few if any positive results. For example, after the 1991 
Dili Massacre, the Indonesian troops continued to commit human-rights violations in East 
Timor. In addition, because the Indonesian government remained an adherent to the principle 
of non-interference, it accepted only ASEAN members’ input into the implementation of 
peacekeeping operations in East Timor61 (see Haacke, 2003: 65-71). The U.S. government 
provided only some military equipment to INTERFET (Simon, 1999: 35).62 
 
5.4.2 Exploration of the U.S. Government’s Strategies for the APSC 
5.4.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the U.S. Government’s Strategies 
According to the historical review above covering the period from the 1950s to 2002, we 
know that the U.S. government’s involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues was 
based on national interests—prevention of communism’s expansion and promotion of human 
rights. What strategies did the U.S. government adopt in response to the creation of the APSC 
and what has motivations have underlain these strategies?  
The answer to this two-fold question is rather straight-forward: the U.S. government’s 
strategies have centred on supporting the creation of the APSC, and the motivations 
underlying these strategies have centred essentially on a desire to promote American 
influence in Southeast Asia. After the American military withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, 
the U.S. government’s influence in Southeast Asia gradually declined. Most ASEAN 
members have disliked the U.S. government’s tendency to express concerns about Southeast 
Asian human-rights issues. According to Memorandum of Confidence-Building Measures in 
Southeast Asia, which was issued by the ASEAN-Institute of Strategic and International 
Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) in 1993, the ASEAN-ISIS questioned the capacity of the U.S. 
                                                 
61The only non-Southeast Asian country to join the East Timorese peacekeeping operations was Australia 
(please see section 5.1.1.2.2). 
62
 The U.S. government was observably unwilling to join the East Timorese peacekeeping operation, because 
“U.S. forces were already deeply committed in Bosnia and Kosovo” (Simon, 1999: 35). 
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government to maintain its influence in Southeast Asia due to human-rights disputes between 
the U.S. and ASEAN members (see also Stuart and Tow, 1995: 60).  
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the U.S. government adopted a global 
anti-terrorism campaign, which however failed to enhance U.S. influence in Southeast Asia 
(Mauzy and Job, 2007: 630). This outcome was disappointing, insofar as the U.S. 
government regarded Southeast Asia as the “second front” in its counter-terrorism efforts 
(Dalpino, 2002: 346). After all, the Southeast Asian militant Islamic organisation Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) had connections with al-Qaeda. Regardless of its success or failure on this 
second front, the U.S. government carried on providing anti-terrorism assistance to Southeast 
Asian countries (Limaye, 2004: 83-6). For example, since 2001, the U.S. government has 
offered economic and military assistance to the government of the Philippines to combat the Abu 
Sayyaf guerrilla group in Mindanao; the U.S. government provided US$468 million to the 
Indonesian government for curtailing the presence of radical Islamic thought in school curriculum 
(Simon, 2004a: 70). However, Southeast Asian people, particularly those of Muslim faith, 
disliked the U.S. government’s involvement in terrorism issues. First, these critics felt that the 
U.S. government’s anti-terrorism campaign was “a war against Islam” (Mauzy and Job, 2007: 
638). Second, some Southeast Asians believed the U.S. government’s war on terrorism 
infringed upon their nations’ sovereignty. For example, the secretary general of the 
Indonesian Council of Ulemas Din Syansudd argued that the U.S. government’s efforts to 
expunge radical Islamic thought from the country’s education programme was “a form of 
interference” (Simon, 2004b: 70). 
 The Chinese government, meanwhile, has been profiting from Southeast Asians’ 
resentment of the U.S. government by increasing its own share of influence in Southeast Asia. 
To accomplish this feat, China has made generous offerings of assistance available to the 
region’s countries. Many scholars agree that this pattern has further marginalised the U.S. 
government’s influence in Southeast Asia (Mauzy and Job, 2007: 633-4, Sutter, 2009: 206). 
Since late in George W. Bush’s second presidential term, the U.S. government has gradually 
sought to expand its influence in Southeast Asia, which is clearly an important area to the U.S. 
government, anti-terrorism campaigns aside: economically, ASEAN has been the United 
States’ fifth largest trading partner,63 and, politically, ASEAN—after creating the APSC by 
2015—may increase its standing in the international community. So the U.S. government has 
                                                 
63
 Hence, the U.S. government continued to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, despite criticising human-rights abuses in 
Myanmar (Katsumata, 2009: 624). 
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regarded its involvement in the creation of the APSC as an opportunity to buoy U.S. 
influence in Southeast Asia. After ASEAN members adopted the ASEAN Charter at the 13th 
ASEAN Summit in November 2007, the U.S. government was the first ASEAN’s dialogue 
partner to appoint its own ambassador to the regional organisation, Deputy Assistance 
Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Scott Marciel. In February 2009, Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton visited the ASEAN Secretariat. This was the first time that a U.S. 
Secretary of State had expressly set out to meet an ASEAN Secretariat. Under the Obama 
administration, the U.S. government has shown an appreciation for Southeast Asia’s vast 
importance as a region (Wilson, 2012: 113). 
 
5.4.2.2 The U.S. Government’s Strategy 
5.4.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
In order to increase its influence in Southeast Asia, the U.S. government has provided 
countries there with assistance for tackling freedom-from-want problems, particular as 
spelled out in the APSC and the ASCC blueprints. The U.S. government has used the five-
year ASEAN Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic 
Integration (ADVANCE) as a conduit for this effort. As noted, in 2007, the U.S. government 
and ASEAN created the ADVANCE, which comprised four projects: the ASEAN–U.S. 
Technical Assistance and Training Facility, the ASEAN Single Window Project, the ASEAN 
Value Chain Project and the Lao BTA Implementation/WTO Accession Project. The aim of 
the ASEAN–U.S. Technical Assistance and Training Facility was to promote the freedom-
from-want elements as outlined in the AC by enhancing the capacity of the ASEAN 
Secretariat to address transnational crimes, disaster management, environmental degradation, 
climate change, and regional human rights (Wilson, 2012: 115-7).  
Under this project, the U.S. government contributed to disaster-management 
preparedness. The U.S. trade and Development Agency (USTDA) sponsored the Workshop 
on ASEAN Disaster Management, Mitigation, and Response Technologies in Bangkok, 
whose purpose was to enhance ASEAN’s “capabilities for emergency preparedness and 
disaster management and to promote a stronger U.S. private sector role in supporting these 
efforts,” and made available various experts whose task was to cooperate with the AHA 
Centre to develop the ASEAN Disaster Monitoring and Response System (ADMRS), which 
would “enable the AHA Centre to have better overall capability to analyse disasters and speed 
up decision making” (ASEAN, July 24, 2012b).  
The U.S. government also provided support and assistance to various causes for the 
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furtherance of human rights. In October 2010, the U.S. government funded the Human Rights 
Resource Centre for ASEAN (HRRCA), whose tasks have been to “pursue research, training, 
teaching, capacity building, and raising awareness of human rights issues and the rule of law 
throughout the ASEAN region” (U.S. Department of State, October 18, 2010). The U.S. 
government also supported the work of the ACWC and invited members of the ACWC to 
visit the United States for exchanges of important information. In April 2012, members of the 
ACWC took up the invitation and discussed with U.S., NGOs and academic groups various 
human-rights issues. 
Between the 1950s and 2002, the U.S. government’s strategies for handling the creation 
of the APSC and the U.S. government’s strategies for handling Southeast Asian human-
security issues evolved, sometimes quite dramatically. First, the U.S. government focused its 
attention on an ever widening scope of Southeast Asian human-security issues. The APSC 
and the ASCC blueprints identify, for example, newer freedom-from-want issues in which the 
U.S. government has involved itself, and among these issues are natural-disaster management, 
suppression of transnational crime, and climate-change responses. A second change over the 
decades has been the broadening array of human-security issues that have attracted the U.S. 
government’s attention. Take the example of human-rights issues. Between 1990 and 2002 
alone, the U.S. government began concertedly occupying itself with the human-rights 
situation in Southeast Asia, even though neither the criticism nor the sanctions that resulted 
substantively helped victims whose respective governments were dramatically infringing on 
human rights. Noting the less than stellar performance of U.S. policy in this regard, Ian 
Holliday argued that the U.S. government should adopt “a more nuanced carrot-and-stick 
approach” to address the Myanmar problem specifically (Holliday, 2005). Satu Limaye 
argued that difference between the human-rights perspectives held by the U.S. government 
and those held by national Southeast Asian governments are a significant barrier to improve 
relationships between the two regions (Limaye, 2007: 453-5). However, the U.S. 
government’s approach to human-rights issues shifted from one that was hard-line to one that 
was considerably softer. This change has been a promising new start for the U.S. 
government’s efforts to increase U.S. influence in Southeast Asia.  In 2007, the leader of the 
opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), Sam Rainsy praised the U.S. 
government’s decision to “lift the Congressional ban on direct U.S. funding for Cambodia” 
and said that “China does not pay any attention on human rights. We cannot leave our country 
to Chinese influence alone. The world must become more balanced” (cited from Simon, 
2007a: 68) 
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5.4.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
In order to increase its influence in Southeast Asia, the U.S. government has provided 
assistance regarding the APSC’s freedom-from-fear element. Since 2006, the U.S. 
government has spent US$14.8 million trying to strengthen the Indonesian government’s 
peacekeeping capacity through improvements in barracks and the purchase of important 
equipment (U.S. Department of State, November 18, 2011). In addition, the United States 
was the main sponsor of the Cambodian and Indonesian Peacekeeping Training Center. In 
2009 and 2010, the U.S. government sponsored peacekeeping training exercises (known as 
Garuda Shield-09 and the Angkor Sentinel) in Indonesia and Cambodia.  
The long-running separatist movements in Mindanao have been other matter attracting 
the substantive attention of the U.S. government in recent years. The U.S. government has 
not only trained the Filipino troops to combat Muslim extremists Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
but also implemented peacebuilding in Mindanao. For example, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development allocated US$2.5 million for the reconstruction of schools in 
Mindanao in June 2009 (Simon, 2008: 66). 
Some ASEAN members have recognised the importance of the U.S. government’s role 
in regional freedom-from-fear issues. In 2007, the Filipino President Arroyo commented on 
the U.S. government’s involvement in anti-terrorism and peacebuilding in Mindanao: “Our 
strategic relationship with the United States has always been a leading point for Philippines 
and regional security—and becomes even more important as we push for strong collective 
security arrangements in ASEAN and in East Asia involving the U.S., China, and Japan 
(Simon, 2007a: 64). 
 
5.4.3 Summary 
From the 1950s to 1989, the motivations underlying the U.S. government’s involvement in 
Southeast Asian human security centred on preventing the expansion of communism in the 
region. The U.S. government’s involvement created human insecurities: the Marcos regime 
used the U.S. government’s assistance to strengthen Filipino military power and used its 
strengthened military to suppress with greater efficiency the dissidents in Mindanao; the U.S. 
government’s intervention in Vietnam created heavy casualties. From 1990 to 2002, the U.S. 
government’s ideological motivations ceded place to a promotion of human rights. The U.S. 
government adopted hard-line approach in response to the Southeast Asian human-rights 
issues, which soured diplomatic relationships with Southeast Asian countries. Regarding the 
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anti-terrorism campaign, many Southeast Asians considered it an unjust campaign against 
Islam. People and governments in Southeast Asian countries resented the U.S. government’s 
involvement in these issues. The U.S. government’s influence in Southeast Asia declined and 
meanwhile, the Chinese government took advantage of the U.S. government’s declining 
influence in Southeast Asia to increase its power in this region. The U.S. government seized 
upon the APSC’s creation is a powerful opportunity to expand American influence throughout 
Southeast Asia: the U.S. government has recently provided assistance for freedom-from-want 
and freedom-from-fear objectives. 
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks to this Chapter 
5.5.1 What Are Barriers to the Creation of the APSC? 
In this chapter, we reviewed each selected external power’s involvement in Southeast Asian 
human-security issues as it evolved from the 1950s to 2002, and we explored each external 
power’s strategies in response to the APSC. As mentioned in chapter two’s state actors 
section (2.1.4.2), states have their motivations when they are involved in human-security 
issues. As we can see from Table 5.2, each power in question had its own motivations for 
getting involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. Between the 1950s and 1989, 
ideological confrontation was the main factor directing most external powers’ motivations 
toward either preventing or expanding communism. After the removal of this brand of 
ideological hostility, motivations changed. Australia and Japan have created human-security 
diplomacy and have actively promoted it, while China and the U.S. have promoted their own 
sets of modified values: in China’s case, the government has come to support the principle of 
non-interference whereas, in the U.S. case, the government presents itself as a supporter of 
human rights. 
These four external powers have been strategically involved in the creation of the 
APSC, and the strategies have been similar to one another: with the exception of the Chinese 
government, which has downplayed the APSC’s freedom-from-fear element, these external 
powers have supported the creation of the APSC (please see Table 5.3). All the powers have 
regarded the creation of the APSC as an opportunity to achieve their national interests. The 
motivations underlying their strategies have also been similar to one another: China, Japan, 
the U.S. have sought to increase their influence in Southeast Asia, while Australia has been 
protecting its people from various human insecurities.  
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Table 5.2 Motivations for select external powers’ involvement in Southeast Asian human-
security issues 
States The 1950s to 1989 1990 to 2002 
Australia • Prevent communism’s expansion 
• Promote human-security 
diplomatic policies 
China 
• Protect Southeast Asian ethnic 
Chinese 
• Expand communism’s influence 
• Support the principle of non-
interference 
• Be a regional leader 
Japan 
• Improve national reputation 
• Protect economic and security 
interests 
• Maintain national reputation by 
means of human-security 
diplomacy 
U.S.A • Prevent communism’s expansion • Promote human-rights values 
  Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
Table 5.3 Strategies and motivations of external powers in response to the creation of the 
APSC 
States Strategies Motivations 
Australia 
• Support the APSC including 
freedom-from want and freedom-
from-fear elements 
• Protect its people from various 
human insecurities 
China 
• Support the freedom-from-want 
element 
• Downplay the freedom-from-fear 
element 
• Maintain leadership in 
Southeast Asia 
• Support the principle of non-
interference 
Japan 
• Support the APSC including 
freedom-from-want and freedom-
from-fear elements 
• Increase its influence in 
Southeast Asia 
USA 
• Support the APSC including 
freedom-from-want and freedom-
from-fear elements 
• Increase its influence in 
Southeast Asia 
  Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
 
199 
 
Have external powers created a barrier to the creation of the APSC, despite their 
adoption of supportive strategies? If yes, what kinds of barriers? The answer probably has to 
do with the repercussions that human-development programmes can have—a concept 
discussed in chapter two (see section 2.1.3). For example, from the 1950s to 1989, the U.S. 
government provided assistance to the Filipino government, but President Marcos used the 
assistance to strengthen his military forces’ repression of Mindanao’s Muslim secessionists, 
which compounded incursions into freedom from fear there. Likewise, external powers’ 
human-development programmes related to the creation of the APSC have had their own 
repercussions. A notable example is the Chinese government’s participation in cooperative 
efforts involving the Mekong River—several types of human insecurity have resulted (please 
see section 5.2.2.2.1). This overall situation has become a barrier to ASEAN’s goal of 
creating the APSC, particularly regarding environmental sustainability, poverty reduction, 
and natural-disaster management. The Chinese government, for its part, has provided no 
solutions to the problems under its purview. Moreover, a tendency has emerged in Southeast 
Asia for some Southeast Asian countries, Cambodia included, to foster closer ties to China. 
Closer ties between Cambodia and China, for example, have undermined ASEAN’s unity. 
When Cambodia assumed the chair of the twenty-first ASEAN Summit in November 2012, 
the Cambodian Foreign Minister stated that “Southeast Asian leaders had decided that they 
will not internationalise the South China Sea from now on” (cited from Simon, 2013: 57). 
ASEAN leaders suspected that the Cambodian government’s declaration was made at the 
behest of the Chinese government (Simon, 2013: 57). Of future concern is whether the 
Chinese government, in order to protect its national interests, will pressure its allies among 
ASEAN’s member states to withdraw support for the proposal that ASEAN resolve human 
insecurities traceable directly to the Chinese government’s actions.  
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CHAPTER 6 STATE ACTORS III: MULTILATERAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
Chapter six will discuss regional and international organisations as comprising a type of state 
actor. The main emphasis here will be on three state actors: ASEAN, the EU, and the UN, 
which since the 1970s, have been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. The 
chapter will detail the three actors’ strategies and underlying motivations in regard to the 
creation of the APSC. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter two’s commentary on state actors 
(see section 2.1.4.2), regional and international organisations have advantages and 
disadvantages when addressing human-security issues. For this reason, chapter six will also 
explore the advantages and disadvantages that characterise the involvement of ASEAN, the 
EU, and the UN in Southeast Asian human-security issues, including in particular the creation 
of the APSC. 
 
6.1 ASEAN 
Since its formation in 1967, ASEAN as a regional organisation has been involved in several 
human-security issues in Southeast Asia, but its ability to address human insecurities has been 
limited. In order to enhance its ability, ASEAN decided to transform itself in to a rules-based 
organisation, namely through the creation of the AC. However, ASEAN’s ability in this 
regard has not improved. In this section, I will review ASEAN’s past involvement in 
Southeast Asian human-security issues and explore what factors have hampered ASEAN’s 
ability to address regional human insecurities. Then, I will analyse how ASEAN has dealt 
with the regional human-security issues that were laid down in APSC-related documents and 
what factors have impeded ASEAN’s ability to address various regional human-security 
issues. 
 
6.1.1 Historical Review: Since Inception in 1967 to 2002 
I have divided the following historical review of ASEAN into two parts. Both parts discuss 
how ASEAN addressed regional human-security issues. The first part covers the period 
extending from ASEAN’s inception in 1967 to 1989, and the second part covers the years 
from 1990 to 2002. 
 
6.1.1.1 From 1967 to 1989 
Since its formation in 1967, ASEAN has served as a platform where state members can 
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cooperate on human-security issues. However, ASEAN’s norms and identities have been 
obstacles to ASEAN’s management of human insecurities. 
As mentioned in chapter 1 (see section 1.3.1.1.4), the term ‘ASEAN norms’ refers 
roundly to the principle of non-interference. The non-interference principle stemmed from 
ASEAN members’ mutual-distrust (Katanyuu, 2006: 826-7), itself resulting from a regional 
historical legacy of entrenched feuds and long-running competition over territory (Leifer, 
1980: 11-3). Given this sometimes poisonous atmosphere, member-states were worried that 
their counterparts would financially and militarily support acts of domestic subversion, such 
as Muslim secessionist activity and communist insurgency warfare. In this context, ASEAN’s 
original members signed the TAC in 1976, which outlined ASEAN’s norms: “non-
interference in the internal affairs of one another” (ASEAN, February 24, 1976b). It cannot 
be reasonably denied that the motivation underlying ASEAN’s decision to address the 
Cambodian conflict was protection of the principle of non-interference (Acharya, 2009b: 
101-117). However, as mentioned in chapter two (see section 2.1.4.2), regional organisations’ 
norms may become a barrier to the realisation of human-security targets. A significant barrier 
realising the principle non-interference is that ASEAN members, through their adherence to 
the principle, have successfully pursued certain national interests that contravene the concept 
of human security—protection of human beings. 
ASEAN’s identities refer to the ASEAN Way (for a review of the ASEAN Way, see 
section 1.3.1.1.4). According to constructivist discourse, the ASEAN Way has helped ASEAN 
avoid inter-state tension (Acharya, 2009b: 78-85). However, in terms of the human-security 
concept, these qualities have limited ASEAN’s ability to address human insecurities, because 
under implementation of the ASEAN Way, ASEAN has lacked bureaucratic institutions 
capable of monitoring its own implementation of ASEAN’s plans. Probably of more 
importance is the absence in ASEAN of binding regulations that could deter members’ 
contravention of ASEAN decisions. Such regulations are a critical mechanism by which 
regional organisations address human-security issues (see section 2.1.4.2). 
 
6.1.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
ASEAN did not specifically discuss human-security issues until the first ASEAN Summit 
held in Bali in 1976. At this summit, ASEAN issued the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and 
agreed to cooperate in freedom-from-want issues, including elimination of poverty, hunger, 
disease, and illiteracy, improvement of living standards, and a renewed campaign against 
transnational crime, including drug abuse and trafficking (ASEAN, February 24, 1976a). In 
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order to enhance ASEAN members’ cooperation on the above issues, ASEAN created several 
Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, like 1980’s ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting (AHMM) and 
1981’s ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Environment (AMME). ASEAN also issued 
declarations and agreements, like the ASEAN Declaration of Principles to Combat the 
Abuses of Narcotics Drugs (1976) and the Bangkok Declaration on the ASEAN Environment 
(1984). However, these meetings and declarations were limited insofar as they could address 
human insecurities.  
As an example of the ASEAN Way, take the issue of environmental sustainability. In 
1981, ASEAN launched the AMME, which had a total of three meetings from 1981 to 1989. 
In each meeting, ASEAN members pledged to pursue environmental sustainability in various 
ways.64 However, ASEAN failed to identify the cooperation oriented details of these pledges, 
such as which law-enforcement agencies would be responsible for policing the extent of 
members’ cooperation. Ralf Emmers pointed out that an obstacle to ASEAN members’ 
management of human insecurities has been ASEAN’s reliance on “non-binding and 
unspecific measures without addressing the question of funding, setting target dates and 
establishing monitoring mechanisms to assess progress” (Emmers, 2003: 430). The lack of 
enforcement and the lack of specificity are quality of the ASEAN Way. Thus, although 
ASEAN held meetings and issued declarations, environmental sustainability in ASEAN 
members’ respective states did not greatly improve. In fact, Indonesia and Malaysia were 
members that permitted large-scale deforestation in the 1980s (Dupont, 2001: 50-1).  
The principle of non-interference has prevented ASEAN from improving the regional 
human-rights situation. Prior to 1991, ASEAN members never discussed human-rights issues 
in reference to the ASEAN agenda. They regarded development of human rights as a threat to 
their regimes’ viability,65 and “the non-interference principle enabled countries to concentrate 
on domestic matters, avoiding interference or criticism from other states” (Katsumata, 2004: 
243). Thus, member-states eschewed efforts to integrate discussions about human-rights 
issues into the ASEAN agenda. For example, after the Regional Council of Human Rights in 
Asia in 1983 submitted the Declaration on the Basic Duties of ASEAN Peoples and 
Governments to ASEAN, discussions about this document never took place in the ASEAN 
agenda (Phan, 2008: 2).  
 
                                                 
64
 Please see http://environment.asean.org/documentation/ 
65
 Interview in Indonesia, January 27, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei 
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6.1.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
The principle of non-interference has, as well, been a major obstacle to ASEAN members’ 
handling of freedom-from-fear issues: Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor and the mass 
killings in Cambodia in the late 1970s are brutal reminders of this pattern. In 1975, 
Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor led to heavy casualties. However, ASEAN members—
rather than criticise the Indonesian government’s illegal annexation—actually supported it 
(Jones, 2012: 67-73). Two reasons explain ASEAN members’ failure to criticise these actions. 
First, in the Cold War period, ASEAN members spared no efforts to suppress their own 
communist insurgencies, because communism was a threat to regime’s viability and political 
stability. They were also worried that, in particular, an independent East Timor would lead to 
communism’s expansion regionwide (Jones, 2012: 59-73). Moreover, many ASEAN 
members did not want to voice criticism that might sour their relationship with Indonesia, for 
such a turn of events might create tension in the region and, thus, weaken national security 
(Dupont, 2000: 164). It is safe to say that the principle of non-interference was the main 
factor leading ASEAN members to respond as they did to the Indonesian annexation of East 
Timor, and this principle had its roots in the widespread pursuit among member-states of two 
central national interests: the prevention of communist expansion and the promotion of 
national safety. Likewise it is this same principle of non-interference that explains ASEAN’s 
failure to stand up for East Timorese as they fell victim to the Indonesian government’s 
atrocities. 
Regarding freedom from fear, the other example cited above has to do with the mass 
killings under the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s. The Democratic Kampuchea regime of Pol Pot 
was responsible for the brutal deaths of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. 
ASEAN members chose to be officially silent on the mass deaths, because “Cambodia under 
Pol Pot was seen as a useful ‘buffer’ against any Vietnamese plans to foment revolution 
abroad” (Jones, 2012: 78). Likewise, in order to promote national interests (which, for many 
member-states, included preventing the expansion of Vietnamese influence), ASEAN is a 
collection of autonomous states chose to adhere to the principle of non-interference; that is, 
the organisation refrained from voicing concerns about the victims. 
 
6.1.1.2 From 1990 to 2002 
From 1989, when Vietnamese forces withdrew from Cambodia to 2002, several human-
security incidents emerged in Southeast Asia: the outbreak of the Asian economic crisis in 
1997; pro-Indonesian militias’ massacre of East Timorese in the wake of the UN-supervised 
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ballot of August 1999; deadly terrorist attacks in Indonesia in 2002; and transboundary haze 
pollution. These events and themes, at best, diminished people’s living standards and, at 
worst, claimed people’s lives and severely damaged to people’s living environments. A few 
scholars argued that in order to address new challenges, ASEAN has changed its norms. Hiro 
Katsumata argued that ASEAN has changed its principle of non-interference to “open and 
frank discussions” (Katsumata, 2004). Ruukun Katanyuu argued that ASEAN members, in 
particular founding members, have relaxed their adherence to the principle of non-
interference (Katanyuu, 2006). Indeed, the principle of non-interference has come under fire 
from ASEAN members. In 1998, Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan suggested that 
ASEAN’s non-interference principle should cede place to “flexible engagement”. However, I 
argue that norms and identities remain extraordinarily potent guideposts in the ASEAN 
agenda. In other words, ASEAN’s norms and identities remain a formidable obstacle to 
ASEAN’s engagement with human insecurities. 
 
6.1.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
Between 1990 and 2002, ASEAN encountered freedom-from-want problems. In response, 
ASEAN called for yet more meetings and issued yet more declarations. Throughout all of 
these activities, ASEAN’s approach to addressing human-security issues has remained firmly 
rooted in obedience to norms and identities. 
Take the example of haze pollution. Since the 4th AMME, ASEAN has emphasised that 
it is necessary for ASEAN members to cooperate with one another in addressing haze 
pollution. In 1995, ASEAN members adopted the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on 
Transboundary Pollution. And two years later, in 1997, ASEAN created the Regional Action 
Plan in response specifically to haze pollution. Under this plan, ASEAN members are 
encouraged to create their own plans for prevention of haze pollution, to strengthen their own 
ability to monitor and anticipate haze pollution, and to improve their own “fire fighting 
capability” (Jones, 2004: 64-5). However, David Seth Jones argued that this plan was “no 
more than recommendations which were not binding on members states” (Jones, 2004: 65). 
More important is the fact that this plan gave rise to a way of operating that was remarkably 
similar to the one employed by ASEAN between 1967 and 1989: in both cases, there was a 
definite lack of detailed  information regarding who “would be responsible for drawing up the 
list of resources, expertise, and procedures for preventing and fighting fires” (Jones, 2004: 
65). 
ASEAN members have adhered to the principle of non-interference, particularly for 
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ASEAN’s newer members. As mentioned in chapter two’s discussion of Cambodia (see 
section 4.2.2.1), we know that the Cambodian government has been a strong supporter of the 
non-interference principle. Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam have also been prominent advocates 
of the principle. These newer members opposed Surin’s proposal for “constructive 
intervention” (Acharya, 2003: 383, Thayer, 1999: 41). Their insistence has prevented ASEAN 
from addressing human-rights issues. For example, since the early 2000s, ASEAN has 
changed its policies towards Myanmar’s woeful human-rights record. ASEAN has pressured 
Myanmar to improve domestically human rights and to accept democracy as a form of 
national government. However, the Myanmar junta has, more often than not, used the 
principle of non-interference as pretext for rejecting improvements to the nation’s human-
rights situation (Haacke, 2006: 45). 
 
6.1.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
ASEAN’s involvement in East Timorese peacekeeping operations suggested that ASEAN 
members have remained to adhere to the principle of non-interference. After the UN-
sponsored independent ballot in East Timor in August 1999, pro-Jakarta militias killed 
hundreds of East Timorese, which attracted international criticism. However, most ASEAN 
members were silent to this tragedy (Freistein, 2005: 184), because they adhered to the 
principle of non-interference. ASEAN members’ adherence to this instance of the non-
interference doctrine was rooted not so much in a concern over people’s well-being as in a 
wish not to encourage their own domestic separatist movements and an equally notable wish 
not to irritate Indonesia, ASEAN’s largest member-states (Dupont, 2000: 164). Again, 
ASEAN’s response to the East Timorese massacre was related to member-states’ national 
interests. 
After the bloody campaign in East Timor, ASEAN members (Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand) joined the INTERFET. Two motivations account for this decision by 
the four members: first of all, they expected that their participation in the INTERFET could 
enhance ASEAN’s credibility, which had diminished significantly during the financial crisis 
owing to the organisation’s incompetent response to it; and second of all, these members 
wanted to balance the Australian government’s leading role in East Timor’s peacekeeping 
task (Dupont, 2000: 166-7). An important point is worth making here: Although ASEAN 
members participated in the East Timorese peacekeeping task, the participation neither offset 
nor degraded in any substantial way either ASEAN’s consensual style of decision-making or 
ASEAN’s adherence to the principle of non-interference (Haacke, 2003: 70). ASEAN 
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members still had the right to invoke the “ASEAN Minus X”66 calculation. In this regard, 
Myanmar and Vietnam expressed little interest in the East Timorese-peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding mission (Dupont, 2000: 168). Moreover, ASEAN members’ participation 
rested on both the explicit agreement of and an explicit invitation from the Indonesian 
government (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005a: 132). Had the Indonesian government’s 
consent not been forthcoming, one can reasonably speculate that the ASEAN members would 
have refrained from the mission as originally defined, despite its function of enhancing 
ASEAN’s international credibility.  
 
6.1.2 ASEAN’s Involvement in the Creation of the APSC 
In chapter one, I explored the motivations underlying ASEAN’s decision to create the APSC. 
In this section, I will explore ASEAN’s handling of human-security issues relative to the 
blueprints of the APSC and the ASCC. I argue that the ability of ASEAN to address human-
security issues has been limited, because the way in which ASEAN has addressed those 
issues has been inextricable from its modus operandi, namely the combination of the non-
interference principle and the ASEAN Way. 
 
6.1.2.1 ASEAN’s Modus Operandi in the APSC 
6.1.2.1.1 Freedom from Want 
The blueprint of the APSC involves ASEAN in several freedom-from-want issues. Five main 
issues will be discussed in this section: opposition to transnational crime, promotion of 
environmental sustainability, promotion of public health and control of communicable 
diseases, reduction of risk from natural disasters, and promotion and protection of human 
rights. 
 
6.1.2.1.1.1 Opposition to Transnational Crimes 
Combat transnational crimes have been one of the human-security issues in the APSC 
blueprints (ASEAN, 2009a: 12-3). So far, ASEAN has issued several declarations. In 
November 2004, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons 
Particularly Women and Children. In this declaration, ASEAN pledged to combat the human-
                                                 
66
 “ASEAN Minus X” means ASEAN members have had the option of participating in or refraining from joint 
ventures, an approach similar to the one outlined in the ASEAN Way—flexible participation and non-binding 
commitment. 
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trafficking problem through various measures including the creation of a regional network, 
the prevention of fraudulent use of travel documents, intensified cooperation among member-
states’ enforcement authorities, and the protection of victims of such crimes (ASEAN, 
November 29, 2004a). In 2007, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Convention on Counter 
Terrorism, which came into force in May 2011. The convention provided the framework in 
which ASEAN would combat terrorist activities. The cooperation included exchanges of 
information and intelligence, strengthening of border control, suppression of terrorists’ tools 
(e.g., of terrorist financing), and development of members’ anti-terrorism capacity through 
training and meetings (ASEAN, January 9-15, 2007).  
However, ASEAN’s ability to address transnational crimes has been limited, because 
the approach underlying this effort has rested squarely on the ASEAN Way. These documents 
elucidated the related areas in which ASEAN members would cooperate and the measures 
that ASEAN members would adopt. However, these documents lay out no concrete actions: 
Which agencies in member-states should conduct cooperative training and intelligence 
operations? Where will ASEAN acquire the resources for funding and equipment? And how 
will ASEAN overcome inter-member difficulties like unequal skill levels and infrastructure 
levels among member-states? These problems suggest that ASEAN has preferred to address 
problems in line with under the ASEAN Way. However, as mentioned previously (see section 
6.1.1.1.1), the ASEAN Way has been a barrier to ASEAN’s handling of address transnational 
crimes. As suggested by comments made by Ralf Emmers, ASEAN’s approach to addressing 
transnational crimes has not improved ASEAN members’ ability to combat the transnational 
crimes. He specifically stated, 
 
I am doing some work on human trafficking. I remember interviewing people, and I 
was told that, in Laos, one very basic problem is the lack of computers. So, Thailand 
may have information on someone they have found who is working as a prostitute in 
Bangkok and has been the victim of human trafficking. Police will ask you to share the 
information on your country of origin. But, if you don’t have appropriate data bases, it 
is very difficult to find out where this person is coming from. There are lots of 
anecdotes of this nature, but this is what we really mean by capacity.67 
 
 
                                                 
67
 Interview in Singapore, January 18, 2012, conducted by Chu Ta-Wei. 
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6.1.2.1.1.2 Promotion of Environmental Sustainability 
ASEAN embedded provisions for both environmental protection and environmental 
sustainability in the ASCC blueprint (ASEAN, 2009b: 14-20) and, to a  lesser extent, in the 
APSC blueprint (specifically, the provision addresses illegal fishing) (ASEAN, 2009a: 16). 
As with the effort to combat transnational crime, ASEAN has addressed environmental 
problems on the basis largely of the ASEAN Way. Let us again take the topic of haze 
pollution as an example. In the ASCC blueprint, ASEAN agreed to implement the ASEAN 
Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, signed by ASEAN members in June 2002, and 
to create the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control 
(ASEAN, 2009b: 14-5). However, the prevention of haze pollution in the ASCC blueprint has 
lacked detail: Which agency in each member should be responsible for regional cooperation? 
Which member should cover the expenses related to meetings and so on? And how should 
ASEAN handle non-compliant members. The absent of such details is a pattern similarly 
applicable to the ASEAN Way, in which non-binding commitment and flexible participation 
are preeminent. Lorraine Elliott argued that the ASEAN Way would prevent ASEAN from 
addressing environmental problems rigorously. She stated, in particular, that “ASEAN’s anti-
institutionalism is now increasingly a barrier to dealing with the kinds of interdependencies 
and crisis situations associated with environmental degradation and resource decline” (Elliott, 
2003: 45). Of course, we cannot reasonably deny that some members have actively addressed 
haze pollution (Nguitragool, 2011: 364). As a case in point, the Singaporean government has 
pressured the Indonesian government to reduce factors contributing to haze pollution. 
However, adoption of the ASEAN Way has meant that non-compliant members run no risk of 
bringing down upon themselves onerous sanctions. Thus, even though ASEAN created a 
measure to address haze pollution, people in Brunei, Singapore, and Malaysia continue to 
suffer from completely avoidable haze spawned by Indonesian bushfires. 
 
6.1.2.1.1.3 Promotion of Public Health and Control of Communicable Diseases 
In the area of public health and communicable diseases, ASEAN has adopted several 
measures in the blueprint of the ASCC. The measures include cooperation through meetings 
and other exchanges of information involving experts, growth in people’s awareness of 
diseases through educational activities, adherence to the international norms like the 
International Health Regulations 2005, and implementation of regional disease-prevention 
programs like the ASEAN Work Programme on HIV and AIDS (ASEAN, 2009b: 8-10). 
Again, these measures have been non-binding commitments and have lacked detailed 
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information regarding such pivotal matters which agency in ASEAN members should oversee 
health problems singled out in the ASEAN agenda?  
ASEAN’s involvement in this area has lacked sufficient substance also because relevant 
agencies have lacked proficiency in their particular field. For example, Mely Caballero-
Anthony pointed out that robust monitoring networks have been the chief mechanism for 
managing outbreaks of diseases and that public-health experts and equipment have been the 
critical elements in creating international as well as regional networks, but that less-
developed ASEAN countries have lacked both public health experts and equipment 
(Caballero-Anthony, 2008: 518-9). Ironically, the ASCC blueprint makes no mention of any 
mechanism for resolving these deficiencies. 
 
6.1.2.1.1.4 Reduction of Risk from Natural Disasters 
ASEAN embedded guidelines for natural-disaster management in the APSC blueprint 
(ASEAN, 2009a: 14) and the ASCC blueprint (ASEAN, 2009b: 11). Perhaps, the most 
important task in these guidelines is to implement the AADMER, whose aims have been 
“substantial reduction of disaster losses in lives and in the social, economic and 
environmental assets of” ASEAN members (ASEAN, July 2005) through the creation of an 
effective mechanism for enhancing regional cooperation, and more importantly, creation of 
the AHA Centre, which would serve as the platform for ASEAN’s cooperation with external 
actors, like the UN regarding natural-disaster issues (ASEAN, 2009b: 79-80). In order to 
improve members’ ability to respond to natural disasters, ASEAN held a series of exercises, 
including the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercises 
(ARDEX). The ARF, ASEAN-derived institutions, also held the Disaster Relief Exercise 
Table Top Exercise (2008), the ASEAN Regional Forum Voluntary Demonstration of 
Response on Disaster Relief (2009), and the Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx) (Collins, 2013: 
136). 
Although ASEAN has strengthened its ability to respond to natural disasters, 
implementation of the AADMER has been based on the principle of non-interference and the 
ASEAN Way. Regarding the principle of non-interference, the AADMER states that “each 
affected party shall have the primary responsibility to respond to disasters occurring within 
its territory” (ASEAN, July 2005). At first glance, this statement is similar, and content, to the 
RtoP concept—“the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety 
and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare” (ICISS, 2001: 13). However, the 
AADMER also states that “the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of the 
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parties shall be respected….external assistance or offers of assistance shall only be provided 
upon the request or with the consent of the affected party” (ASEAN, July 2005). This 
statement suggests that the implementation of the AADMER has rested on the principle of 
non-interference, which may delay external assistance to natural-disaster victims. Alan 
Collins argued that this provision “is actually an example of the [ASEAN] norms’ vitality” 
(Collins, 2013: 148). 
Regarding ASEAN identities, ASEAN “is proud to claim the AADMER is the one and 
only legally-binding instrument in the world relating to the Hyogo Framework for Action 
(HFA)” (Collins, 2013: 135). The HFA is an objective in the Yokohama Strategy, which 
serves “to strengthen regional response to natural disasters” (Collins, 2013: 133), and the 
HFA clearly regulates what state actors must do—and how they must do it—when responding 
to natural disasters (Collins, 2013: 135). However, the AADMER, like other ASEAN 
declaration, lacks of detailed information. For example, Alan Collins pointed out that the 
AADMER has failed to deliver sustainable development policies and guidelines of the 
involvement of non-state actors in natural-disaster management (Collins, 2013: 136). 
 
6.1.2.1.1.5 Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
Since ASEAN’s decision to create the APSC, human rights have become a spotlight issue for 
member-states and for external powers concerned about Southeast Asia. The international 
community and media have been observing how ASEAN developed human-rights issues. As 
mentioned in sections 4.3.2.2.1 and 4.5.2.2.1, Indonesia and Malaysia were the two members 
that insisted upon the ASEAN Charter’s enshrinement of human-rights language. Indeed, 
during the APSC-building process, ASEAN has achieved several related targets (please see 
Table 1.3). Has ASEAN promoted human rights without having considered the principle of 
non-interference and the ASEAN Way? 
I argue that the ability of ASEAN to address human-rights issues has been limited, 
because the human-rights mechanism that ASEAN created has rested on the principle of non-
interference and the ASEAN Way. Since ASEAN’s decision to create the APSC, not only 
ASEAN representatives, mainly the EPG and the High-Level Task Force (HLTF), but also 
CSOs have held several meetings devoted to human-rights affairs, including human-rights 
language in the ASEAN Charter and creation of a regional human-rights body (Dosch, 2008: 
532-6). As for the human-rights body, CSOs have suggested that for it to be strong, the 
body’s representatives must be independent from their respective governments, the body must 
reject consensus decision-making, and body must operate fairly and freely, without 
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submitting to constraints characteristic of the non-interference principle (Collins, 2013: 95-6).  
In 2009, ASEAN created the regional human-rights body AICHR, whose Terms of 
Reference (ToR) included the ASEAN norms and identities. Article 2.1 a-c is informed by the 
principle of non-interference: “respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity and national identity of all ASEAN members states; non-interference in the internal 
affairs of ASEAN members states; and respect for the right of every member state to lead its 
national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion”; in its turn,  
Article 2.4 is informed by “pursuance of a constructive and non-confrontational approach” 
(ASEAN, October 2009: 4-5), which is one of the qualities of the ASEAN Way. Not all the 
ASEAN members funded the AICHR. As mentioned in chapter two’s commentary on the 
state actors (see section 2.1.4.2), an advantage of having multi-lateral organisation to address 
human-security issues is that regional and international organisations can retain the right to 
collect funds from individual states, rendering the organisations at times more robust, policy-
wise, than the individual states could be on their own. However, according to Alan Collins, 
“the lack of resources is a serious hindrance to what AICHR can achieve” (Collins, 2013: 98). 
Thus, ASEAN members have not granted the AICHR the right to investigate human-rights 
violations alleged to have occurred in ASEAN member-states. It is reasonable to characterise 
the AICHR as a regional human-rights body without teeth. 
 
6.1.2.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
ASEAN’s involvement in the freedom-from-fear issue is on display in the APSC blueprint. 
As mentioned in chapter two (see section 2.1.3), the RtoP has been means by which ASEAN 
can address freedom-from-fear issues, such as massacres. But ASEAN adopted several 
different measures for achieving freedom from fear. The APSC blueprint mentions such 
conflict-avoidance and dispute-resolution measures as the implementation of CBMs, the 
clarification of ASEAN members’ defence policies, and the establishment of the AIPR 
(ASEAN, 2009a: 8-10). In addition, ASEAN members agreed that conflicts and disputes 
“should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures” (ASEAN, 
2009a: 10), and when conflicts and disputes remain unresolved, they “shall be referred to the 
ASEAN Summit” (ASEAN, 2007: 24). However, these measures serve mainly to manage 
inter-members relationships rather than to protect Southeast Asians (Sukma, 2012: 141). 
Probably what Southeast Asians need is the RtoP. Chapter three discusses a survey I 
conducted inquiring into respondents’ knowledge about the AC and respondents’ sense of 
their own human security. These respondents, in particular, answer the following questions: If 
212 
 
your living environment is devastated by a natural disaster or you are exposed to atrocious 
crimes, like genocide, imposed on you by your own government, would you expect 
governments or groups outside your country to conduct a rescue operation within your own 
country’s borders? Of the 120 respondents, 71 replied that external assistance should be 
forthcoming. 
Rizal Sukma expressed a glimmer of hope that the five-year amendment in the ASEAN 
Charter (2013) and the APSC (2015) might include the RtoP (Sukma, 2012: 149). I argue that 
Sukma’s anticipated outcome is unlikely to become a reality, at least in the short term. The 
key point is that ASEAN enshrined the principle of non-interference in the ASEAN Charter 
(Article 2.2.d and 2.2.e) (ASEAN, 2007: 5). As mentioned in chapter two’s Cambodian 
section (see section 4.2.1.2.2), this principle stands a remarkably poor chance of co-existing 
effectively with the RtoP, because these two concepts have radically different perspectives of 
national sovereignty: the non-interference principle treats national sovereignty as sacrosanct 
whereas the RtoP unabashedly downplays the inviolability of national sovereignty, rendering 
it secondary to the protection of human beings. Moreover, ASEAN’s newcomer member-
states have been stalwart defenders of the non-interference principle. The principle has 
become the central mechanism by which ASEAN newcomers have sought to consolidate their 
respective regimes’ stability and protect national sovereignty. Thus, it is unlikely for them to 
give up supporting of the principle of non-interference. It is safe to say that the measures that 
ASEAN provided to address freedom-from-fear issues may not be directly beneficial for 
Southeast Asians and the RtoP may not be enshrined in the ASEAN Charter in the short term. 
 
6.1.3 Summary 
Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN as a regional organisation has been involved in Southeast 
Asian human-security issues. However, by adopting a consensual decision-making style and 
by adhering to the principle of non-interference ASEAN has limited its ability to address 
these issues effectively. 
The ASEAN Charter and the APSC blueprint represent ASEAN’s effort to remedy this 
problematic circumstance. These documents feature language supportive of human rights and 
signal the creation of a regional human-rights body. In addition, ASEAN has planned to 
address several pressing human-security issues, including transnational crime, natural 
disasters, diseases, and environmental problems. Despite this shift in focus, ASEAN has 
addressed these issues on the basis of its norms and identities, and many scholars have agreed 
that ASEAN’s norms and identities have been a barrier to ASEAN’s successful handling of 
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human-security issues. Thus, one can reasonably postulate that ASEAN’s overall approach to 
human-security issues has not significantly changed since the organisation’s inception.  
 
6.2 The EU68 
The EU’s involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues started in the 1970s. The EU 
has provided development assistance, helped resolve refugee crises, and expressed concern 
about human-rights violations. Although the EU’s involvement has been positive, some 
Southeast Asian countries and individuals have expressed disapproval of the EU’s 
involvement. After ASEAN decided to create the AC, the EU has been actively involved in 
furthering this project—assistance that ASEAN has welcomed. In this section, I will review 
both the EU’s responses to Southeast Asian human-security issues and the motivations 
underlying the EU’s involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues over the course of 
different periods. Then, I will explore the EU’s strategic response to the creation of the AC 
and the EU’s implementation of this strategy. 
 
6.2.1 Historical Review: From the 1970s to 2002 
The historical review in this chapter discusses how and why the EU was involved in 
Southeast Asian human-security issues. The discussion has two parts. The time-frame in the 
                                                 
68
 The EU’s integration has its roots in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was created by 
Belgium, France, German, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in 1951. In 1957, the ECSC members 
established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 
In 1965, member-states adopted the Luxembourg Compromise. Under this agreement, important resolutions 
were based on unanimous decision-making. In the same year, the ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom were integrated 
into the European Communities by the Merger Treaty. By the late 1980s, the European Communities had 
experienced three enlargements. The first and second enlargements involved the acceptance of Denmark (1973), 
England (1973), Ireland (1973), and Greece (1981) into the fold. In 1983, the European Communities accepted 
Spain and Portugal as members, and adopted the Single European Act (SEA), which integrated each Community 
under a single entity entitled the European Community (EC) and which created a single European market. In 
1991, the EC’s members signed the Maastricht Treaty, according to which the EC officially became known as 
the EU in 1993. In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU. In 2000, the EU’s members signed the 
Treaty of Nice, which institutionalised the EU’s enlargement. In 2005, the EU approved the largest enlargement, 
as the organisation welcomed ten new members: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania became official participants in 
the EU. The EU accepted Croatia as the organisation’s 28th member in 2013. In order to avoid unnecessary 
complexities in terminology, I will use the term ‘EC’ to designate the organisation in my section covering the 
period between the 1970s and the late 1980 and I will used the term ‘EU’ in the remaining sections. 
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first part extends from the 1970s to 1989, and the time-frame in the second part extends from 
1990 to 2002. 
 
6.2.1.1 From the 1970s to 1989 
Between the 1970s and 1989, the EC was involved in several Southeast Asian human-security 
issues. The motivations driving the EC’s involvement in this region were rooted in economic 
and human-rights considerations. Regarding the economic considerations, the EC tried to 
strengthen both its own economic interests and Southeast Asia’s economic interests by 
extending development assistance to the latter. Regarding the human-rights considerations, 
beginning in the 1970s, the EC voiced concerns about human-rights situations in third world 
countries. In Southeast Asia, the EC’s central concerns pivoted chiefly on the refugee crisis 
resulting from the Indochinese wars waged from the 1970s to the late 1980s. 
 
6.2.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
The EC provided developmental assistance to Southeast Asia (mainly ASEAN’s founding 
members) and, in this way, tried to cultivate the region’s freedom from want. The motivations 
underlying the EC’s developmental assistance usually reflected a desire to strengthen the 
economics of Southeast Asia and of Europe, with the former being important to the latter: 
European countries imported much-needed raw materials like rubber, tin, copra, and palm oil 
from Southeast Asia (Hull, 1984: 24). The thinking was that the more prosperous a Southeast 
Asian country was, the more useful the country would be to the EC members. In this context, 
ASEAN and the EC signed the ASEAN–EC Cooperation Agreement (AECA). According to 
this agreement, the signatories cooperated in commerce, culture, development, and the 
economy (Petersson, 2006: 572). In the area of development, the EC focused on advancing 
ASEAN’s members’ rural areas and food production (Hull, 1984: 19). Whether the AECA’s 
development projects made substantial contributions to ASEAN members’ general 
populations remains unclear, mainly because of a distinct lack of detailed statistical 
information. One point that is clear, however, is that the AECA was the only region-to-region 
conduit through which the EC could get involved effectively in Southeast Asian freedom-
from-want issues.  
 
6.2.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
The freedom-from-fear issue that most preoccupied the EC was the refugee crisis resulting 
from the Indochinese wars. In the 1970s, the EC began addressing the human-rights 
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situations in countries outside the EC. For example, EC members held frequent formal 
discussions about such human-rights issues as Palestinians’ human rights and South African 
apartheid policies, all in line with the European Political Cooperation (EPC) agenda (Smith, 
2008: 117). As for Southeast Asia, the EC occupied itself with refugee problems. In July 1979, 
the EC launched a meeting devoted specifically to Indochinese refugees. At the meeting, EC 
members pledged that they would help resolve the crisis (EUROPA, July 20, 1979). Between 
the 1970s and the late 1980s, the EC provided food, shelter, health, education and training 
assistance through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United 
Nations Border Relief Organization (UNBRO), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the 
NGOs (EUROPA, January 23, 1990). President of the Council of Ministers of the European 
Communities Michael O’Kennedy expressed the EC’s position regarding the Indochinese 
refugee crisis at that time: 
 
We uphold the right of people to leave their own countries freely and to return freely to 
them; we believe that no one should be obliged to leave his own country through fear or 
compulsion…We believe that anyone who does nevertheless leave his country of origin 
for any such reason must not be forcibly returned against his will, nor denied asylum 
elsewhere. (EUROPA, July 20, 1979) 
 
6.2.1.2 From 1990 to 2002 
From 1990 to 2002, the EU (formerly the EC) continued to involved itself in human-security 
issues in Southeast Asia. Motivating the EU’s involvement herein was a desire to promote 
and protect human rights. As mentioned, beginning in the 1970s, the EC—and subsequently 
the EU—have addressed human-rights situations in non-member countries. In the post-Cold 
War period, the EU strengthened its promotion of human-rights values. Since the late 1980s, 
the EU has declared that human rights are a basic and important value held by EU members, 
confirming this position in the SEA (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997), and the Nice Treaty (2000). Also, the EU has cited the value of human 
rights as an underpinning of the organisation’s external relations and policies (Møller, 2007: 
474). Promotion and protection of human rights tended to be EU norms. Ian Manners argued 
that “the value of human rights plays a constitutive role in shaping the EU as a hybrid polity, 
as well as EU-self-images and EU relations with the rest of the world” (cited from Smith, 
2008: 122). 
In this context, human-rights issues constituted an important element, when the EU was 
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involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. For example, in the report Creating a 
New Dynamic in EU–ASEAN Relations, published by the European Commission in 1996, the 
EU reiterated that human rights and democracy “must be important elements of the political 
dialogue between the European Union and ASEAN” (European Commission, July 1996: 11). 
Interestingly, the EU’s promotion and protection of human rights have been incompatible 
with ASEAN’s principle of non-interference. Moreover, the EU’s involvement in Southeast 
Asian human-rights issues has rested on often intractably hard-line measures, like the 
imposition of sanctions on offending states. Thus, the EU’s involvement in Southeast Asian 
human-rights issues has not helped resolve human-rights violations, but has created 
noteworthy diplomatic friction between the EU and ASEAN. 
 
6.2.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
Between 1990 and 2002, the EU continued its involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-
want issues. For example, the AECA extended to ASEAN new members: Cambodia, Laos, 
and Vietnam. The EU also pursued rural development in Southeast Asia. For example, in 
1998, the EU provided funding to develop rural area, education, legal reform and health and 
human resources in Laos (Thayer, 1999: 41) and, in 2002, the EU launched the National 
Indicative Programme, one of whose objectives was to develop rural areas in Cambodia, with 
an emphasis on water supply and construction of roads.  
The most conspicuous Southeast Asian issue in which the EU was involved was 
probably human rights. However, this involvement soured diplomatic relationships between 
the EU and ASEAN. Because the Myanmar government did not improve its human-rights 
records, the EU imposed economic and political sanctions on the country, including an 
embargo on exports of goods, a refusal to issue visas to Myanmar officials, and a freeze on 
Myanmar officials’ assets abroad (Petersson, 2006: 571-4). In addition, the EU blocked 
Myanmar’s participation in the AECA (Manea, 2008: 376). 
The EU’s involvement specifically in Myanmar’s human-rights issues was a notable 
source of tension between the EU and ASEAN. The central contributing factor to this tension 
was the difference between the EU and ASEAN regarding socio-political values (Møller, 
2007: 474-5). Since the end of the Cold War, promotion and protection of human rights have 
been EU norms, whereas ASEAN, since its inception in 1967, has adhered to the principle of 
non-interference, which would most often trump human-rights concerns. As mentioned in 
chapter two (see section 2.1.4.2), a regional organisation’s norms can be a barrier to 
organisation’s handling of human-security issues. In theory, the EU’s norms should benefit 
217 
 
human rights. However, EU norms promote the concept of universal values, which clashes 
with the concept that nations’ borders and nation’s sovereignty are inviolable, and as noted, it 
is the latter concept that is central to ASEAN’s handling of state matters. When the two sides 
act on the basis of their respective norms, disputes are inevitable. Møller argued that a desire 
to avoid confrontation explains ASEAN’s preference for economic discussions rather than 
political and human-rights discussions when engaging with the EU (Møller, 2007: 472). 
In the case of Myanmar, ASEAN insisted to follow the principle of non-interference in 
responding to the country’s domestic affairs. The EU, by contrast, castigated the Myanmar 
government’s gross abuse of human rights and imposed political and economic sanctions 
upon the Myanmar government. These two markedly different norms pitted the two regional 
organisations—and members of their wider communities—against each other. ASEAN 
members and certain segments of Southeast Asia’s population expressed sharp antipathy 
toward the EU’s stance. For example, ASEAN accused the EU of practicing “political 
imperialism,” and even democratic activists in Myanmar described the EU as guilty of 
engaging in “political hypocrisies” (Rocher, 2012: 169-70). It is reasonable to say that the 
EU’s norms became a catalyst for disputes that did little to resolve Myanmar’s human-rights 
problems.  
 
6.2.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
Between 1990 and 2002, the EU was not involved in freedom-from-fear issues. Exemplifying 
this trend were Cambodian peacekeeping efforts: the EU en masse did not participate in the 
UNTAC and contributed to the post-conflict reconstruction. Because the EU generally 
absented itself from Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues, the European Commission in 
2001 published Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership, which 
suggested that the EU should engage in freedom-from-fear issues in this region (European 
Commission, April 2001: 21). This report paved the way for the EU’s involvement in 
Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues after ASEAN decided to create the APSC. 
 
6.2.2 Exploration of the EU’s Strategies for the APSC 
6.2.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the EU’s Strategies 
My historical review of EU’s involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues shows 
that between the 1970s and 2002, the EU’s involvement in Southeast Asian human-security 
issues was driven by its norms—promotion and protection of human rights. However, 
because significant differences between the EU norms and ASEAN norms have resulted in 
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diplomatic friction between the two parties and between their respective member-states, EU 
norms failed to improve the human-rights situation in Myanmar. With this pattern of conflict 
in mind, two questions merit our attention regarding the creation of the APSC: What 
strategies has the EU adopted in response to it? And has the EU’s involvement in it 
corresponded to a constant or variable motivation? 
The EU’s strategies have supported the creation of the APSC. Two motivations have 
underlain the EU’s strategies. The first EU motivation has been to protect its European people 
from human insecurities. Since the early 2000s, people in Europe have suffered from a series 
of human insecurities: in March 2004, train bombings struck Madrid; in July 2005, a series 
suicide bomb attacks occurred in London; and Europe has became the destination for 
substantial illegal Asian migration (UNODC, 2012: 72). In order to protect people in Europe, 
the EU has sought cooperation with non-European countries to combat related human 
insecurities. Southeast Asian countries, where local extreme Muslim groups such as JI have 
links to Al-Qaeda and where trafficked people make their way to the European continent, has 
been a region of great importance to the EU. Cooperation between the EU and ASEAN has 
been a key strategy for the EU in addressing these problems. Thus, the EU has been able to 
support the creation of the APSC, one of whose goals has been to address transnational 
crimes. 
The EU’s second motivation has been to improve relationships with ASEAN. Since the 
1970s, the EU has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. Different norms 
between the EU and ASEAN soured both diplomatic relationships. However, Southeast Asia 
has been an important region for the EU. Economically, the EU was ASEAN’s second-largest 
export market and third-largest trading partner after Japan and the United States (European 
Commission, July 1996: 5). Politically, ASEAN has come to play a central role in East Asian 
political integration, and this centrality has served to increase ASEAN’s political influence in 
East Asia (Eaton and Stubbs, 2006). The EU has hoped to consolidate its economic interests 
and expand its influence in Southeast Asia. For example, according to Yepes, many EU 
members, such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Sweden, have 
expected to strengthen either their economic or their political relationships with Asian 
countries, including Southeast Asian ones, through participation in the ASEM (Yepes, 2005: 
27-9). ASEAN’s decision to create the APSC provided the EU an opportunity to improve its 
relationships with ASEAN. Thus, individual EU members and the EU en masse have 
similarly expected to strengthen their relationships specifically with ASEAN through 
cooperation on several issues. Interestingly, while helping ASEAN create the APSC, 
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particularly in the area of human-rights issues, the EU has been adjusting its norms. 
 
6.2.2.2 The EU’s Strategies 
6.2.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, one of the motivations underlying the EU’s 
involvement in the creation of the APSC has been to protect European people from human 
insecurities. Little academic research has discussed the EU’s involvement in the APSC 
blueprint’s treatment of transnational-crime issues. In general, this involvement by the EU 
reflects its desire to cooperate with external actors to ameliorate the negative effects of 
transnational crime. The EU and ASEAN created the Regional Indicative Programme (2005–
2006) one of whose targets was the effective combating of terrorism through shared 
information (Severino, 2006: 333-4). In 2008, the EU contributed €6 million to ASEAN to 
create the EU–ASEAN Statistical Capacity Building (2009–2013). The purpose of this 
project was to strengthen the capacity of less-developed ASEAN countries and the ASEAN 
Secretariat regarding the creation of compatible official statistical data. This project could 
offset the problems associated with less-developed ASEAN members’ poor capacity to share 
accurate information about transnational crime. In 2010, the two organisations created the 
EU–ASEAN Migration and Border Management Programme. Two pillars supported this 
programme. One was to facilitate trade between Europe and Southeast Asia and the other was 
to enhance cooperation on the issues of illegal migration and human trafficking (EUROPA, 
May 27-28, 2009).  
 The EU publicly praised and supported ASEAN’s efforts to craft the APSC’s human-
rights elements. During the process of drafting the ASEAN Charter, the EU supported the 
embodiment of human-rights language in the Charter (European Commission, May 2007: 11). 
The EU welcomed ASEAN’s embedding of the rights of migrant workers and the welfare of 
women in the blueprint of the ASCC (ASEAN, April 26-27, 2012, EUROPA, May 27-28, 
2009). The EU also expressed its support for the creation of the AICHR and the ACWC 
(EUROPA, May 27-28, 2009). The EU arranged for officials in ASEAN’s human-rights 
institutions to visit the EU.69 Probably more importantly, the EU has created bilateral human-
rights negotiation platforms. So far, the EU has launched bilateral human-rights dialogues 
with Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. 
                                                 
69
 For example, in February 2013, representatives of the ACWC visited the EU to share experiences and 
information regarding the protection and promotion of children’s and women’s rights. 
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The above examples suggest that the EU has adopted a soft approach to the human-
rights element in the APSC. Møller argued that economic cooperation, such as 
implementation of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), may be an opportunity for the EU to 
improve its relationships with ASEAN (Møller, 2007: 477-9). However, the real obstacle to 
solidifying these relationships has been the chasm between EU norms and ASEAN norms—a 
chasm that is unlikely to be bridged by economic cooperation alone. The EU’s adjustments to 
its norms suggest that the organisation has diagnosed the dilemma as stemming from a 
different in norms. For example, in A New Partnership with Southeast Asia, the EU declared 
that its involvement in human-rights issues in Southeast Asia would hinge on dialogue that 
might enhance ASEAN members’ confidence in improving human rights and that might help 
the EU “explore possibilities for cooperation” (European Commission, 2003: 15). This is not 
to say that the EU has diverted its “hard-line” attention to human-rights issues; after all, the 
EU still criticises human-rights violations in Southeast Asia, as is this case with the EU’s 
continued pressure on Laos and Vietnam to improve their religious freedom. However, one 
thing of which we can be sure is that the EU’s policies towards Southeast Asian human-rights 
issues have gradually evolved from a hard approach to a soft one. 
 
6.2.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
Regarding the freedom-from-fear element, the EU has inserted itself in civil wars in 
Indonesia, where the organisation specifically acted as a mediator in the Aceh peace process. 
In 2002, the EU provided €2.3 million to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, which 
comprises NGOs engaging in peacekeeping operations around the world, and this financial 
assistance went to implementing the peace process in Aceh (Herrberg, 2008: 33). After a 
massive earthquake struck the Indian Ocean in 2004, triggering a catastrophic tsunami that 
devastated Aceh Province, the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari—under the auspices 
of the Finnish NGO Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)—arranged negotiations between 
GAM and the Indonesian government. In August 2005, the Indonesian government and GAM 
signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), under which GAM had to demobilise and 
decommission its troops, while the Indonesian government had to withdraw its police and 
military forces from Aceh and release political Acehnese prisoners. In addition, according to 
the MoU, EU and ASEAN members had to create the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), 
whose tasks were to monitor the peace process in Aceh.  
The motivation directly the EU’s engagement in the Aceh civil war was chiefly a desire 
to improve Europe’s relationships with Southeast Asian countries. According to Gunaryadi, 
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several motivations explain the EU’s role as a mediator in the Aceh civil war. For starters, re-
building in Aceh would benefit for European contractors, as would Aceh’s huge reserves of 
oil and gas; furthermore, the primary act of participating in the Aceh peace process could 
improve the EU’s international status (Gunaryadi, 2006: 95-6). One specific motivation is to 
improve the EU’s relationship with Indonesia—the primus inter pares in ASEAN. The EU 
has regarded Indonesia as a key player in the Asia-Pacific area, and a good relationship with 
the country could help member-states establish good relationships with other Asian countries, 
including countries in Southeast Asia (Gunaryadi, 2006: 96-7). Alongside the EU have been 
other ASEAN member-states and Japan, all participating in Aceh’s peace process and all 
interacting with one another—an opportunity to forge stronger ties all around. So has the 
EU’s involvement in the Aceh peace process improved the EU’s relationships with ASEAN? 
Although sporadic conflicts have continued to arise in Aceh, the Indonesian government has 
expressed appreciation to the EU for its largely helpful efforts. The Office of the 
Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister Amiruddin Usman responded to 
the EU’s efforts with the following comments: 
 
We sincerely thank the EU for their active involvement in reaching peace in Aceh. The 
peace process has not been easy to reach, but thanks to outside participation, 
particularly from the EU, pace has prevailed. (Jakarta Post, May 25, 2012) 
 
6.2.3 Summary 
Since the 1970s, the EU has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues, 
providing development aid, resolving refugee crises, and addressing human rights. However, 
owing to differences between their respective norms, the EU and ASEAN experienced 
friction in their diplomatic exchanges. Nevertheless, the EU has supported the creation of the 
APSC, with the two primary goals being to protect Europeans from human insecurities and to 
improve the EU relationship with ASEAN. It is too early to conclude whether the EU’s 
strategies have positively influenced the creation of the APSC or not. What is clear is that 
diplomatic friction between the EU and ASEAN has declined. The key point to draw from 
these interactions is most likely that the EU has gradually shifted its method of addressing 
human-rights issues from a hard to a soft approach. 
 
6.3 The UN 
The UN as an international organisation dependent on members’ contributions of funding, 
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manpower, and materials has concerned itself with the development, safety, and security of 
populations and regions since its creation in 1945. The UN has been involved in Southeast 
Asian human-security issues since the 1970s. Early on, the UN’s involvement there was 
limited to human development (freedom-from-want), and did not prioritise the establishment 
of justice (freedom-from-fear) for Southeast Asian people; however, the UN has gradually 
broaden the scope of human-security issues in Southeast Asia. In this section, I will review 
how and why the UN has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues and will 
explore the UN’s strategies for responding to the creation of the APSC and the motivations 
underlying these strategies. 
 
6.3.1 Historical Review: From the 1970s to 2002 
I have divided my historical review of the UN into two sections. Both sections discuss how 
and why the UN was involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. The first section 
covers the period extending from the 1970s to 1989, and the second section, from 1990 to 
2002. 
 
6.3.1.1 From the 1970s to 1989 
Since its creation in 1945, the UN has been a multi-functional organisation in the world. One 
function has been, according to the UN Charter, “to achieve international cooperation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character” 
(UN, June 1945). The UN’s motivation for making this public declaration has been to 
enhance people’s living standards worldwide. The UN, to this end, have strategically created 
a host of human-development programmes. For example, in every decade since 1961, the UN 
has launched the UN Development Decade, and since 1980s, “the UN system has delivered a 
total of US$67.73 billion to promote development and human progress” (Fomerand, 2004: 
164). Insofar as Southeast Asian countries have become UN members since 1945,70 the UN 
has provided social and economic assistance to these countries for the purpose of human 
development. 
Another UN function, which is also the UN’s motivation, has been to maintain 
international peace and security, and the Security Council has been responsible for this 
                                                 
70
 The Philippines was the first Southeast Asian country to join the UN (October 1945), followed by Thailand, 
Myanmar and Indonesia in December 1946, April 1948, and September 1950. Cambodia and Laos joined the 
UN at the same time (December 1955). Malaysia and Singapore joined in September 1957 and September 1965. 
Vietnam and Brunei became members in September 1977 and September 1984. 
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function (UN, June 1945). In order to fulfil this function, the UN has employed both 
incentives and deterrents (Knight, 2005: 521). For example, the Security Council 
diplomatically mediated in the dispute between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s, and imposed 
sanctions on Iraq, when it invaded Kuwait in 1990. Moreover, under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, the UN Security Council may employ coercive means both to diminish threats to 
peace and to restore peace. For example, from 1948 to 1989, the Security Council authorised 
18 peacekeeping operations in various parts of the world (UN). However, during the Cold 
War period, the Security Council sometimes sacrificed people’s safety and rights. These 
instances of realpolitik reflected the rivalry between the Communist and the U.S. bloc—a 
rivalry that spread to Security Council members, who sought to capitalise on security issues 
in ways that would strengthen their own bloc’s influence (Russell, 1970: 324-5). In other 
words, for Security Council members, increasing their own bloc’s influence was more 
important than genuinely addressing people’s safety and security. The UN’s involvement in 
the Indonesian invasion of East Timor exemplifies this murky area of compromise. 
 
6.3.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
Since the 1970s, the UN has provided financial and technical assistance to Southeast Asian 
countries through a multilateral mechanism. In 1971, the UNDP became a dialogue partner of 
ASEAN, and from 1972 to 1991, the UNDP launched the fourth cycle of ASEAN–UNDP 
Sub-Regional Programmes (ASPs) (1972–1976, 1977–1981, 1982–1986, and 1987–1991). 
Although there is little documentation of how the UN’s assistance may have affected 
Southeast Asian people’s living standards, Southeast Asian Perceptions of Foreign Assistance, 
published by Chulalongkorn University in 1977, recorded where the UN’s assistance was 
allocated. According to this book, the Philippines government received funding to develop 
internal infrastructure (Villavicencio, 1977: 26, 29). The Thai government received UN 
assistance (US$295 million) in the areas of administration, agriculture, community and social 
development, communication, education, health, and industry (Chaowasilp, 1977: 74). 
Malaysia and Singapore received UN technical assistance in the areas of industrial 
development, technical education, primary production, and communication (Leng, 1977: 22, 
Soon, 1977: 68).  
 
6.3.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
During this period, the UN’s involvement in Southeast Asia centred on East Timor’s 
integration into Indonesia. In 1974, the Indonesian government invaded East Timor, 
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bombarding Suai, Betano, and Tiomar and using napalm and biological weapons, leading to 
the deaths of hundreds of East Timorese (Lawless, 1976: 956). The Indonesian government’s 
conduct clearly breached the UN Charter, but the Security Council called only twice for a 
withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the disputed region (Security Council Resolution 384 
in 1975 and Resolution 389 in 1976), and from these calls came nothing. The main cause of 
these tepid, ineffective steps was the Security Council’s most dominant power, the United 
States, which sought Indonesia’s support in the context of the Soviet–American rivalry 
(Howard, 2008: 269). Even, the United States Ambassador to Indonesia, David Newsome, 
stated that Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor should be effective and quick (Carey, 2008: 
349). Thus, despite passing the aforementioned resolutions, the Security Council failed to 
take substantial action that could have ended the Indonesia invasion. In the process, the UN 
effectively sacrificed East Timorese people’s lives and rights. 
 
6.3.1.2 From 1990 to 2002 
The end of the Cold War meant that inter-state conflicts were diminishing as an immediate 
threat to people’s safety and security. Intra-state disputes, transnational crimes (e.g., human 
and drug trafficking and terrorism), natural disasters, and financial crises became the UN’s 
focus regarding emerging threats to people. In Human Development Report 1994, the UN 
characterised the threats to people as distinctly various (UNDP, 1994: 2). Thus, in Southeast 
Asia, the UN addressed not only human-development issues but transnational crimes and 
economic instability, as well. In addition, with a decline in the barrier of ideological 
confrontation, the UN could strengthen its impartiality when handling freedom-from-fear 
issues.  
 
6.3.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
The scope of the freedom-from-want issues that the UN addressed in Southeast Asia between 
1990 and 2002 was broad. In 1994, the UNDP published the Human Development Report. 
The report emphasised the importance of the human-security concept and identified seven 
areas in which insecurities common to human beings often arise: economics, food, health, the 
environment, the personal, community, and politics (UNDP, 1994: 25-33). S. Neil 
MacFarland and Yuen Foong Khong argued that the 1994 Human Development Report has 
far-reaching influence: it shifted the central reference for security from states to individuals 
and it broadened the scope of security issues (Facfarlane and Khong, 2006: 145-50).  
In this context, we can find that the UN as an international organisation continued to 
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provide development aid to Southeast Asian countries, but the issues that the development 
plans covered were various, including combating transnational crime and coping with 
economic crisis in 1997. From 1990 to 2002, the UN continued to launch ASPs. In the fifth 
ASPs (1992–1996), the UN provided nearly US$1 million to the human-development 
program (ASEAN). The programme’s purpose was to promote people’s living standards and 
to reduce drug trafficking. The sixth ASP addressed mainly the problems resulting from 
1997’s financial crisis, which had dramatically degraded many Southeast Asian people’s 
living standards. The UNDP devoted US$1.7 million to facilitating the economic recovery in 
affected ASEAN countries and conducted a series of reforms in the financial sectors of such 
less-developed ASEAN members—as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (ASEAN).
  
6.3.1.2.2 Freedom from fear 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union that quickly followed the thawing rivalry between the 
U.S. and the Soviet bloc ended the possibility that Cold War antagonism would sabotage the 
UN’s handling of freedom-from-fear issues. As mentioned in chapter two’s comments on 
state actors (section 2.1.4.2), an advantage of regional and international organisations is their 
ability to collect funds and to harness manpower from individual states. Benefiting from this 
advantage, the UN from 1990 to 2002 was involved in Cambodian and East Timorese 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks. In Cambodia, after the pull-out of Vietnamese troops 
from Cambodia in September 1989, the UN held the Paris International Conference on 
Cambodia and adopted the Paris Agreement, which authorised UNTAC to conduct 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. The UN established a budget of US$2 billion 
and dispatched 16,000 troops, 3,000 police officers, and 3,000 civilian officials to the area 
(Jeldres, 1993: 106). In East Timor, according to Resolution 1264, the Security Council 
authorised the creation of INTERFET. Nearly 8,000 personnel, including military, medical, 
and engineering experts from five countries (Australia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand) joined the mission. Scholars agreed that the UN positively contributed to the peace 
process in Cambodia and East Timor, although violence continued to occur, including 
sporadic conflicts between peacekeeping forces and local insurgents (in Cambodia) and 
destruction of infrastructure by pro-Indonesian militia (East Timor). On the whole, large-
scale conflicts have dramatically wound down in Cambodia (Howard, 2008: 173), and 
peacekeeping operations in East Timor paved the way for the UN’s assumption of 
peacebuilding operations (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005b: 132). 
However, chapter two (section 2.1.4.2) mentioned that the UN must remain alert to the 
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possibility of significant technical problems in its rescue operations. In the Cambodian case, 
according to Berdal and Leifer, peacekeeping troops from various countries lacked 
compatible communication equipment, “standardized communications procedures and joint 
level planning before deployment” were conspicuously insufficient, and failure to use a 
common language plagued the flow of critical information among segments of the 
international contingent (Berdal and Leifer, 1996: 41, 50). In the East Timorese case, the 
international forces had difficulty contacting and communicating with one another, largely 
because of underdeveloped or damaged infrastructure (Smith, 2003: 62). And while 
conducting reconstruction tasks UN personnel found it difficult to communicate with local 
people, as most of them spoke Tetun rather than English (Ishizuka, 2003: 54).  
 
6.3.2 Exploration of the UN’s Strategies for the APSC 
6.3.2.1 The Motivations Underlying the UN’s Strategy 
The strategies employed by the UN in response to the creation of the APSC have centred 
chiefly on support the creation of the APSC and the motivations underlying the UN’s 
strategies have centred chiefly on strengthening the UN’s ties with ASEAN. Chapter VIII of 
the UN Charter states that participants in regional arrangements and agencies “shall make 
every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes” before the Security Council 
involves itself in the matter, and “the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such 
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority” (UN, June 
1945). This statement indicates that the UN should strengthen cooperation with regional 
organisations. Indeed, from 2002 to 2006, the UN General Assembly passed three resolutions 
(A/RES/57/35 of 2002,71 A/RES/59/4 of 2004,72 and A/RES/61/46 of 200673) whose content 
was to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN. However, the UN has received little cooperation 
from ASEAN regarding human-security issues, with the exception of ASPs and peacekeeping 
in Cambodia and East Timor. A report from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD 
Centre) argued that “cooperation between the two bodies lags far behind cooperation between 
the UN” and the African Union and the EU (HD Centre 2009: 5).  
The creation of the APSC gave the UN an opportunity to strengthen relations with 
ASEAN, because in the APSC’s blueprints, ASEAN pledges to address several categories of 
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 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/57/35&Lang=E 
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 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/59/4&Lang=E 
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 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/61/46&Lang=E 
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human insecurity and emphasised cooperation with the UN, particularly regarding security 
and peace issues (ASEAN, 2009a: 8, 11). The UN has established its resolve to support the 
creation of the APSC and has made related allocations of assistance and support available. At 
the second ASEAN–UN Summit, held in New York in September 2005, the UN agreed to 
cooperate with ASEAN on the matter of the following AC elements: the MDGs, poverty 
alleviation, prevention and control of infectious diseases, disaster management, transnational 
crimes, development and peace and security (ASEAN, September 2005). At the fourth 
ASEAN–UN Summit, held in Bali in November 2011, the two sides issued the Joint 
Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership between the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and the United Nations. According to this declaration, the UN’s assistance and 
cooperation regarding human-security elements in the AC would fall into four categories: 
political security (peace and security, including peacekeeping and peacebuilding), economics 
(the MDGs, narrowing the development gap among members), socio-cultural issues (rural 
development, poverty reduction and improvement of people’s living standards, prevention of 
HIV/AIDS), and cooperation between the ASEAN Secretariat and the UN Secretariat 
(ASEAN, November 2011b).  
 
6.3.2.2 The UN’s Strategies 
6.3.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
The UN has provided assistance to several freedom-from-want issues in the APSC and ASCC 
blueprints. Regarding the human-rights element in the APSC, the UN welcomed ASEAN’s 
contribution to regional human rights issues (Katsumata, 2009: 632), as Asia had not had a 
regional human-rights body before the creation of the AICHR in October 2009 (HD Cenre, 
2009: 14). Thus, the UN has been involved in the process of ASEAN’s promotion of human 
rights. For example, UN Women and UNICEF joined the ACWC in an effort to reduce 
violence against women and children. The purpose of this conference was to strengthen the 
ACWC’s engagement in the UN’s human-rights mechanism.  
The UN has been involved in the APSC’s efforts to alleviate poverty and promote 
people’s living standards. In order to help ASEAN create the APSC, the UNDP allocated 
US$1.45 million to the creation of the ASEAN–UNDP Partnership Facility (AUFP) in 2004. 
The purpose of this programme was to reduce poverty and narrow development gap between 
ASEAN developed members and ASEAN developing members through facilitating regional 
economic integration (ASEAN).  
In the area of natural disaster management, the UN and ASEAN in the third ASEAN–
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UN Summit agreed to strengthen cooperation and coordination between the UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the AHA Centre, and they issued the 
Joint Declaration on ASEAN–UN Collaboration in Disaster Management, whose main 
purpose was to create the ASEAN–UN Strategic Plan of Action on Disaster Management 
2011–2015 which would be the guideline for the two sides’ cooperative handling of natural 
disasters (UN, November 1, 2010).  
It should be noted here that the UN has implemented its strategies. As exemplified by 
the aforementioned cooperation, the UN has adopted a soft approach: focusing on providing 
experts and funding. The reason for the UN’s adoption of the soft approach concerned 
ASEAN’s unshakable adherence to the non-interference principle. The condition that UN 
assistance be tethered to human-rights improvements might have been objectionable to 
ASEAN members, hindering the UN’s efforts to strengthen its relationship with ASEAN. The 
HD Centre report stated that regarding the UN’s support of the human-rights element, “few 
ASEAN governments would welcome an intrusive human rights mechanism” (HD Centre 
2009: 14). Thus, we can see the “soft” nature of the UN approach. The soft approach has, to 
an extent, promoted ASEAN’s willingness to cooperate with the UN. Vietnamese UN 
Ambassador Le Luong Ming declared that “[ASEAN] cooperation between the United 
Nations and regional and subregional organisations is crucial and beneficial, not only to the 
safeguarding of peace and security but also to development” (Xinhua, January 14, 2010). 
 
6.3.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
The UN initially responded actively—some might say even intrusively—to the freedom-
from-fear issues. In point of fact, the UN was the first of ASEAN’s dialogue partners to 
express support for the creation of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. The UN Assistant 
Secretary-General Danilo Türk “expressed the United Nations Department of Political Affairs 
(UNDPA)’s readiness to solicit assistance from the United Nations Department for 
Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) if ASEAN decides to establish it” (ASEAN, February 
19, 2003). In the ninth ASEAN Summit, held in October 2003, the Indonesian government 
suggested creating the ASEAN Peacekeeping Force, a proposal supported by the UN. The 
Indonesian suggestion was rejected by ASEAN members. Vietnam argued that “it is too early 
to think of having regional peacekeepers,” and Singapore argued that “ASEAN is the wrong 
forum for peacekeeping, because it isn’t a defence or security organization” (Wain, 2004: 19). 
Among the many obstacles to creating the force was financial expense (Wain, 2004: 19). 
However, ASEAN’s insistence on the principle of non-interference has probably been the 
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main barrier (Askandar, 2005: 44). The ASEAN members worried that the regional 
peacekeeping force might undermine the principle of non-interference. Since the second 
ASEAN–UN Summit (ASEAN, September 2005, UN, November 1, 2010, ASEAN, 
November 2011a), the UN has changed its way of supporting the freedom-from-fear element 
in the APSC: UN seminars, workshops, and other training measures serving to strengthen 
ASEAN’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacity are just some examples of the UN’s more 
recently acquired soft approach. 
 
6.3.3 Summary 
Since the 1970s, the UN has been involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. The 
UN’s central motivation has been to enhance people’s living standards, safety, and security. 
However, in the freedom-from-fear area, a rivalry between the United States and the Soviet 
bloc prevented the UN from bringing justice to afflicted peoples in parts of Southeast Asia. In 
the post-Cold War era, the UN has emphasised human-security and has broadened the scope 
of UN involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-want issues. Also, the end of the US-
Soviet ideological confrontation permitted the UN to play a more impartial role in freedom-
from-fear issues than had generally been possible. In order to strengthen ASEAN’s capacity 
to protect people’s human security, the UN backed the regional organisation’s mission to 
create the APSC. The UN has provided assistance to projects supportive of human rights, 
natural-disaster management, living standards, and ASEAN members’ peacekeeping capacity. 
It is too early to conclude that the UN has substantially strengthened its relations with 
ASEAN, but ASEAN has been willing to cooperate with the UN on several noteworthy 
human-security issues. 
 
6.4 Concluding Remarks to this Chapter 
6.4.1 What Are Barriers to the Creation of the APSC? 
In chapter six, we reviewed ASEAN’s, the EU’s, and the UN’s involvement in Southeast 
Asian human-security issues. Earlier, in chapter two (section 2.1.4.2), we had observed that, 
along with advantages, certain disadvantages characterise regional and international 
organisations’ handling of human insecurities: ASEAN’s norms and identities have greatly 
impeded its ability to address human-security issues, including environmental sustainability, 
human rights, massacres, and haze pollution; the EU’s norms essentially ruled out improved 
relations with ASEAN; and the UN encountered technical problems when conducting 
peacekeeping operations in far-flung, technologically and infrastructurally challenging places 
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like Cambodia and East Timor. 
These three actors’ strategies for responding to the proposed creation of the APSC have 
been formally indistinguishable from one another: provide material or verbal support for the 
APSC’s creation. Nevertheless, the motivations underlying these strategies have varied 
somewhat from one actor to the next: ASEAN has expected to improve its handling of 
security issues and to enhance its regional influence; the EU has expected to diminish the 
effects of transnational crime on Europeans while improving relations with ASEAN; and the 
UN has expected simply to improve its relations with ASEAN.  
As mentioned in chapter two, norms have constituted a major obstacle to the realisation 
of these various expectations (section 2.1.4.2). Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has 
adopted its norms—the non-interference principle and the ASEAN Way—to address regional 
security issues. Despite planning to enhance its problem-solving capacity through the creation 
of the APSC, ASEAN has rested on its norms to address the issues that it enshrined in the 
APSC and ASCC blueprints. However, ASEAN’s modus operandi has not helped the regional 
organisation address human insecurities. This study has found that ASEAN’s capacity to 
address human-rights violations and natural disasters have been constrained by principle of 
the non-interference, enshrined as it is in the AICHR’s Terms of Reference and the 
declaration of the AADMER. In addition, this study has found that ASEAN has been 
anything but forthcoming regarding how it will address transnational crime, public-health 
threats, and unsustainable use and abuse of the environment. 
As mentioned in section 6.2.1.2, sine the 1990s, the EU has established and talked up 
its mission to promote and protect human rights. However, EU norms are different from 
ASEAN norms which treat national sovereignty as sacrosanct. The difference has led to 
diplomatic spats between the two regional entities regarding Myanmar’s woeful human-rights 
record. In order to protect European people from transnational crimes and strengthen its 
relations with ASEAN, the EU has supported the creation of the APSC. Interestingly, the EU 
has played down its norms and adopted a soft approach to getting and staying involved the 
creation of the APSC. 
 In avoiding a confrontation with the non-interference principle, the UN too has 
adopted a “diplomatic” approach to ASEAN. Early on, the UN actively provided assistance to 
the task of integrating into the APSC such human-security issues as the promotion and 
protection of human rights and the creation of regional peacekeeping forces. However, early 
on, ASEAN did not accept the UN’s efforts, mainly because the UN’s efforts challenged 
ASEAN’s non-interference principle. Like the EU, the UN has played down its norms and 
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has adopted a soft approach toward the APSC. Whether the EU’s and the UN’s approaches 
have been successful means to the desired end remains to be seen. One point is clear: ASEAN 
has accepted the EU’s and the UN’s assistance. 
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CHAPTER 7 NON-STATE ACTORS: CIVIL SOCIETY 
ORGANISATIONS 
As mentioned in chapter two’s commentary on non-state actors (section 2.1.4.3), a central 
motivation underlying the relevant non-state actors’ attitude to the human-security issues has 
been to improve people’s living standards and to help people overcome significant 
community-wide difficulties. However, between the 1970s and 1989, CSOs addressing 
Southeast Asian human-security issues were themselves the target of regional national 
governments’ repressive policies. Between 1990 and 2002, Southeast Asian governments 
tolerated CSOs, which could—in the absence of erstwhile governmental restrictions—
participate relatively freely in human-security issues. In particular, CSOs have proposed 
recommendations for the creation of the APSC but have had only a marginal influence. In this 
chapter, I will first review CSOs involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues from 
the 1970s to 2002 and the related problems besetting CSOs. In the very next section, I will 
analyse CSOs’ involvement in the creation of the APSC, focusing on their contributions to 
the project and their experience of various related obstacles. 
 
7.1 Historical Review: From the 1970s to 2002 
I have divided my historical review of relevant CSOs into two sections. Each one addresses 
how these diverse CSOs responded to Southeast Asian human-security issues in recent 
decades. The first section begins its review in the 1970s and continues through 1989; the 
second section picks up the review in 1990 and takes us through 2002. 
 
7.1.1 From the 1970s to 1989 
Between the 1970s and 1989, CSOs’ involvement in Southeast Asian human-security issues 
brought the organisations into direct conflict with Southeast Asian governments’ repressive 
policies.  
 
7.1.1.1 Freedom from Want 
During this period, CSOs’ involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-want issues led to 
conflicts between many of the organisations and repressive governments in the region. The 
reasons for the conflicts are not mysterious. For starters, the government of ASEAN’s 
original members feared communist expansion and were acutely aware that many CSOs 
represented workers, peasants, and nationalists whose thinking was leftist (Gerard, 2014: 52-
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3). Thus, in order to ensure regime stability and viability, member-states’ governments often 
unhesitatingly repressed CSOs’ activities. For example, in the Philippines, under Marcos, 
CSOs directly criticised and challenged Marcos’ policies, like martial law and land-grabbing, 
which had resulted unjust evictions of the ill-compensated powerless masses (Youngblood, 
1978: 508-10); in response, the Marcos government arrested and murdered a host of CSO 
workers, whom Marcos and his ilk regarded “as subversives and tools of the communists” 
(Youngblood, 1978: 508). Governments in Indochinese states feared the potential rise of a 
viable political opposition. CSOs tended to comprise a good number of anti-government 
dissidents and, thus, came under repressive state scrutiny (Gerard, 2014: 53-4). Taking the 
example of Cambodia, Kelly Gerard asserted that “space for civil society was limited”—a 
result of the government’s repressive policies (Gerard, 2014: 54). 
 
7.1.1.2 Freedom from Fear 
Few studies have examined CSOs’ involvement in Southeast Asian freedom-from-fear issues. 
One rare and noteworthy study by Barter in 2012, however, discusses how Oxfam Australia 
helped victims in Cambodia. Oxfam Australia donated food and rice seed to victims of the 
country’s upheaval, created infrastructure for the delivery of potable water, made health 
clinics available to many impoverished Cambodians, and provided many others with 
vocational training (Barter, May 2012). The historical evidence suggests that Oxfam Australia 
never made a priority of challenging a government’s policies and political system. In other 
words, Oxfam Australia kept a low-“political” profile (see section 2.1.4.3). The first task of 
Oxfam Australia was to “save lives before, during and after humanitarian crises.”74 Their 
activities would not pose a threat to any government’s viability, and thus, Oxfam Australia 
successfully circumvented obstacles to its goal of addressing freedom-from-fear issues. 
 
7.1.2 From 1990 to 2002 
From 1990 to 2002, the number of CSOs in Southeast Asia rapidly increased: the number of 
CSOs in Southeast Asia spiralled up from 6,558 to 11,270, of which Malaysia and Indonesia 
hosted a relative majority (Chandra, 2004: 159). Two factors can help explain the rapid 
growth of CSOs. First, ASEAN founding members have implemented democratic systems of 
government (Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand) or at least voiced support for 
democracy (Malaysia and Singapore), indicating that the leadership in these countries was 
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growing tolerant of divergent voices from diverse quarters in society. Lars Jørgensen noted 
that “the more legitimate and effective the state is, the more it can allow a strong civil society 
to develop” (Jørgensen, 1996: 37). Second, the governments of Indochinese states, although 
not going so far as to adopt political reforms, launched economic reforms based on liberal 
models. In Cambodia, Hun Sen’s government sought to attract foreign investment in the 
country’s beleaguered economy; the government of Laos transformed its collective economy 
into a liberal one in 1986; Myanmar’s military junta implemented a market economy 
nationwide, despite being the target of Western countries’ sanctions; and Vietnam adopted the 
market-oriented economic-reform policy known as Đổi Mới. When these governments 
implemented liberal economies, foreign CSOs were able to benefit from this liberalisation 
insofar as they could now gain entrance to these countries and directly address as-yet 
unresolved human-security problems (Gerard, 2014: 60). Of perhaps even greater importance 
was the assistance that these foreign CSOs provided to local CSOs (Landau, 2008: 247), 
which quite directly led to the development of several new CSOs.  
Many CSOs were involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues. First, despite 
being extraordinarily diverse in their structure and mission, these CSO usually operated 
according to modus operandi that directly challenged government policies, prioritising issues 
that were at the forefront of people’s concerns—not leaders’ concerns. As noted, Southeast 
Asian national governments have grown rather tolerant of CSOs’ activities and existence 
because political and economic liberalisation has been taking root in the countries. Of 
perhaps less but significant importance has been CSOs’ collective involvement in human-
security issues. This second factor merits further attention here. As mentioned in chapter 
two’s discussion of non-state actors (see section 2.1.4.3), it was not unusual for CSOs to face 
such difficulties as a lack of resources and a shortage of personnel necessary for a proper 
handling of human-security issues. From the early 1990s to 2002, CSO networks became 
ever more popular, as they permitted like-minded CSOs to address human-security issues 
under often powerful alliances.75 The key objective behind this trend was to improve CSOs’ 
communication technology. For example, the Internet simplified CSOs’ communications with 
one another, facilitating the development of CSO networks. Julie Gilson argued that the use 
of the Internet would quicken “the pace of social learning and development among” CSOs 
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 For example, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum-Asia) comprises nearly fifty 
Asian CSOs, many of which have their own official websites (Gilson, 2011: 136). Under the framework of 
Forum-Asia, CSOs have provided human-rights training and education to people in East Asia. 
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(Gilson, 2011: 135). By providing their constituent members with mutual financial and 
material assistance, CSO networks are likely to resolve or minimise many of the difficulties 
that individual CSOs face regarding shortages of resources and personnel. 
 
7.1.2.1 Freedom from Want 
CSOs’ direct and unified modus operandi are evident in the CSOs’ handling of freedom-
from-want issues during this period. In the 1990s, Indonesian forest fires jeopardised people’s 
health in neighbouring countries. Although ASEAN held meetings to discuss the problem and 
oversaw a series of agreements, like the Kuala Lumpur Accord on the Environment and 
Development in 1990 and the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution in 1995, 
transboundary haze pollution remained unresolved (Jones, 2004: 64-65). When the haze 
problem became more serious in 1997, CSOs created a cooperating network. They raised 
their concerns about ASEAN’s incompetence handling of the regional haze crisis and directly 
exerted pressure on ASEAN to put more effort into transboundary haze pollution (Aviel, 2000: 
21). CSOs’ involvement in the issue of haze pollution reveals that their modus operandi has 
been direct and unified. Joann Fagot Aviel argued that although CSOs’ involvement in 
addressing haze pollution did not immediately resolve the problem, their efforts “may help 
prevent a total neglect of environmental issues” (Aviel, 2000: 21).  
CSOs’ direct and unified modus operandi also presented themselves in human-rights 
issues. After ASEAN accepted Myanmar as a member, 46 CSOs from 20 countries issued the 
Alternative ASEAN Declaration on Burma. In this declaration, CSOs listed the Myanmar’s 
government many human-rights violations and openly opposed ASEAN’s enlargement 
through an extension of membership to Myanmar.76 In 1999, CSOs attending the ASEAN 
People’s Summit continued to express concerns about the human-rights situation in Myanmar. 
They asked ASEAN to review Myanmar’s membership and to provide assistance to displaced 
people in Myanmar (Aviel, 2000: 25). Again, CSOs’ involvement in the accession of 
Myanmar to ASEAN exemplifies their embrace of a direct and unified set of modus operandi. 
 
7.1.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
CSOs’ involvement in freedom-from-fear issues reflected these CSOs’ direct and unified 
modus operandi. Six CSOs in Forum-Asia addressed the massacre carried out by Indonesian 
government forces in East Timor. The CSOs attempted to hold an Asia Pacific Conference on 
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East Timor to discuss the problem, but met with government harassment (Aviel, 2000: 25). 
When the conference was first held in Manila, the Indonesian government threatened to sever 
its diplomatic relationships with the Philippines. When the conference was held again, this 
time in Kuala Lumpur in 1996, the Malaysian government arrested participants. Despite 
government obstacle, CSOs jointly condemned the Indonesian atrocities and emphasised the 
East Timorese people’s right to self-determination. In the case of the atrocities in East Timor, 
CSOs reasserted their use of direct and unified modus operandi. 
 
7.2 Exploration of CSOs’ Strategies for the APSC 
7.2.1 CSOs’ Approaches to Strategy Implementation 
From the preceding, we know that Southeast Asian governments have been a key factor in 
CSOs’ involvement in human-security there. It is reasonable to say that the more democratic 
a Southeast Asian government is, the more space CSOs have to address human-security 
issues in the country. AC-related documents show that ASEAN condoned CSOs’ participation 
in the community-building process: in the ASCC Plan of Action (PoA), ASEAN formally 
agreed that CSOs should play a role in the AC’s development (ASEAN, 2004); and the 
ASEAN Charter approves of CSOs’ role in ASEAN integration and community building 
(ASEAN, 2007: 4). Indeed, ASEAN’s openness to certain CSOs has been instrumental in 
their involvement specifically in the APSC-building process. Some important questions, of 
course, arise as regards this process of participation: What strategies have CSOs adopted for 
dealing with the building process? What motivations underlain these strategies? And what 
barriers have CSOs encountered in the building process? 
In this building process, CSOs’ strategies—through diverse in form—have functioned 
to support the creation of the APSC. The motivations underlying these strategies have centred 
on improving Southeast Asians’ human security. Theoretically, according to Mary Kaldor, an 
important sub-set of this motivation has been a desire to resolve significant community-wide 
problems and to improve people’s living standards (Kaldor, 2003: 16-7). It should not be 
surprising that CSOs’ motivations have been to improve people’s human security. Perhaps, 
what is less clear—and what is worth exploring in some detail here—is how CSOs have 
implemented their strategy.  
The implementation of CSO strategies has been based on dual channels: use of 
ASEAN-recognised channel and use of CSO-led channels.77 The ASEAN People’s Assembly 
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(APA) is an ASEAN-recognised channel (ASEAN, November 2004: 30). The original 
concept of the APA is attributable to Thai Foreign Minister Kasem Kasemsri, who suggested 
that ASEAN create a “congress of ASEAN peoples” and who assigned to the ASEAN-ISIS 
the task of implementing his concept (Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 577). ASEAN-ISIS launched 
the first APA in 2000 and launched the last APA in 2009. Beginning with the third APA, 
CSOs used the APA as a forum for proposing recommendations regarding human-security 
issues in the APSC’s and the ASCC’s blueprints. ASEAN-ISIS selected the APA participants, 
which included CSOs, think-tanks, business officials and high-level government officials.  
The ACSC is a CSO-led channel. The ACSC was organised by the SAPA network, 
which comprised precisely 100 CSOs, and had the support of Malaysian Prime Minister 
Abdullah Badawi. Since the launch of the first ACSC in 2005, CSOs have used this channel 
to voice their recommendations regarding the human-security issues in the APSC’s and 
ASCC’s in the blueprints. In addition, CSOs have tried to organise the ACSC so that it would 
take place in parallel with the annual ASEAN Summit. The ACSC has been an open 
conference, as any type of CSO may participate in it (Gerard, 2013: 421).  
However, CSOs’ strategies, which have been based on ASEAN-recognised and CSO-
led channels, have encountered several noteworthy problems. First, these two channels have 
permitted CSOs to wield only a marginal influence on the creation of the APSC, because 
ASEAN has excluded CSOs from community-building processes. CSOs’ modus operandi 
constitutes the key determinant in whether or not ASEAN has tamped down on the CSOs’ 
roles in community-building processes. In general, CSOs have selected modus operandi that 
most accurately give voice to people’s aspirations and concerns and that most effectively 
address pressing difficulties in people’s lives. CSOs have challenged and criticised ASEAN’s 
policies. Non-democratic ASEAN members, like Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, 
and to a lesser extent democratic ASEAN members, like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
originated from Kelly Gerard’s book ASEAN’s Engagement of Civil Society. In it, she dually categorized the 
contexts in which CSOs would join ASEAN decision-making processes: “participation in spaces established by 
ASEAN” and “participation in spaces recognised by ASEAN.” CSOs have been involved in the APSC’s human-
security issues mainly by way of the APA and the ACSC, which Kelly Gerard categorized as “participation in 
spaces recognised by ASEAN.” I agree with the assertion that ASEAN has recognised APA activities. Although 
not a sincere supporter of the APA, ASEAN has refrained from repressing APA activities. However, I disagree 
with the assertion that ASEAN has recognised ACSC: ASEAN members have adopted various means of 
discouraging ACSC activities. Not in contention, however, is the assertion that a CSO network has organised 
and led ACSC. Thus, in this section, I categorise the ACSC as a CSO-led channel. 
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Philippines, have contested CSOs’ modus operandi. ASEAN members have thwarted the 
activities of a long list of CSOs vis-à-vis the ACSC. Thus, although CSOs involved in various 
human-security issues have had a channel for proposing recommendations, ASEAN members 
have rejected with swaths of them. 
The second noteworthy problem besetting CSOs in this regard is their distrust or dislike 
of one another—mutual suspicions can be counter-productive and are particularly tangible in 
the APA. As mentioned in the previous section, the creation of a CSO network helped the 
CSOs overcome problems like insufficient resource—problems that would be insurmountable 
for CSOs acting individually. The CSO network, however, has given rise to problems. For 
example, CSOs differ from one another regarding their perspectives on how best to address 
issues, how best to manage agendas, and which issues merit discussion. In fact, it has not 
been unusual for CSOs’ personnel to distrust each other, even though they may belong to a 
common network. When a CSO network comprises only a few organisations (as is the case 
with the previous section’s cited examples), strengthened communications can diminish these 
problems of contentious distrust. However, the APA differed from small CSO network. There 
are over 200 CSOs in the APA and this sheer number makes the resolution of intra-
organisational strife highly problematic. In the APA, discrepancies regarding organising the 
APA agenda among members’ positions led to the termination of the APA (Gerard, 2013: 415-
6). 
 
7.2.2 CSOs’ Strategies 
7.2.2.1 Freedom from Want 
CSOs have proposed their recommendations for the APSC’s freedom-from-want issues by 
using the platforms of the APA and the ACSC, but neither platform could serve as an 
effective conduit for these recommendations. 
In the APA, CSOs failed to exercise substantive influence on the freedom-from-want 
issues. Two central objectives underlay CSOs’ creation of the APA: promotion of “greater 
awareness of an ASEAN Community” and assistance “in the building of an ASEAN 
Community of caring societies as sought by ASEAN Vision 2020” (cited from Caballero-
Anthony, 2004: 577-8). At the third through sixth APA gatherings, the most ardently 
discussed theme concerned ASEAN’s creation of the AC.78 The freedom-from-want issues 
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 The titles of these gatherings were “Towards an ASEAN Community of Caring Societies,” “Towards a 
People-Centred Development in the ASEAN Community,” “The Role of the People in Building an ASEAN 
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that the CSOs discussed at the APA gatherings included empowerment of people (e.g. “the 
role of the people in setting ASEAN’s agenda,” “the power of women and their 
empowerment,” “the role of civil society”), and human rights (e.g., “the possibility of a 
regional human rights mechanism”), and environmental and poverty issues (e.g., “efforts to 
address poverty” and “the limits and opportunities of environmental management”) 
(Caballero-Anthony, 2004: 579).  
However, the APA was able to secure only marginal influence on the APSC’s freedom-
from-want issues, and two factors go far in explaining this general failure. First, ASEAN 
members were reluctant to support the APA. Although the APA counted among its members 
some high-level ASEAN officials, such as ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino and 
ASEAN Deputy Secretary-General Wilfredo V. Viullacorta, most ASEAN officials had no 
interest in joining the APA. Beginning with the fourth APA gathering, ASEAN required some 
of its low-ranking officials to join the APA and ASEAN opposed the APA’s efforts to establish 
“an interface meeting that would create the opportunity for dialogue between officials and 
APA participants” (Gerard, 2014: 112). Insufficient channels for communication between 
ASEAN members and CSOs could result in a situation where ASEAN would, unknowingly 
and to its own detriment, neglect CSOs’ worthy recommendations. Thus, the APA operated in 
a context where CSOs issued recommendations that ASEAN members could consider and 
either accept or reject as they saw it. 
The second reason is that CSOs in the APA did not trust each other. The creator of the 
APA, ASEAN–ISIS, has had close ties to ASEAN member-states (Dosch, 2008: 533, Gerard, 
2013: 416). In addition, ASEAN–ISIS was able to select CSOs that would join in the APA. 
“ASEAN–ISIS’ regulation of CSO participation” (Gerard, 2013: 416) in the APA transformed 
ASEAN–ISIS into a “gatekeeper” (Collins, 2008: 322). From CSOs’ perspectives, ASEAN–
ISIS was representative of ASEAN rather than of Southeast Asians. Thus, CSOs in the APA 
were suspicious of ASEAN–ISIS.  
The other channel through which CSOs can communicate with ASEAN is the ACSC. 
Since 2005, when CSOs created the ACSC, it has been involved in the APSC’s freedom-
from-want issues. Before ASEAN ratified the ASEAN Charter, the ACSC’s main organiser, 
SAPA, submitted proposals to the EPG regarding each pillar of the AC (The EPG was 
responsible for drafting the ASEAN Charter). SAPA pointed out that the blueprint of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Community of Caring and Sharing Societies,” and “ASEAN at 40: Realising the People’s Expectations” (Gerard, 
2004: 110-1). 
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APSC had contradicted itself. The gist of the contradiction was this: ASEAN had stated that 
the APSC process “shall be guided by well-established principles of non-interference and 
respect for national sovereignty,” but ASEAN had also stated that “ASEAN shall not condone 
undemocratic regimes” (Đặng, 2008: 21). 79  Regarding the AEC, SAPA suggested that 
ASEAN should achieve “redistributive justice, poverty eradication, and growth equity and 
non-discrimination” when ASEAN members strives to strengthen the economy (Đặng, 2008: 
21). Regarding the ACSC, “SAPA urged for a people-centred and people-empowered ASEAN 
community with the recognition of local culture, language, and heritage” (Đặng, 2008: 21). 
Regarding human rights, SAPA suggested that ASEAN should create a regional human-rights 
body responsible for monitoring, investigating, and reporting the human-rights situation in 
Southeast Asia (Đặng, 2008: 22). Regarding environmental issues, SAPA suggested that 
ASEAN create the fourth pillar—the ASEAN Environmental Community. Regarding 
people’s empowerment, people should have the right to vote on the ASEAN Charter.  
Clearly, ASEAN adopted none of SAPA’s suggestions: the principle of non-interference 
and respect for national sovereignty are enshrined in the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN, 2007: 5); 
the ASEAN Charter and the APSC blueprints have had no provision for punishing non-
compliant members; some ASEAN members like Laos and Vietnam have failed to respect the 
culture of their minorities; ASEAN created a human-rights body, but it has lacked teeth; 
ASEAN has not considered the ASEAN Environmental Community to be the fourth pillar of 
the AC; and Southeast Asian people have not had a right to vote on the ASEAN Charter. 
Clearly, the ACSCs’ recommendation had limited influence on the APSC’s handling of 
freedom-from-want issues. In fact, CSOs in the ACSC had higher expectations for the 
ACSC’s inputs than for the APA’s inputs, because the main organiser of the ACSC was not a 
group of ASEAN-supported non-governmental entities but SAPA, which constitutes a CSO 
network. Thus, the ACSC could avoid the problem of CSOs’ mutual distrust within a CSO 
network. However, the ACSC encountered the same problems as those encountered by like 
the APA, having to do chiefly with ASEAN government’s obstructionism. 
When we consider how ASEAN members prevented the ACSC’s activities, we can 
hardly be surprised that ASEAN rejected CSOs recommendations regarding the APSC’s 
freedom-from-want element. At the second and third ACSC gatherings held in the Philippines 
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 The statement from the Malaysian representative at the EPG Tan Sri Musa Hitam accepted SAPA’s point. 
Musa stated that “I would think yes it [the principle of non-interference] would be revised. If you look at the 
current situation, there are contradictions as on one hand you respect sovereignty and non-interference while on 
the other hand you say you must behave yourself” (The Star, September 12, 2007). 
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and Singapore in December 2006 and November 2007, the Filipino and Singaporean 
governments refused to endorse the ACSC and refused to join the interface meeting between 
ASEAN and CSOs (Gerard, 2014: 118). At the fifth ACSC gathering, held in Thailand in 
October 2009, the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Singapore 
“rejected their civil society representatives that had been elected to participate through ACSC 
processes” (Gerard, 2014: 119). The CSOs representing Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand 
walked out of the conference in protest against those governments’ non-democratic policies. 
At the eighth ACSC gathering held in Cambodia in March 2012, the Cambodian government 
created the ASEAN People’s Forum (APF), whose function was to encourage the ACSC’s 
CSOs to participate in the APF, thereby further weakening the ACSC’s influence. In addition, 
the Lucky Star Hotel in Cambodia Phnom Penh, where the ACSC planned to hold its 
workshops, threatened to cut power to conference rooms and to change padlocks on 
conference rooms if the ACSC held workshops at the establishment (Gerard, 2014: 121). 
CSOs in the ACSC suspected that the Cambodian government was the mastermind behind 
objections to the ACSC’s activities (Gerard, 2014: 121). Interestingly, the workshop topics 
that the ACSC planned to discuss were sensitive issues, including the human-rights situation 
in Myanmar and land grabbing throughout Southeast Asia.  
A previous section in this chapter mentioned that since the early 1990s, CSOs have had 
more chances than in the period between the 1970s and 1989 to express concerns about 
human-security issues because ASEAN members have grown increasingly tolerant of CSO 
activities. Moreover, ASEAN recognised the effective role of CSOs in the process of 
community-building. So why did ASEAN member reject CSOs’ recommendations regarding 
the APSC’s freedom-from-want element and adopt various means to discourage CSO 
activities? The main reason for this rejection was that most of the ACSC’s freedom-from-
want recommendations were so contentious that they challenged not only ASEAN’s modus 
operandi but also ASEAN members’ policies. The principle of non-interference has shielded 
ASEAN members, in particular ASEAN new comers, from Western governments’ criticism 
of the members’ sometimes woeful human-rights records. In addition, no ASEAN members 
have been willing to change ASEANs’ consultative process from a top-down to a bottom-up 
one, because this change would essentially invite more and more CSOs into the ASEAN 
decision-making process, where they would undoubtedly challenge ASEAN policies. Thus, 
removal of the principle of non-interference, people’s vote for the ASEAN Charter, and 
creation of a powerful human-rights body have been contentious issues for ASEAN members. 
Both non-democratic and post-authoritarian ASEAN members have roundly rejected CSOs’ 
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recommendations in these regards. 
 
7.2.2.2 Freedom from Fear 
CSOs’ influence on the APSC’s handling of freedom-from-fear issues has also been marginal. 
The first reason for this lack of influence has been rooted in how CSOs’ networks raise 
concerns about these issues. In the APA, CSOs have never discussed freedom-from-fear 
issues, such as peacekeeping operations and the RtoP. In the ACSC, freedom-from-fear 
issues—although discussed—have remained unimportant topics relative to such other topics 
as human rights. So far, no studies have discussed why CSOs have neglected the APSC’s 
freedom-from-fear element. One possibility is that—both the APA and the ACSC have 
gathered together a huge number of CSOs, so consensus among them may be highly difficult 
to reach regarding the prioritisation of issues. 
The second reason for the aforementioned lack of influence has been the series of 
hurdles that ASEAN members have erected to destabilise CSOs. In 2009, ASEAN created a 
chance for CSOs to discuss the AC’s freedom-from-fear issues, but not through the ACSC 
mechanism. In February 2009, the ADMM adopted the Concept Paper of ASEAN Defence 
Establishment and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Cooperation on Non-Traditional 
Security.80 The paper described CSOs as indispensable actors in the effort to achieve freedom 
from fear: 
 
CSOs have played a major role in contributing assistance and worked closely with the 
people at all levels on non-traditional security issues. Generally, they often have strong 
links with community groups in developing countries, and they often work in areas 
where government-to-government aid is not possible … Appropriate CSOs 
participation and involvement, in a value added manner, have also contributed to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector’s work and the betterment of people 
and society. In the future, this trend of CSOs involvement will continue to rise 
(ASEAN).  
 
The ASEAN paper points to a strong likelihood that CSOs in the future would make greater 
and greater contributions to ASEAN’s handling of freedom-from-fear issues. However, in 
                                                 
80
 In this concept paper, freedom-from-fear issues like post-conflict peacebuilding fall under the category of 
non-traditional issues. 
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practice, CSOs’ influence has remained distinctly limited. For example, ASEAN stated in the 
concept paper that “the CSOs should be legalised and recognised by local or state 
government” (ASEAN), and this seemingly minor point is crucial, as it indicates that without 
ASEAN member-states’ consent, CSOs shall be barred from the freedom-from-fear 
discussion. 
All in all, CSOs’ marginal influence in this sphere of discussion has come down to the 
sheer contentiousness of freedom-from-fear. From ASEAN members’ perspective, the 
successful implementation of the APSC’s freedom-from-fear element can take place only if 
ASEAN members first water down its principle of non-interference. In defense of their 
sovereignty, ASEAN members have rejected—and will continue to reject any element that 
undercuts the importance of the principle of non-interference. The ASEAN members’ resolve 
to defend the principle of non-interference was manifested in the workshop on ASEAN 
Defence Establishments and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) on Non-Traditional Security. 
In this workshop, held in June 2009, ASEAN selected both the CSO participants and the 
discussion topics. Such strategies reveal, in short, that ASEAN has been controlling CSOs’ 
role in shaping the APSC’s treatment of freedom-from-fear issues. ASEAN quite predictably 
picked complaisant CSOs and benign discussion topics for the workshop in question (topics 
like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief won out over topics like peacekeeping 
operations or the RtoP). ASEAN members have exercised nearly total control over the 
handling of the APSC’s freedom-from-fear issues, and as a consequence of this oversight, 
CSOs’ recommendations on these issues have been marginal. 
 
7.3 Concluding Remarks to this Chapter 
As mentioned in chapter two’s discussion of non-state actors (see section 2.1.4.3), CSOs have 
advantages and disadvantages when addressing human-security issues. One advantage is that 
many CSOs are less inclined to follow national interests than are state actors. Thus, 
sometimes CSOs can implement their programmes more efficiently than state actors can. 
Exemplifying this trend is the case of Oxfam Australia’s engagement in Cambodia during the 
reign of the murderous Khmer Rouge regime. A leading disadvantage is that CSOs usually 
lack resources. However, the effect of this disadvantage on CSOs’ activities worldwide has 
declined owing to technological advances we can see that since the post-Cold War, CSOs 
involved in Southeast Asian human-security issues have linked up and have collectively 
voiced their concerns and goals, oftentimes by virtue of new technology. At the same time, 
Southeast Asian governments that once strictly imposed repressive policies on CSOs have, in 
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the post-Cold War era, followed paths toward political and economic liberalisation. These 
same governments have taken a correspondingly liberal view of more and more CSOs. 
Benefiting from governmental tolerance of their activities, CSOs have rapidly grown in 
number throughout much of the region. 
Dealing, as they have been, with the creation of the APSC, ASEAN member-states’ 
governments have largely agreed to the premise that some CSOs should play a role in the 
community-building process. And CSOs have been actively involved in freedom-from-want 
and freedom-from-fear issues in the APSC’s blueprint. Nevertheless, CSOs’ involvement in 
the APSC has encountered two barriers: mutual-distrust among CSOs and ASEAN’s non-
interference principle. Mutual distrust among CSOs worsened as a direct result of their 
interactions with one another in the APA, and once divided, CSOs were less effective at 
giving voice to their human-security concerns. In addition, ASEAN has rejected ACSC’s 
human-security recommendations while ASEAN members have individually discouraged 
related CSO activities, because the issues raised by ACSC have been sensitive and at times so 
contentious as to threaten adherence to the non-interference principle. In this context, 
although ASEAN has recognised CSOs’ role of integrating recommendations into the APSC 
building process, the influence of these recommendations within the actual process have been 
marginal at best. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
In 1967, ASEAN was created by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand. This inter-governmental organisation has dealt with regional political issues and 
has followed, as its modus operandi: the principle of non-interference and the ASEAN Way. 
In this way, ASEAN has generally avoided inter-state conflict in Southeast Asia while 
nonetheless failing to address several significant types of human insecurity. Recent economic 
downturns, health crises, and natural disasters have prompted ASEAN to improve its 
handling of such threats to human well-being. ASEAN’s fundamental push in this direction 
has been the decision to create the APSC. However, by using a human-security analytical 
framework, this study has identified several barriers to ASEAN’s creation of the APSC. In 
this chapter, which concludes the study, I will present its research contribution, review its 
research findings, explore its research limitations, and suggest directions for future research. 
 
8.1 Research Contributions of this Study 
The first contribution made by this study is its identification and clarification of discrepancies 
between mainstream IR theories and Southeast Asian security culture. From the 1950s to the 
late 1990s, explanations of security issues were dominated by state-centric IR theories, 
through which one would strive to understand states’ behaviour: why states launch wars, why 
states develop their military, and why states cooperate with each other despite the chaos 
sometimes inherent in a given international set up. These state-centric IR theories, including 
realism and constructivism, also became popular among scholars exploring Southeast Asian 
security issues. 
Realism and constructivism indeed underlay successful explorations of Southeast Asian 
security issues from the Cold War period to the late 1990s, because both realism and 
constructivism generated theoretical discourses in line with Southeast Asia’s security cultures 
during those decades. From the Cold War period to the late 1990s, Southeast Asian countries 
were concerned mainly with national-security threats involving other states’ aggressive 
policies and behaviours. And Southeast Asian countries addressed state-sourced threats by 
pursuing balances of power and by developing norms and identities. According to realism and 
constructivism, the primary source of threats is the state, the state is the actor best capable of 
addressing threats, and the typical state combats threats by establishing a balance of power 
and developing norms and identities. 
However, security culture in Southeast Asia is not static as I mentioned in chapter one 
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(1.3.1.2.2). This study argued on evidence that Southeast Asian security culture has gradually 
shifted from state-centric to people-centred ways of thinking. Under the new Southeast Asian 
security culture, threats come from unpredictable phenomena, such as pandemic diseases, 
natural disasters, and economic crises, and from sometimes slightly less unpredictable non-
state actors, such as religious secessionists. In addition, the actors addressing threats comprise 
both state and non-state actors. The new Southeast Asian security culture rocked the 
foundations of both realism and constructivism, which declare that threats arise only from 
states and that states are the only actors capable of addressing threats successfully.  
The APSC is the product of the new Southeast Asian security culture. There are three 
discrepancies between previously cited the mainstream theories and the APSC. The first 
discrepancy is that the target of the APSC is the realisation of a people-oriented ASEAN, 
whereas realism and constructivism focus only on the state rather than people. The second 
discrepancy is that state and non-state actors have been involved in the APSC-building 
process, whereas realism and constructivism recognise only state as the type of actor 
equipped to address threats. The third discrepancy is that the threats that ASEAN has planned 
to address in the APSC are mainly non-state threats, whereas neither realism nor 
constructivism has ever prioritised non-state threats over state threats.  
What we need is an in line with this new Southeast Asian security culture, and 
perhaps—as I contend—the human-security concept can lead us to just such an approach. 
Three qualities of the human-security concept fit with the new Southeast Asian security 
culture. First, in the human-security concept, the security referent is human beings. Second, 
the human-security concept recognises that origins of threats are various. Third, in the 
human-security concept, the types of actors addressing threats should encompass state actors 
and non-state actors. The human-security concept, in sum, is a highly useful—and perhaps 
even the most suitable—approach to exploring the security issues under the new Southeast 
Asian security culture including the APSC, which is people-oriented, characterises origins of 
threats as various, and regards non-state actors as well as state actors as critical factors in 
addressing insecurities. 
The second contribution of this study is to transform the human-security concept into a 
human-security theory. Although the concept of human security has attracted criticism, Lam 
Peng Er argued that “we do not necessarily ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’ just 
because certain concepts are deemed to be less than clear or useful to everyone” (Lam, 2006: 
145). I agree with his statement. Indeed, the concept of human security has changed our 
perception of exploring security issues: the security referent is human beings and the role of 
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the state is to protect people within the state’s borders or to assist people outside the borders. 
However, the human-security concept, since its emergence in the mid-1990s, has been 
uniquely a ‘concept’ and never an applicable ‘theoretical approach’, and this fact goes far in 
explaining why many scholars who have analysed human security (i.e., the safety and well-
being of people) have done so on the basis of the human-security concept rather than a 
human-security theory: quite simply no one has ever drawn up a human-security theory. For 
the present study, I have theorised the human-security concept by way of a five-step process 
and, finally, created a human-security theoretical approach: the security referent is human 
beings, the threats to human beings come from freedom from want and freedom from fear, 
human development programmes and humanitarian intervention are the means to address 
insecurities arising from freedom from want and freedom from fear, and individuals, states 
actors, and non-state actors are the essential elements functioning to ensure human security.  
 
8.2 Research Findings of this Study 
By using this new theoretical human-security approach, the current study made six significant 
findings regarding Southeast Asia’s new security culture as it is manifested in the APSC. The 
first finding concerns individual actors: Southeast Asians. I conducted a questionnaire-survey, 
the results of which show that not many respondents were familiar with the creation of the 
AC. Of the 120 respondents, only 32 (27%) knew that ASEAN will create the AC by 2015 
and only 4 could identify the basic characteristics of the AC. These numbers indicate that 
ASEAN has failed to communicate to Southeast Asians the nature of the APSC.  
 Three sets of results show that many respondents were not satisfied with their human-
security condition. First, 77 respondents (64%) felt that their governments did not provide 
enough human security. These respondents complained that their governments failed to 
address the problems of medical care, environmental degradation, and poverty. Second, 52 
respondents (43%) pointed to a personal lack of adequate human rights, citing the freedom of 
religion and the freedom of expression as the two most troubling types of personally 
experienced human-rights violations. The final result shows that 62 respondents (52%) did 
not have confidence in their government’s ability to manage natural disasters. They pointed 
out that the barriers preventing their governments from effectively addressing natural 
disasters were corruption, inexperience, and material deficiencies in government. According 
to these results, we can reasonably conclude that ASEAN has done a poor job of countering 
human insecurities experienced at least by the respondents. We can also see that CSOs and 
media outlets have criticised ASEAN for failing to develop a people-oriented AC. However, I 
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argue that individuals should bear a personal responsibility to protect and promote their one 
human security. Please recall an important observation I mentioned in chapter two (see 
section 2.1.4.1): the better the understanding that people have of how state actors and CSOs 
can be beneficial, the greater the possibility that the organisations can successfully address 
human insecurity. 
A second significant finding is that regarding the creation of the APSC, ASEAN 
member-states fall into one of two groups: the democratic group (ASEAN’s founding 
members) and the non-democratic group (ASEAN’s new-comers), which has prevented 
ASEAN from achieving people-oriented target. Members in the democratic group have 
actively supported and provided assistance to the task of creating the APSC, but the members 
of the non-democratic group have effectively prevented ASEAN from addressing sensitive 
issues that, if openly explored, would likely undermine the stability and viability of various 
state regimes. Divisions among ASEAN’s member-states have stunted ASEAN’s proposed 
adoption of a more people-oriented set of targets. The creation of the AICHR best exemplifies 
this trend: members in the non-democratic group opposed the AICHR’s exercise of real 
power; thus, the AICHR has been nothing more than a regional human-rights body that, 
limited to promoting people’s human rights, is wholly incapable of protecting them. 
A third significant finding in the current study is that external powers have supported 
the creation of the APSC in order to achieve their own national interests, but the Chinese 
government’s involvement in the APSC has resulted in several human insecurities. In chapter 
five, we learned that the motivations of Australia, China, Japan, and the U.S. in response to 
the creation of the APSC have centred either on expanding the countries’ respective spheres 
of influence in Southeast Asia (China, Japan, and the U.S.) or on protecting the given 
country’s citizens from transnational crimes (Australia). In this context, each external power 
has supported and provided assistance to the creation of the APSC. However, as mentioned in 
chapter two (see section 2.1.3), when state actors launch human-development programmes, it 
is likely that the programmes may result in other human insecurities. We find that in Yunnan 
Province and the downstream Mekong riparian states, some of the Chinese government’s 
human-development programmes, such as the creation of dams, have produced several 
daunting sources of human insecurity. 
A fourth significant finding here is that even though ASEAN has pledged to address 
several human-security issues in the blueprints of the APSC and the ASCC, ASEAN’s ability 
to address these issues has been limited. Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has adopted its 
norms and identities—the non-interference principle and the ASEAN Way—to address 
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regional security issues. Regarding the creation of the APSC, ASEAN’s modus operandi has 
remained based on its norms and identities. However, ASEAN’s modus operandi has 
prevented it from addressing several human-security issues: (1) The non-interference 
principle being embedded in the AICHR’s Terms of Reference, the AICHR has lacked the 
power to investigated human-rights violations satisfactorily. (2) ASEAN is at risk of lagging 
in its response to natural disasters because, in line with the spirit of the non-interference 
principle, “external assistance or offers of assistance shall only be provided upon the request 
or with the consent of the affected party” (ASEAN, July 2005). And (3) ASEAN’s reliance on 
the slow, non-binding consultative process of the ASEAN Way when addressing human-
security threats has prevented ASEAN from detailing which agencies in member-states 
should conduct cooperative training and intelligence operations, where ASEAN will acquire 
resources for funding and equipment, how ASEAN can overcome inter-member wealth and 
human-capital inequities, and how ASEAN will punish members who do not adhere to its 
binding decisions, which are few in number as noted. 
A fifth significant finding is that the EU and the UN have adopted a soft approach to 
being involved in the creation of the APSC. As mentioned in chapter six (see sections 6.2 and 
6.3), the EU’s and the UN’s norms emphasise the promotion and protection of human security 
including human rights.  These norms soured the two organisations’ diplomatic relationships 
with ASEAN, most notably in the case of the EU. In order to improve relationships with 
ASEAN, the EU and the UN played down their norms and adopted a soft approach to 
handling the creation of the APSC. 
A sixth significant finding from the current study is that only marginal spaces exist in 
which non-state actors can be involved in the creation of the APSC. This finding is somewhat 
curious for two reasons: first, in the ASEAN Charter and the blueprints of the APSC and the 
ASCC, ASEAN has officially recognised CSOs’ role in the APSC-building process; and 
second, technological advances have ensured that most CSOs are not lacking for resources 
with regard to involvement in the creation of the APSC. However, for ASEAN members, 
issues raised by CSOs have been sensitive and challenged ASEAN’s non-interference 
principle. In order to defend its non-interference principle, some ASEAN members have 
hindered CSOs’ participation in the APSC-building process—hence, the marginality of CSOs’ 
role in this process. 
 
8.3 Research Limitations of this Study 
As with any study, the one here has its fair share of limitations. By considering them, we can 
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better gauge the many strengths of this study and we can identify directions in which future 
research should contribute to the literature, perhaps in part on the shoulders of this project. A 
limitation of the current study is the rudimentary status of my proposed human-security 
theory. I have used this new human-security theory to good effect in exploring the creation of 
the APSC, but the theory does not address several important questions related to human-
security issues. For example, which human-security issues are the most critical ones to 
human beings? Why are democratic and semi-democratic states likely to fail in their efforts to 
address some human insecurity? Thus, although highly useful in analysing different actors’ 
responses to the creation of the APSC, the new theory did not permit this study to identify 
which human-security issues are the most critical ones besetting Southeast Asians and could 
not explain why even the Indonesia and Malaysian governments, which have actively 
supported the creation of the APSC, have resoundingly failed to address several pressing 
domestic human insecurities, such as land-grabbing (Indonesia) and sharp incursions into 
religious freedom (Malaysia).  
Another limitation is that my proposed human-security theory does not clearly explain 
the relations between the freedom-from-want issues and the freedom-from-fear issues. In fact, 
I contend that the issues of freedom from want and the issues of freedom from fears are 
causally related to each other. People’s lack of freedom from want may lead to their adoption 
of radical means to gain freedom from want, resulting in freedom-from-fear problems, such 
as civil wars. The areas or states that have freedom-from-fear problems usually have 
freedom-from-want problems, such as famine, low living standards, and human trafficking. 
In order to create an applicable human-security theory, I artificially separated freedom-from-
want issues and freedom-from-fear issues from each other. This separation has helped me 
clarify how each analysed type of actor had been responding and might respond to different 
human-security issues and why each actor has had unique response to freedom-from-want 
and freedom-from-fear issues. However, because the proposed human-security theory does 
not address the relationship between freedom-from-want and freedom-from-fear issues, both 
my freedom-from-want section and my freedom-from-fear section in each of five consecutive 
chapters (chapters three through seven) lack any reference to the aforementioned causal links. 
The final theoretical limitation I would like to mention here is that my proposed 
human-security theory does not identify the extent to which state actors play important roles 
in human-security issues. As the foundation of my theory, the human-security concept has 
prompted many scholars to recognise that state actor can help achieve human security. In 
chapter two (see section 2.1.4.2), I even explored differences between democratic and non-
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democratic states regarding their provision of human security to their people and differences 
between individual states and multilateral state actors regarding their involvement in human-
security issues. However, my proposed human-security theory offers researchers no measure 
by which to assess state actors’ effects on human-security issues. Because of this limitation, 
my proposed human-security theory specifically lacks a mechanism for helping to determine 
which state actors merit the most attention in scholarly research. As for my own study, I 
eventually chose to discuss Australia, China, the EU, Japan, the UN, and the U.S. because 
these state actors have close historical, political, economic, and security relations with 
ASEAN. As stricter, more refined mechanism for making these choices and for assigning 
varying degrees of attention to state actors would have strengthened the current study. 
 Limited funding, which is entirely non-theoretical, has been a significant limitation on 
this study. My constrained budget prevented me, first and foremost, from going to Southeast 
Asian countries where I would have distributed my questionnaires to local university students. 
The current study features a questionnaire whose respondents were all university students of 
Southeast Asian origins (residing and studying mainly in the UK). Thus, the sample size of 
my respondent population was small, relegated to six ASEAN members, and hence not nearly 
as generalisable as would have been desired. In other words, the data stemming from the 
respondents might not reflect wider patterns concerning Southeast Asians’ understanding of 
the APSC. 
Owing to limited funding, this study relied on a smaller than desirable field study. I 
conducted the field study in Indonesia and Singapore in January 2012, but budget constraints 
prevented me from extending the field study into other ASEAN countries, where I would 
have interviewed additional experts and officials. Consequently, this study’s exploration of 
Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand rested exclusively on 
secondary academic sources and media sources, not on author-conducted interviews. 
Although these sources presented substantive direct and indirect evidence about each ASEAN 
member’s responses to the creation of the APSC, and were thus extremely helpful in 
identifying each member’s strategies and each member’s motivations underlying the 
strategies, the human-security issues that these sources covered were rather homogeneous in 
their focus, prioritising such reliably popular topics as human rights and democracy. Thus, 
while exploring the ASEAN members’ response to the creation of the APSC, I found that 
these gaps in the literature prevented me from discussing ASEAN members’ response to such 
critical but less popular human-security issues as disease, poverty, and public health. 
Also, my limited budget prevented me from travelling to Australia, China, Japan, and 
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the United States, where I would have interviewed officials and experts. So yet again my 
exploration—this time, of both these external powers’ strategies and their underlying 
motivations—rested mainly on the academic literature and media sources. And of course 
these sources usually rested on the perspective of realism. Thus, with the exception of 
external powers’ motivation to bolster their influence in Southeast Asia, I found no evidence 
that other motivations underlie external powers’ involvement in the creation of the APSC. 
This absence of evidence may reflect the incompleteness of the existing literature’s 
theoretical foundations rather than an actual absence of diverse factors in reality. 
 
8.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
I would like to offer three suggestions for future research. My first suggestion is that scholars 
in the field clarify why my proposed human-security theory encompasses state-centric 
elements. The human-security theory integrates some features of two mainstream IR theories: 
realism and constructivism. This overlap may confuse readers and researchers. In chapter one, 
I argued that mainstream IR theories have not permitted rigorous analyses of Southeast Asian 
security issues, owing to the discrepancies between the IR theories and today’s evolving 
Southeast Asian security culture. However, my proposed human-security theory still includes 
the concept of balance of power and ideational factors, like norms and identities. If the 
human-security theory is to help researchers explore human-security issues rigorously, 
researchers should first explain why it encompasses state-centric elements. The main issue 
currently is that balance of power and ideational factors can serve to explain only state actors’ 
behaviours, not individual actors’ and non-state actors’ behaviours regarding involvement in 
human-security issues.  
I would also like to suggest that researchers address several important human-security 
problems that I mentioned when discussing my study’s research limitations. Researchers 
might consider exploring how to grade human-security issues in their order of important to 
human beings. If this task is not challenging enough, researchers might try to cast light on 
why democratic and semi-democratic state have, on notable occasion, failed to address their 
own domestic human securities. An issue of both theoretical and practical concern to future 
researchers is how they might embed causal links between the freedom-from-want and 
freedom-from-fear issues when discussing the two sets of issues separately. Future 
researchers might ask, how can we identify the extent to which state actors play important 
roles in human-security issues? From my perspective, serious inquiries into these issues 
might rock the structure of human-security theory. For example, a failure to explain which 
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human-security issues are the most important ones to human beings may call into question—
why this study mainly discuss human rights and transnational crimes issues rather than 
poverty and public health issues. Moreover, the current study cannot properly assess state 
actors’ important to human-security issues, hence calling into question this study’s decision to 
discuss Australia, China, the EU, Japan, and the U.S. rather than, say, Canada, India, Russia, 
and South Korea.  
The third suggestion is that adoption of this proposed human-security theory to explore 
human-security issues should also conduct field study. This new human-security theory is a 
macro-theory because (1) it emphasises that each type of actor—individual actors, state 
actors, and non-state actor—is essential; (2) it covers each type of actor’s responses to 
human-security issues, and (3) it does not exclude any insecurity variable that may threaten 
human beings. Thus, when researchers apply this approach to a given topic, research sources 
should include not only academic essays and media information but also field studies, such as 
interviews and questionnaire-survey. For example, interviews may help researchers find out 
information regarding actors’ responses to human-security issues such as public health and 
poverty—issues that much of the literature either overlooks or relegates to a secondary status. 
And as for questionnaire-surveys, they can help researchers specify individual actors’ 
responses to human-security issues in quantifiably useful ways. 
For the present study, I have explored analytical approaches to determine which is most 
congruous with Southeast Asian’s new security culture and I have found that the concept of 
human security appears to be the most suitable candidate. In addition, I have tried to 
transform the concept into a workable approach and subsequently applied it to the study of a 
current affair: the creation of the APSC. By exploring individuals’, state actors’, and non-
state actors’ responses, strategies, and motivations underlying these strategies, this study has 
found several research findings. Most of findings are the barrier for ASEAN to create the 
APSC. In this context, ASEAN may create the APSC by the 2015 target date, but the 
likelihood that the APSC would then function properly seems narrow indeed. 
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
 
Interviewee: Ian Storey  
Meeting Location: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
Question: 
What is your perspective on the creation of the APSC regarding the issue of the South China 
Sea? 
Answer: 
I don’t really see much connection. I don’t think it will have any impact on the dispute. It will 
be ten years, this year, since the DOC (the Declaration of Conduct of the Parties in the South 
China Sea) was signed in November. It was only last year that they agreed on implementation 
guidelines. It was quite disappointing, because they are not really specific, there are no details 
and it basically reiterates what was in the original agreement of 2002. But, now ASEAN and 
China have started to discuss confidence building measures. There was meeting in Cambodia 
last week. The kind of things that they are looking at is search and rescue, maritime, disaster 
relief and environmental concerns. Even if those projects go ahead, I don’t think they’ll have 
any impact on tensions in the South China Sea. The South China Sea is driven by rivalry over 
maritime resources: oil, gas, fish. It’s driven by nationalism. The military balance of power is 
changing in the South China Sea, because of the growth of the Chinese navy. The US has 
shown a much greater interest in the South China Sea dispute. So, the DOC has no impact 
any of the central drivers of the dispute, in my opinion. 
The two sides have also agreed to start discussing a code of conduct, but I think that will be 
very difficult to agree on. What is the geographical scope of the agreement? Is there going to 
be joint development? How do you do that? How do you enforce an agreement like that? 
What kind of sanctions are available? I am not very optimistic that either the DOC or the 
code of conduct will have much of an impact on tensions in the South China Sea. I predict 
that we will see the kind of incidents that we saw last year that you just mentioned again this 
year. Or involving fishery vessels or fishing trawlers. 
I think the status quo will remain in place for the time being. Tensions in the South China Sea 
go up and they go down. And that’s what we’ve seen over the last few years. I’d say they 
have been on the up since about 2007—2008. I don’t see them going down in the future, 
because I don’t think the DOC and code of conduct can really have much of an impact on 
reducing tensions. I don’t envisage a major conflict in the South China Sea or war, but 
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because of the increasing number of incidents at sea, like we saw last year, then the risk of an 
accidental clash at sea which could escalate into a more serious diplomatic or military crisis, 
that risk increases.  
 
Question: 
Do you think ASEAN’s norms and identities matter in the South China Sea issues? 
Answer: 
Not really. Tensions in the South China Sea went down in the late 1990s and early 2000 
partly because China saw it in its own interests to try to reduce the tensions. It was all part of 
its charm offensive, one of the central messages of which was that rising power of China does 
not pose a strategic threat to any country and that China’s armed forces are for defensive 
purposes only. It was highly symbolic for China to sign the TAC, but they gained a lot of 
goodwill but gave away nothing. It didn’t cost them anything, because it was symbolic. This 
is true of every country that signed the TAC. It doesn’t constrain their ability to employ 
military force in Southeast Asia. So, I don’t think it has had any impact. Some countries have 
written an additional protocol where they basically say yes we’ve signed the TAC, but it 
won’t affect our ability to use force. So what does it all mean then? So, norms and 
identity…they both talk about the importance of stability, peace, the need for cooperation and 
confidence-building measures, but they say one thing and they tend to do something else. I 
would say that particularly China’s actions have been very destabilizing. It’s not just China, 
but also Vietnam and, to some extent, the Philippines. I am not really convinced that norms 
and identities somehow constrain China.  
 
Question:  
What is your perspective about the cooperation between China and ASEAN members 
regarding the non-traditional security issues? 
Answer: 
I think the primary issue will continue to be the South China Sea, because I don’t see any 
breakthrough in that dispute. I don’t think the tension will be lowered in the foreseeable 
future, so the South China Sea is the security issue between China and ASEAN. In fact, there 
aren’t many other issues between them, it’s the South China Sea. [With regard to non-
traditional security threats] they have signed a number of agreements, but I haven’t seen 
much real practical cooperation…possibly, in the area of anti-narcotics among the mainland 
Southeast Asian countries and China. [On the issue of] piracy, China has offered to support to 
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the Southeast Asian countries but there has been no follow through, they haven’t delivered 
anything. I suppose they did cooperate over SARS, the spread of infectious diseases and 
human trafficking, mainly the mainland Southeast Asian states and China. Is that really a 
security issue? That’s a police issue, I think. That’s a matter for law enforcement agencies. Is 
it really security issue? I am not convinced about that. I am not a big fan of this non-
traditional security thing, to be honest. When it comes to terrorism, has there been much 
cooperation or exchanging intelligence between ASEAN countries and China? I haven’t 
heard of very much. It’s possible that it goes on, but I have no evidence of that.  
I have looked at piracy in Southeast Asia very closely and China’s contribution to that area 
has been minimal, certainly compared to the United States and Japan. The United States has 
provided Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines with a lot of money for radar installation 
and patrol boats, which was hundred million dollars. The only thing I can find that China has 
provided is some computer equipment for Indonesia, which is ten thousand dollars. Japan has 
been doing this since the 1960s, providing technology and financial assistance. Again, this is 
not really a security issue. That is a safety of navigation issue. Japan wants its ships to come 
through the Straits of Malacca and up to the South China Sea safely. A bit of anti-piracy 
cooperation, the Japanese coastguard has been active in that respect. Japan and the United 
States have done much more than China in that area.  
Another issue would be the Mekong River. If you want to class that as a security issue or 
environmental issue, again, there is not much cooperation. China is not a member of the 
Mekong River Commission. Last year, because many of the Thais started to complain about 
the low water level in the Mekong, China said they would provide more information on the 
dams and that kind of thing. My understanding is the lower riparian countries have been a bit 
disappointed with cooperation from China in that area.  
 
Question:  
Last year, Myanmar released Aung San Suu Kyi and allowed her to meet foreign diplomats. 
Do you think that Myanmar’s change regarding the issue of human right is due to ASEAN’s 
pressure? Or has Myanmar itself accepted ASEAN’s norms? Or are there other political 
implication? 
Answer: 
No, I don’t think that is due to ASEAN pressure. It is all about the internal domestic politics. 
In fact, we are going to publish an article in the next issue of Contemporary Southeast Asia 
on this issue of how effective ASEAN has been in putting pressure on Burma over human 
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rights, and the answer is not very effective. I think this is all internal. I think it’s the new 
government’s desire to break out of its isolation and to reduce its dependence on China. And, 
in order to have sanctions lifted, and have better relations with the west, particularly the 
United States, they are going to have made the progress on this issue, which they have. I 
think the reform process looks quite genuine. Some people suggested the reforms were 
cosmetic, when they were first introduced. I don’t think you can make argument now. 
Something positive is happening in Burma. Whether it will continue, we don’t know, but 
certainly, things are changing in the right direction in Burma. I don’t think it has much to do 
with ASEAN. It is purely internal politics in Myanmar and their desire to broaden their 
foreign policy and to improve the image. Actually, you might argue Chinese pressure has 
been more effective than ASEAN pressure. 
 
Question: 
As you mentioned, why is Myanmar trying to reduce its dependence on China? 
Answer:  
They don’t like to be dependent on China. I don’t think they like the Chinese very much. No 
one likes to be dependent on another country. I don’t think the generals in Myanmar have 
ever been very happy about this relationship with China. Basically, they had no choice in 
1988-89, but to turn to China. It was more of a marriage of convenience than a love match. 
They’ve tried over years to reduce that dependence by joining ASEAN and then trying to 
pursue closer relationships with India and Russia and other countries, but every time they 
have been forced to rely even more on China. This is another attempt, I think, to reduce that 
dependence. There’s a lot of unhappiness within Burma about their close relationship with 
China. Obviously, it negatively affects their relationship with the United States. And there 
have been people within ASEAN that are uncomfortable with Burma’s close relationship with 
China. It is not to say that China won’t be an important country in Burma’s future. Of course, 
it will. It is their neighbour and their biggest trading partner and China has a lot of interests in 
Burma which it will want to protect. But, perhaps, the role of China will lessen in the future. 
It won’t be [Burma’s] primary patron in their foreign policy. 
 
Question: 
Will the problem of human rights and democracy within Myanmar continue to be a barrier in 
the relationship with ASEAN and Western countries, in particular the United States and the 
EU? 
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Answer: 
That depends on how far and how fast the process continues. They have made a lot of 
progress in the last six months, but will it continue? We don’t know. It looks to me like it will, 
because it’s hard to reverse these things once you start. So, definitely, if the reforms continue, 
then human rights will become less of an issue with the EU and the United States and with 
ASEAN. But, it will still be an issue. Until, maybe one day Burma is a fully fledged liberal 
democracy and there are no political prisoners, the ethnic minorities aren’t mistreated. Then, 
it stops being a problem.  
But the United States has human rights issues with every country in Southeast Asia, even 
Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam. These issues don’t disappear, but they are not central 
issues. You can say right now this is the big issue in Burma-US relations. Clearly, human 
rights is not the big issue in Singapore-US relations. It’s an issue, a small one, but nothing 
like it is with the United States and Burma. So, over time, if these positive trends continue, it 
will become less of an issue.  
 
Question:  
Do you think that, after the creation of the APSC, the relationship between the US and 
ASEAN will be influenced, still, by the issue of terrorism? 
Answer: 
Not so much. The terrorism issue around the world, in particular in US foreign policy, is far 
less significant than it was five years ago or ten years ago after 9/11. When senior US 
officials visit Southeast Asia, they seldom talk about terrorism now. The United States has 
lots of interests in Southeast Asia, trade and investment, education and promoting democracy. 
Increasingly, the US focuses on Southeast Asia’s geopolitics, and that is its increasingly 
competitive relationship with China. Terrorism will always be on the agenda between the 
United States and ASEAN countries, particularly the Philippines and Indonesia, but I don’t 
think it is such big issue between ASEAN and China in the future. ASEAN countries have 
been quite successful in dealing with that issue with support from other countries like 
Australia and the US.  
 
Question: 
Will the United States continue its military presence in Southeast Asia? 
Answer: 
As long as they can afford it, yes. They have already increased their military presence in 
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Southeast Asia through more ship visits, more training and more exercises. In the future, they 
will forward deploy littoral combat ships to Singapore and, possibly, to the Philippines as 
well. More training, more exercises and more ship visits, that’s all good. Most Southeast 
Asian countries support that and facilitate it. But the question on the minds of Southeast 
Asians is, given America’s severe finical difficulties, can it sustain this military presence?  
Also, you have to consider two things. If Obama is elected in November, Hillary Clinton 
probably will not be the Secretary of State. Probably, Kurt Campbell will leave as well. So, 
you may have a Secretary of State who doesn’t focus as much on Asia and Southeast Asia in 
the future.  
The second thing is if Obama losses and the Republicans come into power, they also may not 
focus on Asia. I think what will happen is, many of the people, if the republicans win, who go 
into office, they are people who will want to justify decisions made by the Republicans about 
Iraq, the Middle East and Afghanistan, so those issues might be more prominent in their 
minds. So, it’s really a question of money, political will and political interests, whether this 
focus on Southeast Asia is maintained. And it’s not a given. 
 
Interviewee: Jose Javares  
Meeting Location: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia 
Question: 
How will the relationships between the EU and ASEAN develop in the future, after the 
creation of the APSC? 
Answer: 
I think the EU is very important as ASEAN’s dialogue partner. The EU also has the 
commitment to continue its support for ASEAN so I believe that, by the establishment of the 
APSC, the relationships between ASEAN and the EU continue to become closer, because 
there are some activities are projects by the EU which support the establishment of the APSC.  
Specifically, the support provided is like last year in October, we had the related workshops 
so I think they are going to start focusing on this kind of area. I believe there is also a fund of 
17 million Euros. The European Union is supporting various projects, including human rights, 
transnational crimes, capacity building and also initiatives of ASEAN integration, if I’m not 
mistaken. There is quite a lot of money, several million Euros for several years.  
One of the obstacles you see, even though the EU has already been established a long time 
ago, it still has the problems and continues to develop as a community, as a union. So, I 
believe that ASEAN too is in the earlier stage in comparison with the EU. We are developing 
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towards 2015 and this is not the end of it. It will continue and nobody will say when the 
community will reach a point when it is takes enough. No! I believe that the community will 
continue evolving. Before, I heard that if you want to study the European Community, it’s 
like shooting a moving target while riding a horse. So, both are moving. It is very difficult, 
very fluid. The same thing applied to ASEAN too.  
These two regional organizations have emerged. They are moving in their way so they have 
to do some fine-tuning when they are cooperating. They have their own internal evolution, 
their own process to do. I think this is the problem. Of course, another aspect, as you have 
already mentioned, is they have an impact on human right values and democracy.  
But now, ASEAN since 2008 has had the ASEAN Charter and Indonesia too few years ago. 
We were a totalitarian regime now we are moving. We are already at the higher stage. We are 
better in terms of democracy. Likewise, other ASEAN members countries too. So, as you see, 
Myanmar has been developing very fast over the past year, in terms of the political 
transformation, they released of Aung San Suu Kyi and the release of political prisoners. And 
now, she is engaging in a by-election in Myanmar. So, everything is moving. I believe now 
this is new momentum for cooperation between the EU and ASEAN.  
The EU has also experienced a financial crisis in several countries. Because of the single 
currency in the EU, you cannot tackle this issue at the national level. You must tackle it, of 
course. You cannot have a national policy, then, suddenly, be impacted at the national level. 
That is one thing. Of course, there is an impact of the issue of the single currency, where we 
should be a kind of the policy that have an impact on all of the European Union. Why in 
ASEAN we don’t have the single currency yet. So, every national policy has an immediate 
effect on its own, even though they have regional effects, obviously. I believe that it’s about 
time that the relations between ASEAN and the EU will improve very fast. I believe in the 
next few months. I hear that the EU will be discussing Myanmar perhaps in April. And after 
that, there will be significant progress in the cooperation between the EU and ASEAN.  
 
Question: 
After the creation of the AC, will ASEAN become the more institutionalized organization, for 
example, through the implementation of more stringent mechanisms like the EU? 
Answer: 
You are right. The institutionalisation has become more integrated, through the single 
currency. They have their own shortcomings and weaknesses because I believe that there are 
strong European countries like Germany, Spain and France, obviously the United Kingdom 
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doesn’t want to be there, opting out from the single currency. Now, we are ASEAN. We are 
not like the EU that is more like a supra-national body. ASEAN is like a lot of sovereignties 
that belong to the European Union. They have more regulations on every aspect like 
agriculture. They still have their own sovereignty maintained in various aspects of national 
affairs. In terms of ASEAN, we are not moving to that yet. I don’t know whether we are 
going to move in the same direction. At this point, we are more an inter-governmental 
organization. Sovereignty still belongs to every country and we are doing our own different 
parts of community. It doesn’t have to be the same as the European Union. There, you are 
surrendering a certain level of your sovereignty to the EU. In ASEAN, this is not the case. It 
is more like an intra-governmental organization. In handling issues like finance, of course, we 
have Chi-Maing initiatives. This is something different. The EU does not have this. If 
problems of liquidity emerges, they use this pocket money to help in assisting. The 
arrangement now is becoming more multi-lateralised in ASEAN. So, the kind of different 
parts we are taking, not necessarily like the EU. I don’t think the EU models are quite 
suitable for us, because we are not at the same level yet. I don’t know if, when we reach a 
point, that a certain level of sovereignty will be given to ASEAN, in terms of economy, yes, 
there is already harmonization in the regulations on trade, for example. Actually, we are 
talking about a certain small level of sovereignty, but not in the political aspects.  
We will see whether it is suitable to learn from certain aspects of the EU and adopt them here. 
For example, the EU has the same visa. Now, in ASEAN, we have already an agreement 
between the ASEAN member-states that there is no longer a need for diplomats to have a visa. 
When you have an agreement with ASEAN, some countries give a one-month visa and some 
countries two-weeks visa. It depends on the bilateral agreement. But for diplomats and 
officials, there is no longer a visa. Also, common people, ordinary people, no longer need a 
visa. But not all of the countries in ASEAN have yet applied this, because Myanmar needs to 
have bilateral agreements with other ASEAN countries. All of the ASEAN countries have 
already implemented it, except one, which is Myanmar. I believe that, in the near future, 
Myanmar will do so also. We are going to have some kind of similar arrangement, if someone 
from outside comes to ASEAN and visits Indonesia, they can go everywhere and vice versa. 
So, this is a kind of certain level of regulation of sovereignty of our countries which is given, 
not as vast as the EU but it has already been accepted.  
 
Question: 
What is your perspective about the relationship between ASEAN and Japan and ASEAN and 
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the United States, in terms of non-traditional security issues? 
Answer: 
The maritime cooperation is very important for ASEAN and Japan, including piracy, armed 
robbery at sea, freedom of navigation, fisheries, pollution of the environment and cooperation 
on disaster issues, as we have a problem with that. Obviously, this is one of the issues that are 
really of interest to ASEAN countries, Japan and others too, because it will always be a 
problem for trade in this area. I believe that, if countries can increase their cooperation in this 
area, they can tackle the issue. Somalian piracy also reached the Indian Ocean. It’s very 
dangerous and can hamper the trade of the countries in the region. 
The cooperation between ASEAN and the U.S. has already reached a summit. Now, we have 
plan of action for 2011-2015. There is a pattern of cooperation between ASEAN and its 
dialogue partners, which is political cooperation, such as the promotion of human rights, 
capacity building, combating transnational crime, and terrorism, and so on. The cooperation 
also includes economic and educational aspects. There is an enhancement of trade, culture 
and also education. A lot of ASEAN students study in the U.S. Now, we are thinking that the 
U.S. too has to understand us, so they send their students to us to study at our universities. 
Things are moving. The direction now is in the process of discussing strategic partnership. 
They want to enhance the partnership to a higher level. But this issue has now been studied 
by the eminent persons just established in November last year. So, the eminent persons from 
ASEAN and the U.S. will sit together and discuss on what has been done already, what needs 
to be improved and what new should be done.  
 
Question: 
What is your perspective about the improving democratic situation in Indonesia and its effect 
on ASEAN? 
Answer:  
Since the Soeharto ear, Indonesia has been moving towards democracy. Sometimes, we think 
that democracy is too much. For example, if someone criticizes the president, for example, 
and even doesn’t have any strong substantive reason to say such things. You don’t find this in 
very democratic countries like Europe and the U.S. You don’t see such things. Sometimes, it 
is too much. People are using opportunity of democracy to do more than what other 
democratic countries have already done. Then, I hear that the president went to the police and 
reported someone, because these people are saying something serious about him. You don’t 
see this situation in the U.S., because if you want to accuse a president, you must have really 
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strong evidence to do that. Here it happens! So, sometimes, there is too much democracy. 
Some people say no. The academics say that you a pendulum that is moving too much when 
it should be in the middle. Right in the middle. You should have democracy that is 
responsible. Everybody knows how to play with democracy. 
And what we have here is that we are trying to tell people that this system democracy and 
respect for human rights better for us rather than authoritarianism, when you can go and hit 
everybody. We are telling our ASEAN colleagues that this is the best thing to do. By doing 
that, you see what is institutionalized in ASEAN is the ASEAN Charter. It is very clear on 
democracy and human rights. Whether you like it or not, you have to follow what is written 
and signed by the ASEAN leaders. So, every country is gradually moving towards what has 
been set by the ASEAN Charter in 2007, coming into force in 2008. 
 
Interviewee: Lay Hwee Yeo  
Meeting Location: European Union Centre 
Question: 
When members of the EU such as Greece and Spain were engulfed in last year’s financial 
crisis, the EU, which is the most institutionalized regional organization in the world, showed 
that, like ASEAN, it was unable to solve problems effectively. Do you think the fact that, for 
example, the EU failed to resolve the Greek default will encourage ASEAN to insist on its 
informal conflict-avoidance mechanisms? 
Answer:  
During the Asian financial crisis, ASEAN, of course, was criticized for being unable to 
respond effectively. So, there was lot of soul-searching. Coming from that, you can see that, 
of course, there was a lot of ...sort of… trying to look at the EU’s example, policy-learning, 
trying to understand how other regional institutions work. But, I think all along ASEAN has 
been quite balanced, in that they knew that they had to think of new ways of handling their 
own regional affairs. But, they are not naïve enough to believe that what is done in the EU 
can be entirely copied for the ASEAN context. So, they are willing to open their minds to 
look at what does deepening mean? What does to be more institutionalized mean for ASEAN? 
So, they are willing to explore. That is why they came up the idea of the ASEAN Community, 
trying to create a single production network, for very practical reasons, in order to continue to 
be competitive. But, at the same time, they are also quite clear that they cannot adopt all 
things, the EU institutional methods. So in many ways, I think that it’s balanced.  
So now, I think the situation in the EU will just c
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to find its own way of handling… There are advantages of being very institutionalised, but 
there are also advantages of being very flexible. Soft institutionalisation, like ASEAN, which 
can, in some way, use favourable geometry that maybe the EU has to learn to be much more 
relaxed about this, moving in the two-speed Europe that is taking place. Or a few countries 
saying they are willing, like France is now threatening to say, we are going to impose a 
financial transaction tax anyway and go ahead. Even the others like London are not willing to 
come along. I think that just confirmed to the ASEAN policy makers that that each regional 
institution needs to find its own way of managing its own regional affairs.  
Of course, there are those who are starting to criticize the EU methods and theories as just too 
inflexible. Of course, there are lots of people that when things are bad they will bring all this 
criticism. In general, both the Asian financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis that is 
unfolding in the EU just confirm to many of these more rational policymakers and more 
prominent policymakers in ASEAN that each needs to find its own way of building its own 
region.  
ASEAN has been becoming more institutionalized over the last decade. Already, they have 
taken steps. But how far would they go? I think the EU case tells them that this is not 
necessarily the way to go. It doesn’t mean that regional integration must be a linear process. 
It is not necessary to keep on being more and more institutionalised.  
 
Question: 
Do you think that ASEAN will review the ASEAN Way? 
Answer: 
When we talk about the ASEAN Way, in reality, it has always been interpreted very widely. 
People always say ASEAN always talks about non-interference. The UN Charter also talks 
about non-interference, because this principle of sovereignty equality is very important in the 
context of international relations, especially for the weaker powers. You need to have that 
kind of sense of security. The ASEAN Way is not just about non-interference, but also about 
trying to seek solutions through consensual methods and consultation. You can see over the 
history of ASEAN, sometimes, this so-called principle of non-interference, is not strictly 
adhered to. But, the way they do it is different from this megaphone diplomacy that the West 
uses, like openly-criticizing. But, there is a lot of quiet diplomacy ASEAN uses. If you look 
at how, in this Thai-Cambodian conflict, the ASEAN Chair, Indonesia, tried in some ways to 
be involved.  
So I think the principle has to stay, because, if you look at the history of ASEAN, ASEAN 
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was launched because of the fear of confrontation and interference into each other’s affairs, 
because we have our own domestic problems, all these ethnic tensions. So officially, the 
principle has to be strongly adhered to, but the operationalizing of it changes with the context. 
I think, again, it shows ASEAN members are quite pragmatic. When the opportunity arises, 
they can do something. Especially, when it comes to what we call the issues that certainly 
affect the region as a whole. Of course, it is not internal issues where it doesn’t have regional 
repercussions, like in a case where someone is going to be given the death penalty for drug-
trafficking. But in the case of Myanmar, you can see that they feel that what happens in 
Myanmar has regional repercussions. It had started to undermine ASEAN. They will see that 
the other ASEAN members will get together and say “how shall we resolve this” and they 
will put pressure on Myanmar in a quiet way, not openly. Already, some have openly 
criticized Myanmar, but they try not to, they send some people to the Myanmar government.  
 
Question: 
Do you think that the relations between ASEAN and the EU will be enhanced after the 
creation of the APSC? What kinds of barriers will emerge between them in the future? 
Answer: 
What I am concerned about is that the sovereign debt crisis will consume lots of time and 
energy of the European Union and they will not be able to meet this opportunity at the point 
when there is a lot of movement and Myanmar is opening up. I am afraid that they will not be 
able to turn this into a good opportunity where they can really step up relations with ASEAN. 
If you look at how fast the US has responded, it has now restored diplomatic relations in such 
a short time, how much quicker it has responded compared to the EU now. Of course, you 
have just had the French Foreign Minister visiting, Alain Juppe, which is good news. But, to 
get this to translate into a common policy of the EU, again, because of very nature of the need 
for this coordination, getting 27 member-states to change the policy, like, ok now we will 
decide to lift the sanctions. That will take time. This is a very good opportunity for the EU to 
use this occasion to step up relations with ASEAN. But whether it can do so effectively, I am 
not sure, because, like I say, the fact they are still so embroiled with the sovereign debt crisis 
that they might let this opportunity slip and they cannot come up with a coherent response 
and a good coherent, cohesive policy at this moment.  
 
Questions: 
What is the perspective from the EU in terms of the human rights and democracy of ASEAN? 
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Answers: 
Officially, the EU welcomes this move by ASEAN to set up the ASEAN Inter-Governmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). Officially, the stance is very clear, that what 
ASEAN is doing with the ASEAN Political-Security Community pillar, in terms of focusing 
on education on human rights are all moves in the right direction. I think that will be the 
typical response from the EU. But, again, they are probably still waiting for more concrete 
policies. Myanmar seems to be responding to this and all these exciting changes that are 
taking place, but it comes back to what I was saying just now about whether they are able to 
respond quickly, because ASEAN has already called on the US and EU to lift the sanctions. 
And how fast the EU can respond to this, I am not sure, whereas I think that, with the US 
making all this effort to establish full diplomatic ties, they will probably be much faster in 
lifting certain sanctions towards Myanmar. 
 
Questions: 
What kind of barriers will emerge between the EU and ASEAN in the future? 
Answers: 
I think the concern now will be more about protectionism because of the problems faced by 
the EU because of its growth prospects and all these austerity measures and social political 
tensions arising in the EU itself, which I think is the challenge. If you think of more far-right 
parties, for instance, coming into power or having a bigger share of the popular vote and 
sharing power than you can expect the EU policies may become more protectionist, maybe 
become more anti-immigrant, that dents the image of the EU that wants to show itself to be a 
normative power. These are the obstacles which might arise because the domestic situation in 
the EU itself with the anger from young people over the austerity in all of the countries and 
the prospects for low growth for a long time, so sentiment within Europe itself may turn sour. 
Then politicians who have to pander to the domestic constituencies will start to take a much 
more strident, anti-Asian, because it’s seen as competition, as you can see with China, they 
see this more as a threat, you know “We have to protect our industry. We have to make sure 
there’s no outsourcing to China”. These kinds of sentiments already exist. But what I am 
concerned with is that if the crisis continues to drag on making things even more problematic. 
One can say that it is quite lucky that there are no wholesale protectionist measures in the 
wake of the crisis. But as I say, if the crisis is prolonged, the main threat is really this kind of 
protectionism and then you will have global trade impeded. You know the EU has long been 
the bigger trading power, but if it closes its market, I mean not entirely, but starts to put up all 
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these protective barriers, then you will have more trade friction and tensions between Asia 
and Europe.  
 
Question: 
As a relatively weak and fragile state, what are the security strategies of Singapore, after the 
creation of the APSC?  
Answer: 
I think the Singaporean government has always understood this vulnerability. As a very small 
country, the sense of being vulnerable has always been there. So, of course, if the regional 
environment is good, then that helps Singapore to feel a little bit more secure, but it will 
never be the case, because the policy-makers have always believed it is in a very challenging 
environment and it’s going to get even more challenging and volatile for the region. It has 
always positioned itself to try to make sure that it continues to be active, and to be able to 
influence developments within ASEAN is very important. That’s why it has always tried to 
tell ASEAN that it must not become too nationalistic in some ways and to tone down some of 
the rhetoric. I think it will continue to play an important role in ASEAN.  
In some ways, Singapore must find a way to work more closely with Indonesia. We are 
realizing that Indonesia is becoming the key power and will want to exert their power in 
ASEAN. For a long time, Indonesia was quite willing to ‘lead from behind’ but now it’s no 
longer doing that. Now they want to lead from the front. Of course, you can say that the other 
small ASEAN powers’ countries maybe concerned. So, Singapore, in that sense, as a very 
small country, with little power, can manage this good relationship and work with Indonesia 
closely. Then, a lot of things within ASEAN can be pushed because they can be seen in some 
ways as a sort of…if any ideas come, it will both take care of the interests of big powers and 
small powers within the regional institutions. Working closely with Indonesia has become a 
very important strategy. I think our government has to adopt… has to be very concerned 
about… how to manage the good relationship with Indonesia within ASEAN to move the 
agenda of ASEAN forward as a joint effort, so the smaller countries in ASEAN will also look 
at this initiative as something that is not being pushed only by the big powers. So, I think that 
is the important strategy that Singapore really has to be cognisant of. Now that Indonesia has 
emerged as a big power, playing a role in the G20, of course, its global image has improved 
considerably, as a good example of a Muslim country that has achieved democratization also.  
Of course, Singapore will see itself as a global city. It always pursues different parallel 
strategies at the same time. It doesn’t only say we are focusing on regional dimensions but 
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also the global connection. So, it will continue to develop this cross-regional means. You can 
see that it is very active with trying to link up with Brazil, in Latin America, and South Africa, 
in the African continent. They will continue this global strategy, whilst Indonesia will be the 
regional power.  
 
Question: 
How does Singapore face the implementation of the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN 
Security Community in terms of the issue of human rights and democracy? 
Answer: 
The understanding within ASEAN is quite clear. We put in our charter this respect for 
democracy and human rights, but they also believe that each country should take its own pace. 
A lot of this change has to come from within, which means they believe, for instance, in 
internal measures taken by Myanmar and to support it in ways that are helpful not just 
criticise, because each country, because of its own historical, cultural, background and 
context, will take a different pace of liberalisation and democratisation. If you take the long 
view, as long as there is improvement… So, we have a lot of states in ASEAN now that are 
not completely free or democratic. You have Brunei which is a monarchy, which doesn’t have 
regular elections, because they have only a parliament which is appointed. You accept that 
there are different political systems, with different levels, different degrees of openness and 
democracy. The issue is that the Charter says ASEAN members are committed to improve 
their human rights. As long as there are signs that each country in some ways is taking steps 
to do that, then, there should not be an issue at all. But, we are not the one to determine that 
by 2015, everyone has to be completely democratic and have the same system. I think 
ASEAN has never dictated in any way in the Charter everyone should become similar. We 
are all different, as long as there is a commitment to improve on what we have politically 
aspired to achieve and as long as that benchmark is there and there are certain moves taken to 
improve the situation then I think there is no issue at all. Similarly, how can you compare 
Singapore’s democracy? What about the issue of rule of law? Singapore has a very high score 
in rule of law. What does democracy mean, again? We don’t look at democracy as only one 
model. The key to me in ASEAN is that the pressure for change should come from within, 
which means the domestic constituency. Singapore is becoming more open. This is not 
because of the pressure from Indonesia or the Philippines, but because of its own people, like 
in the election last year when they made it clear to the government that they don’t want this 
government to keep on being elitist in its approach. Similarly, you see what happened in 
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Myanmar when they had their own vote for democracy, which they say they are going to 
implement, so they say ‘we are going to carry out elections in November 2011’. I think 
ASEAN is flexible enough to accommodate these differences. 
 
Interviewee: Lina Alexandra  
Meeting Location: Centre for Strategic and International Studies – Jakarta 
Question: 
The Indonesian government adopted a comprehensive approach to deal with terrorism and 
separatism, encompassing national security, society, educational policy and ideology. Do you 
think this approach has been successful? 
Answer: 
I think, on the one hand, this is two different issues. On the other hand, there is some 
overlapping of the two issues. Before, actually, the concern was mainly on the issue of 
separatism, like Aceh and Papua. Some of the separatist groups, such as the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) last time, used some terrorist ways to intimidate people or force the 
government to do something, regarding their voice and demands. But, if you think about that 
there is a certain connection with international terrorism that is definitely a different case with 
the separatism issue, like some arms of Jemaah Islamiyah, for example, here in this country. 
So I would rather argue that they are two different things.  
The way the government deals with these issues are also different in their mindset. But, on 
the surface you can see that the government is focusing much on using the military 
instrument to deal with this. And that would certainly bring a lot of consequences. If you ask 
whether it is effective or not, when they are using military instruments, using arms for 
example, that would be certainly be the domain of those police and military authorities. But, I 
would rather argue this is mainly a police issue, on the one hand. On the other hand, that 
would certainly not touch on the root causes of the issues. For example, the case in Aceh, the 
idea of separatism was there but it has been nurtured by the cases where people with lots of 
abundant natural resources, but they have never tasted any benefits, even a trickle of benefits 
from those natural resources. It is all absorbed by the central government. So, it is still an 
economic issue.  
In the terrorism issue, because some people, out of poverty, were inspired to join this group 
and then committed suicide bombing, or just joined the terrorist activities, because they are 
disappointed with the central government. The government cannot actually increase their 
prosperity. So, the effort so far has not really touched upon those root causes. Like in Papua, 
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this is a burning issue, but the government both local and central, have no idea how to deal 
with the Papua issue. They just put military instruments there, like soldiers, whatever, armies. 
They barely have any idea. 
Because of the decentralization issue, the government has tried to engage more through the 
local government, but for example if there is certain movement from the Papua separatist 
group for example just to raise the flag, they would send a lot of soldiers there just to show 
some strong action to that idea. I don’t think that is necessary. The instrument is not 
proportionate. It’s like when the president cancelled his trip to the Netherlands because there 
is a [Maluku?] in exile there, and we cancelled the government for cancelling his trip there, 
because that group is not significant. But he showed they are significant enough to cancel his 
trip to the Netherlands. The way the government responds to those issues is militaristic and 
disproportionate.  
 
Question: 
ASEAN leaders have decided to establish the APSC before 2015. How does the creation of 
the APSC impact on Indonesia’s policies towards non-traditional and traditional security 
issues? 
Answer: 
I think ASEAN Political-Security Community has been focused more on the high political 
issues rather than non-traditional security issues. Non-traditional security issues are still there 
in the APSC but are also being addressed in other forms like the East Asian Summit. From a 
political view, the non-traditional security issues have been considered as something not 
sensitive. Usually, the non-traditional security issues have been elevated and used to make 
major countries in the Asia-Pacific or Asia talk with each other because those issues are not 
sensitive issues. If you check the last summit, they mainly talked about climate change, for 
example.  
Indonesia is trying to put more attention on non-traditional security issues. Well, we certainly 
accommodate the non-traditional security issues. For example, we came up the idea of the 
ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center. But we want more from the ASEAN Political-
Security Community. For example, we want to come up with an Institute for Peace and 
Reconciliation. We want to come up with a Network of Peacekeeping Center. We want to 
come up with a dispute settlement mechanism, which should be more effective than the 
ASEAN High Council.  
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Question: 
What is your perspective regarding the Indonesian leadership in ASEAN? 
Answer: 
The Indonesian economy is relatively stable, although it is not actually persistent if there is 
any huge economic crisis. Militarily, we still lag behind, especially compared to Singapore, 
although our country is more than ten times bigger than Singapore. I think the Indonesian 
government, especially in terms of foreign policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has worked 
very hard to put Indonesia in a more prestigious position, at least in Southeast Asia. They 
invested a lot during their chairmanship of ASEAN last year. They came out with lots of 
initiatives like the Institute for Peace and Reconciliation and other initiatives. For example, 
trying to mediate the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, trying to boost certain 
developments of ASEAN bodies and trying to mediate the problems in the South China Sea. 
They invented lots of ideas and initiatives. So I would argue that the leadership or power has 
been in terms of those initiatives. 
However, we still have to wait and see whether Indonesia’s leading role can be turned into 
reality and whether it can be sustained in future or not. To say that Indonesia is a benevolent 
power, a middle power, the leader of ASEAN, we still have to wait and see, because if it is 
still at the level of initiatives and we cannot sustain them during others’ chairmanship after 
Indonesia. Then, I don’t think anyone would see that this is because of Indonesia’s leadership 
role in the region because this leadership has to be nurtured and has to be maintained 
somehow for at least the next five to ten years. It is easy to come up with initiatives, but the 
most important thing is to transform those initiatives into real action. 
 
Question: 
What is your perspective about the idea of establishing a peacekeeping force which was 
provided by Indonesia? 
Answer: 
At least, in the past few years, and hopefully in the future, Indonesia has been confident about 
its domestic problems, that they can actually manage the issues. In the future, I think that 
Indonesia will push for this idea again, to create this regional peacekeeping force. We, as 
academicians, also put our recommendation to the government to actually create the parts 
towards that at the end the final creation of the ASEAN Regional Peacekeeping Force. This 
mechanism will support the United Nations peacekeeping force.  
But, the thing is that we are certainly aware or acknowledge the problems within ASEAN, 
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especially the countries who have just joined ASEAN, as well as some old members who are 
still very much concerned with the strict implementation of sovereignty and non-interference, 
so they wouldn’t be happy at all with this idea. So we are aware of these issues and we cannot 
certainly push too hard or fasten the process, because everything, not only regional 
peacekeeping issues, but also other issues like human rights, in ASEAN, that should be a 
gradual approach. Sometimes, it is really slow; sometimes you see that it’s actually not 
moving anywhere. That’s how ASEAN works, actually. So, you have to start with the 
peacekeeping network, for example. Just creating a network among the peacekeeping centres. 
Last time, we put our recommendations to say where it is heading to. In creating a network of 
peacekeeping centres, what are you aiming for? Whether you want to build the regional 
capability, for example, to supply the UN peace-keeping. So, it is no longer national 
contribution but it will be regional contribution. We ask the government to actually scrutinize 
this idea. The network should evolve into something. It should not stop in creating or 
building this network only.  Because actually the network has been existing for so many years 
already in the peacekeeping centres. That’s first. Second, whether this network of the peace 
keeping centres will influence the other countries that have not yet developed or established 
peace-keeping centres. So whether we want to aim for those countries to have peacekeeping 
centres because so far we have only four or five if I’m not mistaken, but the others are still 
not yet thinking about developing peacekeeping centres. So, we want more. We want to 
continue further with this issue. The latest issue, actually, is to build the civilian capacity for 
peacekeeping but so far the idea is still somehow nationally developed. So in Indonesia, for 
example, in order to support operations conducted by the UN, we want to contribute more for 
security capacities rather than soldiers. I think we will still push this idea because we need 
regional peacekeeping capacities in the region and don’t want the conflict between Thailand 
and Cambodia to destabilize the region.  
 
Question: 
When the idea of a peace-keeping force is being pushed, how does the Indonesian 
government overcome the principle of the non-interference? 
Answer: 
Indonesia is the single fighter so far in somehow moderating the mindset of the non-
interference principle, because this is not only a regional peacekeeping issue but also a 
human rights issue. Last time, our former foreign minister has already addressed the issue 
that we cannot ignore, if there are certain serious human rights violations happening in our 
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neighboring countries. That was in the context of Myanmar at that time. 
Because of the Asian financial crisis, regional countries realized that we cannot strictly 
adhere to the non-interference principle. When we did that, we don’t want to interfere with 
each other, that is exactly how the Asian financial crisis took place in the region. Because we 
just didn’t care about each other. So, there should be some modification on how non-
interference principle should be interpreted and implemented in the interactions of countries 
in ASEAN. And then that’s how the idea of an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN 
Economic Community and an ASEAN Socio-cultural Community developed. Because, with 
the term “community”, we want something more, we should be able to somehow influence 
other countries in this community, because you can say that in the Community, I am doing 
my own business and you are doing your own business, but my business would certainly 
influence your business. And that’s the logic. Although, certainly it is not easy, that’s how I 
think the issue of regional peacekeeping is still being debated very much in the region. 
Whether this regional peacekeeping would deal only with inter-state conflicts which then lead 
into the category traditional peacekeeping or into more robust peace-keeping efforts, for 
example peace-making or peace building, as well as intra-state conflicts, which are more 
relevant conflicts in the region, because currently we seldom deal with interstate conflicts in 
the region, we have more intra-state or separatist conflicts. That is why, so far, we are still 
lingering upon the issues of a network of peacekeeping centers just to have communication, 
joint training and seminars.  
I think through many challenges, Indonesian government is trying to again and again put 
forward this idea that non-interference should be modified in order to deal with so many 
challenges in the region, like human rights and democracy. We don’t say that then there are 
no borders, I would argue that is not the case. The idea is that, if you face common challenges, 
you have to deal with them and re-think the non-interference principle.  
In practice now, it still very much needs the consent of the countries involved. For example, 
with the development of Myanmar, previously our government tried to engage with Myanmar. 
It’s not too pushy. For example last time with the Cyclone Nargis, the junta closed access for 
all international or foreign aid. So what happened is the Indonesian foreign minister told the 
junta government, “Well, you can choose, first you open up for international humanitarian aid 
or second let ASEAN coordinate or lead the humanitarian assistance, or third you let the 
international community come in on the responsibility to protect principle.” That means they 
are eligible to use Chapter 6 until Chapter 8 instruments, which includes Chapter 7. They 
talked for a while and eventually they decided to let our government in. This is how we are 
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able to use this idea of modification of non-interference. You don’t want the international 
[community] to intervene or interfere in your domestic affairs, but you can let ASEAN deal 
with you. That’s quiet diplomacy, but, to some extent, that shows you how intervention can 
be conducted depending on the issues. And now, with the current development of Myanmar, 
our government has already offered assistance, for example on how to build the election 
commission, how to create the think tanks and civil society, and sent our election commission 
there to monitor the free and fair elections to help them set up all the democratic instruments 
in the country, that’s still interference to some extent, but they happily accept it. So it’s not all 
about military intervention and sometimes, interference can be beneficial to other countries.  
 
Question: 
How will the relationship between the US and Indonesia develop after the creation of the 
APSC? 
Answer: 
Generally, you can say that the U.S. certainly supports the establishment of the APSC, 
because it is expecting, by the creation of the ASEAN Community in the future, that will 
create regional stability which will benefit the U.S., as well as countries in the region having 
significant power to deal with the challenge coming from the rise of China. I would argue 
that the United States definitely supports this. In terms of the impact towards the relationship 
between Indonesia and the U.S., not much has changed because, not only Indonesia but other 
countries in the region, have become very much the interest of the United States now, 
because of the policies of the current government to look to Asia not focusing too much on 
the Middle East or to Europe.  
 
Interviewee: Mely Caballero-Anthony 
Meeting Location: ASEAN Secretariat 
Question: 
After the creation of the APSC, will ASEAN create an effective mechanism to deal with its 
problems, or remain dependent on its traditional approaches, such as the ASEAN Way and 
non-interference? 
Answer: 
ASEAN has created new mechanisms. If you go to the website and look at the writings under 
the APSC, the ASEAN Charter will tell you that the institutions are created. For example, you 
have the Charter that, then, stipulates certain norms and principles that ASEAN countries 
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must adhere to. And one is the principle of democracy. Then, you have elements of 
economics and dispute settlement. And then you have mechanisms which look at, for 
example, enhancing cooperation, in issues like maritime security, cooperation in infection 
diseases. That’s to say the work plan. You have the Charter and then you have the blueprint of 
the APSC. All these mechanisms that enhance cooperation in areas like terrorism, maritime 
security, infection diseases, disaster management and food security; these are gearing us 
towards the possibility where the practice of non-interference will have to be recalibrated. 
How is that so, you may ask? For example, if you want to ask for certain information on 
counter-terrorism or certain information on preparation for disaster relief, all that, actually, 
opens up your country and allows them to look into your policies. In the field of economics 
when you have a surveillance mechanism that looks at your fiscal policies. For all intents and 
purposes, you’re opening yourself to international or regional scrutiny. These are some of the 
things which you can no longer hide behind the shield of sovereignty or non-interference. Are 
there any specific examples, if you want to push for examples, are there specific things where 
the non-interference principle, since the adoption of the APSC, has been openly challenged? 
Yes, when you look at, for example, the efforts by the ASEAN Chair, which is now 
empowered to look at managing tensions in the region whether it’s a regional one or bilateral 
one that causes a regional impact. Yes, last year, for example, the Indonesian chair tried to 
mediate between Thailand and Cambodia.  
The ASEAN Way is still there. It has not been scrapped but it has been recalibrated, because 
you can argue this is not your business. But they come in, because it has an impact on the 
region. So that can be an example where you don’t necessarily discard the principle of non-
interference but you challenge it and you open spaces where you can sort of help, mediate, 
and that can be regarded as already challenging principle of non-interference. Whether it is in 
the area of traditional in terms of bilateral or in the area of non-traditional, then, the ASEAN 
Way has already moved to a more flexible, a more open kind of engagement between and 
among member-states.  
The ASEAN Way has changed. I have often argued and you have read this from me that the 
depiction of ASEAN as very strictly following the non-interference, I think, is no longer 
correct because there are events even from 1997 to the present, when you need more 
enhanced, deeper regional cooperation. To be able to do that, you have to be able give way on 
some elements. You ask for records, you give me your policy, in the field of economics, for 
example. Show me your trade statistics. Show me this, show me that. You can choose to say 
no, this is not you business, but in order to have a more coherent fiscal policy in the region, 
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you have to open up. If you tell me about reporting the rate of infectious diseases, whether 
it’s H5N1, et cetera, you have opened up your medical record. Issues of national health are 
issues of national security but then you are compelled to open up because for the sake of 
regional cooperation. In natural disaster, if your task force that deals with it are hampered by 
their own constraints, they don’t have enough capabilities, and then you ask for help from the 
outside, that’s already seen as opening up.  
You can look at what the whole concept of non-interference actually means. There’s no such 
thing as pure if you look at the works by Krasner on sovereignty, contested sovereignty or 
whatever, there’s no such thing, so what do you want to do? If you want to argue that the 
ASEAN Way has changed, it is to look at the framework of what it means. How has it 
evolved over the years? And then you apply in the context of ASEAN. This jealous effort to 
protect sovereignty, is it actually true? I mean is it as sacred as some commentators put it to 
be? I think, historically, there are elements of that, there are points of reference, whether it’s 
in the west or here. They have actually opened up sovereignty. 
 
Question: 
ASEAN ratified the ASEAN Charter. However, some people are disappointed about the 
Charter, because they think the Charter ignores civil society. What is your perspective? 
Answer: 
The criticism about the role of the civil society, well, what is a Charter? A charter is the thing 
meant to put legal stature to ASEAN. Civil society is not a part of it. But, if you look at the 
blueprint, you have to be really careful. This is the goal of ASEAN. You have the goal which 
is the ASEAN Community by 2015 or now they move it to 2020. How do they do that goal? 
There are several mechanisms. One is the ASEAN Charter. What else? The blueprint for the 
ASEAN Community, which has three legs: the APSC, the ASCC and the AEC. All of these, 
and they are available on the website, they have blueprints on how implement the APSC, the 
ASCC and the AEC. It is here where you can look at the participation of the civil society. And 
they have that. So, to say that the ASEAN Charter has not or has failed to promote civil 
society participation is not necessarily correct. You can ask Lina about it, because she deals 
with regional associations associated with ASEAN. That is also something that provides that. 
So, be very clear about what the criticism is and that you also know whether in fact it is or it 
isn’t. Perhaps, if you are a scholar what you want is to know the extent to which that is 
actually being realized. You go beyond the Charter but you look at the APSC blueprint, where 
you perhaps get more information or what could have been improved. This is where you 
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target a certain part in the ASEAN Secretariat.  
 
Question: 
Do norms and identities matter in Southeast Asia in terms of security issues? 
Answer:  
Yes, the answer to that is yes. What are the norms that are promoted in Southeast Asia? The 
norms that are there in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, are peaceful resolution of 
disputes, non-use of force and also non-interference. It’s all there. These are norms that have 
been promoted ever since ASEAN was created in 1967 and the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation was adopted in 1976. You could say that from 1976 when that was actually 
codified there and that was also codified in the Charter that means you find the legal voice in 
the ASEAN Charter. Every effort by ASEAN member-states individually or ASEAN as a 
corporate body and now the new ASEAN, which is all this mechanism, whether it’s the 
ASEAN Chair, the Secretary General, one could say, I think, with true conviction, that much 
of these norms are being promoted because these norms matter. They matter for managing 
inter-state tension. And, again, if you look at how you demonstrate that these norms in fact 
matter, you look at certain events in the most recent past. If you look at bilateral disputes, 
although there were real clashes between Thailand and Cambodia, efforts were being made to 
defuse that as soon as possible. Norms were broken but norms were made or were put back 
on the table when they agreed to sort of resist or desist from going into armed conflict. What 
about extra-regional norms? ASEAN promoted this. What is ASEAN Regional Forum? They 
called it the ‘talk shop’. But the ASEAN Regional Forum, some constructivists argued, was 
basically a brewery of norms. It has advanced. It has carried on and its activities are all 
informed, premised on the promotion of these norms. Norms that are not necessarily unique 
to ASEAN, but norms that ASEAN had promoted and are integral to its identity. This is what 
it is: they are a community, and to be able to achieve the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community, you must abide by these norms. Even the norms that promote the respect of 
human rights, it is there. That is why in the Charter, for the longest time, the promotion of 
human rights seen in the adoption of regional human rights body since 1993, it took long time, 
but these norms were very important. And with ASEAN becoming a more mature community, 
they had to, against all reservation and scepticism, a body was finally formed. These norms 
do matter.  
But, are they being challenged? Yes, they are being challenged. Otherwise, all the activities, 
such as human rights, human welfare, peaceful settlement, all of the activities of ASEAN are 
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not contrary to these norms. These activities are all geared towards the promotion of these 
norms. This is what it’s all about. 
 
Question: 
Don’t you think ASEAN just sweep the problems under the carpet? 
Answer: 
Well, they did that. And that’s part of an approach to minimize tension. Some would argue it 
is good to meet the problems head on, but if that is not a wise thing to do, why do you have to 
push it. One used to think that sweeping under the carpet is really a way not to solve it. But 
not solving it, but sweeping it is also a response, a mechanism, an approach to resolve 
something which is really intractable. For example, how can you resolve the bilateral disputes? 
It will take ages to do that. So all they do is sweep it under the carpet. Don’t bring it up and 
work around it. Whether it is between ASEAN member-states? You have bilateral disputes, 
for example, the Philippines and Malaysia. They have swept that under the carpet. Thailand 
and Cambodia, it was swept for long time because of domestic pressures it came up. So they 
cannot sweep it, they have to manage it. They cannot resolve it. It takes years to manage and 
resolve this dispute. Outside ASEAN, you have the South China Sea again, it has been swept 
under the carpet. Well, yes, it was. But sweeping under the carpet also means don’t bring it up 
until a more reasonable way to solve it can be thought about and discussed. Slowly, they have, 
from the time they adopted the 2003 Declaration of Code of Conduct of South China Sea and 
took that from 2003 until last year, the guidelines were adopted. Is that sweeping under the 
carpet? Ya, it was swept. And, until pressure on them and they are ready address it. And, even 
that, it was very slow, extremely slow. And, is this because of failure of ASEAN as an 
organization? It’s not just ASEAN, it’s the readiness of other countries, in this case the 
readiness of China, to actually address issue.  
 
Question: 
Regarding non-traditional security issues, how can ASEAN member-states deal with their 
fundamental differences of strategic perspective? 
Answer: 
If addressing this issue, which is transnational, requires, first and foremost, the ability of the 
countries concerned to address it, from their own domain and that is not possible, because, as 
I’ve argued in the past, they lack, perhaps, capability to do so, or there is a question of 
governance, then if Country A, who is a member of an association is not able to do it, because 
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of either an inherent problem or lack of capacity to do it or perhaps just a problem of 
governance, ASEAN can help to manage this or address this, again, by choosing a number of 
approaches. Number one is, if it is a question of capability, then, you help. It has been done 
bilaterally. If you look at my essays on health, you would have seen that there are cases 
where countries who have got the technical expertise have come in and helped. Whether it’s 
in the speed of detection of virus or even in the context of providing money be able to 
purchase vaccines that is being done on a bilateral basis.  
Regionally, they have put that as an agenda for the region to tackle. What is the advantage of 
putting it at the regional agenda? The advantage is to urge other member-states to provide the 
necessary support, help in capacity-building and put formal pressure, because when you come 
together and you say “my dear neighbour you have to do more”. That is peer-pressure.   
So that’s that. Has that happened in the past? If you don’t look at it at your end, then, it comes 
to me as your neighbour. If you don’t address the issues… if you think they are in fact, in the 
case of infectious diseases there are outbreaks you cannot do anything about. You don’t know, 
and people are actually travelling to that part of the world. If you don’t want the people to be 
stuck at the borders you’d better do something about it. And if you can’t do something about 
it because of inherent problems—you don’t have testing kits—tell us, we can help you. There 
have been many cases. There is actually a lot of material that has already been published on 
this. You just even Google ASEAN+3 cooperation infectious diseases. You see the modalities 
in addressing this. And you would understand why this has become a regional agenda. You 
bring it to the region because you know unilateral and bilateral efforts are insufficient. And 
you need to multilateralize the problems, because it is through multilateralism that you are 
able to maximize efforts to address this. And this is where ASEAN matters, because you have 
small states, who are obviously hampered. You have states who are advanced but whose 
security is tied to somebody else’s. So there’s no other way but to work together and it is a 
multilateral setting that allows you to do this.  
What is a country’s national interest? A country’s national interest is to make sure that the 
country is safe and economically progressive, that its political system is not challenged. 
That’s the international interest. You can frame it in the other way. How does that affect or 
how does that become an obstacle in addressing non-traditional security issues? You have to 
use an example. Then, you can say, yes these are the fundamental problems that inhibit 
deeper cooperation in addressing non-traditional security issues. A general argument for that 
is no because it is in the interest of the country to address national non-traditional security 
issues, because if you address that, then, it actually serves your national interests. That is one 
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way of doing it. But unless you can cite an example to say, I refuse to for example open up 
my economic books, my policies, because if I open up, then it is no longer to my interests. 
They know what my economic policies are they know my investment policies are, so 
fundamentally I think it affects my interests so I will not give you 100% cooperation, only 
give you 20%, 50%. If you argue that way, yes, of course, national interests matter. But 
interests change. If you follow the constructivist argument, identities interests are all shared 
but they are not constant it depends on what are the demands or the challenges of the day. 
 
Question: 
Will ASEAN keep pushing the idea of a peace-keeping force in ASEAN? 
Answer: 
The peace keeping force, when it was initiated, was geared to peace keeping. I mean that is 
what it is. How do you relate that to humanitarian assistance? Those who argue that if you 
have a peace keeping force or if you have already acted as one of those country contributors, 
then it allows you to have already a base, a mechanism, a platform to deploy your troops for 
humanitarian purposes. So, the argument from those who say that it is good to encourage 
countries to seriously look at eventually having a regional peacekeeping force or, to start with, 
to have a national contingent dedicated to peacekeeping, they make it easy for deployment of 
troops for humanitarian purposes. There are two different purposes. One can be used in lieu 
of something that is actually more ambitious. Then, you can use it for that. And, is that 
actually being done, well there are already talks to that. Under the ASEAN plan for the 
ASEAN Humanitarian Centre and, whether it’s under the auspices of the ARF, or the 
ASEAN+3 there are efforts to coordinate among the military, volunteers for coming and 
providing disaster relief and assistance.  
So, it is good. But, the original objective, which is that we should already have reached a 
level—this was in 2003—reached a level of comfort, then, to be able to call in our regional 
troops to come in, should a humanitarian crisis arise. Many people are uncomfortable about 
this for several reasons. One is that they didn’t think this was going to happen in the region. 
The kind of humanitarian crisis you would find in Africa, or in Europe, Bosnia Herzegovina 
or Rwanda. Some countries in Asia would argue that it was not going to happen here. So, 
why do you need this? So, while you socialize the idea having to have this force, so that you 
can be ready, should a need arise. One way to look at it is to still have this for the purpose of 
international deployment. So, if, in lieu of a force, you have peace-keeping training centres, 
you can have activities to train your own troops and address the major problems of 
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interoperability when it comes to global deployment. You can also build camaraderie, which 
is also part of confidence-building. So, the long and short of my answer is it is not anywhere 
close to achieving what Indonesia had wanted to do, as it had proposed, but the idea is being 
socializing and in lieu of the main regional peace-keeping force, they adopted the second best 
option, and that is the promotion of regional peace-keeping training centres. And that is 
already happening, you have one in Malaysia. One has been established in Thailand. And one 
I think will be established in Indonesia and eventually also Cambodia.  
 
Interviewee: Rafendi Djamin  
Meeting Location: Menteng Jakarta Pusat 
Question: 
ASEAN is applying the conservative understanding of the non-interference principle, 
particularly in relation to human rights. So how is the development on that? 
Answer: 
Any other governments are part of an inter-governmental organization. They know that the 
non-interference principle is an evolving concept, evolving principle which really goes in line 
with the development of relations between states and challenges among states in relation to 
security, in relation to human rights that will then have impact on regional stability. This kind 
of thing has something that is already in the back of the minds of the ten member countries, 
because there are all members of the union. They will all be subjected to the so-called 
universal political review. And universal political review is an instrument that really strikes 
the conservative understanding of non-interference. And all the member-countries accept the 
universal political review. When it comes to ASEAN, that is a different context. Why is it a 
different context? They don’t mind to be questioned, to be intervened. If you use the word 
‘intervene’ on the internal matter of human rights, they consider that those internal matters in 
the UN Human Rights Council. They follow that. They make a report. But when it comes to 
ASEAN, they don’t want it. This will be something that shows ASEAN, as the inter-
governmental organization in this region of ten member-countries, would like to build 
something different than what is happening in the global level. What they are trying to build 
is that…when it comes to the world of the ASEAN Way, the world of a very strong notion, a 
very conservative notion of non-interference, when you talk about a national situation 
without the consent of the respective country, that would already be an exercise of 
intervention. That will not be accepted in ASEAN. 
So these are the things which replicate, in the context of ASEAN, when it goes back to its 
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initiation in 1967. In its initiation in 1967, the TAC is one of the basic instruments which is 
introduced by ASEAN. They would like that ASEAN will grow with its own interpretation of 
the non-interference principle. So, the members are applying double-standard in 
understanding and applying the non-interference principle. That is what happening as far as I 
concerned.   
When ASEAN was initiated, human rights were not an issue. It is something that should not 
be discussed in the ASEAN context. For us, it is enough that human rights is discussed in the 
UN, not in ASEAN. Our purpose for ASEAN is not human rights but on the stability of the 
region to prevent wars between the nations. That is the main concern at the time. 
And the second later on after ten years, because ASEAN was developed by all dictator 
governments. So, the main purpose is to establish a region that is stable and can try to 
develop itself by guaranteeing the stability of the region. At the global level at that time was 
still in the context of Cold War situation. So, ASEAN was really part of this Cold War 
situation, where stability with an authoritarian government in the Cold War situation is a safe, 
one way solution to have development in this region. So that is what they believed. That 
means anywhere that will actually go through the principle of non-interference like human 
rights, which is very intrusive, is rejected since the beginning. There is no language of human 
rights from 1967 until 1993. All the members refused to discuss human rights in the ASEAN 
context. In 1993, when the world was redefining itself, understanding about the post-Cold 
War situation, then you have this world conference of human right. Then ASEAN member-
states will have to follow rhetorically to this process. That is why they made up the 
communiqué, political communiqué, the first political communiqué 1993. That they would 
also like to implement, the so-called Vienna Regulations on Human Rights, one pillar of the 
Vienna Regulations on Human Rights is to create regional human rights mechanisms. Then, 
the word of human rights is there in the ASEAN context for the first time as a political 
document. 
That means the readiness, the feeling of comfortable in the ASEAN context to discuss human 
right was only initiated in 1993. That’s a very short history for the inter-relations of the states 
to re-develop human rights in this region. If you look at the process since 1993, it took almost 
16, 17 years, before ASEAN established or adopted the Charter of ASEAN in 2008. So 1993 
to 2008, how many years is that? It has been sixteen years. What’s happening along those 
times? Is there anything happening about human right? Yes, something in terms of discourses 
is happening, because ASEAN government rulers, ministers and their senior administrators 
created, appointed, giving the task to a group or the so-called track I or track II, track 1½, 
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formal government officials, to discuss and to think how ASEAN in the future should 
establish human rights mechanisms. The group called the working group on ASEAN human 
rights mechanisms made the report of their study, their activities every year to the ASEAN 
Senior Officer Meeting (SOM). It’s a standing agenda but it remains a standing agenda that 
stays without any significant progress in the last 15 years. Only when ASEAN decided to 
discuss and to have the ASEAN Charter, then the notion of human rights is getting stronger. 
This (getting stronger) is also influenced by the political changes happening in some of 
member-states, particularly in Indonesia.  
Indonesia changed in 1998. Suharto fall down. The authoritarian military regime fall down. 
All of a sudden, you have open democratic Indonesia in transition. This also gave some 
influence in the dynamics of relations in the ten nation states. That is the first time that the 
political security was also introduced as the political security pillar, next to the economic 
pillar. Basically it was first stability. You can call it hard security.  
As I say, because of the development between 1998 and 2008, that is a very important 
process, an expedient process. A more expedient process of introducing and making human 
rights more comfortable to be discussed among ASEAN officials, particularly the Senior 
Officer Meetings, which is a political body before the ASEAN Minister Meeting. SOM is the 
one actually discussing and then trying to recommend and make a connection. 
When all member-states of ASEAN finally agreed to adopt the ASEAN Charter, which is 
making a very strong reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Vienna 
Declaration of Human Rights and then to International Humanitarian Law in the Charter. And 
the principle of the good governance, rule of law, independence of the judiciary, respect to 
fundamental rights. This is something which is very fundamental as a basis for ASEAN to 
reinterpret the understanding of non-interference in the context of ASEAN. So, it is 
something that grows in applying the non-interference principle in the context of ASEAN. 
After the Charter the terms of reference were discussed. One year of negotiations on the 
terms of reference of the ASEAN Human Rights Commission. Indonesia wanted to call it the 
ASEAN Human Rights Commission, but then some member-states disagreed with that. They 
wanted to a make strong emphasis that this is a governmental organization. So they put 
ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights. ASEAN itself, however, is 
already an inter-government. Why do they want to put into inter-governmental again? They 
just wanted to underline this is governments. That reflects the position to be very cautious 
about understanding the new reinterpretation of human rights and non-interference principles. 
In the formulation of the terms of reference, the Commission on Human Rights is 
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intentionally not going to be created with a mandate to discuss countries’ regulations. Of 
course, Indonesia disagreed with that during the negotiations, supported by some member-
states. If you want to have a commission, at least you should be able to investigate any 
human rights violations, you should be able to make a report on the current situation. No, it 
was an agenda, it was one against nine. Indonesia and the whole nine at the end of 
negotiation 2009 in Thailand among the ministers. 
So, the compromise had to be taken. Otherwise, the Commission would not be there anymore. 
So the compromise is taken. Indonesia withdrew, with the strong position to have strong 
mandate of protection, country situation and so forth. We go along with this. But, of course, 
with the promise that in the review after four years of implementation. That should be 
opportunity to review the terms of reference and to redefine it again. Now, we are in the 
middle of this five years. We are in the second year, so the practice with the AICHR (ASEAN 
Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights), that human rights is discussed 
systematically in the approach of human rights not welfare not anything but really human 
rights is only within AICHR. But, AICHR is also representing governments. So, that is good. 
That means it’s engaging governments and governments keep on engaged and really try to 
understand and to learn each other and to share each other about how human rights actually 
should be implemented. When you have to answer the question how human rights should be 
implemented, you cannot go out or you cannot run away from creating in the future 
mechanisms of protection. So, this is something that develops in the course of the year. This 
is something that will develop the reinterpretation of the practice of non-interference and 
human rights in the ASEAN context. If you are looking at this perspective after 2006, I think 
ASEAN is making a lot of progress in terms of redefining human rights from nothing in 1993, 
communiqué, rhetoric, statement, political will. It goes to a very long process and gained 
momentum again in 1999. And then the second momentum is in 2006, when the Charter is 
made. It goes with the reinterpretation of non-interference. I think that is my answer.  
 
Question: 
Do you think the establishment of the APSC will directly benefit Southeast Asian people? 
Answer: 
Of course, it does benefit the local people. Why does it benefit people? Because it starts the 
most fundamental principles of the way of life of the people. The principle of good 
governance, the principle of the independence of the judiciary, the principle of the respect of 
fundamental rights will benefit people definitely. But, the question is how fast and how far if 
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you achieve that if you already put that in the action line of the blueprint? But to answer your 
question, of course it will benefit, if implemented, because on paper it means nothing. But the 
blueprint, we should not also forget is the outcome of political negotiation. A political 
negotiation which was then adopted by heads of states. It was only in 2009. 2009 is the 
political blueprint to achieve the ASEAN Community in 2015. There are now in the 2011. It 
is just another two years. With a very big agenda on those things that we mentioned: good 
governance, independence of the judiciary, rule of law. These are the things that we have to 
look at. Whether ASEAN is making progress, whether ASEAN is making progress by 
implementing its own commitments in the political blueprint and to be fair with the measure 
and the benchmark what you can achieve for ten member-states to implement that kind of 
programme. Then, you are making sense. If you look at the APSC blueprint, it accepts in the 
making of its implementation. It is good if you can look at what are the assessments of this 
political security blueprint. You should check it out with the ASEAN Secretariat, talk with the 
guys responsible the DSG (Deputy Secretary General) of Political Security. And then you can 
have a discussion about what is the assessment about the implementation of the Political-
Security blueprint. You can also have your own judgement, of course. I think if you only 
achieve this much, with the capacity you have this much then you can firmly say you are 
achieving very low. So that bit remains for the academics, public, media whether the 
implementation is highly achievement implementation or not. But that’s very interesting to 
look at though. I can mention something. For example, in the political blueprint in 2009, it’s 
creation of this commission. On the declaration of the commission, then there is another thing 
on the Commission on women and children. It is implemented, it is then established. It’s is 
not easy to establish that kind of thing because you have to go through a series of 
negotiations. On other things, for example on the good governance, has anything been 
implemented on good governance? So far, after three years, there is only one programme on 
good governance, which is implemented. What is that? The creation of the ASEAN Supreme 
Audit Association. That’s a good start because ASEAN then talks about good governance, at 
least, from the auditing, they talk, they share together. They can make a recommendation or 
any guideline for the policy on a regional level on the good governance. On conflict 
prevention? In the last two years, what has been done in the conflict prevention? One which 
is very significant is, in 2011, introduced by Indonesia is the creation of one institute, 
ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation. It was already adopted by heads of state in the 
process of making and shaping that institution, because that institution will then discuss on 
the issue of how to prevent conflict how to build the programme of peace-building and 
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negotiation in the situation of post-combat situation. So these are some of the benchmarks 
that you can see whether ASEAN is making progress or not in this form of implementation of 
the blueprint. 
When you look at other instrument of some affairs, DOC, COC, there is progress. In 2011, 
you cannot deny there is progress. The function of the ARF, ASEAN’s role in the North 
Korean Peninsula conflict to stimulate the six parties starting to talk in the context in the ARF 
in the informal meeting. Those are the things that are happening. Implementing this political 
blueprint and on the matter of peace keeping operations there’s been a lot that’s been done 
and achieved in the context of the last two years. In the context of disaster management a lot 
has been achieved. In the context of non-traditional security like trafficking in persons, so 
many have been done, even in terms of institutions, even in the terms of standard setting, 
even organising the states in the creation of a convention. A convention is something that will 
be politically and legally binding and on the war against terrorism, there is a convention 
which is already working into force, just waiting for the ratification of the ten member 
countries. So, these other things are looking at the progress related as well as human rights, 
how it’s implemented in the political-security building and how this then benefits the people. 
The ASEAN Maritime Forum is already started. It’s in the second year since it started. It’s 
even going to be advanced. ASEAN Maritime Forum will also discuss about this non-
traditional security threat on the illegal fishing, illegal logging that will also affect human 
rights of the people. And the AICHR is looking at this programme and trying now to play a 
role. Not only monitor the progress, contribute to the process. When you are discussing about 
preventing illegal fishing you have to look at the fishermen, the innocent fishermen who are 
trapped in the situation. When you arrest them, without looking at the context and without 
respecting their rights, you are violating human right that needs to be protected by AICHR. 
AICHR has the mandate to look at this and provides the contribution to the process, in the 
issues of trafficking in persons. The approach is not only on the security to combat and 
eliminate smugglers. But, the victims, the rights of the victims have to be respected. How are 
you going to respect the human rights of the victims? How are you going to treat them? That 
is supposed to be the role of AICHR. The question is how human rights internalizes itself in 
the political-security blueprint. It is not only political-security blueprint. AICHR has an 
overarching role cross-cutting the three pillars of ASEAN. Human Rights is not only in the 
Political-Security Pillar. That is the basic understanding that everybody should internalize 
among ASEAN, particularly, the ASEAN Secretariat as well as the member states. Of course, 
it takes time to understand that. Even the ASEAN Secretariat is not ready yet. With this 
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ASEAN Commission of Human Rights, what is the role of the ASEAN Commission in my 
programme of action and programme of implementation of anything? On economic 
programme, on the trade negotiations it has nothing to do with us. But, now it has something 
to do with us. So this kind of thing needs time to really become something mainstreamed in 
ASEAN. Now, we are already touching on other pillars not only the political-security pillar, 
because for human rights, it is much easier to intervene with the political-security pillar. 
Because in the beginning, the creation of human rights cooperation is coming from the 
political-security blueprint. That is one aspect of the brief that AICHR has. It is a part of the 
so-called ASEAN Security Community blueprint. For AICHR now, it is much easier to create 
a programme to intertwine with other sectoral bodies within the political security 
coordination.  
 
Question: 
Do you think that Myanmar’s change regarding the issue of human rights is due to ASEAN’s 
pressure? Or has Myanmar itself accepted ASEAN’s norms? Or are there other political 
implications? 
Answer: 
That is very interesting to look at Myanmar. I think maybe ASEAN will have to thank 
Myanmar later on in the future, as part of the history. Its plays a very significant role in the 
institutional building of ASEAN as a regional group, in terms of discussing human rights of a 
member state. Since the beginning, as I already said in my earlier explanation, it is not very 
keen. It is something taboo to discuss internal matters of human rights. But, with Myanmar, it 
isn’t internal matters which is discussed by ASEAN. It is not by AICHR because AICHR was 
not there yet. In 2005, when Myanmar was forced make to them understand not to have a 
chair, to take up the chair of presidency, because of the pressure from ASEAN, look for the 
sake of ASEAN, we request you, your willingness, your big heart, not to take up the chair of 
presidency. So, they did not. But, of course, after that Myanmar is becoming a standing 
agenda of the political negotiation of the leaders. The leaders and the AMM. This is very 
interesting. When one argues ASEAN doesn’t care about human rights matters in one 
member-state but Myanmar is still a strong case. It is a very internal domestic situation which 
is discussed by other member states. So, this is my proposition, without the role of ASEAN, 
since the beginning of 2005, in engaging Myanmar as part of the ten member-states and 
discuss annually even in every summit and every AMM on the agenda of Myanmar. Actually, 
look at the so-called roadmap to democracy, the so-called changing of Myanmar to a modern 
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democracy. Without the role of ASEAN, Myanmar wouldn’t change.   
Without the pressure of the groups of states outside of ASEAN, there is no pressure for 
ASEAN to ask Myanmar to step down from the chair of presidency. Without the role of the 
EU, US and others, to look at ASEAN and “we cannot deal with you if you are having the 
chair of Myanmar” the situation like this. That also helps, because then ASEAN will have to 
ask Myanmar, please stay down for a while. Without the pressure, Myanmar would be the 
chair. So, it is a kind of combination: the engagement and the pressure from outside. The 
pressure from outside makes ASEAN leaders have to convince Myanmar and then, with some 
programmes of action, the roadmap of democracy, that goes along since 2005 until 2011. Six 
years of this course, every year we’re criticised, we’re not making progress you are making 
progress but you are arresting people. There is a war there, human rights, you know. Those 
things are happening every year under the scrutiny of ASEAN but in the spirit of engaging.  
What do you think Indonesia? Indonesia is changing also because of international pressure. 
When there is no international pressure on Timor-Leste, then there is no agenda of human 
rights in the UN in Indonesia. I am the activist since 1990, active in the council during the 
Timor-Leste occupation. I have taken the benefits of the fact that Indonesia is on the agenda 
of the UN because Indonesia then in the agenda, so I can also raise issues and concerns of 
human rights situation of the Suharto Period. So Realism works.  
 
Interviewee: Ralf Emmers  
Meeting Location: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
Question: 
There is the debate over whether Michael Leifer is a realist or not. As Leifer’s student, what 
is your personal standpoint about his research approach and contribution to the realm of 
Southeast Asian international relations? 
Answer: 
I remember Michael Leifer once told me that he had been called a realist at a conference, and 
his response [was that he] had been called worse things than a realist. Ultimately, I think 
Leifer was less interested in the IR classifications than he was interested in understanding the 
region. He was, therefore, perhaps less trying to make a contribution to the IR theory debate 
than he was to making a contribution to the study of the international relations of Southeast 
Asia. That’s why he has often been called the doyen of Southeast Asian Studies. He was more 
interested in that than anything else. Leifer was also a rare academic, especially in the 
contemporary context, because he was both looking at domestic politics and international 
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relations. So, he was both a comparative politics person, as well as an international relations 
scholar. He happened to be in an international relations department, but quite a big chunk of 
his publications could have been considered to be comparative politics. You did mention, 
however, that he does have this reliance on the balance of power concept. Because of that, I 
would agree, from the IR point of view, that Leifer was predominantly a realist. His starting 
point was the distribution of power and denial of [hegemony]. He was mostly interested in 
how small or medium sizes countries ensure their survival and their autonomy. So, if you 
look at his very extensive bibliography, he started working on Cambodia’s foreign policy. 
Then, later on, he worked on Indonesian and Singaporean foreign policies, ASEAN and 
maritime security. I think his starting point was how small or medium sizes countries can 
ensure their security and survival in international politics. He was not a classical realist in that 
sense and he was not so interested in the great powers. He was much more interested in the 
smaller countries in Southeast Asia but he did assume that power and power distribution were 
very important variables in international relations. At the same time, he also paid great 
attention to factors, like regime legitimacy, socio-economic security and nationalism. In fact, 
his PhD was on nationalism in the Middle East. He only came to Southeast Asia much later 
on. So, he is very difficult to box into one political category but if you have to choose one, I 
would choose realist.  
Regarding his contribution, I think, to a large extent, he is the one who started this 
International Relations of Southeast Asia discipline. With others, he was not the only one, but 
he’s part of the generation that really started looking at the international relations of Southeast 
Asia. And, up until that point, you have a lot of very good work being done in comparative 
politics, you have Indonesianists, people who are focussing on the Philippines, people 
focussing on Thailand, people focussing on the Vietnam War, but he was a man who was 
really interested in the international relations of this region or this sub-region. I think this will 
probably remain his main contribution. 
 
Question:  
Although Acharya argues that ‘realism remains the dominant approach to the study of 
regional order in Southeast Asia’, it is true that constructivism has become the mainstream 
research approach in the realm of Southeast Asian international relations. By contrast, the 
approach of realism is less popular than constructivism. In particular, except for Michael 
Leifer, it seems difficult to find researchers whose tests focus on the realism approach. 
Regarding this unbalanced situation in the methodology of Southeast Asian international 
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relations, what is your perspective? 
Answer: 
I agree with you completely. I know Amitav very well and he used to work here. And he 
would make this point. And I would say no. And I think it’s mostly thanks to his own 
influence. But, most of the work that I now see focusing on Southeast Asia, especially work 
on ASEAN, seems to be driven by constructivism. With great attention being given to identity, 
to regionalism, to community-building and I would have a hard time, as you suggested, 
naming one IR theorist from a realist inclination looking at Southeast Asia. If I had to 
personally classify myself, I would probably put myself into the soft-realist camp. Then, I 
have moved on, I’ve done all kinds of things, I’ve even looked at securitization theory, which 
is very much a constructivist theory. So, you have some out there, you have seen those guys 
moving increasingly towards the South China Sea situation, because here is an immediate 
interstate conflict situation that could [progress]. So, it is not surprising that people, like Ian 
Storey and myself and others have paid so much attention to South China Sea because this is 
where the concept of balance of power and arms procurement and all of those things can have 
an immediate relevance. If you’re looking at ASEAN studies, I would agree with you that I 
think there is a very strong imbalance. You know that Jürgen Haacke, Alice Ba, Amtitav 
Acharya and Tan Seen Teng tend to come from more of a constructivism position. It is good 
for them but the realists have to wake up and publish a bit more. But, what is true also is that 
realists are ultimately more interested in great power politics. I think they’ve moved either to 
focusing on Sino-Southeast Asia relations or they’ve started looking at East Asian order 
questions where the realist toolbox is more applicable. Within Southeast Asia, I would 
actually go a step further. I think it’s not only constructivism but I think there is also now a 
very strong focus on non-traditional security, human security. It is true that security in 
Southeast Asia is increasingly interpreted through the comprehensive security lens or the non-
traditional security lens. The state is still pivotal but the threats to security are considered 
increasingly to be transnational and coming from non-state actors. I think we’ll probably see 
a swing back. We’ve seen it a bit over the last two years with China becoming more assertive. 
This will give more room for the realists to have something to say.  
 
Question:  
From your personal standpoint, why is the influence of realism within Southeast Asian IR 
gradually declining? 
Answer: 
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I think there are multiple factors. On the one hand, perhaps, this is not a region of the world 
where classical realism or offensive realism is easily applicable, because you don’t have a 
hegemon in Southeast Asia, you don’t have immediate conflict situation with the exception of 
the South China Sea. So, most of the problems seem to be more coming from socioeconomic 
point of view, domestic issues that can transcend national borders. That is one factor. When 
the realists are focusing on Southeast Asia, I think it’s increasingly in terms of how Southeast 
Asia has to coexist with two rising powers: China and India. So, they fit Southeast Asia in the 
wider region. Then, there is also a much more personal dimension which is that you need 
personalities. I don’t think there is a lack of materials to the realists to apply theory in 
Southeast Asia, but perhaps at this moment we don’t have strong personalities applying it.      
 
Question: 
What kind of limitations will constructivism have, when constructivism is used to explain the 
security environment after the establishment of the APSC? 
Answer: 
I think the major limitation of constructivism is that they don’t have much to say about great 
power relations and great power competition. It is not [inaudible] based on the development 
last two or three years, which has led to a very strong the US engagement region, military re-
engagement, a perception that Sino-US relations will become more complicated, a perception 
also that there is a power transition in Asia, perhaps from Japan to China and to some extent 
from the US to China. All of this will have implication for Southeast Asia and I don’t think 
constructivists would have very much to say about what those consequences could be, 
because they are very much in the realist camp. Again, if you are looking at Southeast Asia 
and how Southeast Asia tries to address this changing of distribution of power, constructivists 
would say it’s all about socialization of China and India, building up common norms, 
localization of norms and Amitav has written a lot of them. When I read Amitav nowadays, I 
am starting to feel that he is becoming increasingly realist himself. Even some of his latest 
books on the localisation of norms, I would argue there is a bit of a realist undercurrent there 
and also his shorter pieces the ones that he published for Pacific Forum and others. Amitav is 
well aware power matters and we are in the midst of a power transition. Again, this will 
influence Southeast Asia, the way Southeast Asia has, kind of, welcomed back the US, for 
instance. I think on most issues a sophisticated realist and a sophisticated constructivist would 
agree on the importance that they would give to some variables.  
No sophisticated constructivist would deny material powers, but they put it in the wider 
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context of ‘its not the only explanation’, so you need to pay attention to normative 
development to understand how this power is utilized and how it is transformed into 
influence, leadership. I think on most issues a sophisticated realist and a sophisticated 
constructivist would agree, they just disagree on the importance that they would give to some 
variables. I mean, obviously a constructivist would pay much more attention to identity and 
to the notion of the socialization of norms, while a realist would obviously have power as a 
starting point.  
 
Question: 
Do you think, after the creation of the APSC, the security environment in Southeast Asia will 
change? 
Answer: 
The security community endeavour is interesting but of what I can see not very much has 
been achieved. What is ultimate objective? Is the ultimate objective to make sure we live in a 
region where interstate conflict is unlikely? Well, that is kind of already the case, with the 
exception of some of the newer members. We’ve had, of course, the border clashes between 
Cambodia and Thailand, but generally, the region is unlikely to see interstate conflict. I think 
the question is, is that the result of ASEAN or is that the result something else? But that 
seems to be the question constructivists never want to answer. What about the alternative 
explanations? And some alternative explanations are the role of external powers, the United 
States and China and others. Others is perhaps, and this is an argument that Michael Leifer 
often made, within Southeast Asia, you don’t have an obvious casus bellum, you don’t have 
an immediate reason for two countries to go to war, as you would have, for instance, in 
Northeast Asia over Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula or as you have now in South Asia over 
Kashmir. Southeast Asia is fortunate not to have this. You have lots of territorial dispute, but 
they’ve been managed, generally, at the bilateral level. That is one objective and if that’s an 
objective then we could always read that ASEAN is already a security community. The 
likelihood of conflicts is quite remote. What I am more interested in is whether ASEAN is 
able to set up a conflict management and resolution mechanism. On that front – and I do keep 
an eye on what is coming out of ASEAN, as in documents and everything else – I don’t see 
much progress. I see calls for a high council that have never been implemented. I hear calls 
for a Troika to be set up and so on and so forth, but to me, that is all a rhetorical response. I 
am quite interested that, when we have the Thai and Cambodia border clashes, both parties 
prefer to work with the United Nations than with ASEAN. So, I think that says a great deal 
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about conflict management and conflict resolution within ASEAN. ASEAN yet doesn’t have 
structures in place and also the level of trust is not there. For all of those reasons, I think we 
need to take this community idea with a pinch of salt.  
 
Question:  
In the essay – Comprehensive Security and Resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN's Approach 
to Terrorism – you pointed out that the way to deal with terrorism is exploiting differences 
between the group of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore and the group of Thailand 
and Malaysia, which indicates that the ASEAN members have divergent strategic 
perspectives on the issue of terrorism. Indeed, fundamental differences in the strategic 
perspectives within ASEAN appear on every ASEAN member’s agenda. How can the 
member-states overcome this given problem? 
Answer: 
I think to the large extent that non-traditional security issues are not new to Southeast Asia. If 
you look at security in Southeast Asia post-independence, in Indonesia, Malaysia and other 
countries, it’s mostly been dominated by socio-economic problems translating into 
insurgency movements, or criminal organizations and piracy. Piracy is the oldest form of 
insecurity in Southeast Asia – the British were trying to solve it for hundreds of years. My 
friend, Tim Huxley always says that non-traditional security problems are actually traditional 
security problems, because they have been problems forever in Southeast Asia. What is new, 
to some extent, would be environmental concerns, the repercussion for climate change and 
food security issues. Those problems, by the way, fall under the concept of governance. 
Problems that have are transnational nature, and therefore they need to be addressed in an 
integrated fashion. The ASEAN countries are trying to do so by finding the middle ground. 
They don’t want to go as far as the Europeans, where sovereignty is being pooled together 
into supra-national institutions. I don’t think that is likely to happen in the years to come. At 
the same time, they are still trying to coordinate their response and then it very much depends 
on domestic interests. In some areas, this has indeed worked out, look at the piracy of the 
Straits of Malacca, you have multiple arrangements outside of the ASEAN umbrella, at the 
trilateral level, because Thailand has joined in, as well.  
But then, there are other problems where you haven’t seen the convergence of interests across 
member countries, I am particularly thinking about the haze problem, which you do have an 
ASEAN initiative to enhance environmental security address the haze problem and all the 
countries have ratified it, except Indonesia, which is where the haze originates. I think that 
294 
 
Indonesia makes a very fair point which is that most of the activities that lead to the haze are 
actually undertaken by Malaysia and Singaporean companies, except that it’s on Indonesian 
soil. So, they would say why is Indonesia the only country to blame and the only country that 
really has to respond to this problem? Malaysia and Singapore should look into the finance 
behind the logging. So, here I think we are in very good old traditional liberalism territory, 
which is when you do see the convergent of interest. When you do see the convergence of 
interests and when you see the institutionalization of relations to address this, then yes, 
indeed, it happens. But, quite often, unfortunately, you don’t see a convergence, you see a 
divergence of interests, a lack of trust, a lack of confidence, you see the problems of free-
riding and all those sorts of issues. And that ultimately undermines the setting up of regimes, 
because that’s what we are looking at. We are looking at the setting up of international 
regimes to address particular problems. And I think that is what ASEAN is doing now. I 
would argue that ASEAN has probably over-committed itself, in the sense that, at the 
moment, if you look at the non-traditional security agenda, it has really tried to address many 
different issues…food security…I mean you name an issue and ASEAN has set up an 
initiative. All of this has been done over the last ten years or so. Up until the late 1990s, 
ASEAN was pre-dominantly a diplomatic club, trying to address the climate of 
relations…trust, confidence. But, post-911 and post-Bali Bombing, the non-traditional 
security agendas are becoming very prominent. It looks like now the ASEAN countries are 
really trying to address many of those issues. They have come up with lots of declarations. 
The problem of course, is that it has, to some extent, I think, undermined its creditability, 
because it has probably overstretched itself. It has promised way too many things. And, now 
people are starting to look at the where are the deliverables, and very often the deliverables 
are not there. Then, that begs the question, are you only taking a rhetorical stand or are you 
truly committed to address the issues? 
For example Southeast Asia is supposed to be a drug-free area by 2015…it’s impossible. And 
drugs will always be with us, it’s a question of managing the problem. And you see more and 
more such declarations and I think ultimately it weakens the credibility of ASEAN. 
 
Question: 
With the exception of divergent strategic perspectives, are there other obstacles, when 
ASEAN deals with non-traditional security issues? 
Answer: 
One significant obstacle would be capacity. After all, many of those problems have socio-
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economic roots… also, problems of corruption. I will give you one example. I am doing some 
work on human trafficking. I remember interviewing people, and I was told that, in Laos, one 
very basic problem is the lack of computers. So, Thailand may have information on someone 
they have found who is working as a prostitute in Bangkok and has been the victim of human 
trafficking. Police will ask you to share the information on your country of origin. But, if you 
don’t have appropriate data bases, it is very difficult to find out where this person is coming 
from. There are lots of anecdotes of this nature, but this is what we really mean by capacity. 
So that’s physical capacity, but also, there is lack of knowledge. If you have very small teams 
working on some of those problems, that is not going to be easy to get on top of it. So, if you 
put all of this together, it brings us to a very big problem within ASEAN, which is economic 
disparity. Flying from Singapore to Vientiane, you will see the economic disparity. Of course, 
this makes it much harder to respond to the problems. I give you another example. Many 
people are saying that ASEAN should take a common stand on climate change negotiations, 
but, when you think about it, that actually makes very little sense, because there are such 
diverse economies and such different levels of economic development that it’s hard to 
imagine that you could come up with a position on the climate change negotiation that would 
fit both the interests of Singapore, a highly industrialized nation, and the countries like Laos 
and Myanmar. Again, we need to bring socio-economic disparity into bear, if you want to 
really understand why ASEAN has a problem moving beyond the low common denominator. 
Again, those are transnational problems. But, if you have such differences in capacity and 
everything else, it is hard to have a coordinated policy.  
From a rhetorical point of view [the APSC] is a very ambitious project. There are lots of 
plans of actions, scheduling and everything else. It’s all there and I think what people now 
want to see is implementation. And of course this is not unique to ASEAN. International 
organisations usually don’t fare very well as far as implementation is concerned. That is often 
the weakest link.  
 
Question: 
As you mentioned in Regional Hegemonies and the Exercise of Power in Southeast Asia, 
because of the impact of the Asian economic crisis and domestic insurgencies, Indonesia 
failed to use benevolent power in ASEAN. Do you think that Indonesia will continue to use 
benevolent power to increase its influence due to its leadership role within ASEAN, after the 
creation of the ASC? Is it useful that a benevolent power emerges in Southeast Asia, when the 
member-states address non-traditional security issues? 
296 
 
Answer: 
In 2004 and 2005, it was fair to say that the Indonesian economy was so weak that it did not 
have the capacity to transform its natural position as first among equals into strong leadership. 
And that was also partly because of Indonesia not wanting to play that role, always being 
wary of causing alarm among other Southeast Asian countries. Although he was a dictator, 
Suharto, in particular, understood international relations and foreign policy-making well. I 
think he understood that it was more effective for Indonesia to take this benign position 
within ASEAN, to kind of lead from behind. And this policy worked very well for many 
years and then, of course, with the financial crisis, Indonesia had no foreign policy to speak 
off and Indonesia became very inward-looking, and didn’t really have an ASEAN policy. 
Now that the economy is back on its feet, and doing quite well—it was less affected by the 
global crisis, for instance—it is clear that Indonesia wants to play that ball again. What has 
changed since the Suharto years is that Indonesia has become a democracy. They are very 
proud of becoming a democracy. They would like to see the promotion of good governance, 
democratization in other Southeast Asian countries. I think Indonesia would like to steer 
ASEAN in that direction, leading the association, and at the same time, starting to pay more 
and more attention to those factors, democracy and good governance.  
But, Indonesia had a very good year as chair last year. It was a strong leadership and it 
managed to navigate issues carefully on the South China Sea, the East Asia Summit. It did a 
good job. But, at the same time, Indonesia is starting to face resistance. There are other 
countries that feel like ‘well wait a minute, you’re not the only leader’. Countries like 
Vietnam and the new members don’t want to hear about democratization and human rights. 
They say ‘this is not the association we joined’. That is very interesting area of contention, 
because on the one hand, you have the ASEAN Human Rights commission but without any 
teeth and I think that is the Charter that mentions good governance, but the next paragraph 
says non-interference. I think that’s the balancing act that you have going between Indonesia 
and the Philippines, in particular, and the newer members, on the other hand. I think, 
generally, Indonesia is still regarded as the benign leader of Southeast Asia, but it’s not an 
uncontested position. I think it’s uncontested in areas of regional security and political 
cooperation. But in economics, for instance, the leadership doesn’t come from Indonesia. The 
leadership tends to come from Singapore and, to some extent, Malaysia and Thailand. The 
leadership in socio-cultural issues tends to come from the Philippines. I call it sectorial 
leadership. You have leadership in different sectors of cooperation. Indonesia, probably, pre-
dominantly leading in security and political cooperation, economics somewhere else, socio-
297 
 
cultural somewhere else. That is one big debate. The debate we had one or two years ago, is 
that some people are starting to say—people like Rizal Sukma—that ASEAN is too small for 
Indonesia, because Indonesia is now a G20 member, it’s a middle power and the largest 
Muslim country in the world. What Rizal and others were saying is that ASEAN is such 
frustrating experience, because it’s moving slowly. Indonesia needs to have a better sense of 
its national interests and let those interests drive its foreign policy. I often go to Indonesia and 
I often meet young Indonesian researchers. What always surprises me is how critical they are 
of ASEAN. I always wonder, if that’s the generation that will lead Indonesia’s foreign policy 
in say ten or twenty years, then ASEAN has a problem. But if you go to the Indonesian 
ministry foreign affairs, they all love ASEAN. And I think that’s partly because, at some point, 
they were all on the ASEAN desk of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. To have a good career 
in the Indonesia foreign ministry, you have spent time on the ASEAN desk.  
I would actually go beyond the benevolent power. I would now really go and use the concept 
of leadership. I think what ASEAN needs more than anything else is leadership. Indonesia is 
the obvious example but I think that people are still waiting for more leadership coming from 
Indonesia…Indonesia taking a clearer stand. Last year was very good but, unfortunately, with 
this rotation system, we are now stuck with Cambodia for a year…and then Laos, and then 
Brunei: it’s going to be a series of potentially very weak leaderships. So, it would be 
interesting to see how Indonesia will be able to continue playing its role of the natural leader 
of ASEAN, even if it is not in charge, even if it is not holding the chair.  
 
Question: 
Last year, Myanmar released Aung San Suu Kyi and allowed her to meet foreign diplomats. 
Do you think that Myanmar’s change regarding the issue of human right is due to ASEAN’s 
pressure? 
Answer: 
I would personally argue that is mostly due to the domestic transformations within Myanmar. 
I think, perhaps, it’s a generational shift in Myanmar, but also realization in Myanmar could 
not continue be a pariah state. That is the primary reason, like a transformation from within 
and the realization that the region is changing. They don’t want to be overly reliant on China. 
But, I would still give some credit to Indonesia. Especially, president SBY committed himself, 
because you have multiple parliamentarian delegations travelling to Myanmar and of course, 
Myanmar could listen to Indonesia, because they have a very similar history, they had to fight 
for their independence. And, Indonesia is a success story. Indonesia is a country that managed 
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to go from being led by a soft-authoritarian and it has actually managed to go through a 
process of democratization and managed to keep the countries together, despite separatist 
movements. I don’t know much about Myanmar but I hope they are looking at the Indonesian 
case closely, because, possibly, it could happen to them. Of course, Myanmar seems to be an 
even more complicated country to manage because of separatist movements, but they have 
the resources. So, if they were to be plugged in into the international economy, they could 
perhaps benefit from that.  
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